

EDITED BY

MARY ROMERO & ERIC MARGOLIS



THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL INEQUALITIES



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THE BLACKWELL COMPANION
TO SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

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Mary Romero and Eric Margolis

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Introduction

The discipline of sociology that arose in nineteenth-century Europe was in very large part developed as an inquiry into the persistent inequalities the founders perceived as the Industrial Revolution and the rise of capitalism decimated the medieval world. Marx saw the increasing emiseration of the proletariat and the monopolization of wealth and power in a few hands as the inevitable contradiction of capitalism. Weber's dialogue with Marx's ghost separated class from social status, and power. He also investigated the economic inequalities of Catholic and Protestant societies in his most famous work (Weber 1958 [1906]). Durkeim, though less interested in inequality than in the basis for social solidarity, was also concerned that increasing conflict between capital and labor threatened the social order: "the working classes are not really satisfied with the conditions under which they live, but very often accept them only as constrained and forced, since they have not the means to change them" (1964 [1893]). It is curious, then, that a recent "Dictionary of Sociology," promising definitions for everything from "Anomie to Zeitgeist," has no entry for "inequality" and the only entry for equality defines it as "Equality of Opportunity" (Jary and Jary 1991). This is very much in keeping with the American sociological view that was developed in the (in)famous "debate on equality" that took place in the *American Sociological Review*, beginning in the 1940s and continuing into the 1960s (Davis 1942, 1953; Davis and Moore 1945; Tumin 1953, 1963; Wrong 1959). In the continuing attempt to refute Marx and demonstrate, as George Homans sanctimoniously quipped, that the proletariat had no intellectual or moral right to demand his money or his life, American sociologists vigorously attempted to reduce the issues of inequality to social stratification; and then they sought to demonstrate the inevitability – in fact, the benefits – of stratification in any advanced technological social system. Every human quality came to be ranked on a scale: income, wealth, intelligence, education level, status, and so on. The individuals' relative position on these different dimensions – and mobility in the great social race – then boiled down to "equality of opportunity," as competitive individuals lined up at the starting blocks. All of this intended to create a science demonstrating that

Western democratic capitalist societies had developed into meritocracies, and that the few examples of illegitimate inequality were on their way to being eliminated.

However, the alternative sociological view, inherited from Marx – that capitalist society was riven with persistent and illegitimate inequalities – refused to die a natural death. Sociologists and political economists continued to deeply examine structural inequalities in social class (Mills 1959; Kolko 1962; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Lundberg 1968). Books like Michael Harrington's *The Other America* (1962) brought the issue of generations of poverty-stricken Americans to the fore. W. E. B. DuBois – who defined the problem of the twentieth century as the problem of the color line – explored the inequalities of caste-like racial hierarchy (1986). While his prolific work was all but ignored by the mainstream Structural Functionalists, in the 1960s it was amplified by many critical sociological studies. Sociological investigations of racism and the effects on African American inequality spurred similar sociologies of Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, American Indians, and other racial/ethnic groups caught in the webs of racial caste and class (Johnson 1934, 1941, 1943; Galarza 1964; Deloria 1969; Brown 1970; Galarza et al. 1970; Blauner 1972; Maldonado-Denis 1972; Piore 1979). Similarly, second-wave feminist sociologists investigated the inequalities experienced by women in the home and in the workforce (Mitchell 1971; Oakley 1972, 1974; Rowbotham 1974; Millman and Kanter 1975; Eisenstein 1979). International scholars like Frantz Fanon (1963), Noam Chomsky (1969), and Paulo Freire (1973) described the deep gulfs of imperialism and international inequalities. All this research sought to name racism, sexism, and neocolonialism and expose the systematic and structural sources of persistent inequality over which the notions of “equality of opportunity” glossed. This book follows in the footsteps of those pioneers.

The following chapters, written at the beginning of a new century, revisit inequalities within the extensive normative and technological changes the world is experiencing. Some developments have resulted in reducing inequalities – in parts of the developed world, at least, inequalities of gender, ability, sexual orientation, and even race have been mitigated but not eliminated. Others have exacerbated and extended inequalities that have plagued humankind for centuries – again, gender, ability, and race but also social class, and increasingly deep divisions between the center and the periphery in global systems. Yet other social and technological developments have created new forms of inequality – digital divides, advances in genetics and biotechnology, environmental racism, and cultural imperialism, for example. The chapters in this volume represent the conversation on social inequalities taking place in the discipline, which is also reflected in national and international political debates. Debates within the field of sociology concerning the influence of technology, identity politics, and globalization enter into the analysis of parenting, childhood, racism, migration, welfare, media, tourism, and health care.¹

This volume in the Blackwell Companions to Sociology series provides a state-of-the-art collection of sociological scholarship on inequalities, emphasizing those incorporating race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, citizenship, and nationality. We approached the project by identifying emerging topics and trends that represent the scope and range of theoretical orientations and contemporary emphases in the field of social inequalities. As we began to map out our project, it became obvious that

issues of social inequalities between individuals, families, communities, societies, nation-states, and global regions have become central to research in every field in sociology. Consequently, drawing the boundaries for the specific study of social inequalities remains an ongoing enterprise in sociology. However, from the beginning, we decided against the conventional approach of categorizing social inequalities in terms of specific axes of domination – race, sex, gender, and so forth – an approach that too frequently works against understanding structures and processes that cut across these social constructions. Instead, we encouraged our contributors to focus on the conceptual underpinnings of inequality.

Leading scholars responded to the invitation to write chapters in their area of expertise that represent the scope and range of theoretical orientations, contemporary emphases, and emerging topics in the field of social inequalities. We urged contributors to attend to debates in the field, highlighting developing trends, directions, and interdisciplinary influences in the study of social inequalities. They were similarly encouraged to address the construction, maintenance, and deconstruction of inequalities, as expressed in processes of production, reproduction, and normalization, but also to address the dismantling of inequalities through individual, community, and institutional resistance. We also made two other requests: first, we asked the authors to highlight their own substantial contributions to sociological theory, research, and methodologies on social inequalities; second, we asked them to incorporate detailed literature reviews to help orient readers new to the area. The scholarship on social inequalities presented in this volume accomplishes these many tasks well. In ensemble, it reveals multiple and competing values that surround issues of equity, fairness, and justice, as well as individual rights and obligations.

With these goals shaping the volume, the chapters are organized around five themes that reflect emerging perspectives and approaches that suggest changing as well as consistent ways of thinking about social inequality. Chapters selected for Part I, starting with Charles Tilly's masterful and succinct historical perspective, provide essential theoretical foundations and conceptual frameworks that influenced and continue to influence the ways that subfields in sociology discuss and debate social inequalities. Part II contains chapters addressing epistemological and methodological concerns in researching social inequality, which range from the development of critical race theory to methodological concerns with measuring homelessness. Part III turns to the crucial mechanisms studied by sociologists at sites where social inequalities are reproduced. The four chapters focus on families in the context of childhood and parenting; communities in terms of migrant networks used in international migration; and the debates surrounding education, which long ago Horace Mann saw as the "great balance wheel" of society and which modern sociologists, from Structural Functionalists like James Coleman (1988 [1966]) to Marxists like Bowles and Gintis (1976), saw as essential to meritocracy. The chapters organized in Part IV deal with the debates over policy responses to inequalities, including government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements: what rights and claims to equity and citizenship can be made by the poor, criminals, disabled persons, sick people, and so on. The final section brings together analyses that are essential in understanding media and technology as sites of both oppression and resistance. The final chapter, an important work by Stephen Pfohl, reexamines theoretical inquiries discussed in Part I.

In Part I the authors provide comprehensive overviews of how inequalities have been conceptualized. Major themes that are addressed in the rest of the volume are given a sound grounding, including: social inclusion and exclusion, citizenship, politics of recognition, agency vs. structural explanations, subordination, domination, and resistance. Charles Tilly (Chapter 1) sets forth the basic premise that contemporary debates on inequalities are evaluated through a historical lens that distinguishes long-term changes as either distinctive or universal. He argues for an analysis that focuses on changes in the control of resources and examines the structures of exploitation and opportunity hoarding in the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. Tilly's goal is to provide a theoretical foundation for the study of social inequality that is not nation- or region-bound. In Chapter 2, Ronaldo Munck investigates debates on social inclusion and exclusion in the globalization discourse. He examines the complexity of global economic and social integration as articulated by the separate circumstances confronting North and South. He poses questions concerning the opportunities for diverse struggles to eliminate global inequality, and concludes his essay with an assessment of arguments identifying possible paths toward global justice. Sallie Westwood's chapter amplifies several questions raised in the previous two chapters. Her analysis of the rhetoric of process and rights, the discourse of the nation and modernity, and the spaces of opportunity for democratic struggles, poses a politics of recognition for racialized subjects. Highlighting the establishment of inequality from the point of nationhood, Westwood turns to examining institutional practices that maintain inequality through specific expressions of citizenship. She considers nationalism and resistance occurring in politics of recognition, as demonstrated by Mothers of the Disappeared, gay pride marches, Sydney Mardi Gras, and other collective activities. In the fourth chapter, Ken Plummer further expands the discussion of politics of recognition in exposing inequalities from the perspective of intimate rights. Similar to Charles Tilly's emphasis on identifying resources, Plummer problematizes the significantly different choices and inequalities that groups within society and across nations experience in the shaping of intimacy. Attending to the matrix of inequalities that includes both processes of social exclusion and the personal experience of inequalities, Plummer conceptualizes "citizenship of equalities" and "citizenship of choices." He highlights the limitation of choices versus the choices of luxury. In the final chapter in *Conceptualizing Inequalities*, Barry Adam returns to the question of the relation between subjectivity and social inequality. He provides a comprehensive synthesis of social theory, identifying points of agreement and disputes in theorizing domination, resistance, and subjectivity.

Chapters selected for Part II are diverse in subject matter but share a similar approach in formulating their contribution to the volume. Each of the scholars frames their argument around questions of epistemology and the methods used to research social inequality. Advocating a critical race theory approach in sociology of race relations, Tara J. Yosso and Daniel G. Solórzano's chapter underscores the failure of traditional US sociological approaches based on Eurocentric versions of history. They argue that such an approach constructs a hierarchy of cultural values that are based on the promise of social mobility through assimilation. In chronicling their own intellectual journey to critical race theory, they provide a brief

overview of the emergence of critical race theory among legal scholars of color, and the later development of LatCrit (see <http://personal.law.miami.edu/~fvaldes/latcrit/>). Suggesting compatibility with interdisciplinary social and racial justice research, they center racialized and gendered experiences at the center of social inequality analysis. In the next chapter, David Naguib Pellow traces the development of scholarship on environmental racism, environmental inequality, and environmental injustice. He simultaneously chronicles the emergence of the environmental justice movement within communities of color and poor and working-class White communities in the United States. Pellow's approach to the growing sociological field of environmental racism emphasizes the synergy of innovative methodologies. For instance, he shows how participatory research collaborations can link environmental inequalities to other social issues, including housing, transportation, the workplace, natural resources, immigration, and gender. In Chapter 8, Irene Browne and Joya Misra critique intersectionality as an undertheorized but potentially useful construct. In studying labor markets, they identify themes and questions posed by various conceptions of intersectionality, and the empirical challenges for researchers who would seek to employ the concept; three areas of study are synthesized to indicate methodological problems encountered in the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. In the final chapter in Epistemology, Method, and Inequality, Malcolm Williams uses the research on homelessness to demonstrate the challenges in researching social inequality, particularly hidden and hard-to-reach populations that are considered to be difficult to identify and uncharacteristic of the general population. Starting with the problem of defining homelessness – which has various meanings for particular societies and interest groups – he analyzes the methodological issues confronted by both definitional and enumeration strategies. Williams concludes the chapter with suggestions for alternative ways to conceptualize the inequalities of homelessness and alternative methodological approaches that apply to many other areas of social inequality.

Part III thoroughly examines social inequalities in families, communities, and education. This section includes comprehensive reviews of the literature, and introduces new themes and directions emerging in the sociology of family, immigrant communities, and education. The focus is generally on the reproduction of social inequality in areas that have traditionally been framed as primary sites for socialization, acculturation, and social change. By placing these four chapters together, the domain assumptions embedded in traditional approaches are purged; for example, the significance of studying childhood and parenting separately suggests the importance of these new directions in the study of social inequality. Similarly, the critical assessment of immigrant networks generates new questions about adaptability, social mobility, and social equality. Research on educational achievement and race, long dominated by genetic, cultural, and structural explanations, is related to traditions of studies on the family and immigrants. Julia Wrigley and Joanna Dreby's chapter incorporates the newly emerging field of the sociology of children, with literature on the impact of economic inequality on children. They suggest productive integrations to capture both structural analyses and the centrality of human choice and agency. Throughout their overview societal change in constructing childhood is evident, as is its effect of increasing inequality among children. In the chapter

on parenting and social inequality, Rachel Grob and Barbara Katz Rothman demonstrate how changing societal structures and ideologies function to produce and maintain social inequality within families as well as between families. They examine the axes of inequality (race, class, gender, sexuality, medicalization, professional expertise, and technology) that frame the choices or limitations in parenting (or not parenting). Included are discussions of conception, pregnancy, birth, and adoption. Grob and Katz Rothman's discussion of parenting practices in different ethnic communities, and the social networks available in each, makes an excellent segue into Steven J. Gold's chapter on migrant networks. His review of studies of migrant networks suggests that in the past they have been overly positive, and only recently have gender inequities and other restrictive membership, as well as the unequal allocation of resources, been considered. Gold's synthesis of the literature on network-based approaches to international migration centers on identifying significant conceptual and methodological problems that require attention to better assess the level of opportunity that networks offer migrant communities. The final chapter in this section examines race, education, and inequality by considering why indicators of educational achievement are significant and how they vary by race. Caroline Hodges Persell and Giselle F. Hendrie's thorough literature review will be useful to any scholars in this area. They review and evaluate the wide variety of explanations for variation in educational achievement by race and access. They make a major contribution to the literature by proposing a composite-theoretical model that has potential for much more sophisticated explanations for educational variations among racial groups and across nations.

Part IV deals forthrightly with policy responses to inequalities. In Chapter 14, Lynne Haney and Robin Rogers-Dillon critique the uses and abuses of feminist constructions of the independence-dependency debates on welfare. In the past, welfare dependency has been linked to a social pathology approach and "independence" has been employed to express normality and conceptualize the neoliberal connections between state, market, and familial institutions. Haney and Rogers-Dillon draw on their own research conducted in the United States and Hungary to develop the implications of an interdependence model. In the next chapter, Nigel South investigates social inequalities in the criminal justice system through the concept of citizenship. He examines the widening gap between the treatment of rich and poor persons accused of committing crime, but notes that the victims of crime are similarly placed in categories of "deserving" and "undeserving" when they are poor. Synthesizing the literature of both social and income inequality makes it clear that there is no easy causal relationship between poverty and crime; South concludes that it is essential to attend to issues of personal choice and responsibility as well as the social conditions in which citizens encounter the criminal justice system. The reader may find placing a chapter on disability in a section on policy responses to social inequality a bit odd, but Mark Priestley's overview of disability studies skillfully links the social construction of disability with institutional responses. He also reveals the impact that the international disabled people's movement has had in shaping academic discourse. Examining disability along dimensions of difference (gender, ethnicity, generation, class, and sexuality), Priestley draws attention to the significance of cultural values in defining disability and imagining solutions that follow. In the chapter on the culture of medicine, Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, Cara

James, Byron J. Good, and Anne E. Becker report on their investigation into the ways that health care providers deliver inequitable care. They synthesize the literature on many aspects of medical culture, including health care delivery, medical training, medical decision making, the actions of individuals, and institutional cultures and practices that contribute to disparities in the health status and medical treatment of ethnic and racial populations in the United States. Claudia Bell's chapter on tourism and social inequality exposes the deep ironies of tourism. Social policies advocate tourism for economic expansion and cultural exchange when, in reality, little economic advantage is gained by Third World host populations, most of whom become a servant class. Drawing on her research on backpacking tourism in Pretoria and Botswana, Bell illustrates how tourism depends on the social construction "otherness." However, well-heeled Western tourists are cocooned to the point where they rarely ever encounter the "other" outside of circumstances as tightly controlled as spectators of a museum diorama. Drawing on primary research in Indian villages, Tulsi Patel and Navtej Purewal's chapter rounds out the discussion of policy responses to social inequality. They criticize the origins of the population debate, chronicling theories, government policies, laws, and social movements limiting population growth among targeted populations.

Part V is pivotal in bringing the volume of social inequalities full circle. These chapters identify debates over the role of new media and technologies in maintaining or dismantling inequalities. Processes of reproduction and normalization of inequality, as well as disruption and resistance, lie coiled at the heart of the technologies of global communication. In his chapter, "Selling Images of Inequality: Hollywood Cinema and the Reproduction of Racial and Gender Stereotypes," Norman K. Denzin offers an overview of cinematic history that identifies key historical moments and structural processes producing and reinforcing negative representations of minorities in the United States. This chapter also contrasts the critical cultural approach and the traditional sociological approaches to the study of cinema. Although in his conclusion Denzin argues that there is a potential for Hollywood cinema to become a progressive force challenging inequality, he is generally making the cultural imperialism case. Taking an entirely different approach to representation, Chris Barker claims that US cultural hegemony has not occurred and argues that television viewers read and decode images based on their own national and ethnic positions. Even if Hollywood offers negative stereotypes, he suggests, they are not consumed uncritically. Denzin attempts to systematically identify historical moments with corresponding versions of class-based American racial representation, thus making visible the ideological underpinnings in popular culture. Barker, on the other hand, counters that "television *could* act as a cultural and social interpreter and promote an arena of communicative equality and solidarity in which to present diverse values." Unlike many critical cultural studies scholars in the field, Barker contends that nation-states and language communities have retained control over public and commercial television, and disputes the cultural imperialism thesis from the context of audience research.

Moving away from the globalization of film and television, the next chapter turns to the complex questions of assessing the digital divide as producing and reinforcing social inequality or offering an avenue toward equality. Wenhong Chen and Barry Wellman identify three scenarios that frame the literature; they then suggest

competing perspectives on the Internet and the question of social inequality: equalization, amplification, and transformation. They conclude by summarizing the conceptual and methodological gaps in the existing literature that contribute to inconclusive and paradoxical findings. The concluding chapter in this section addresses all the major arguments and debates in the previous chapters. In his chapter, "New Global Technologies of Power: Cybernetic Capitalism and Social Inequality," Stephen Pfohl reasons that a historical analysis is essential to understanding the impact that technology has on social life. He provides a genealogy that traces the links of social power and technology from the onset of Northwestern modernity. Each major technological advancement has transformed our social world. The second half of Pfohl's chapter constitutes an overview of the global distribution of power entailed in cybernetic control mechanisms and identifies the means of accessing these new forms of power. Responding to the question, "Why have the utopian dreams of cyberneticians been transformed into the global economic nightmares and social injustices depicted by more recent observers?," he concludes by assessing both cybernetic sites of power and control, as well as subversion, resistance, and transformation.

The dominant themes in this anthology are social inclusion and exclusion – and resistance. Although issues of agency and structure continue to dominate the discussion, throughout the entire volume the sociologists can be seen engaging in common attempts to assess the most promising ways to conceptualize all-embracing social inequalities and allow for comparative research. Far from the twentieth-century grand narratives of stratification theory and equality of opportunity or class analysis and imperialism, these sociological investigations reveal a discipline that is much less narrow, methodologically obsessed, and boundary maintaining than it has been in the past. In defining social inequalities, recognizing the centrality of a society's values surrounding issues of equity, fairness, and justice, as well as centering individual agency, rights, and obligations, the authors moved to incorporate much that was developed in diverse fields, including: women's studies, ethnic studies, cultural studies, history, the law, and anthropology/ethnology, to name but a few. Embedded in the synthesis of the literature within the diverse fields of study are social constructions of inequalities that eschew the construction of master narratives in favor of recognizing differences among various populations and distinguishing between inequalities that destroy life or threaten life chances, from those involving quality of life, and others that limit the range of opportunities available. In this work we are given new tools and asked to consider new questions: How shall sociologists conceptualize the different levels of inequality, within and between nations? How can we unpack the particular institutions – family, education, welfare, criminal system, and media – that dominate our lives? Given the multiple layers of oppression and discrimination in such things as intimate citizenship or population policies, what is justice? Where do the rights and obligations of individual, state, and nation converge and diverge? How do our personal and political identities – class position and consciousness, sexual behaviors, abilities, racial, ethnic, national, and citizenship – facilitate or frustrate the mitigation of inequalities? What forms of resistance are even possible given the advanced cybernetic technologies for surveillance and behavior control?

Note

- 1 Highlighting the socio-spatial dynamic producing new forms of inequality, important debates recognize complex geographical division of labor and markets and point to the new and sharpened inequalities within global cities and across the North South divide (see Bluestone and Harrison 2000; Harvey 2000, 2001, 2003; Sassen 1991, 1999, 2002).

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Part I

Conceptualizing Inequalities

Chapter 1

Historical Perspectives on Inequality

CHARLES TILLY

Reculer pour mieux sauter: step back, goes the old French saying, to jump forward. Students of inequality understandably focus mostly on currently pressing varieties of inequality and injustice. Visible inequalities that visit iniquity on racial and ethnic minorities, women, religious faiths, or whole categories of sexual preference appropriately preoccupy contemporary British and North American sociologists, just as students of globalization and international political economy properly stress today's widening income inequalities between and within countries. Yet now and then it helps to step back and put contemporary inequalities into historical perspective. It helps both to stimulate reflection on where longer-term changes of inequality are taking the world and to underline what is distinctive or universal about contemporary inequalities. Historical perspective also helps clarify the stakes of competing explanations for inequality. A clear understanding of how inequality works, in its turn, provides a first step toward mitigating its harmful effects.

Let us first underline the prevalence of inequality in the contemporary world. As of 2001, the world economy displayed startling inequalities. North America hosted only 5 percent of the world's population but 30 percent of the world's industrial production. At the other extreme, Africa contained 13 percent of world population and a mere 2 percent of industrial production. Asia (including the rich economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) stood between with a full 61 percent of world population and only 26 percent of industrial production (*Le Monde* 2001: 22). If we compared these figures with an even worldwide distribution of wealth, they would mean that inhabitants of North America had six times their share of the wealth, Asians less than half their share, Africans less than a sixth of their share.

Country-by-country disparities, of course, ran even larger. National income per capita is a peculiar statistic for three reasons: First, it averages over the entire population – men, women, and children of all ages – regardless of whether they are earning money. Second, how well it describes the economic situation of most people depends on how equally income is distributed; medium per capita income plus high inequality means many poor people. Third, income figures exaggerate differences

Table 1.1 Indicators of welfare for selected countries, 1970–2001

<i>Country</i>	<i>GNP per capita</i> ¹	<i>Income inequality</i> ²	<i>Infant mortality per 1,000 births</i> ³		<i>Public expenditure on health (percent GDP)</i> ⁴
	2001	1990s	1970	2000	1998
Australia	19,770	35.2	17	6	6.0
Bangladesh	370	33.6	145	54	1.7
Canada	21,340	31.5	19	6	6.6
China	890	40.3	85	32	2.1
Czech Rep.	5,270	25.4	21	5	6.6
Japan	35,990	24.9	14	4	5.7
Jordan	1,750	36.4	77	28	3.6
Mexico	5,540	53.7	79	25	2.6
Niger	170	50.5	197	159	1.2
Norway	35,530	25.8	13	4	7.0
S. Africa	2,900	59.3	80	55	3.3
Turkey	2,540	41.5	150	38	3.3
UK	24,230	36.8	18	6	5.8
USA	34,870	40.8	20	8	5.7

Sources: World Bank (2001: 276–87); World Bank (2003: 234–41); UNDP (2002: 149–77).

¹ Gross National Product/population, in US dollars.

² Gini index: 0 = perfect equality, 100 = complete inequality.

³ Deaths of children less than 1 year old in year/1,000 live births in same year.

⁴ GDP = Gross Domestic Product.

between rich and poor countries because in poorer regions as a whole people produce a larger share of goods and services outside of the market; national income accounts generally undercount nonmarket goods and services.

Nevertheless, big international differences in per capita income reliably indicate large differences in overall conditions of life. Compare Switzerland, its annual income per person almost \$37,000, with Sierra Leone, whose average inhabitant received \$140 per year – about 38 cents a day per person (World Bank 2003: 235). The differences are huge. They make it easier to understand why most people in such countries as Sierra Leone have no hope of ever acquiring goods most Western Europeans and North Americans take for granted. They have no prospect of buying automobiles, televisions, or expensive prescription drugs.

Still, we should avoid thinking that money alone makes the difference. Table 1.1 shows that national income correlates with a number of other advantages, but by no means perfectly. In the table, the highest income countries are Japan, Norway, and the United States, in that order. The lowest income countries are Niger and Bangladesh. In the table's two poorest countries, income per capita runs at no more than a dollar a day, as compared with Japan's 99 dollars per day per person. How many people actually live above or below these national averages depends, however, on the inequality of income distribution. On the list, South Africa, Mexico, Niger, Turkey, and the United States top the other countries in their degrees of income

inequality. Japan, the Czech Republic, and Norway have relatively low income inequality, which means that higher shares of their populations are sharing their countries' prosperity.

Infant mortality provides a sensitive indicator of a country's overall welfare, reflecting the availability of both food and health care. Table 1.1 shows that Japanese, Czech, and Norwegian citizens benefit from the greater equality of income distribution: they enjoy significantly lower infant mortality than rich countries such as the United States. High average income by itself, then, does not guarantee low infant mortality. Take another comparison: Australia, the Czech Republic, and Canada all had lower per capita incomes than the United States in 2001, but their babies more often survived their first years. Even in fairly prosperous countries with advanced medical facilities, provision of health care for poor people increased the overall population's life expectancy.

Among poorer countries, the data also show that relatively equal access to health care saves babies' lives. On vastly lower average income, China manages much lower infant mortality than South Africa or Turkey. China does so by spreading its meager health resources more evenly. When poverty, inequality, and low public expenditure on health combine, however, they usually produce much higher rates of death among the newborn. In these terms, citizens of Niger had the worst of all worlds: extremely low per capita income, acute income inequality, and very small public expenditure on health. In 2000, a newborn infant in Niger was 40 times as likely to die within a year as a newborn Japanese.

International inequality extended well beyond income and life expectancy. From the perspective of people in the wealthier North American and European countries, for example, the Internet looks like a great equalizer, connecting everyone with everyone else. After all, in 2000 the United States led the world with 160 Internet-connected computers per thousand people; Finland followed closely with 125 connections per thousand, and Iceland came next with 100. Iceland, those numbers mean, had one computer connected to the Internet for every ten people. Over the world as a whole, the Internet then had an estimated 378 million users, as compared with fewer than 20 million in 1995 (*Le Monde* 2001: 33; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2001: 32).

The total seems immense, but stop to think: it represented 6 percent of world population in 2000. Inverted, the figure means that 94 percent of humanity lacked access to the Internet. The USA, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea accounted for something like nine-tenths of all the world's Internet users. Less than one person in a thousand was surfing the Internet in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. At least for the moment, no one who lacks computer knowledge or access can log onto the powerful communication network. With the cheapest Pentium III computers selling for US\$500 dollars or more, the five-sixths of the world's population living in countries boasting per capita incomes of \$4,000 per year or less will wait a very long time for Internet access. Since connection to the Internet does, as advertised, provide rapid access to vast quantities of information and millions of people, the net effect of the Internet's impressive expansion has been to increase information inequality across the world. Most likely computer-based communication will continue to divide the world sharply into informational rich and poor for decades to come.

Despite the raging success of cellular telephones, the situation does not differ so much for other communications media; in today's Africa, to take the extreme example, newspaper circulation equals 1 percent of the population, fewer than four television sets are operating per 100 people, and only one radio exists for every six people (World Bank 2002: 191). Globalization is certainly occurring in some regards, but it is not equalizing its benefits. Far from it!

Similar stories apply to other forms of globalization: seen from centers of influence, it looks as though the entire world is globalizing. Seen from the edges, penetration of global influence is highly selective (Cowen 2002; Stiglitz 2002; Fischer 2003). At least in the short and medium runs, it increases inequalities. Scientific advances, for example, are having profound effects on medicine, communications, agriculture, and manufacturing. But those effects are concentrated very heavily in already rich countries. To take a simple indicator, the only countries registering 10 or more patents per million population in 1997 were Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, the United States, the Nordic countries, and the countries of Western Europe less Spain and Portugal (World Bank 2001: 310–11). Their technological advantages over the rest of the world were actually increasing.

Or take the case of advances in medicine. As the HIV virus spread globally during the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, Western pharmaceutical companies started creating drugs that greatly prolonged and improved the lives of HIV victims. But the virus continued to kill in Africa. In 2000, an estimated 38.8 percent of Botswana's population aged 15–49 carried the virus, with rates substantially higher for women (Boyd 2002: 1). The hardest-hit countries – Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and other African regions farther north – had neither the financial means nor the delivery systems to get life-saving drugs to their ailing populations.

Nevertheless, globalization was transforming the world's economic and political geography. During the period after 1945, three major shifts deserve attention: breakup or transformation of all the major socialist regimes; movement of a number of regional economies into niches of high-technology production and export; the overall rise of Asia and the Pacific as sites of economic and political power. Socialist breakup and transformation included the disintegration of both the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia. It also involved the cautious but quite successful movement of China toward production for world markets, notably those of Japan and North America. The new regional specialization in niches of high-tech production shows up in the list of countries having at least 10 percent of their manufacturing exports in high-tech products as of 1998:

Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States. (World Bank 2001: 310–11)

Beside the old industrial countries on the list, we find ex-socialist states such as Hungary (21 percent of manufacturing exports high-tech), the Kyrgyz Republic (16 percent), and Russia (12 percent). We also find up-and-coming low-wage manufacturers of Central America and the Pacific. A regional, rather than national, list

would include coastal India and parts of South America's southern cone as well. In such industries as electronics, international firms based in the major industrial powers have been seeking out entrepreneurs who can supply disciplined low-wage workers for production of high-tech components. The entrepreneurs are showing up increasingly outside the traditional centers of manufacturing.

Explaining Inequality

As the income inequality figures in Table 1.1 suggest, unequal welfare also prevails *within* countries of the capitalist world, old and new. Why does it occur? These days anyone who tries to explain, criticize, or influence major social inequalities in capitalist countries is likely to rely on the same basic model of how inequality comes about. The model features sorting of unequally endowed individuals into unequal positions, one by one. In its simplest versions, it contains just four elements:

- 1 A set of positions – jobs, public offices, dwellings, prestige categories, and so on.
- 2 A set of unequal rewards attached to those positions.
- 3 A sorting mechanism that channels people to different positions.
- 4 Individuals who vary in characteristics that the sorting mechanism detects.

The model calls up a vivid scenario: individuals arrive at the scanner, undergo evaluation, get shunted to an appropriate position, then collect that position's rewards. In mildly complicated versions of the model, these elements interact; for example, the number and characteristics of persons that present themselves for sorting (the "labor supply" in some versions) affect the distribution and character of positions ("jobs" in those same versions).

Critics and defenders of existing inequalities commonly adopt the same basic model. Critics typically attack the sorting mechanism as unfair, inefficient, or destructive. They say that assigning people to advantageous or disadvantageous positions on the basis of race, gender, age, nationality, or physical attractiveness produces injustice, misuse of valuable talents, or damage to individual and society. Defenders of the existing system typically stress differences among individuals – differences in energy, knowledge, skill, intelligence, strength, or (more rarely) acceptability to people who already occupy positions connected with those that newcomers might fill. They say that people differ significantly in their capacities to fill various positions, and that efficiency, justice, or even divine will prescribes matching of capacity to position.

Some kinds of inequality do result from such sorting systems. Competitors for positions on football teams, ballet corps, and parliamentary seats undergo scanning by sorting mechanisms – tryouts, auditions, and elections – in which only candidates with certain characteristics end up in coveted positions. Critics then typically declare that the screening is unfair, inefficient, or destructive. Defenders typically reply that (a) possible candidates differ greatly in ability, (b) the ability of people who occupy high-reward positions strongly affects the relevant organization's overall performance, hence (c) the screening produces a superior outcome to its

likely alternatives, such as patronage, quotas by social category, assignment by seniority, or random selection.

Proposals to alter such unequal systems concern changes in one or more of the four elements: revamp positions so that opportunities available to the candidates change in some desirable direction; equalize rewards to occupants of comparably worthy positions; fix the sorting mechanism; transform the preparation of possible candidates for selection. Critics of gender inequality in employment have, for example, made all four kinds of proposals: recast jobs so that they give masculine bodies no advantage; establish comparable worth, hence similar rewards, for otherwise similar but predominantly male and predominantly female jobs; monitor hiring so that it is gender-blind; give women adequate training so they are well prepared to fill previously all-male jobs (see, for example, England 1992; Reskin et al. 2002; Reskin 2003).

Sorting systems do not evolve naturally. Like competitive markets and athletic leagues, they rest on extensive social structure, and easily deviate from their ideal forms when participants collude or the underlying institutional structure changes. Competitive electoral systems, for example, depend on extensive institutional underpinnings: widespread schooling, easy travel to polling places, relatively free communications media, barriers to flagrant patronage, coercion, and vote buying. During the second half of the twentieth century, a majority of the world's independent countries maintained or installed competitive elections of some sort. Many of them, however, moved from democratic to undemocratic rule despite continuing to stage elections; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Congo, Ecuador, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay – all passed through at least one shift from democracy to nondemocracy between 1950 and 1990 (Przeworski et al. 2000: 59–69).

In those many reversions from democratic to undemocratic regimes, incoming oligarchs typically left the apparatus of competitive elections in place, but subverted elections' organizational infrastructure by manipulating media, harassing dissidents, restricting freedom of assembly, and feeding governmental resources to favored candidates. With those changes of institutional underpinnings, previously democratic sorting mechanisms produce undemocratic outcomes. Even well developed and familiar sorting systems, in short, depend on extensive, supportive social conditions.

Most inequality-generating processes do not, in any case, conform to the sorting model. Even where competitive sorting occurs, individual differences in sorted attributes result from organized social processes that do not themselves conform to the sorting model. The social surroundings where people grow up, for example, affect their adult characteristics deeply and collectively. Resulting differences do not vary continuously, but bunch categorically – by gender, nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, and so on. Closely observed, furthermore, assignment of persons to positions commonly does not result from individual-by-individual scrutiny of all possible candidates but from categorical assignments and mutual recruitment within categories. Indeed, organizations often sustain inequality by building categories directly into their structures: women's jobs, religious ghettos, property qualifications for office, and ethnic or linguistic criteria for membership in associations.

Categorical Inequality

Categories matter. To the extent that routine social life endows them with readily available names, markers, intergroup practices, and internal connections, categories facilitate unequal treatment by both members and outsiders. To incorporate an existing category into an organization also incorporates the shared understandings, practices, and interpersonal relations attached to that category. Categories thus transfer shared understandings, practices, and interpersonal relations from setting to setting, making old routines easy to reproduce in new settings.

Categories consist of negotiated collective boundaries within interpersonal networks. Let us consider a “cluster” of persons to consist of individuals who are more closely connected with each other than with others around them. To the extent that all persons or clusters of persons adjacent to a boundary on one side apply names, practices, and understandings that differentiate them from all persons or clusters of persons on the immediate other side of the same boundary, a pair of categories exists – us and them. Thus mutually acquainted high school students identify each other collectively as grinds and jocks, without ever making complete rosters of all the school’s grinds and jocks. So long as the we–they boundary operates locally, such categories easily accommodate heterogeneity in actual attributes (gender, skin color, academic performance, athletic skill, and more) of category members.

At the limit, paired categories need not be mutual: police may, for example, create a category of suspects whose members are unconnected and unaware of being suspects. The FBI’s domestic antisubversive program of the 1960s and thereafter created whole categories of suspects, most of whom did not know they had fallen under surveillance (Davenport 2002). The categories that matter most for durable inequality, however, involve both mutual awareness and connectedness: we know who they are, they know who we are, on each side of that line people interact with each other, and across the line we interact with them – but differently.

Categories emerge and change as a result of four processes: encounter, imposition, negotiation, and transfer:

- When previously unconnected clusters of persons *encounter* each other, members of each cluster react to the encounter by creating names, practices, and understandings that mark the points of contact between them. When connected new populations move into old neighborhoods, newcomers and old settlers commonly label each other even if they did not previously have categories for the larger populations to which the two clusters belong.
- Sometimes powerful individuals or clusters *impose* categorical definitions that did not apply to others previously. In January 2002, American authorities created a new category – “unlawful combatant” – to contain the captives they transported from Afghanistan to makeshift prisons at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The American government specifically denied that the captives qualified as prisoners of war (that is, as members of a different available category entailing different rights and obligations) under the Geneva Convention (British Broadcasting Corporation 2002).

- More frequently, sets of interacting persons or clusters *negotiate* boundaries having distinctive names, practices, and understandings. American street gangs often assume distinctive names, but also work out relations with different segments of the surrounding population, including members of nearby gangs (Schneider 1999).
- Most often, people *transfer* boundaries, names, practices, and understandings from other settings to the one at hand. During the 1990s, when New York's Korean merchants set up new delicatessens, they regularly and knowingly hired Mexican immigrants to clean up and tend the flowers, thus establishing a clear distinction between those who ran cash registers and those who worked for the cash-handlers. Once the unequal model stood visibly in place, new storekeepers frequently adopted it. The recently arrived Mexican immigrant by the flowers on the sidewalk became a standard Manhattan neighborhood scene.

Categories always produce difference, but they do not necessarily produce inequality. Adjacent peasant communities, for example, always erect boundaries involving names, practices, and understandings. Those boundaries set significant limits to cultivation, grazing, foraging, cooperation, and sometimes sexual relations, but adjacent villages frequently maintain rough equality with each other. Categories produce durable inequality, however, when repeated transactions across the boundary both (a) regularly yield net advantages to those on one side and (b) reproduce the boundary.

How can that happen? Here is the crucial scenario: members of a clique on one side of a categorical boundary seize control of a value-producing resource of limited availability and allocate a large share of the value produced to themselves, devoting some of the value to reproducing the boundary. The scenario has two variants: exploitation and opportunity hoarding. In *exploitation*, the clique enlists value-producing effort from people on the opposite side of the boundary, but allocates to those others less than the value added by their effort. For example, mine owners hire hewers to send coal up from underground, but by no means pay those hewers the full value their effort adds to the mine's production. They use some of the return to create clothing styles, offices, signs, symbols, and guards that reinforce the boundary between management and workers (hence many a struggle among hewers, managers, and surface workers.)

In *opportunity hoarding*, the clique excludes people on the opposite side of the boundary from use of the value-producing resource, captures the returns, and devotes some of the returns to reproducing the boundary. For instance, people in the diamond trade organize ethnically recruited circuits for acquisition, cutting, polishing, distribution, and sale of different types of gems, excluding others from their sections of the trade. Some of the monopoly's return goes into reinforcing ethnic ties, thus making new recruits to the trade available.

Two additional mechanisms play significant parts in maintaining exploitation and opportunity hoarding: emulation and adaptation. Emulation consists of transferring boundaries, names, practices, understandings, and social relations – in short, categories – from other settings. People setting up a new high-tech firm introduce a division of labor (including distinctions by gender, ethnicity, and age) greatly resembling

that of other firms in the industry, and even recruit blocks of people from those other firms to fill similar positions. Compared to inventing and installing new names, practices, understandings, and social relations, emulation greatly reduces the startup cost of new, internally unequal organizations.

Adaptation consists of all parties' establishment of rewarding social routines that depend on the maintenance of existing categories and/or relations across the categorical boundary. Military conscripts who would rather be elsewhere nevertheless organize rackets, communication systems, friendships, and routines for dealing with officers. Those routines engage them and organize their lives from day to day. Adaptation gives even those who suffer from exploitation and opportunity hoarding short-term incentives for collaboration with existing social arrangements.

Bases of Inequality

Over the long run of human history, a wide variety of value-producing resources have sometimes served as bases of categorical inequality-generation. Relevant resources are in short supply, subject to sequestration, widely valued, and capable of producing further value in combination with other resources and/or coordinated effort. At times, for example, control of water, precious gems, exotic spices, salt, and means of transportation have all served exploitation or opportunity hoarding. On the whole, however, the most extensive historical systems of inequality have depended on control of one or more of these value-producing resources:

- coercive means, including weapons, jails, and organized specialists in violence;
- labor, especially skilled and/or effectively coordinated labor;
- animals, especially domesticated food- and/or work-producing animals;
- land, including natural resources located in and upon it;
- commitment-maintaining institutions such as religious sects, kinship systems, and trade diasporas;
- machines, especially machines that convert raw materials, produce goods or services, and transport persons, goods, services, or information;
- financial capital – transferable and fungible means of acquiring property rights;
- information, especially information that facilitates profitable, safe, or coordinated action;
- media that disseminate such information;
- scientific-technical knowledge, especially knowledge that facilitates intervention – for good or evil – in human welfare.

All of these resources lend themselves to production of benefits for some recipients by means of coordinated effort. When they are in short supply and relatively easy to circumscribe, they lend themselves to exploitation and opportunity hoarding, hence to the generation of inequality.

Of course, these value-producing resources operate in combination. Once settled agriculture began to prevail in Eurasia – 5000 or so years ago – those who controlled land and animals on a large scale usually also controlled coercive means,

and acted either to contain, to displace, or to co-opt those who deployed coercive means locally. Until recent centuries, the early items on the list – coercive means, labor, animals, land, and commitment-maintaining institutions – predominated in the world's production of categorical inequality. Even today, they probably account for the bulk of the world's inequality at the local and regional levels. Between the eighteenth century and the recent past, however, control over machines gained ever-increasing prominence as a base for exploitation and opportunity hoarding.

Recent Bases of Inequality

Still, four newly prominent bundles of value-producing resources show signs of displacing control over machines from its world dominance of the last few centuries. The first is financial capital – by no means a new element in the world economy, but one whose volume and volatility now lend enormous power to those who control it. Small, well-connected networks of financiers can batter whole national economies by shifting their investments from site to site.

The second is information – as old as the world, but newly prominent with the spectacular expansion of computing and electronic communication. Despite the Internet's promiscuity, information is even easier to hoard than money, machines, and land; all it takes is dedicated circuits and secure memories. Administrative and commercial records, personal files, results of research, and much more reside in databases whose scale dwarfs anything imaginable only a few decades ago.

The third, science, is looming larger by the day. In the form of pharmaceutical development, genetic engineering, biomechanical computing, microelectronics, medical diagnostics, telecommunication, geophysical mapping, and astrophysical exploration, scientific innovation produces possibilities of control, hence of inequality, exceeding all its predecessors.

The fourth type of value-producing resource – media for storage and transmission of capital, information, and scientific-technical knowledge – wields a partly independent influence on inequality. The huge amounts of capital recently invested in publishing, mass media, and electronic communication suggest as much.

Financial capital, information, scientific-technical expertise, and media all currently remain under the control of small networks of persons, compared to the world population as a whole. Think about the ranking of the world's major hubs of technological innovation that *Wired* magazine published in 2000. The ranking gave highest place to Silicon Valley, USA. Next in line came Boston, Stockholm, Israel as a whole, Raleigh–Durham–Chapel Hill, London, Helsinki, Austin, San Francisco, Taipei, Bangalore, New York, Albuquerque, Montreal, and Seattle (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2001: 45). Many readers of this chapter surely live in those high-tech precincts, but the great bulk of the world's population does not. Relative to the whole globe, financial capital, information, scientific-technical expertise, and media that store or disseminate all of them huddle together in a small number of privileged enclaves.

During the last half-century, then, differences built on financial capital, information, scientific-technical knowledge, and media have figured increasingly in the

production of inequality – especially at the international level. During the next century, they will almost certainly become even more prominent as bases of categorical inequality both locally and internationally. In recent decades, the combination of financial capital and scientific-technical knowledge has gained unparalleled potency in the production of inequality between those who control the combination and those who do not. In a plea to scientists themselves for action against scientific-technical inequality, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out that:

Ninety-five percent of the new science in the world is created in the countries comprising only one-fifth of the world's population. And much of that science – in the realm of health, for example – neglects the problems that afflict most of the world's people.

This unbalanced distribution of scientific activity generates serious problems not only for the scientific community in the developing countries, but also for development itself. It accelerates the disparity between advanced and developing countries, creating social and economic difficulties at both national and international levels. The idea of two worlds of science is anathema to the scientific spirit. It will require the commitment of scientists and scientific institutions throughout the world to change that portrait to bring the benefits of science to all. (Annan 2003: 1485)

We should obviously broaden any survey of unequal scientific-technical knowledge into two, closely related bases of inequality: first, information stores and, second, media that distribute both general information and scientific-technical knowledge. We should also recognize that some portions of knowledge produced outside of the natural and applied sciences qualify as scientific or technical in the sense that they result from systematic empirical inquiry, accumulate and improve through a process of internal testing and critique, form coherent bodies of falsifiable theory, generate techniques for effective intervention in the world, and yield relatively reliable expectations concerning the likely consequences of such interventions. Archaeology, paleontology, demography, agriculture, clinical medicine, epidemiology, and linguistics, for example, all contain patches of knowledge that qualify as scientific-technical in this sense.

Unequal access to knowledge and unequal control over its production or distribution matter in the twenty-first century world not only because of knowledge's intrinsic value but also because its unequal distribution causes other sorts of inequality. Knowledge gives political, financial, and existential advantages to its holders. Returns from knowledge allow its holders to reproduce the institutions and relations that sustain their advantages. In such areas as public health, food supply, environmental quality, and lethal combat, applications of knowledge strongly affect who survives and who lives comfortably.

Knowledge-based inequality prevails in the contemporary world. Consider the obvious case of health care (Deaton 2003). Health care compounds natural science with other forms of knowledge, since it entails training and assignment of health-care professionals, distribution systems for drugs and other health-related materials, not to mention extensive knowledge on the part of health-care recipients as well as their families or friends. Take an elementary statistic. The

United Nations Development Programme reports that recently Canada had 229 physicians per 100,000 people, not so high as Norway (413) or Belgium (395), but still one of the world's highest proportions. The proportion fell to less than a twentieth of the Canadian level – 11 or fewer physicians per 100,000 people – in Ghana, Lesotho, Comoros, Cameroon, Togo, Nepal, Haiti, Madagascar, Sudan, Tanzania, Congo-Kinshasa, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Angola, Benin, Eritrea, and Gambia (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2001: 158–61).

Although many Canadians can no doubt tell tales of ills they suffered as a result of faulty medical treatment, over the world as a whole the absence of physicians correlates very strongly with high infant mortality, little access to essential drugs, low children's immunization rates, high frequencies of malnutrition, and many deaths from HIV/AIDS. It also correlates with other knowledge-related deficits, such as illiteracy, low school enrollments, and small national investments in scientific research. Of course, national poverty levels help explain the absence of adequate health care, but that is the point: in the contemporary world, access to the knowledge and care embedded in science-based medicine depends on income and wealth, not on need or just deserts.

We could make a similar case for food supply and distribution. Biotechnology and agronomy thrive not in the hungry countries, but in the well-fed ones. They depend heavily on scientific-technical research. Adequate food distribution, in any case, requires not only strong agricultural technology but also extensive organizational effort and protection of potential consumers from human predators. Some relatively poor countries are coping. As compared with Canada's 1999 GDP per capita of US\$26,251 in purchasing power parity (PPP), China had only a seventh of that per capita income: US\$3,617 (PPP measures compensate for the greater local buying power of dollars in poorer countries.) Yet, on that low income, China managed to have only about 10 percent of its children less than five years old significantly underweight. At similar income levels, 24 percent of Guatemala's youngsters, 28 percent of the Philippines' youngsters, and a full 34 percent of Sri Lanka's youngsters fell below desirable weight levels for their ages (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2001: 141–51). In the three unhappy countries, inadequate knowledge, defective infrastructure, and civil war interacted to inhibit food supply and distribution.

In China – for all the top-down tyranny we can rightly deplore – since the disastrous famines during the early Communist regime, careful crop management based on scientific research but implemented through social technology has produced a remarkable food supply for the country's quarter of the world's population. Between the 1960s and the late 1990s, for example, China went from a relatively minor site of potato production to becoming the world's largest producer of potatoes, turning out almost 50 million metric tons for a sixth of the global potato supply (Lang 2001: 32). Benefiting from scientific agronomy, China more or less deliberately turned from rice toward high-efficiency potatoes.

We also could identify other science- and technology-based interventions in human welfare: some enhance human life and others destroy it, but the benefits and costs distribute with dramatic inequality. High environmental quality, good transportation, high-tech products, and even life-enhancing education concentrate enor-

mously in rich corners of a poor world. Environmental degradation, predatory exploitation of natural resources, lethal combat, military rule, homicide, and polluted water supplies affect the world's poorer neighborhoods disproportionately. Not all of these, to be sure, result directly and exclusively from the presence or absence of knowledge as such. But all of them spring at least in part from the unequal availability of life-enhancing scientific-technical knowledge, including knowledge of public administration and social processes.

Inhabitants of higher learning's institutions occupy an ambivalent position with respect to unequal control and access. Our institutions specialize in the production, transformation, and diffusion of knowledge. That includes social knowledge of the sort exemplified by censuses and opinion polls, both proud products of social scientific effort. Certainly researchers, professors, students, and even administrators develop an interest in the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge, if only because it justifies their callings and gives them claims to public attention.

On the other side, formidable incentives to practice knowledge hoarding prevail in every academic institution. First comes the understandable preference of specialists to communicate mainly with other specialists within their own communities; physicists, linguists, and economists gain a considerable portion of their satisfaction and self-esteem from communication with other physicists, linguists, and economists. Second, to the extent that a discipline yields results for which a monetary demand exists, producers within that discipline gain, at least in the short run, from channeling dissemination of those results by means of such devices as patents, trademarks, licenses, and closed professional associations; sharp contemporary debates on intellectual property center on how much protection commercially valuable results should receive.

Future Inequality

Unequal control over financial capital, information, media, and scientific-technical knowledge has, then, in recent years been displacing control over coercive means, labor, animals, land, commitment-maintaining institutions, and even machines as bases of large-scale inequality across the world. Each has expanded with extensive systems of hoarding, which yield increasing advantages to those who live within those systems.

The future impact of financial capital, information, media and scientific-technical knowledge on inequality will still depend on two other factors: their integration with categorical differences, and their relation to concentrated means of coercion. Although all four have incorporated existing distinctions by gender, age, race, ethnicity, and religion to some degree, so far the largest gap fostered by these emerging bases of inequality separates people with qualifying technical educations from everyone else: MBAs, JDs, computer science degrees, PhDs, and the like. Of course each arena has its heroic tales of people who succeeded without certification: college dropouts who made billions as investors or Internet entrepreneurs, and so on. Not since the Chinese mandarinates, however, have specially educated people played so prominent a part in world affairs, and received rewards so definitively separating them from their neighbors. Educators will have to balance between two

long-cherished dreams: on one side, forming an intellectual meritocracy that recruits regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion; on the other, spreading the benefits of knowledge equally through whole populations.

The second unknown is connection between these competing bases of inequality and organized coercion concentrations. Through most of human history coercive means remained relatively fragmented, dispersed among communities, warlords, thugs, bandits, pirates, mercenaries, feudal retainers, religious organizations, and private armies despite the occasional formation of an empire. Over the last few centuries, humanity performed the surprising feat of placing its major concentrations of coercive means under the control of national governments. The cost was increasingly bloody international warfare, but it brought the benefit of reduction in domestic mayhem – more so, I might add, in other Western countries than in my own United States.

In our own time, that trend seems to be reversing. Civil war, guerrilla, genocide, politicide, gunrunning, and even mercenary activity have been rising irregularly since World War II (van Crevelde 1991; Gurr 1993, 2000; Kaldor 1999; Tilly 2003, Ch. 3). Despite often being incited by outside states or by paramilitary shadows of existing states, on the whole these homicidal activities are escaping the system of state control over concentrated coercion that grew up between 1750 and 1950 or so. These changes, too, result in part from the unequal distribution of scientific-technical knowledge, broadly defined: the rich world floods the poorer parts of the world with precision-built weapons, but not with the institutions to control them. To the degree that international flows of drugs, arms, oil, gas, military expertise, and precious stones come under the influence of those who already dominate financial capital, information banks, scientific-technical knowledge, and media for their storage or transmission, whole new forms of inequality could form, with disastrous consequences for humanity as a whole.

To explain and predict the future of categorical inequality across the world, it follows that analysts must specify what changes occur in: (a) cliques that control value-producing resources; (b) prevailing combinations of resources; (c) categories incorporated into relations of exploitation and opportunity hoarding; (d) extent of conjunction between exploitation and opportunity hoarding; (e) relative prominence of exploitation and opportunity hoarding; (f) causes of (a)–(e). Proper specification of changes in all these items will produce explanations and predictions of change in the worldwide distribution of welfare. Over the twenty-first century, for example, the organization of exploitation and opportunity hoarding in the production, distribution, and consumption of health care will fundamentally affect worldwide differentials in sickness and life expectancy.

In conjunction with old standbys – coercion, land, and labor – during the twenty-first century control of financial capital and scientific-technical knowledge will also shape the fate of democracy. Democracy depends on barriers against the direct entry of unequal categories into public politics. Any substantial weakening of those barriers and any large increase in categorical inequality itself both threaten democracy. They do so by providing beneficiaries of inequality with incentives and means to subvert or opt out of equal rights, equal obligations, equal consultation, and equal protection. A world of human welfare stands at risk.

Note

I have adapted some material from “Past and future inequalities,” *Hagar* 2 (2001), 5–18; “Changing forms of inequality,” *Sociological Theory*, 21 (2003): 31–36; and “Unequal knowledge,” keynote address, Millennium Conference 2003, Concordia and McGill Universities, Montreal, March 14–15, 2003.[/nt]

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Chapter 2

Social Exclusion: New Inequality Paradigm for the Era of Globalization?

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The growing concern with globalization's social impact is placing the question of social inequality back on the political agenda. During the Reagan and Thatcher eras of rampant economic liberalism social inequality was seen as inevitable, even as a healthy spur for "competitiveness." Now all the major international organizations, such as the World Bank and even the IMF (International Monetary Fund) – not to mention the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) – actually are concerned with the level of social inequality being generated by globalization, both within and between nations. From a global-justice perspective, this provides an opportunity to foreground social inequality as a pressing political concern. To do so effectively, a critical sociology needs to rethink its concepts and "ways of seeing" the world, which has changed dramatically in the last 25 years.

The main question this chapter addresses is whether social exclusion's problematic can serve to unify and combat the various facets of inequality present in today's world. For John Gray, while the notion of inclusion is quite distinct from that of equality, we should be clear that "[g]lobal laissez-faire is no less inimical to the project of an inclusive society" (Gray 2000: 33) than it is to that of an equal one. That may well be the case, but we should not neglect the discursive power of "social inclusion" – a concept which conservatives as much as (or even more than) radicals will support. Nor should we underestimate the growing concern in the global corridors of power over increasing inequality and, above all, its possible political effects. Mainstream economists are cognizant now that global governances require at least some attention to those regions and people not benefiting from globalization. The "Polanyi problematic" (how social control over free-market forces can be achieved) will, I shall argue, come increasingly to the fore in the years to come. Indeed, there are already signs that the heyday of Gray's "global laissez faire" is over.

In terms of politics, by stressing the need for globalization to deal with social exclusion we are making the citizenship agenda central. The liberal-democratic state

promoted by globalization advocates supposedly grants everyone certain basic political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Yet these rights are flouted everywhere. People are excluded from jobs and land, health and education, or from life itself. As Bhalla and Lapeyre stress, “social exclusion can be interpreted in terms of a denial of the above rights or in terms of incomplete citizenship” (1999: 26). Thus, in the era of globalization, the struggle against social exclusion is a key element of the struggle for citizenship rights. It reintroduces into traditional poverty debates the social element, as against individual responsibility, and it foregrounds agency. It also serves to unify struggles against diverse forms of social inequality and, centrally, cuts across North/South global divides.

This chapter first addresses the emerging “social-exclusion problematic,” understood as a theoretical structure that frames the repertoire of competing discourses and structures as much by its absences as its statements. The origins of the sociology and social-policy concept are traced and a potentially radical variant is sketched out. We then move to the new context of social inequality, namely the phenomenon or processes known as “globalization.” Behind the buzzword lies a complex set of tendencies (including the simultaneously economic integration and social disintegration) that operate as parameters for existing and emerging forms of social inequality. The third section outlines some of the major forms that global-social inequality takes today from a social-exclusion perspective. The main theme is the complexity and interpenetration of the North and South. Finally, a section on global justice examines, briefly, the diverse ways in which global inequality might be overcome.

The Social-exclusion Problematic

There was a time when social class was the uncontested paradigm of social analysis. Debate raged between Marxists and Weberian sociologists (see, for example, Giddens 1973; Parkin 1979) and between both of these schools, while the US-functional approach focused more on stratification (see Davis and Moore 1945 for a foundational statement). There was agreement, however, that the fundamental factor in relation to social inequality centered around social classes or strata – usually defined in economic terms. Then, in the 1980s, a series of interlinked developments undermined the social-class paradigm to the extent that any reappearance is a notable event (for example, Wright 1985). Within sociology the main cause of this decline was the perceived rise of a “post-industrial” society (see, for example, Bell 1973; Kumar 1995) or an informational society, which would render social divisions that were inextricably bound up with industrial societies obsolete.

Another set of issues arose around the emergence of social movements, where factors other than class were preeminent (such as the women’s or Blacks’ movements). Paul Gilroy referred to “writers and thinkers, struggling against forms of subordination which are not obviously or directly related to class” (Gilroy 1987: 18). Divisions and identities centered on gender, race, age, or sexual orientation were clearly not reducible to the worker/capitalist confrontation in the workplace. Theoretically, various feminist (see Barrett 1980) and poststructuralist (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985) theorists validated the critique of what became known as “class

essentialism.” The stress was now on the social fragmentation caused by society rather than on its unifying tendencies, which had once created the proletariat. The “new” capitalism of the 1980s caused a certain “decomposition” of class (see Offe 1985) and other aspects of inequality came to the fore. For Ulrich Beck, societies had been submerged by a “surge of individualization” and in this process “people will be set free from the social forms of industrial society” – such as class and stratification (1992: 87).

The shift from a class analysis, to one based on stratification (the US model), to the new postindustrial model based on social fragmentation and exclusion, can be illustrated as follows. The “working class” of traditional class analysis is based on an image of a society structured by class where all play a useful function. The “lower class” image of the stratification studies is based on a conception of “social mobility.” As Bauman argues, it “evokes an image of a class of people who stand . . . at the bottom of a ladder which they may yet climb, and so exit from their present inferiority” (1998: 66). However, when we move on to current debates on social inequality these two terms seem to have been superseded by that of “underclass,” even when it might not actually be deployed. Now this term, as Bauman puts it, “belongs to the imagery of a society which is not all-embracing and comprehensive” (ibid.). This is a group of people “beyond” class and “excluded” from a society where they no longer have a role as even the “working class” clearly did.

European Paradigm

The term “social exclusion” first emerged in the context of the European social-policy debates of the late 1980s. The European Commission first made reference to the term “social exclusion” in its third pan-European poverty program issued in 1988. Poverty and social deprivation were no longer to be viewed as national but, rather, as European issues. Poverty was no longer to be seen simply as economic deprivation, but as part of a broader pattern of disadvantage to be termed “social exclusion” (see Room 1995). When the European Social Charter was signed in 1990, it had as a core principle that “in the spirit of solidarity it is important to combat social exclusion” (European Commission 1990). In the French context, where the concept first took off discursively, it had an unambiguously normative content. *L'exclus* were the marginal, the misfits, the “asocial” individuals who need to be “inserted” in society. The social-exclusion rhetoric in France was based on the need for “cohesion” and the duty of “solidarity” in a highly Durkheimian idiom. There was, thus, an early normative social-exclusion paradigm focused on the need to “assimilate” those who deviated from the social norm in some way.

In Britain, somewhat later under the post-1997 New Labour governments, social exclusion replaced the traditional social-democratic engagement with poverty and inequality. In earlier, more socialist, readings poverty had been seen as multifaceted (involving income, housing, and health, for example) and, to deal with it, strongly redistributivist discourses were called upon. However, with New Labour this agenda was recast in the language of exclusion. This was in part due to the growing influence of the European social-exclusion course, but it also reflected a turn away from redistribution to a social-integration mode of dealing with poverty. As Ruth Levitas

puts it, under New Labour: “Exclusion is understood as the breakdown of the structural, cultural and moral ties which bind the individual to society, and family instability is a key concern” (1998: 21). So while some traditional social-democratic concerns remained, much more focus was placed on the individual’s responsibilities with strongly moralistic undertones.

While social exclusion certainly emerged in a European idiom, it did have a fairly direct parallel discourse in the United States, where the “underclass” perspective had originated. The New Right of the 1980s presented welfare recipients as suffering from a “culture of dependency.” They needed to be weaned off it because it was necessary to overcome such a social exclusion. In its most notorious form, Charles Murray referred to a veritable cultural “disease” amongst the poor “whose values are contaminating the life of entire neighbourhoods” (1990: 23) through their rejection of the work and family ethics. Not all the poor were deemed to be part of the “underclass” and, in this rightist discourse with its moral dichotomies, the real inequalities in society inevitably were obscured. While the “underclass” concept itself was severely critiqued, the underlying “cultural” as against structural understanding of social exclusion persisted. This is, of course, a gendered discourse (insofar as unpaid work is not acknowledged) and, especially in the context of the United States, a highly racialized interpretation.

So, in conclusion to this brief introductory survey, we can say that social exclusion has at least three clearly distinguishable variants. This typology is derived from the work of Ruth Levitas (1998) although it also incorporates elements of Hilary Silver’s (1994) original influential distinction of three social-exclusion paradigms. The first interpretation is congruent with a critical-social policy and is based firmly on a redistributive-egalitarian discourse based on social rights and citizenship. Social exclusion, then, is viewed as the result of the power monopoly held by certain privileged groups in society. The second paradigm is the social-integrationist perspective typical of the official European Union discourse on social exclusion. It is infused with notions of social solidarity that can be traced back to the work of Emile Durkheim. The third perspective is based on a moralistic view of an “underclass” that is culturally distinct from the societal mainstream. This conservative view can be found either in libertarian (or neoliberal) variants or in a communitarian guise.

Beyond Poverty?

The question now is to ask whether social exclusion, as a concept, helps us to broaden out traditional theories of poverty and inequality (for which, see Gordon and Spicker 1999). Whereas poverty can be defined as a simple lack of material resources, social exclusion – following Walker and Walker – is defined as “a more comprehensive formulation which refers to the dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially from any of the social, economic, political or cultural systems which determine the social integration of a person in society” (1997: 8). Whether it is access to employment or political decision making, it all fits into a broader process of social exclusion. When combined, these various aspects of social exclusion can take a spatial form and, thus, lead to formatting poor neighborhoods or urban ghettos. We might, however, question whether the opposite of exclusion is

(or should be) integration, rather than a broad conception of active citizenship that would include social, economic, and cultural rights as well as traditional democratic-political rights.

It is, however, the very breadth of the “social exclusion” concept that poses analytical problems. Social exclusion’s various aspects may or may not be related to one another. This concept also might lead to a fragmentation of oppressions. It focuses on one aspect of exclusion, and on different social groups in isolation, as they are “targeted” for social-policy intervention. I would thus agree with David Byrne’s interpretation of social exclusion. For him, “exclusion is not a property of individuals or even of social spaces. Rather it is a necessary and inherent characteristic of an unequal postindustrial capitalism” (1999: 128). Taken up in this way, the social-exclusion paradigm does not seek to “blame the poor” or seek to remedy what are seen as individual deficits to allow for societal integration. We can understand social exclusion as a structural result of globalized capitalism, both within and between nation-states.

Beyond Eurocentrism

The next question we need to ask is whether social exclusion is a concept that can “travel” or whether it is irredeemably Eurocentric. For Gerry Rogers, who coordinated a major International Labor Organization (ILO) project, “[S]ocial exclusion has become a mainstream policy in the countries of the North, in Europe at least. In the South, its relevance remains to be established” (Rogers et al. 1995: 53). It is easy to see how a European social-policy perspective might seem irrelevant in countries and regions of the South devastated by neoliberal globalization. It is also clear that the problem is not the actual “integration” of the South, but the nature of its integration into the world system that is highly unequal. The term “social exclusion” can also be seen as Eurocentric in the way it blithely ignores the productive debate in Latin America, in particular around the question of “marginality” (see Faria 1995). It was directed precisely at understanding why some social groups and individuals were excluded socially by dependent-capitalist development.

Having considered the very real problems associated with extending the concept of social exclusion to the South as it stands, I think we can and should seek to develop the concept as a new global optic for the analysis of poverty and deprivation worldwide. First of all, globalization has created one world, in many ways, and a unified perspective on its inequality aspects generally makes sense (see O’Brien et al. 2000a). Secondly, we can no longer sustain simple South/North distinctions as though they were watertight compartments. The South is very much part of the North in the big urban conurbations, where immigrant and local workers live in appalling “Third World” conditions. Likewise, the North is in the South in the glittering high-rise buildings of the financial sector and the gated communities where the rich and powerful live. A unified focus through social exclusion’s lens is a good way to capture this uneven development process and its exclusionary tendencies. Finally, for countries suffering from the effects of neoliberalism, it usefully draws attention to the continued need for state intervention to deal with poverty and glaring inequalities.

Whether social exclusion is a useful concept or not, in terms of analyzing and combating inequality, it would seem to depend then on how we use it. I would agree overall with Amartya Sen, for whom “[t]he helpfulness of the social exclusion does not lie . . . in its conceptual newness, but in its practical influence in forcefully emphasizing – and focusing attention on – the role of relational features in deprivation” (2000: 8). It allows us to break with the economistic and individualistic parameters of traditional-sociological concepts of poverty (see Townsend 1979 for a classic statement). The social-exclusion paradigm is multidimensional and multidisciplinary, as well as being firmly social in its focus. It names the causes of inequality in society’s power structures and the global economy. It is not static, as poverty concepts usually are, having a strong dynamic edge focused on the processes of social exclusion. Given a radical democratic thrust, the concept of social exclusion can, in short, direct us to the various facets of inequality – economic, political, social, cultural, and regional – and show how they are interlinked.

A positive balance sheet overall does not mean, however, that the concept of social exclusion has drawbacks now. For example, it has no necessary redistributive connotations because one can achieve “inclusion” through simple access to central goods. As political philosopher John Gray puts it: “Supporters of social inclusion do not pursue an ideal of egalitarian justice, but an ideal of common life” (2000: 22). Social integration can itself be a highly normative term that elides difference and thus easily can become racist, sexist, and Euro- or US-centric. Integration policy toward minority-ethnic groups, for example, not only tends to ignore the level of social and economic integration which exists, but also promotes racism and acts as a disintegrative force insofar as it highlights the “exterior” nature of these groups. It can, in short, be a fairly passive, integrationist, and conservative concept. However, it also can be active, point to the many ways in which capitalist society excludes people, and help us draw up a program for democratic-inclusive citizenship to overcome these flaws. In its very reasonableness – very few people would admit to being in favor of social exclusion – it could serve as a common denominator for various struggles against inequality in the globalization era. Social exclusion is a contested-discursive terrain but one certainly worth engaging with, from a transformationalist perspective.

The Era of Globalization

Globalization did not begin in the 1990s and nor did sociology’s concern with the global dimension. For a long time, the world-systems school (see Wallerstein 1979; Chase-Dunn 1998) had preached a global approach for sociology, in which national societies are seen as part of a larger, international system. It is clear also that during the classical Gold Standard era (1870–1914), the world was probably at least as integrated in trade and financial terms as it is today. However, now growing evidence indicates that a qualitatively new wave of globalization began in the 1990s. It was driven by technological advances (computer and biotechnology, for example), a veritable revolution in communications (the Internet), and the total collapse of any challenge to the dominant capitalist order (after the fall of the Berlin Wall in

1989 and its sequels). The “new-world order” was to be a global order as well as a capitalist one, of course.

Globalization is a malleable term and is subject to a range of definitions and uses (see Scholte 2000 for an introduction). It refers to the increasing internationalization of economic, political, social, and cultural life as these relations are “stretched” across the globe. It means more than liberalization, internationalization, or Westernization. After that, it is a matter of debate as to what extent globalization represents an ideology, a tendency, or actual changes in the way society works. To the degree that we can accept at least some degree of social transformation under the aegis of globalization, we need to rethink our analysis units. There is a growing question now over a methodological or territorial nationalism, which takes the nation-state for granted. Additionally, now there is a growing area of concern with “nonterritorial democracy” (see McGrew 1997) and the way the pursuit of “global justice” needs to look beyond the nation-state.

The globalization debate is settling into its third, more reflective, complexity-conscious phase. The first generation of globalization studies tended to be in awe of the “shrinking world” caused by the Internet revolution in communications and the dramatic cheapening and speeding up of transport (see Ohmae 1996; but also Giddens 1990). Afterwards, the skeptics sought to debunk what they saw as “globaloney” (see Wood 1997; also Hirst and Thompson 1996). Although this cold-shower treatment was probably necessary, it did not advance our understanding particularly of what is new in the world around us. The third-way literature refuses generic globalization logic, rather it focuses on specific aspects or domains (see, for example, Hay and Marsh 2000; Woods 2000). It is much more attuned to the historical context of globalization as uneven development over time and space. This third wave moves more strongly in the direction of unpacking causal processes and stresses the specificity of globalization dynamics.

First- and second-generation globalization studies were anything but complex. One was either for or against globalization and one stressed either the local or the global – in short, it was a world of binary oppositions. Now we find the globalization paradigm actually bringing complexity notions into the social sciences. As John Urry notes, the new paradigm “in effect authorizes certain complexity-innovations, especially those of nonlinear dependencies between peoples, places, organizations and technological systems across the world” (2002: 1). We no longer think in static-equilibrium terms about the world around us. In addition, especially after September 11 and the end of “happy” or “easy” globalization, perceiving the world as always already on the brink of chaos is easy enough. Our attention to global networks and processes is much more fluid and embraces complexity. Our more nonlinear thinking about globalization processes makes us think much more of hybridity, which helps us move beyond debilitating binary oppositions.

We understand much better now that there is no real opposition between the “out there” of globalization and the “in here” of the city or locality where we live. Ash Amin quite rightly, in this regard, states that “the underlying assumption that separate territorial logics – one place-bound and the other at world scale – can be readily identified as incompatible logics of social organisation” (1997: 124). For much of the earlier globalization literature and, indeed, for much of the anti-

globalization movement, there was precisely such a logic operating. We now tend to focus much more on the local and global connections. Indeed, globalization is also “made” and realized in these local places. We also have tended to break with the notion of the global as active and dynamic, contrasted with a passive and tradition-bound local. Rather, we understand the essential hybridity of globalization (the “global”) and the agency that rests with individuals and social groups (who are not just “done to” by an all-powerful global juggernaut).

What is also very clear to most analysts, including hegemonic-globalization drivers, is that globalization is an uneven and socially unequal process. The very notions of, for example, “one world” or the “end of place” that permeated the early globalization discourses, are simply inaccurate. Doreen Massey argues that, “as in the case of modernity, this is an a-geographical imagination which ignores the structured divides, the necessary ruptures and inequalities, on which the successful projection of the vision itself depends” (1999: 36–7). It is these divides – from the digital divide to that of gender, from poor–rich divides to cultural ones – which now dominate much of the debate on the future of globalization. From insiders turned critics of “actually existing globalization,” such as George Soros (2002) and Joseph Stiglitz (2002), there is a growing call for globalization to address, as a matter of urgency, the divides and inequalities it either creates or exacerbates – in the interests of good governance if nothing else.

We also need to stress that globalization is an open-ended process, contrary to what its architects, the globalizers, argue (as do many of the antiglobalization protestors, who also seem to read it as an inexorable teleological process). As Brazilian political philosopher Mangabeira Unger (1987) has warned, we should not fall into the trap of “necessitarianism” for which things are necessarily as they must be. There may be globalization projects, but these are diverse, sometimes contradictory, and clearly of uncertain future. The defensive reaction of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to the protests at Seattle in 1999 showed to what extent the future was still open. Nor should we accept the “false necessity” that globalization inexorably leads to social polarization. The way the international, labor-standards issue was introduced into the WTO debates shows precisely how “porous” and contested global governance is today (see O’Brien et al. 2000b). The issue of “global governance” now is firmly on the international agenda, in some way seen as a means of saving globalization from the social and political backlash it unleashes.

In this respect it is quite useful to refer back to the neglected writing of Karl Polanyi (1957) which, as World War II was coming to a close, reflected on a similar problematic. Then, as now, the free-market economy was entering an ascendant phase, but it had to be reconciled with some degree of social and political-life stability. The “Polanyi problem” centered around how the so-called “self-regulating” markets could generate “protective” measures by society to prevent its total collapse or dissolution by market forces. This second “golden age” of capitalism (1945–75) was based on a form of “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982) and, of course, the rise of the welfare state – at least in most Western societies. What the debates around “global governance” reflect is a reemergence of the “Polanyi problematic.” What is most important to realize, following Peter Evans, “is that organizers of counter-hegemonic globalization have more on their side than pluck. Elites, no less than the rest of us, need to resolve the Polanyi problem” (Evans 2000: 239).

Global Inequality

Globalization can be said to have placed the question of inequality back onto the political agenda. As Robert Wade puts it: "If world income distribution became more equal in the final quarter of the last century, this would be powerful evidence that globalisation works to the benefit of all" (2001: 2). While during the heyday of neoliberalism the very notion of inequality had become invisible, now the proponents of the globalized version themselves foreground it. Even the critics of neoliberalism were beginning to argue that, perhaps, globalization at least had the potential to overcome poverty and underdevelopment. Thus Keith Griffin, a long-standing critic of orthodox, capitalist-development strategies, could now argue that: "in recent years the pattern of global growth, contrary to a widely held belief, has helped to reduce inequality in the distribution of world income. For once, the proportionate gains of the poor exceed those of the rich" (1995: 364). In short, "polarisation among peoples has diminished" (*ibid.*), according to this perspective.

Rather than dismiss this optimistic reading as simply the propaganda of the globalizers, we should, perhaps, examine this argument's objective basis. The world has, indeed, changed dramatically over the last 35 years. Infant mortality rates have been reduced by 50 percent and life expectancy has risen ten years (see United Nations Development Programme 1999). The capitalist revolution, which globalization represents, has had incalculable social effects and we cannot just assume that all of these have been negative. In India and China millions of people have been taken out of absolute poverty. From 1980 to 2000, the numbers, worldwide, living in absolute poverty have declined by 200 million or in proportion from 30 percent to 20 percent of the world's population. From these bare statistics, it is a short step to one-time Marxist commentator Charles Leadbetter's verdict that "[g]lobalisation is an essential component of a poverty reduction strategy in the developing world" (2002: 316). The problem is not seen as globalization but, rather, the failure of globalization to spread fast enough.

Back in 1980, as globalization was only just beginning to take effect, Bill Warren (1980) developed an influential Marxist-modernization perspective. Capitalism was seen as progressive in the sense of sweeping away previous modes of production and developing new forces of production. For Warren capitalism was the mainspring of historical progress and was essential if a more humane society was ever to be constructed. Notions of imperialism and dependency were, for this author, simply forms of a nationalist mythology, which was against "foreign" capitalism. For Warren, "although introduced into the Third World externally, capitalism has struck deep roots here and developed its own increasingly vigorous internal dynamic" (1980: 9). Even if we were to accept fully this dynamic and progressive vision of capitalism's worldwide expansion, which led to what we now call globalization, it does not alter the inherently uneven nature of capitalist development. From its origins until today, great wealth coexists with terrible poverty and developing parts of the globe have their counterparts in the underdevelopment of others.

Despite the optimistic readings of globalization from an inequality perspective, there is now a growing consensus that it has increased the global-inequality level over the last quarter of a century. Perhaps the best place to start is with a broad

review of globalization and growth carried out for the IMF (International Monetary Fund) (Crafts 2000). The divergence in income levels and growth rates, which this study confirmed, contradicted the neoclassical tenet that economic growth should lead to convergence. This study shows the IMF to be skeptical of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) future growth projections openly. In particular, Crafts argues that “sustaining strong catch-up growth performance is seen as rather difficult and dependent on unpredictable success in achieving policy reform and institutional innovation as the economy develops” (Crafts 2000: 52). The Asian crisis of 1997–8 demonstrated that while some national economies can “catch up,” they could also fall back. More generally, the IMF understands that there will not be overall convergence between national economies.

If international inequality is not declining as a result of globalization, neither is intra-national income distribution improving, according to a detailed World Bank study (Milanovic 2002). Based uniquely on household-survey data and covering the period 1988 to 1993, this study found (during that critical period for the rise of globalization) that the poorest 5 percent of the world’s population lost almost one-quarter of their income, while the top 5 percent gained by 12 percent (p. 74). Another way of describing increasing global inequality is in terms of the Gini coefficient, which, according to World Bank data, increased from 62 percent in 1988 to 66 percent in 1993. This may not seem to mean much on its own, but it represents a faster increase in inequality than occurred in the United States and the United Kingdom throughout the 1980s, when the neoliberal offensive was at its peak under Reagan and Thatcher.

Measurement

It would be tempting simply to accept that inequality between countries and within them has increased with globalization (see, for example, Chossudovsky 1999; Weinsbrut et al. 2001). However, there are serious issues of measurement and conceptualization that we must consider necessarily before arriving at a balanced view. As Robert Wade explains (2001: 14), the answer to the question of whether world-income distribution is becoming more polarized depends on at least three factors:

- 1 Whether countries are weighted for population (think China, for example);
- 2 Whether income is compared on the basis of market exchange rates or PPP (purchasing power parity rates); and
- 3 Whether we measure inequality through the Gini coefficient or in terms of quintiles distribution.

Clarifying this measurement or, more precisely, methodological issues, is a prerequisite if we are actually going to be talking about the same thing when debating globalization’s impact on social-inequality patterns.

In an important debate around the interpretation of world-income inequality, Glenn Firebaugh (1999) highlighted the importance of weighting national data in terms of population size. To summarize, as Firebaugh puts it: “When each national

economy is given the same weight the data indicates national divergence. Yet weighted studies find stability. . . . So the issue turns on weighting. Do we want to give nations or individuals equal weight?" (1999: 1604). It may seem obvious, from a sociological viewpoint, to deal with weighted data but then we may wish, in terms of an imperialism theory for example, to compare national economies as units. Furthermore, with population-weighted measures, increasing birth rates in poor countries near the mean give the appearance of reducing measured inequality (Babones 2002: 21). Finally, given the problem of deriving comparable data for China, and its being weighted in terms of global population, there are strong arguments for excluding that country from population-weighted measures of inequality.

A debate, related to that on population, is the one between the proponents of market-exchange rates versus purchasing-power parity (PPP). Again, it is Firebaugh who makes a strong case for moving away from the conventional first measure – which simply converts the local currency to the average exchange rate to the US dollar over the last three years. The PPP method, by contrast, converts national incomes into purchasing power in terms of a comparable bundle of goods and services. This has the practical effect of raising the income levels of the poorer countries. For Firebaugh, PPP is a superior measure insofar as the foreign exchange rate method "is an unreliable method for comparing national incomes" and that "the use of official exchange rates exaggerates inter-country inequality" (1999: 1609). Be that as it may, the PPP measures only go back to the 1970s and, thus, long runs are not possible. More fundamentally, the PPP approach is simply not as useful as the previous one in terms of assessing relative nation-state power in the world system or considering class conflict on a global scale.

The Gini coefficient has long been used to measure income inequality on a scale where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 the opposite, where one person (or country) holds all the income. However, it is well known that "the Gini co-efficient tends to overstate changes close to the average and understate changes close to the extreme" (Wade 2001: 6). Given this problem, we obtain a more accurate picture of the extreme by comparing the top quintile (20%) or decile (10%) with the bottom end of the spectrum. Thus, the UNDP neatly encapsulates the nature of global inequality by showing, for example, that the assets of the 200 richest people in the world are greater than the combined income of 41 percent of the world's people living in poverty (UNDP 1999: 20). Or, we can note that at the turn of the century, the richest quintile of the world's population received 83 percent of the world's income compared to only 1.4 percent that went to the world's poorest decile. Averages, such as the Gini coefficient, do allow for comparisons but cannot capture the stark realities of inequality.

There is now fairly widespread agreement that there are winners and losers in the global economy (see Kapstein 2000). There is also an understanding that a rising tide does not lift all boats, as it were. But apart from the methodological muddles referred to previously, there also is disagreement on "what is to be done." From a World Bank perspective, Nancy Birdsall argues that, "not all inequality is a bad thing. Some inequality represents the healthy outcome of differences across individuals in ambition, motivation and willingness to work" (1999: 1). This "constructive" inequality – seen to be characteristic of "equal opportunities" societies – is contrasted with "negative" inequalities, such as access to land or

education in Latin America. The latter is beginning now to concern the multilateral-economic organizations that see its negative, long-term impact on economic growth and its role as a direct cause of social instability. From a sociological perspective, we might prefer to read inequality as an aspect of social exclusion, which conspires against any project for global justice.

Social and Spatial Aspects

Social exclusion often takes a spatial form, but it also is racialized, and gender divisions are central to its various manifestations. I propose to sketch in some current forms of social exclusion in the various parts of the world dubbed the global South, the North, and what was once the East – the former state-socialist countries. The East Asian “tiger economies” stand out as countries where social inequality actually was reduced in the twentieth century’s last two decades. In the three main world regions identified, not only did social inequality increase, but so also did social polarization. With polarization, the differences between the two extremes (rich and poor) increase and we have the phenomenon known as the shrinking or “disappearing middle” class. This applies not only within countries, but also between nation-states in the globalization era.

Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be condemned to a form of continental, social exclusion as a direct result of the globalization processes. Manuel Castells develops the striking image of a fourth world, veritable “black holes” in the globalization era, that is to say, “exclusion of people and territories, which, from the perspective of dominant interests in global, informational capitalism, shift to a position of structural irrelevance” (1998: 162). Sub-Saharan Africa is what he has in mind and, at first glance, this is a powerful image. If people or regions do not serve the project or machine of free-market capitalism, then they become literally “surplus to requirements.” This would be social exclusion in the strongest possible sense of the word, insofar as there is no conceivable way out of the situation. That is not to say that the international economic agencies will not have a strategy – namely the same one recommended for those people locked into urban deprivation (mainly between education and training) so as to find a job.

Ten percent of the world’s population lives in sub-Saharan Africa, yet it only accounts for one percent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Most of the countries in the region have suffered deteriorating and volatile terms of trade for their exports. These countries provide most of the entries in the category of the “poorest of the poor,” known as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), whose share of world trade declined by half between 1980 and 1997. The World Bank argues that for these countries “the problem is not that they are being impoverished by globalization, but that they are in danger of being largely excluded from it” (2002: 2). It is, of course, the people of the LDCs, and sub-Saharan Africa generally, who suffer the effects of this spatial and social exclusion. Clearly the unfolding dynamic of globalization has produced simultaneously not only a growing economic integration across the world, but also a process of social disintegration for those countries or regions not able (for whatever reason) to integrate with the world economy on a favorable basis.

The point leads to a slightly different perspective than those who simply say that globalization has “not gone far enough” in sub-Saharan Africa. Castells quite rightly points out that “Africa is not external to the global economy. Instead it is disarticulated by its fragmented incorporation to the global economy” (1998: 91). International economic relations have penetrated deeply into the continent, disrupting preexisting patterns of production and consumption. From this perspective, it is harder to distinguish between exclusion and exploitation because, clearly, the two can go hand in hand. It is not an absolute lack of integration within the world system that Africa suffers from, but the historical legacy of colonialism and the current patterns of neocolonialism that create a subordinate and disadvantaged insertion into the world system (see Saul and Leys 1999). The politics of social exclusion on a continental scale also lie behind the continuous tragedies of famine and civil war that beset this region (see Duffield 2001). Delinking from the world system is not an option, but the course of dependent development can only be seen in negative terms.

The South in the North

If we now turn to the supposedly affluent North, we find not just “pockets” of poverty but also vast layers of people suffering from social exclusion of the most acute sort. The growing level of inequality and social exclusion in the Black (but also Latino) inner-city ghettos of the United States are a dramatic marker of the polarization caused by globalization processes. Again, Manuel Castells provides the broader picture when he argues that the United States’

experience with social inequality and social exclusion, in the formative state of the network society, may be a sign of the times to come in other areas of the world as well. (1998: 129)

In the very period when US capitalism entered a phase of dynamic growth and worldwide expansion, the daily life for many of its inner-city inhabitants became steadily worse. Despite an array of urban regeneration and social-policy programs, since the 1970s, urban-social exclusion in the United States – and in many cities of Western Europe as well – has become a structural feature of the capitalist city.

Social exclusion in the city is marked by its spatial characteristics and often by a particular “racial” or ethnic marker. Poverty and marginality go hand in hand, with old forms being overlaid by supposedly “new” forms. The period of recent globalization, since 1980, has led to “a significant rise in inequality” (World Bank 2002: 151) and has had a marked-spatial impact on the inner cities. While the “modern” sections of the city are increasingly linked to the global economy, in the segregated ghettos neoliberal globalization leads to victimization (Marcuse 1996: 204). Although sometimes these victims of globalization can be seen as individuals (to an extent that was the case in the depression of the 1930s), when, as Marcuse puts it, “victims can be cast out as a group, for example, by race, the situation is quite different” (1996: 208). Thus, African Americans in US cities, Algerians in the French *banlieue* or Turkish *Gastarbeiter* in Germany are all locked into structural forms of social exclusion in the literal sense of the term.

The broader point that needs to be considered, to my mind, is whether the social-exclusion-policy problematic might be an effective means of reducing poverty and inequality in Western cities. In a major statement on globalization and inequality, the World Bank argues that Europe's relatively open economies "have far less inequality than the United States with similar average incomes. By combining prosperity with equity they are the closest the world has yet come to eradicating poverty" (2002: 152). Whatever the merits of this argument, it is a long way from early neoliberal pronouncements – that the market must be freed of any constraints and that inequality was indeed beneficial for economic growth. There is, in the European Union, an agreed conceptualization of social exclusion – the way in which it will be measured and also a common agenda on the measures needed to combat social exclusion. This may well be simply "globalization with a human face," but it does indicate that different political paths still are possible in the era of global integration.

Transition Economies

Finally, let us return to the once-planned economies of Russia and Eastern Europe, now deemed to be "transition" economies, where the brutal introduction of free-market "reforms" (in the 1990s) produced an unprecedented increase in social inequality. The World Bank, in its influential 1996 report entitled *From Plan to Market* (World Bank 1996), argued for a "short, sharp shock" to get the transition to capitalism going but admitted that:

More Russians are dying during the transition. Male life expectancy fell by six years between 1990 and 1994 (from 65 to 58) and that of women by three years (from 74 to 71). (1996: 120)

While speculating on various contributory causes – including a reported increase in the consumption of vodka – the World Bank acknowledged that "the transition itself is a direct cause" (p. 128). Of course, the transition to capitalism in the East is part of the neoliberal globalization project, which began in the 1990s to impose free-market economies across the globe and to cut back on any state or social regulation of market interactions. The primitive accumulation of capital in the East was to lead to massive levels of social exclusion.

Once the state-socialist model that had prevailed since 1917 began to collapse in Russia after 1990, so did the welfare-state element that had provided for its population. Workers were "free" from welfarism and free to become proletarians. By 1992, there were 100 million people in Russia living below the official poverty line, with 90 percent of the population at one stage in that situation. Those in work were engaged in precarious low-paid jobs, the concept of a minimum wage being seen as a quaint relic of the past. The free-market advisors, brought in from the United States to oversee this process, were ostensibly shocked to see a form of "gangster capitalism" develop, quite unlike the serene model of capitalist development their textbooks suggested would occur. While the World Bank acknowledged "rampant

corruption and rent seeking” (World Bank 1996: 23), it still argued that private-property rights should be sacrosanct. Under their auspices, a “wild” capitalism emerged in which vast swathes of the population were socially excluded from the development model – if it can be called that.

China, by contrast, has engaged in a more managed transition to capitalism that still retains strong elements of the statist model. China is considered one of the “new globalizer” national success stories, but it has been at the cost of increasing social inequality, since opening up to the world market began in the 1980s. According to the World Bank:

China started its modernisation with an extremely equal distribution of income and extremely high poverty. Intra-rural inequality in China has actually decreased. The big growth in inequality has been between the rural areas and the rising urban agglomerations, and between those provinces with agglomerations and those without them. (2002: 48)

In brief, the number of people living in absolute poverty in China has decreased in the 1990s, but inequality levels have increased. Capitalism, as ever, has proven it can be dynamic, but it also causes uneven development. It is down to governance structures whether the process creates structural-social exclusion or whether it is “managed” in some way. Not all roads to global capitalism are the same.

Global Justice

Across the world, the complex globalization phenomena are generating equally diverse and complex forms of social contestation. These may take the form of “religious fundamentalism” or alternative economic forums (Porto Alegre), young anarchists’ protests, or the new “network terrorism” of al-Qaeda. The question to be asked, from the perspective of social justice, is whether they can be seen as part of a new movement for social justice. The more specific question I pose in this conclusion is whether globalization and social exclusion, as a specific problematic, might serve as a conceptual means to unify diverse struggles for democracy and autonomy – against inequality, racism, sexism, and national or religious oppressions. Goran Therborn posed this question in a slightly different form when he argued that: “[t]o the extent that it is actually operating, globalisation puts on the agenda equality or inequality for the whole of human kind” (2000: 34).

Globalization promises equality (at least in the long term), but it actually generates inequality. What it also generates – as a form of contemporary capitalism – is an increased dispersion of subject positions through the process of social exclusion. Hilary Silver refers to how “the older logic of inequality and class conflict made interests in the workplace, neighborhood and family consistent with partisan demands on the state” (1996: 137). In this traditional model of capitalism, social struggles are unified (or at least tend to unification) around demands on the nation-state. Today, under the new informational mode of network capitalism (see Castells 1996), the political logic of social exclusion is one of dispersion; that is, educated

versus the less educated, citizens versus migrants, young versus old, and those with jobs versus those without. As Silver puts it, the new capitalism “fragments constituencies in space. And because of the new poverty’s individualised quality, many of the excluded are isolated from one another, hindering mobilization or representation” (1996: 137).

In terms of global justice, the main or most visible movement today is the anti- or counter-globalization movement. In the light of the data in this article, that global inequality is caused mainly by globalization, it can be argued that makes it the main issue to confront. However, I would agree with Andrew Glyn when he argues that “we should beware of blaming the narrow scope for egalitarian programmes mainly, let alone exclusively, on internationalisation” (1998: 408). Focusing on the global level might actually be detrimental in terms of distracting attention from the national, regional, and subregional levels, where inequality may be countered and social mobilizations generated around specific issues. The notion of an inexorable globalization process plowing back the gains of the welfare state (see Teeple 1995 for this argument) simply cannot be sustained. National patterns of social and economic developments are still, arguably, determinant (see Pierson 1998; Rieger and Leibfried 1998) and globalization cannot be seen as the main causal agent in the decline of the welfare state.

In fact, it does not even make sense to think of globalization as a causal agent at all, insofar as social and economic institutions are based at a whole series of “levels” from the local through to the global. If socioeconomic life is multi-scalar, so also, inevitably, will be the political movements that arise to pursue social justice. Given this diffusion of power, there is probably no one “level” or “scale” which is preeminent today. J. Rogers Hollingsworth refers in this regard to a “world of unprecedented complexity,” but where “the future is very much open” (2004). Given this plurality, the social-democratic struggle will be diverse and plural. These struggles will not converge spontaneously and will require a radical-democratic imagination fit for the globalization era and networked capitalism. What Chantal Mouffe calls for is a new “common sense” that “would transcend the identity of different groups so that the demands of each group could be articulated with those of others according to the principle of democratic equivalence” (1989: 42).

Having stressed the complexity of inequality today, we are seemingly left with “fragmented constituencies” (Silver 1996) and “fractured identities” (Bradley 1996) without the unifying tendency that social class and the nation-state once provided. At the international level, it was imperialism that once served as a “democratic equivalent,” which could unify diverse social struggles in the imperialist heartlands and across the oppressed nations. Today, Hardt and Negri (2000) argue for a common, unified struggle against what they call Empire – actually the United States in practice – that is, all the “capillary struggles” across the world. While it is clear that the national/regional moments of capitalism are not obliterated or erased by globalization/Empire, the latter does act as a framework for many diverse struggles for equality. In that sense, the focus on globalization and social exclusion could serve as a useful focus for a “democratic equivalent,” insofar as inequality and a whole host of other “discontents” generated by globalization can be unified under a common perspective.

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Chapter 3

Unequal Nations: Race, Citizen, and the Politics of Recognition

SALLIE WESTWOOD

This chapter addresses the social construction, maintenance, and deconstruction of inequalities through a focus on the nation, and the way in which to invoke the nation as a central moment in the development of modernity is to invoke unequal relations. The discussion that follows articulates a series of key themes in relation to the discussion of social inequity: First, the nation and modernity in which the discussion elaborates the development of nations and states in relation to rhetorics of progress and a rights discourse and the contradiction between these and notions of territory, exclusivity, and ethnic absolutism. Second, the chapter considers the nation as an “imagined community” in which forms of discourse and institutional practices seek ways to center the nation and to provide the basis for relations between citizens, nationals, and the nation. But, third, the chapter traces the myriad ways in which embodied citizens break out and reconstruct their relations with the nation as, for example, classed, gendered, raced, subjects with specific relations to the national project, thus producing disassembled nations. And, fourth, the discussion turns to diasporic nations and debates on the ways in which nations throughout the world have had to re-vision the Enlightenment rhetoric of nations and nationals in relation to the complexities that now constitute national identities and the struggles that are ongoing around this configuration. Diasporic nations are not new, although sometimes the discussion does suggest this. For instance, Latin American nations called into being before many of their European counterparts were diasporic from their inception. The final section of the paper considers the ways in which resistance to unitary national stories has been mobilized and the ways in which this has shifted the terrain of national identities and unequal relations. Here also, social movements organizing in Latin America provide instructive and illustrative material with which to elaborate the analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ways in which the nation is being re-visioned through the impact of a politics of recognition and the call to cosmopolitanism, which is changing the account of unequal nations. In the end I will interrogate these claims; are reconceptualizations producing actual shifts in the inequalities that nationhood has sustained both within and between nations?

The Nation and Modernity

Conventional accounts of nation formation begin with the premise of the nation as a modern form, one of which was called into being by Western modernity. For Raymond Williams (1983), nations were a convenient way of organizing orderly markets for the ever-expanding capitalism of the modern era and, importantly, a mode of expression of structures of feeling. This combination of sentiment and bounded spaces has characterized the analysis and practice of nation building, nation-state formation, and national identities.

Thus, Weber in his essay on "The Nation" actually provides substantive examples of the multiplicity of relations within nations and suggests that they can change over time; he wrote: "a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own" ([1913] 1978: 121). But, it is a complex picture and one in which, for the purposes of this essay, it is useful to invoke Giddens's account of the growth of nations in relation to the fixing of borders and the development of state structures. Thus, for Giddens, "A nation-state is therefore a power-container . . . and the preeminent power container of the modern era" (1985: 119–21). Central to the power relations of modern nation-states is the claim to legitimate control over the means of violence within a given territory, which has produced forms of governance and the institutionalization of coercive measures in the military and civil policing. This provides for the policing of the borders that constitute the territorial integrity of the nation; and within, ultimately secures the compliance of nationals to the nation-state project. Expressed in a different way, Bauman used the metaphors of "heavy" and "light" to differentiate the modern from the current postmodern era and he notes that "heavy" modernity was the era of "hardware" comprising armies, factories, and machinery, all in the interest of conquering space (2000). He suggests that territory and its domestication was the crucial marker of modernity evident in the rise of nations and the growth of colonial powers. Central to these forms were the inequalities that have come to be the main producers of politics in the contemporary period, a view elaborated by Touraine when he wrote:

We now have to go back to the beginning. It was the strength of the constitutional nation-state that made rationalization and ethical individualism the twin pillars of modernity. That was the great strength of the Republic and the Nation, of the truly political order that took priority over society as a whole, just as reason or the meaning of history took priority over individual interests. (2000: 44)

To invoke modernity and to frame the rise of the nation in the ways in which Touraine elaborates, is, on the grounds of homogeneity and authenticity, to distance nations from the notion of "ethnic origins" and primordial accounts of a people with shared cultures – histories that form a seamless and discontinuous relationship with the nation *per se* (Smith 1986). It is much more useful to employ notions of "fictive ethnicity," which provide the basis for a narrative of the nation which is constantly invoked although it is constantly reinvented in order to secure an account of the nation as fixed (Balibar 1990). Touraine's account seeks instead to foreground

the political and to understand the nation as a political project – as it is understood today by those, from Kashmir to Palestine, who still seek the confluence of territory and sentiment in a homeland.

Precursors to the modern project like Hobbes (1588–1679) and Locke (1632–1704) raised issues of politics and nations that were to become some of the most enduring. For Hobbes it was the issue of order and the ways in which the social contract could secure conditions of life for a population, while Locke sought to unravel the conditions necessary to freedom. Their concerns prefigured those of the Enlightenment philosophers and Rousseau (1712–78), who reversed the Hobbesian account of the state of nature as brutish and sought a social contract and forms of liberty to offset the deleterious effects of society. In these accounts, as Hobbes suggested, it is instrumental reason that will promote civility, the kind of civility that Kant (1724–1804) sought in his writings on cosmopolitanism – although these writings were contradicted by his account of “other races.” However, Kant also sought ways in which to address the moral issues produced by the social changes and generation of “possessive individualism” as capitalism began to consolidate. What he understood about the changing world was that it was important to “Dare to know!” which became so important to the Enlightenment project of reason and science. This, suggested Touraine, was what marked the modern project, and it was revolutionary, offering new ways of knowing the world as a basis for organizing social life on a model of reason. As Touraine noted: “Reason takes nothing for granted; it sweeps away social and political beliefs and forms of organization which are not based upon a scientific proof” (1995: 11). While science and the ordering, classifying, and rationalizing of the world were major motifs of the era, another was the growth in discourses related to the political subject.

The French Revolution with its call to liberty, equality, and fraternity and the American revolutions in both the north and the south produced an account of freedom and self-determination for the collective subject of politics against colonizers and kings. How did these sentiments come to be reorganized in relation to the nation and nationalist discourses? In part this was a product of the earlier historical struggles for land and power in Europe and the imperial influence of the European powers in the Americas. As Bauman suggested, it was the domestication of territory, which mostly implied the subjugation of peoples who sought in myriad ways to resist subjection and reclaim both a sovereignty of the people and a homeland. The ways in which this became allied with notions of progress is one part of the struggle for nationhood that unfolded and became the basis for a notion of rights and the articulation of a rights discourse. Historically, there were antecedents in the types of “civic patriotism” generated in the Italian cities in earlier decades, which promoted art, culture, and Machiavelli’s writings on the politics of the princely states. However, while this tied place and sentiment together and produced a localized “nationism,” it was at some distance from the generation of national agendas. I would like to suggest, to the contrary, that history is much more discontinuous and has been impressed upon by the rise of both the discourse of rights, and by notions of the scientific classifications of peoples prevalent in Western Europe and transported around the globe. It is, in part, the disassembling of the relationship between the West and the rest in which the West also saw diversity, difference, and a basis for collectivity. Thus, the nation emerged within conditions of

racialized inequalities and European identities were being forged against the racialized others of the globe. Of course some within Europe, like Muslims and Jews, had been already purged and exiled. By the nineteenth century, distinctions between peoples were beginning to be codified and produced as science. Simultaneously, the growing power of capitalism and the development of wage laborers, and the Enlightenment discourse of freedom and equality, was impressed upon the practices of enslavement and feudal remnants. Thus, the nation emerged at a time of fractures and as the product of a revolutionary impulse in the Americas, while enslavement was contested in the aftermath of fierce resistance and rebellion across the continents.

The separateness of nations emerged slowly across Europe and in rebellions in the nineteenth century in South America, which very often was ahead of Europe. What emerged were tentative confluences of territory and peoples; and, in order to effect the coalescence of people with nation and land, there developed a whole series of discourses on the nature of national history, ethnic background, and the struggle for nationhood in ways that would become the official discourse of the nation and into which the people were inducted. For some, the inequalities in relations within the nation were all too apparent: Europe had monarchies and aristocracies in Spain, Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany, while France exemplified the republican ideal. What was being formed in this early phase of nation building? Writers like Smith (1986) and Anderson (1991) emphasize the role of intellectuals in articulating a national project and the goals of the nation in relation to a collective, or subject – the people. Thus, there was a strong populism that coexisted with the hierarchies of class and heritage, or blood, in relation to the aristocracy and the landed gentry. Given the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century upheavals, it is not surprising that the inequalities that existed in all these social formations were glossed in an attempt to present “the nation” as an abstract ideal in which all were equal as nationals. Some, like the British, remained as subjects in relation to a monarchy; for others the slow march toward citizenship had begun.

The national project sought to ally the interests of all sections of the population with the specific ruling group, an aristocratic command or a bourgeoisie who formed the central element in the liberal revolutions across the world. However, while the emphasis was upon self-determination, notions of democracy and the people’s representation were again sources of struggle. The development of national polities, and in some nations a parliamentary system of government giving rights and responsibilities to citizens, emerged in the twentieth century long after people had fought and died in wars in the name of nations. Nations, as I have suggested, were constructed in conditions of inequality and incorporated ever-increasing inequalities that were institutionalized by the growing power of the state and bureaucracies. However, the abstracted nation comprised abstracted nationals who stood in for the vast majority of the people within the borders of the nation-state. It was only as capitalism developed into industrialization and the contradictions within the system became apparent that a critique was articulated in which the silent majority began to insist on a voice in the polity. For many working people this initial voice was the voice of labor through trade unionism expressed as the voice of the property-less masses of wage laborers. Citizens were those who held property and who could therefore vote and have a voice; this meant, in effect, that within the

community of the nation with its attention to the equality of nationals, most of the population was disenfranchised – men and women. It was only in frontier societies like New Zealand that women and men secured the vote at the same time. Gender was one axis of inequity; ethnicity and race were a second and third. The nation in the modern period articulated an account of origins, which privileged one ethnicity over others, marginalizing diversity and presenting a monologic account of national memory and construction. Outsiders to this account struggled to be heard, to make claims, and to be counted as citizens; this was a part of the national story whether the population was mixed by migration or colonization of the original inhabitants of the territory now claimed by the nation. This discourse occurred in North America, the Latin American states, and colonized territories of the world where the nation, especially the British nation, sought to advance its imperial claims as a deterritorialized nation. It was this national imaginary that proved so enduring during the twentieth century and to which the discussion now turns.

Nations as Imagined Communities

It was Benedict Anderson (1983, 1991) who revived interest in the conceptualization of nations through his account of “imagined communities,” which drew on Weber’s account of sentiments and the importance of intellectuals and class formation in the rise of nations. Anderson gave preeminence to the role of print and literary culture in producing the nation, prompting an outpouring of work on how nations are narrated through the literary canons that pertain to specific cultural formations (Saïd 1993; Bhabha 1994). Unfortunately, such a view left those without literate cultures outside the nation-building project and, of course, modernity itself. In the second edition of his book, Anderson sought to temper these views and to introduce the importance of spatiality and the ways in which territories become maps that become logos for nations and national consciousness (1991). It was not that Anderson was specifically Eurocentric in his examples, but he had a model of nation building that was constructed within the overarching view of modernity and the modern project. Despite these difficulties, however, the Anderson account of imagined communities fueled a variety of studies of nations including research on the relations within nations where there were strong oral traditions (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996, for example). Equally, the idea of community with its holistic connotations and boundedness led to questions as to the inclusionary and exclusionary nature of this imaginary.

The notion of an imagined community is, however, a very useful way to think about nations and inequalities because the term suggests a form of horizontal integration within the state-organized borders of the nation in which all are equal and connected, although this is a community without face-to-face interaction. Instead, it is precisely an imaginary into which subjects may place themselves as part of the nation and in which legal definitions provided by the state define insiders as “nationals,” and outsiders as “aliens.” The imagined community of the nation provides the backdrop to national identity and provides a place within the community for those with national affiliations while it displaces those who are not imagined within the nation. The British nation is a clear case in which the hegemony of

Englishness, the Church of England, and the power of the monarchy to define Britishness, coupled with the power of empire, subjugated Welsh, Irish, and Scottish identities; such was the power of hegemony that it produced nationalist movements from within these unimagined collectivities. Now, with the devolution of powers to Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, the English (for so long taken for granted as the British) are bereft and debates on national identities have become a major part of current politics. Here, cultural and ethnic claims were made in relation to Britishness, but class and region, land and gender, are also part of this contestation.

The case of Britain alerts us to just how fractured the imaginary community of the nation is, and, in relation to our concerns in this paper, we also understand these fractures to be fault lines of unequal relations. But rather than dwell on the British case, it will be more instructive to travel to Latin America and to India to further explore the ways in which the homogenizing account of the nation, in which disembodied citizens are given rights in law that are equal, is disassembled by the very decentered particularities of social and cultural formations. Mallon's account of Mexico, for example, demonstrates the ways in which despite the revolutionary character of the Mexican liberation war, the indigenous population was not part of the imaginary of the Mexican nation (1995). The subsequent revolt in Chiapas brought together the unequal relations between regions, divisions between rural and urban, between ethnicities, and the class character of the Mexican state. Equally, the inequalities of ethnicity were exacerbated in relation to women who, despite their role in revolutionary struggles, were some of the last women throughout the world to receive citizenship rights in 1957. The states of Latin America are important because they came into being early in the nineteenth century with a national agenda patterned after the North American emancipation from the British. In fact, adventurers and fighters moved south and contributed to the wars of independence in South America. This produced an account of nations with a Creole urban and landed elite for whom the interests of the nation were coterminous with their class interests; the products of this can be seen today in the struggles of those marginalized in this confluence of nation, state, and class. However, the inequities have a very specific inflection in Latin America with the attempt to build a national center organized around a fictive ethnicity which was brought into being as a hybrid identity – *mestizola*.

In Brazil, for example, large claims were made for the inception and maintenance of racial democracy despite the fact that Brazil did not abolish slavery until 1880. In Argentina, the indigenous peoples were dispossessed by the arrival of European migrants although that did not stop specific forms of anti-Semitism traveling with the migrants and being embellished by the Creole elite (Guy 1991). In all these nations as they developed the indigenous peoples were an absence brought back into the nation in the twentieth century in Peru or Chile, Ecuador or Colombia within the discourse of class. They became the undifferentiated peasantry of Latin America in which an economic category produced an erasure of race and ethnicity consistent with national identities built on the fiction of hybridity and racial democracy (Westwood and Radcliffe 1993). Thus, the unequal relations of race, ethnicity, class, gender, region, rural–urban differentiations, and sexualities seriously undermine the claim to an inclusive imagined community. Importantly, it is not just that nations are fractured by inequalities but that the national story, the whole

conception of the nation, has an important role in producing and reproducing these inequalities. It returns us to the notion from Giddens that nations are power containers and containers of unequal powers. This suggests that rather than fixed, inert entities with bounded territories and legal-rational bureaucracies, nations are sites of contestations over resources, visibility, and meaning.

The Nation Disassembled

Contestations within the nation challenge abstract legal notions of citizenship, that is, rights and responsibilities on a liberal model of equality before the law and the right to vote. However, these notions are important and sustain a terrain of dissent that can call up the rhetoric of rights and distributive justice (Walzer 1983) in the interests of specific groups. Equally, the national project, which seeks to fix identification between subjectivities and the nation, is constantly subject to subversions through the multiplicity of imagined communities in which citizens seek a sense of belonging (Chatterjee 1993).

Some part of the debate on the disassembling of the nation relates to gender inequalities and the ways in which feminist theorists like Pateman (1988) and Eisenstein (1989) have argued against the abstracted liberal model of the citizen/national and for an embodied account which exposes the male bias of the abstractions of liberal political theory. Women were excluded from political rights both in practice and in discourse because the radical impulse that promoted democracy against aristocracy was defined in relation to a community of men. Women were excluded because the public realm replicated that of the private and the marital contract in which women were submissive to the power of men. Thus, despite gains in voting rights for which women have fought as embodied subjects, their embodiment as women is still the source of their inequality in a male-dominated world. This argument is that of a radical feminist who views the question of rape and the issue of consent as the crucial marker of women's subordination in a world where it is still, on the whole, not possible to be raped within marriage. In relation to the nation the issue is complicated by notions of inheritance and the emphasis upon paternal rights rather than maternal rights to claim the status of a national. Similarly, it is only recently in Britain that wives have acquired the status necessary to confer national status on husbands. Yet, for many nations the figure of the mother is a key marker of the nation and the language of motherland is common. Gender inequities were, and are, a major axis of political action in relation to citizenship rights; and while earlier struggles focused upon the right to vote, more recent rights claims relating to women as embodied citizens have become more diverse, some relating directly to the nation.

The most well-known action by women in relation to the nation-state was the politics of the disappeared, when the rhetoric of the nation and the signifier of mothers within the state were called up by Motherist groups in search of their missing sons and daughters. The most well-known Motherist group comes from Latin America and is known as the Mothers of the Disappeared. In Argentina and other nation-states, women in the 1970s, faced with the brutality of the coercive power of the military and the arrest, imprisonment, and death of numbers of

citizens, turned the rhetoric of the state upon the state. The state claimed to be protecting citizens and working for the national good to secure family life, while it systematically destroyed civil society and many families. The mothers of those who had disappeared protested as mothers, in full view of the military and the world via the power of television, asking for a voice and claiming the disappeared sons and daughters. They became "disobedient subjects of the state," turning their powerlessness on the state. Schirmer (1993) called these groups "Motherist" and they formed a powerful new mode of politics. Although there were many groups throughout Latin America, the best-known were the Madres of Argentina, who secured a cross-class alliance and mounted a silent protest on a weekly basis in the main square of Buenos Aires. However, despite their protest, the matter of the disappeared – those erased from the national story – remains unresolved, in part, because an amnesty in 1986 all but absolved the military. The Motherist groups were, however, crucial in exposing the hollow call to the nation as a community of equals and were instrumental in the disassembling of "the nation" as a focus for a sense of belonging, foregrounding instead a call to human rights and a larger universalism.

Claims that the nation overrides, or speaks for, class interests orchestrated in relation to the national interest are another arena of ongoing class struggles and contestations. Organized trade unions call up the citizen-worker whose interests and politics may be at some distance from the official account of the nation as a community of equals. This is a polity of inequalities and struggles against the contradictions of capitalism. Nowhere are these contradictions more clearly expressed than in the struggles between state-sector workers and the government of the day, in which the latter appeals to the sense of public duty of the teacher, the nurse, the social worker against their claims as workers. The very language of "public servants" suggests that the nation and the public realm are coterminous, and history has repeatedly shown that this is a powerful imaginary. Nonetheless, embodied workers have frequently disrupted the notion of equality and the abstracted individual of liberal democracy by acting politics beyond the ballot box – by withdrawing their labor or claiming the streets for public demonstrations, thereby making visible fractures within the nation.

The embodiment of citizens is one way in which the abstracted model of the individual has been deconstructed, but the claims go further. Not only is this a model of masculinist citizenship and national identity; it is also one in which heterosexuality is privileged and hegemonic. This hegemony has been challenged in a multiplicity of ways and attempts have been made to normalize multiple sexualities. The transgressive and performative power of Gay Pride marches or the Sydney Mardi Gras is, in part, bound to the insistence on the visibility of gay sexual identities and their claims to public space. Visibility is also a key moment in "outing" campaigns, which insist upon the public acknowledgment of gay identities. However, these forms of politics have been founded upon a homogenous, unitary "gay" subject which might be strategic in terms of the politics of social movements but which has been subjected to the same processes of deconstruction as the unitary Black subject in the politics of race. Seidman (1995) suggests that part of this shift is explored in the work of Queer theory, which makes the binary heterosexual/homosexual problematic and engages in a different form of outing at the cultural and theoretical level.

Sexual minorities are not part of the matrix of citizenship despite the battles fought over sexual freedoms, neither have they become part of the nation (Evans 1993). In most Western countries the figure of the homosexual is the antithesis of the patriot and outside the family of the nation. Despite attempts in Britain to secure marital rights for homosexual and lesbian couples these still do not exist, and it was only in December 2000 that the law was changed, amid opposition, to equalize the age of consent at 16 for both heterosexuals and homosexuals. Discrimination in the military and public service persists, but these inequalities do not compare with the Latin American situation, where gay cultures are largely underground and homosexuality is outlawed, for example in Ecuador where transvestite prostitutes have been shot and physically abused.

Transsexuals as a sexual minority often have considerable difficulties in securing health care and in reassigning their gender for legal purposes. Only in Malaysia, after a campaign involving a prominent soap opera star, is it now possible to change a birth certificate. This is consistent with parts of South East Asia; for example, in Thailand, where "lady boys" are part of the culture of pleasure and of the available sex/gender scripts. Commonsense accounts of gender identities in Thailand stress the existence of a third way against the binary man/woman. These forms of sexuality demonstrate the variety of sexual stories that can be told (Plummer 1996); and the ways in which these stories have multiplied is one part of the Foucauldian notion that the places, spaces, and forms in which sexualities are articulated have multiplied and continue to do so. The question for Plummer, which reiterates that of Weeks (1989) and Seidman (1995), is: How can a terrain be constructed in which the variety and diversity of sexual stories can be told and lived without one account becoming preeminent and reducing other accounts to the margins? This is one part of a radical democratic response and a lived politics, which has been so crucial to sexual politics as part of the social movements for radical democracy. However, sexualities are up against the state and forms of governmentality in which the sexual lives of citizens, from reproductive issues to the institutionalization of heterosexuality, have been increasingly drawn into the regulatory powers of the state. The implications for the national imaginary are expressed through the use of familial language with its implied heterosexuality, and in the inability, most tellingly, of the military that guard the contours of the nation and respond to external threats to accept homosexual and lesbian practices and identities. Despite repeated attempts to alter this in Britain by claims to the European Court of Human Rights, there has been no breakthrough to date.

Fractures by gender and sexuality decenter the nation and produce a multiplicity of imagined communities organized around specific identities and embodied citizens. Racial and ethnic identities not only fracture; they also can create chasms within and between nations because nations are organized around a fictive ethnicity and a national story which promotes the idea of a shared history and origin. The next section will discuss in depth the impact that postcolonial migrations have had in Europe and the ways in which nations have become diasporic nations, hollowing out the original myths of nationhood in the process. Racial discrimination exists throughout the world and has called into question the image of community and the shared space of the nation with its horizontal camaraderie. Nations are organized by states that set the boundaries of the nation and distinguish between

nationals and aliens – determining who will be within and who will be without the nation. Even when racially diverse peoples do manage to get in, they very often find that the everyday racism and the institutional racism of public life marginalizes and eradicates them from the national story. Western European nations have passed laws making racial discrimination illegal in politics, the workplace, and in spheres of the public realm but laws have not eradicated racism – especially in the military or the police who guard the nation. In Britain especially, the question of race and the nation is complicated by a colonial past shared with other European nations, in which Black and Asian soldiers were called to serve and die for the nation but were then discarded when the wars ended. It is summed up by the phrase Paul Gilroy used as the title of his 1987 book: “There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack.” In Britain, and elsewhere, there has been a major politics of race in which all forms of activity have been directed at exposing and attempting to change the conditions in which racism is produced and reproduced. The civil rights movement in the USA in the 1960s and the Black Power movement (from which the feminists and gay rights activists learned so much) did produce change and also violence. However, the issues on which it fought are still part of the American landscape. Often racism and poverty are a couplet adding to the sense of denial and erasure for impoverished sections of minority peoples. Difference is written on the body, thus it is embodied citizens who protest their exclusion and the lack of equality in societies where equality is a central trope of the national story; they use the terrain of the nation to make their claims. By the very nature of such claims, they contribute to the disassembling of the nation.

Specific forms of organizing in relation to inequalities expose the myths of united nations of one people under the flag, but there are also ways in which forms of governance and forces of globalization contribute to the fractures within nations. Thus, nations are being decentered from both within and without. Britain is one example in which the hegemony of Englishness constructed as Britishness has been fractured through devolution, which has given assemblies and parliaments to Wales and Scotland at a time when there had been long campaigns for national autonomy in both areas. Tom Nairn wrote of the “break up of Britain” at the height of the Scottish nationalist campaigns and, more recently, of “after Britain” (Nairn 2000); while another commentator, Andrew Marr, entitled his book *The Day Britain Died* (Marr 2000). For both, old Britain is disassembled. Nairn suggests that Scottish independence is close and Marr suggests a new federalism, a reassembled nation that will constitute Britain for the twenty-first century. These books, with their British focus, represent one part of an ongoing debate about the political ruptures that constitute the new Europe. Changes within nation-states in which the unifying national story has been disrupted are familiar throughout the world and demonstrate the importance of understanding that while the forces of globalization are powerful in reorganizing national imaginaries, dissent and disruption from within the boundaries of nation-states are also part of the narrative. Regions that become part of these ruptures are very often regions with grievances related to poverty and underdevelopment, as in the example of Chiapas in Mexico; but inequalities are also refracted through strong regional or cultural identities – located in Wales, for example, with language and in Scotland with a specific tradition of autonomy and an historical antipathy toward the English. Thus, the terrain on which claims are

made is very often that of the nation and nationalism as a rallying point for disaffection and disenfranchisement, just as it was in anticolonial struggles.

The vision of a united Europe emerged in the wake of World War II and has produced a novel structure in which the sum is more than the parts. It is not a simple confederation of nations but an experiment in European integration which has been most enthusiastically received and entered into by the poorest regions of Europe – Ireland or Portugal, for example – alongside a united Germany. Britain, however, has been a reluctant European at the level of governance and the new currency, claiming for itself specificities beyond the principle of subsidiarity which is enshrined in the European Charter and which allows for nation-state differences. Nevertheless, progressive legal changes have come to Britain from Europe through the European Court for Human Rights and the social contract, which has had an impact on the unequal working lives of women and workers' rights more generally. Europe destabilizes the notion of sovereign nations while promoting common policies on immigration and the conception of the national. Workers across Europe can be mobile and have the right to work throughout the European Union but those outside now find no entry points; there has been considerable discussion of "fortress Europe," which means that if a worker is denied access in one country this holds for all the others. At the same time, however, there are the thousands of "guest workers" on specific contracts doing essential work in the European Union who have no rights to remain at the end of the contract. One reason that the "refugee crisis" has occurred is because the European nations have outlawed economic migration by barring entry to those who wish to work and contribute. The only way to secure entry is via refugee status. Refugees, of course, are beyond all borders, belonging to no nation or state; vagabonds wait at the gate and by their presence disrupt the discourses of freedom and equality so privileged in the Enlightenment discourses of Europe and the Western world.

Diasporic Nations

Recent debates on globalization (Held 2000) have suggested that we are now living in a postnational world and that transnational organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with the United Nations, are more relevant in the postnational era. This strong case is countered by those who suggest that the nation has been in some sense "hollowed out" and that globalization has indeed had an impact but that the national project is far from over. Castells, for example, in his analysis of power flows and economic relations, from the globalization of the drug trade to the importance of the IMF, acknowledges that in order to be involved in global processes it is still necessary to fly a national flag (1998). The most dispossessed are those without a state, which is why peoples like the Palestinians and the Kurds still prioritize the national question.

For Bauman (1998) the attempt to secure a home within national walls still marks the aspirations of those he calls "vagabonds" – refugees on the outside. However, in his later work Bauman is clear that the era of hardware and the modern project of territorial control is tempered as we move into "liquid modernity" analogous to the software era, in which nations and national projects cannot exist except as

globalized entities (2000). In part, globalization contributes to the decentering of the nation, but it can also stir strong national sentiments in a world without free trade, especially for the poor nations. It is the inequities of nations that so often are elided from discussions of globalization. As Bauman noted: "Globalization divides as much as it unites; it divides as it unites – the causes of division being identical with those which promote the uniformity of the globe" (1998: 2).

Giddens reminds us that globalization is not a single or uniform process and for some writers it is more useful to separate globalization from globalism (1999). Even the change of terminology, however, does not signal agreement on the pre-processes involved. Beck, for example, notes that globalism is the "view that the world market eliminates, or supplants political action – the ideology of rule by the world market, the ideology of neoliberalism" (2000: 117); whereas Cohen and Kennedy take the opposite view to suggest that globalism "is at the center of an alternative vision" (2000: 111). It is not surprising that there should be such divergent views because the relationship between the economic, political, and cultural moments of globalization is not being teased out; instead globalization or globalism is being used as the current version of the juggernaut running over us. It is, however, a peculiarly Western metropolitan vision; not one, for instance, that considers an Islamic account of globalization as the world community of believers, the *umma* which preceded the current discussions. Similarly, globalization requires a historical periodization to consider ways that new forms are different from previous empires and colonialism, which were also global phenomena binding territory to governance and generating the unequal nations of today.

People have always migrated, but the increase in migration from the poor world to the rich and within countries from poor regions to rich urban centers has generated a new vision of the nation, the diasporic nation. Although there is considerable discussion in Europe concerning the consequences of migration and resettlement of peoples from across the globe, discussion has been accompanied by amnesia of the earlier diasporic nations of the Americas and forms of nation building consequent upon the movements of people. Nation-building projects in the Americas were born of plunder and subjugation and produced rebellions and revolutions. This is not the place to rehearse this complex history but simply to note that in Latin America Creole minorities generated nation-building projects in the nineteenth century that were as motivated by Enlightenment notions of liberty, equality, and brotherhood as were those in Europe and North America. In these nations, a minority held power, owned land, and organized the military that exercised a powerful role in later nation-building projects. Of concern, in relation to our theme of unequal nations, is the fact that in diverse ways, from Amazonia to the North American plains, American nations were fashioned from diasporic populations in situations where genocide and erasure were enacted on the indigenous populations. Huge migrations flowed from Europe to both South and North America, but the responses in terms of the fictive identities that were generated were different. In Latin America, national identity was constructed in relation to a conception of hybridity expressed in the terms *mestizola* as the people of the nation. In North America, identity was constructed around ideas of an ethnic melting pot and the common sense of hyphenated identities, for example, Jewish American. In each case, however, the fictive ethnicity privileged race and, despite the official

discourse of racial democracy or “the land of the free,” racial disparity was the key inequity of the Americas. It was articulated, of course, with land disparities and unequal rights in relation to citizenship, struggles that are still being fought. In the USA, the model of the ethnic melting pot excluded the eventually emancipated enslaved population, a legacy with which the country lives today. More recently, the arrival of the Latino/a population has prompted a new diaspora nation in the cities where young Puerto Ricans become “AmeRicans” in a witty response to White America. However, Latino migration has also prompted a nationwide campaign in defense of English (Urcoli 1997) against the perceived “threat” of bilingualism and the rise of Spanish in cities from Miami to Los Angeles. Numerous studies attest the social and economic mobility of certain migrants to the USA, even as there remain entrenched impoverished sections of the Black community in the urban centers.

Similarly, in Latin America diaspora nations used the account of racial democracy not as an affirmation of those who are part of the African diaspora but as a disavowal of Blackness (Nascimento 1989). *Mestizo/a* moves people closer to the validation of Whiteness in countries across Latin America. In Colombia, where the Black population fought for land rights, it now appears that they will occupy enclavic spaces. In Brazil, home to a nation-building project in which racial democracy was articulated, Black people find themselves disenfranchised (Wade 1993). In research in Ecuador, on the relationship that different sections of the population had to the nation, the elite of Quito erased the Black presence. They suggested that Esmeraldas, famous as a Black state, was the worst part of Ecuador. Racism persists despite the account of hybridity or of hyphenated identities because nations were constructed as racial formations (Winant 1994), allied with capitalist economic and social relations that were racialized in their inception.

In Europe, enslavement was geographically elsewhere and colonialism somewhere else; the debate centered on a present population of twentieth-century migrants. In some countries citizenship rights and being part of the nation was never an issue; exclusion was expressed in the language of “guest workers” – cheap labor from the periphery countries of Europe, like Turkey, imported to work in the prosperous center. In Britain, where people came as part of an imaginary community of the nation, racism was even more painful and cleaves a crucial fault line across the nations of the world. However, it is a contradictory story. As in the Americas people can prosper and feel at home, enjoy a sense of belonging to the nation, and place themselves in the national imaginary so, too, in Britain. As Stuart Hall comments, there is critical mass; Black and Asian people secured citizenship rights on arrival as British colonial subjects, but this has changed and migration is no longer the issue because, as this paper has discussed, there is now very little migration to Britain. Instead, the issue is how to re-vision the inclusivity of the imagined community of the nation as an inclusive multiracial, multifait, and multicultural society. Population movements decentered the nation and there are now multiple stories to challenge the Enlightenment consensus of individual liberty and freedom as the basis of liberal democracy located within a model of representative politics. These ideals and practices have been located with a notion of the nation as unitary, which, as I have argued, has always been both idealized and contested. New contestations have emerged that radically challenge the fictive ethnicities within the old metropolitan

nations. In a sense, it is clear that “the center cannot hold” and that diversity and multiplicity have to become part of the national story. These nations in effect have to become pluri-nations, an idea from those older diasporic nations in Latin America that is explored in the next section of this paper.

Resistant Nations

Region, linguistic groups, shared cultures and histories further complicate cleavages within nations around inequalities of gender, sexuality, race, and class. However, the idea of the nation as an imaginary community invokes equality and horizontal camaraderie and unity within a territorially bounded space, thus providing the terrain on which claims for equality of status and condition may be presented. Inequities puncture these idealizations of an equal community and can become a mobilizing force against the nation grounded in nationalist rhetorics as a basis for collective action. Anticolonial struggles, for example, called up a shared history of subjugation and welded diverse peoples into a collective subject by the appeal to the notion of self-determination and the fight for nationhood. These struggles, however, usually accepted the territorial map drawn by the colonizers, which allowed inequities and divisions to be incorporated into the new nations, only for the cleavages to reappear decades later. African liberation struggles demonstrate these forms of centering and decentering, the consequences of which have been bloody wars in the latter part of the twentieth century, which have seen the resurgence of ethnic divisions and forms of racialized politics that are a complex mixture of race, region, and impoverishment.

Regional inequities are a major source of conflict in India, where it is the geographically peripheral regions like Kashmir and Assam that have generated long-fought national liberation struggles. This is the most well-articulated form of regionalism but India, a colonial mapping onto huge diversity, has very strong regional identities that incorporate ethnic and linguistic divisions, which mean the national project remains deeply uncertain. A fragile coalition of interests has now been overlain by a political project organized around a mythical Hindu India in which the “otherization” of the Muslim population has been a key marker. Reality contrasts strongly with the secular agenda of those who fought for independence and helped draw up the constitution of India. These were modern men who believed in the Enlightenment vision of progress and order. For some it was refracted through a socialist vision, for others a liberal view, but religion was not to be the signifier of India. However, the tragedy of partition, when India and Pakistan were brutally separated, means that religion is always already present and can be called up in relation to political interests. In Spain, the Basque country has fought a long separatist battle on a nationalist platform emphasizing the distinctive regional culture and, most especially, the separation between the Basque country and Spain through language. Again, this is the most disaffected region in relation to the national project but other regions also claim degrees of autonomy; Catalonia and Andalusia, for example, have traditions of self-determination which survive today in a country now part of the European Union and in which increased prosperity has enhanced the sense of a national sphere. Similar arguments relate to Welsh nationalism in Britain,

which claims a distinctive culture and is fierce in defense of the Welsh language. However, like many other national stories there is as much myth and reinvention of tradition in Celtic nationalism as in English or French nationalisms (James 1999).

Religious affiliation was also a marker of dissent in Northern Ireland, where a disenfranchised Catholic majority was discriminated against in employment, schooling, and housing and where a liberation struggle, generated as an anticolonial struggle against Britain, called up a shared historical and cultural history with Ireland. Ireland, however, remains disunited. In a peculiar twist, 50 years ago a Christian minority in the Moluccan Islands rebelled against Muslim independence and fled to their former colonists in the Netherlands, where they became part of an increasingly diasporic nation. In Britain, one section of the Muslim minority has tried to set up a Muslim parliament as a counter to the British parliament. There are myriad examples of the ways in which difference allied with inequality forms the basis for cleavages within nations, so much so that the idea of a national imaginary becomes hard to maintain and to do so requires powerful ideological work that is part of the common sense of ordinary lives (Hall 1991), alongside nationalist symbols redolent with military power.

The state articulates the exclusivity of the nation by drawing up legal requirements surrounding national status and citizenship; it thereby interpellates "citizens," but the state may also find that those not included contest their exclusion. Equally, those subjected to state abuses answer the state from within the state's own rhetoric concerning the protection of nationals and the rights of citizens. This is, of course, precisely what women across Latin America did in relation to the repression of the 1970s and early 1980s. The new period of democratization in Latin America fuels these contestations by offering a revival of civil society and a new emphasis upon citizenship and democratic rights. In the Americas more generally, the frame within which these contestations are taking place is one in which ethnicities and racisms are foregrounded and once again highlight the national question.

To explore the notion of the resistant nation I want to use examples from Latin America, some more familiar than others. Since its inception in 1994, the Zapatista uprising in Mexico received worldwide media coverage through the astute use of the Internet and global media by the leader, Subcomandante Marcos. The Zapatista struggle globalized a local issue in which poverty and land claims were allied with state abuses toward people who are not recognized as citizens or nationals, who are, in effect, not part of the imaginary of the Mexican nation and are, therefore, excluded and denied in relation to citizenship rights, individually and collectively. The Zapatista struggle is one of many current significant struggles in Latin America, which also include contestations around indigenous rights in Amazonia. In order to explore this further I want to focus on the nation-state of Ecuador.

Ecuador, a small nation with powerful neighbors like Colombia and Peru, is a country in which the military has had a major role in making the nation, using its power to forge a national army, and to claim the title "national" for the military football team. Although the military in Ecuador have engaged in human rights training since 1993, in a previous era the infamous General Pinochet advised on strategy and organization. However, the military vision of Ecuador shifted toward inclusivity and the integration of both Black and indigenous Ecuadorians into the Army and through community-development schemes, technical schools, and

interventions in the countryside. This was an important shift in the imaginary of the nation, which had previously marginalized these populations through the reliance on an ideology of *mestizaje*. In strategic terms, the military sought to pacify the indigenous populations, especially those occupying lands on the borders; the military thus acted in the interests of territorial integrity. However, this is a military within a democracy, facing organized citizens who share an interest in land. Currently, the decentered nation is disassembled and reassembled in a constant dance between the military and the organized indigenous movement, which is both national and transnational (Westwood 2001).

Even in this small nation of 12 million plus, where there is a national curriculum, national symbols, museums and histories recounting the story of the nation, Ecuador is secure neither from within nor without. It is decentered through globalization, regionalism, and the politics of identity and difference: racism, ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality. A politics of difference engages a perpetual politics of the nation; the government and the military seek to center the nation by invoking the common enemy on the border. Peru, the “other” of Ecuadorian nation-ness, has threatened Ecuador in periodic wars and constant battles over territorial integrity (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996). Ideological investments in nation building are thus woven into the state and institutional structure of the country that takes its name from the Equator. Despite all this ideological work on nation-ness, Ecuador has become a dollar economy and its national assets are being sold off due to debt and the failure to negotiate successfully with the IMF and the World Bank. Arguably, the American presence in Ecuador is like the old story of US intervention in its “backyard.” It is connected to the growing US involvement in neighboring Colombia, where dollars, military personnel, and arms is prompted, according to the White House, by the war against drugs and drug barons. It may also be the “final” war against Leftists.

These considerations apart, there are deep internal struggles in Ecuador over nation-ness, democracy, and citizenship, sustained by one of the most well-organized and articulate indigenous movements in Latin America. CONAIE (acronym for the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador) has transnational links across the border to Bolivia and global links through its website. CONAIE is a moment in the politics of recognition. The organization brings together diverse indigenous peoples with tens of linguistic identifications, customs, and religions, who are widely dispersed over a region stretching from the Andes to Amazonia. CONAIE produced a collective subject of politics out of diversity and stepped onto the national stage and into the struggles of the democratic arena. The political subject is not uniform and does not claim a unitary identity as “*indigenista*”; it was born of the recognition of difference and the multicultural world that is Ecuador.

This is all the more interesting because national identities in Latin America are organized around a fictive ethnicity which is hybrid-*mestizola*, a category which, for all the celebration of hybridity in some texts, does not eradicate racism but, perversely, fine-tunes the valorization of Whiteness and disavowal of Blackness. Into this hybrid world of the urban *mestizola* has come an indigenous movement claiming for itself a space in the nation. CONAIE fought for a program in which indigenous languages would be valued and taught; they won local victories but these were not sustained in the longer term as a form of state-sponsored multiculturalism.

In 1996 CONAIE contested elections and their leader, Luis Macas, was returned as deputy in the National Congress on a grassroots platform that, it was hoped, would secure the social movement's position in the democratic process. It was not long, however, before social-movement politics was back on the streets, protesting the sale of national assets, rising prices, failing currency, and the corruption of politicians. A coup overthrew the government of Ecuador and ousted the president, Jamil Mahoud, on January 22, 2000. Again, it was an alliance between the military and CONAIE, which coordinated street protests. The third player in this scenario was the United States and the dollar economy, which had arrived a few weeks earlier, wiping out savings and adding to the immiseration of large sections of the civilian population. The United States brokered a return to civilian rule and a new president, Gustavo Noboa, who was immediately called to account by the leader of CONAIE, Antonio Vargas. Thus, the articulation between globalizing forces and the imaginary of the nation was being enacted in novel ways, which continue today.

The central platform on which CONAIE built its organization and its strength was an alternative understanding of the nation as a pluri-nation, a decentered, polycentric nation in which many nations were recognized and had an equal and equivalent part to play, including those of indigenous descent. The notion of the pluri-nation was also important to the tactics CONAIE used and the material gains that it sought. CONAIE secured a collective subject of politics in part through shared histories, a community of suffering, and mutual respect; but also, and crucially, through land claims. A nation's claim for territorial integrity is the first of all claims. Equally, CONAIE sought to change the constitution in order to accommodate the notion of a pluri-nation. This is a claim more extensive than a call to hybridization and hyphenated identities (see Garcia Canclini 2000). The success and twists and turns in the fortunes of CONAIE in relation to its constituency have been, in part, related to the alliances that have been forged with the military against corrupt politicians. Alliances with the military have been forged in relation to democratic claims and the role of the citizenry in relation to the nation. The military stood alongside trade unions and CONAIE on the streets in 1996 and 1997 in defense of the nation and national integrity, against the selling of national assets and the incursions of foreign capital into Amazonia, plundering the land for oil. The military, trade unions, and CONAIE again cooperated in 1999 and 2000, claiming democracy for the people against the corruption and incompetence of the politicians. However, these are strategic alliances – this should not be read as a story of harmonious relations between CONAIE and the Ecuadorian military. Many indigenous and rural peoples still see the army as colonizing their villages and their land, and young people refuse national service in the military. Nevertheless, relations between CONAIE and the military begin to disturb an account of radical democracy and radical citizenship without the national and offer, instead, a different view of the nation from below, in struggles that have become globalized through the legal claims against Texaco in the oilfields, use of the Internet, and the cross-border organization of CONAIE.

The discussion of CONAIE demonstrates the ways that struggles over citizenship, and national belonging, are not simple binaries – the people versus the state. National imaginary is preeminent, but in a complex choreography is being reimag-

ined in novel ways related to the multifaceted individual and collective identities that are lived and expressed in nations around the world. In a globalized, diasporic world, creative encounters with the nation and how we imagine our sense of living in the world are essential. One part of this has been the discussion of cosmopolitanism; another has concentrated on the politics of recognition rather than a politics of difference. Difference politics has tended to collapse into a strategic essentialism and offers a unitary account of identity, leaving little room for the complex, shifting, and overlapping identities that are constituted and reconstituted through politics and culture. In the concluding section I discuss some of the discourses that seek to refashion the nation for the twenty-first century at a time when American hegemony is exercised through military force, combined with dollar power, in the interests of territorial integrity, an agenda rooted in the development of the modern nation.

Revised Nations, Cosmopolitanism and the Politics of Recognition

This chapter began with conceptualization of the nation as a “power container” (Giddens 1985), but it is very clear from the ensuing discussion that power is deeply unequal and relates to social cleavages within nations. Power is understood here not as a simple capacity but in the Foucauldian sense as productive and exercised in a number of ways. These modalities of power, from coercion to seduction, rest in a series of sites that have been discussed: racialized power, class power, engendered and sexualized power, and forms of visual and spatial power that generate and sustain inequalities in relation to nations and national projects (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000). Territorial power, for example, is allied with military power and visual symbols, from the map as logo of the nation to the ceremonial of armies. Moreover, these forms of power are unequally dispersed through the population. People may take up arms on a nationalist platform, but the legitimated forms of violence remain state-organized and under the control of the national military.

Inequalities similarly mark relations between nations expressed in the language of core and periphery or, more simply, the rich and the poor nations. Nevertheless, it is evident that within the poor world there is a metropolitan class, which is wealthy, looks toward Europe and the United States, and has strong relations with their counterparts and with transnational organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, there are no longer simple binaries between rich and poor, spatialized in the language of first and third world. The first world interpenetrates the third world and the so-called first world both incorporates and excludes the impoverished that are often also racialized minorities. Binaries have been replaced by a discourse on globalization in which the increasing interconnectedness of the world is foregrounded. However, as I commented earlier, globalization has a history and is crucially bound to the development of an unequal world within hegemonic capitalist relations.

One consequence of the attention to globalization has been the discussion of the decline of nations in relation to a world of transnational flows and global finance

capital as part of the international division of labor, which looks remarkably similar to the international division of labor under colonialism in which sections of the poor world provide labor either at home, or on the move to the wealthy North. Movements of people have indeed presented a challenge to the discourse of nations bound to an account of shared ethnic, cultural histories. However, while diasporic nations may look new in Europe, they are the basis of the Americas and the ways in which the nation-building projects of the Americas have developed. While fictive ethnicities have emphasized hybridity and hyphenated identities, this has had little impact on the production and reproduction of inequalities, most especially racial inequalities. The importance of the European Union for one part of the world, and the role of the transnational organizations throughout the globe, have had an impact on the ways in which nations are imagined. But, for the most part, the IMF and the World Bank have consolidated powers in an unequal world for an era, which many commentators call the American century. The problem for nations is that the power container has porous walls, but the level of this porosity relates to wealth and power on the world stage. The World Human Development Index, for example, provides a league table of nations hierarchized on the basis of a series of indicators, from per capita income to telephone access, life expectancy to spending on education and health. The index reproduces what is a commonsense understanding about the division of resources in the world. Thus, a nation like Bangladesh, which fought a liberation war and became a nation in 1971, is ranked 146 out of 167 nations in the world. Yet, Bangladesh is deeply globalized, producing cheap labor and cheap clothes for the world market and in trouble with the IMF and the World Bank for the lack of good governance in the country.

Against this unequal world is a political moment which hopes, through human rights discourse, to generate forms of freedom and equality worldwide in which state abuses will be answerable to the newly inaugurated United Nations Court of Human Rights and no president or general will be above the law. Thus, global governance on a democratic model is being developed and with this has come a renewed interest in the discourse of cosmopolitanism (Fine and Cohen 2002). Derived initially from Kant and at odds with some of his writings on the peoples of the world, which would now be viewed as racist, cosmopolitanism has been a source of contestation, especially from those who belong to an alternative tradition, socialism. Within socialist discourses, internationalism spoke for the connections among the dispossessed around the globe against the cosmopolitan, which was used as a term of abuse for the *flâneurs* of the metropolitan urban world. The cosmopolitan was rootless, usually male, and upper class. However, there has been an attempt to revision the notion in the work of Held et al. (1999), Hall (2000), and Beck (2000), for example.

Held et al. suggest that the cosmopolitan project “argues that in the millennium ahead each citizen of a state will have to learn to become a ‘cosmopolitan citizen’; . . . that is, a person capable of mediating between national traditions, communities of fate and alternative forms of life” (1999: 449). Citizenship will become more dialogical through encounters with difference; at the same time citizenship will mediate different political communities through the development of regional and global forums for debate and governance. Thus, cosmopolitanism suggests “multiple citizenships” which reflect the increasing interconnectedness of the world beyond

national borders. One example might be the work of the CONAIE organization, which works both within and beyond the borders of the nation, and the myriad of groups and networks that relate to the United Nations through forms of coalition building. These groupings use recognized forms of organizing but now in more global ways. The cosmopolitan citizen is not the Internet-organized antiglobalization activist who is not part of an organization but who draws on another history of direct action and street protest.

For Beck (2000) and Hall (2000) notions of cosmopolitanism are not strictly about political configurations and the ways in which citizens will be reformed; they relate to sensibilities and cultures and everyday life within certain European and American cities. These are diasporic urban spaces in which, suggests Hall, there is no political program of cosmopolitanism but an everyday world of what he calls "vernacular cosmopolitanism," replete with forms of hybrid cultures, cross-over relationships and a sense of neighborhood. Beck uses the term "banal cosmopolitanism" in a similar way to mark urban diasporic lives as lived somehow together within nations where different people have markedly different relations to the national project. This cosmopolitanism lives with differences on a daily basis, some days more successfully than others, within nations that still project the national rather than the cosmopolitan, but like the nation-building projects, cosmopolitanism is deeply imbued with the universalisms of the Enlightenment project with which this paper began. It is imbricated in the emancipatory project of the Enlightenment as another step in the progressive story in which a humanist platform of difference can now be acknowledged but domesticated within the discourse of reason. The view of radical alterity (Levinas 1989), which remains unknowable and demands recognition, is not part of the discourse of cosmopolitanism which seems to be constructed in order to develop a model of citizenship in what is understood to be a postnational world. The idea of the "cosmopolitan citizen" incorporates the same abstract qualities as the national citizen and thereby cannot speak to the issues of inequalities, power, and justice.

An alternative understanding comes from the work of Kwame Appiah (1998), who returns to the notion that both national affiliations and cosmopolitanism are sentiments and that it is no longer viable to regard them as opposed. Using his father, Ghana's roving ambassador in the 1970s, as one example, he suggests that it is possible to be a "cosmopolitan patriot," one who lives life as a cosmopolitan and shares in a political culture that is urbane and worldly, while maintaining a sense of rootedness in one nation and sharing a history and culture within a national imaginary. It is possible to be both simultaneously. This is a suggestive notion and speaks to the large numbers of people who are now transnational but who still find an emotional home in one nation. Thus, this is not hybridity but simultaneity and may not be continuous but a form of cosmopolitanism called by Clifford "discrepant cosmopolitanism." The work of Clifford (1992) and Bhabha (1994) suggest that the ways in which cosmopolitanism has traveled as part of the earlier colonial project has been its undoing because in the encounter with local cultures a hybridized form has arisen which is a more radical response from the postcolonial world. Pheng Cheah, in a critical account of both the roots of cosmopolitanism in Kant and the attempt to provide a radical re-visioning through cultural and linguistic iterations, suggested, "These attempts to erect actually existing radical

cosmopolitanism on the back of anthropologicist culturalism or linguistic freedom, however, rely on a cultural reductionist argument"; and continued, "The suggestion that hybrid cultural practices constitute the birth of cosmopolitan consciousness and indicate the impending obsolescence of national identity and the nation-state makes sense only if we reduce the complexity of contemporary neocolonial globalization to one of its strands: cultural hybridization" (Cheah 1998: 298). Instead, any account of cosmopolitanism has to return to the nation-state of a divided and unequal global order in which nationalist struggles are one moment in the attempt to counter a neocolonial order through popular nationisms.

A re-visioned cosmopolitanism, despite its merits as a sentiment, does not address a re-visioning of the national order precisely because it does not allow an encounter with the fractures of the nation and the social with which this volume is concerned; issues of exclusion, of economic inequalities and power differentials and abuses, of gender and sexuality inequities, and racial discrimination and religious intolerance. It is also clear that the nation is more porous than ever before and that attempts to center the nation against globalization, migration, and capitalist hegemony are fraught with difficulties. Yes, globalization and transnationalism are the world of this century and offer new possibilities for what Gilroy has called "planetary humanism" and the politics of human rights (2000); but, again, the human rights agenda relates citizens to states and for many this is a mobile world in which states appear as borders and human beings as the dispossessed, the homeless of the world within and beyond national boundaries.

One attempt to generate a reconceptualization of nations and citizens has been provided by Aihwa Ong in the conception of "flexible citizens." The term does not relate to the stateless and the growing ragged army of refugees that marks this time in history, but it is an attempt to realize coincidence between the transnational and the national in a diasporic era. Using the Chinese diaspora as the main focus of the study, Ong constructs "flexible citizens" as negotiating national borders while immersed in transnational capital flows and subject to the forms of governmentality that produce the subject of late modernity. This subject is formed from "the reciprocal construction of practice, gender, ethnicity, race, class and nation in processes of capital accumulation" (Ong 1999: 5). Thus, globalization processes are neither purely economic nor running over us like the juggernaut of capitalism. Instead, in the everyday practices of localities and cultural forms globalization is being forged in relation to the fractures of the nation. This seems to be a more astute way of understanding global processes as both within and without our everyday lives, from consumption decisions to professional concerns. A similar story may be generated if we return to India and the Jain diaspora (the Jains are a specific religious group whose wealth and economic influence far exceeds their numerical capacity) and the role of the Jains in the global diamond trade, where decisions about who travels where relate both to the global business context and a concern for the production and reproduction of an ethnic and cultural milieu (Westwood 2000). Thus, we return to the notion of multiple imaginary communities within which lives are lived and visioned and, while these produce the fractures of the disassembled nation, these can coalesce and overlap, producing the flexible citizens of the many diasporas throughout the world.

Although there has been an attempt to reframe claims of distributive justice and the politics of difference within claims for recognition, this still begs the question of inequities within and between nations, and these claims are the source of much debate. While Taylor (1994) and Honneth (1995) make claims on a politics of difference or identity in which misrecognition damages identities and injustice relates to modes of intersubjectivity, Fraser has more radical claims that take issue with identity-based politics and suggests that we should make claims on the basis of status and that this should be directed toward “parity of participation in social life” (Fraser 2001: 24). Thus, Fraser asks the question: Is recognition a matter of identities or of justice? She insists that it is the latter and her examples are directly related to the politics of the nation. As this chapter has argued, the imaginary community of the nation has been organized around a national story which is exclusionary and, as Fraser suggests, when claims for recognition are made it is not a claim for “valorizing group identity but rather at overcoming subordination, claims for recognition on the status model seek to establish the subordinated party as a full partner in social life, able to interact with others as a peer” (2001: 25). Thus, state-sponsored forms of multiculturalism sought to validate group identities while ignoring forms of subordination and not invoking a model of redistributive justice. The politics of recognition seeks ways in which to rearticulate redistribution and recognition away from questions of ethics toward practical politics. Thus, in Nancy Fraser’s words: “Whether they are demanding redistribution or recognition, claimants must show that the social changes they seek will in fact promote parity of participation” (2001: 33). Fraser does acknowledge that the norm of participatory parity has to be tested to see if it can distinguish between justified and unjustified claims, the corollary being, not all claims for recognition on the basis of status are justified. This also requires an interrogation and development of the notion of justice in which both national and transnational concerns can be articulated.

Thus, to conclude this discussion of “unequal nations” we return to Bauman. In his recent work he notes: “The demand for recognition is a bid for full citizenship in ‘a global community’ not yet in existence, but which is likely to emerge only if that demand is met and honoured” (2001: 149). Despite the attention to the “global community,” the first place where these demands are being articulated is within the terrain of the nation. On the global political stage inequities between nations are the key rallying cry from the poor world to the rich for social justice and the means whereby an unequal world can be transformed against the exploitation of global capital – through forms of counter-hegemonic globalization that reinvent some of the diasporic and socialist ideals of the early Latin American revolutionaries (de Sousa Santos 2001).

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Chapter 4

Intimate Citizenship in an Unjust World

KEN PLUMMER

In a world of globalised, deregulated commerce in which everything is tradable and economic strength is the only determinant of power and control, resources move from the poor to the rich, and pollution moves from the rich to the poor. The result is a global environmental apartheid.

V. Shiva, in *On the Edge*, p. 112

In the small Brazilian community of Bom Jesus de Mata and the shantytown of urban squatters, Alto de Cruzeiro, the mothers do not cry when their children die. The death of a child seems to the Western world one of the most intimate (and sad) of experiences, but when death is everywhere it becomes less so. Mothers do not even name their young babies when they are under a year old; they do not get involved, as the child's death seems so likely.

In Essex, England, by contrast, two millionaire gay men fly to California where they arrange for their sperm and a woman's eggs to be placed in a surrogate mother. They pay something like £200,000 for the birth of their twin children. A little later they arrange for another baby boy to be born this way, and later still for a fourth child to complete their new family. The children are sent to private schools.

In Los Angeles, a group of (illegal) Hispanic migrant workers go on strike. They clean the offices for a large multi-corporation on very low pay. The managers step over the workers whilst they are on their knees cleaning, and one of the workers suggests that the bosses give them their special overalls and uniforms because it "makes them invisible." One woman does not go on strike: she has had to be a whore over and over again in order to send money back to the family in Mexico, in order to get her sister work, in order to pay for her husband's medical bills, and in order just to survive. She is a traitor . . . to the union, but one can see why.

Meanwhile, also in the United States, Americans spent around \$9 billion on plastic surgery and cosmetic procedures in 2001 – with about 8.5 million procedures (an increase of 48 percent over 2000) – according to the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery. Growing numbers of people, it seems, are not happy with all manner of their body parts and are able to spend small fortunes on perfecting them.

In Philadelphia, and in many inner cities in North America, a pervasive street violence exists: many young people come to live tormented lives in the midst of drugs, death, and a decaying environment. Discount stores appear, along with graffiti and very run-down buildings – many no longer inhabited. It is here that groups of Black youths start to appear; hanging around – on street corners, outside stores, in the street, and at major complexes. The air is thick with danger and potential violence. It is the world of *Boyz 'N the Hood*. Street families seem to show a lack of consideration for others. Additionally, at the heart of the problem “is the issue of respect – being treated ‘right’ or being granted one’s ‘props’ (or proper due) or the deference one deserves” (Anderson 1999).

Here are some invisible lives not accorded much dignity or respect, lives lived without resources, status, or power: often damaged lives.¹ And here, too, are other lives with resources, able to choose what they want and to be accorded status and power: privileged lives.

Clarifying Intimate Inequalities

In a time when the world seems to be seeing the growth of inequalities – with some groups gaining more and wider choices for a comfortable life and others finding their lives becoming more coerced, restricted, and brutalized – these opening vignettes capture, albeit briefly, how inequalities touch on intimate lives and personal experience. While most people engage in intimacies over their lives’ expanse – even the dying infant is usually close to its mother – social divisions always shape these intimacies profoundly. Indeed, inequalities invade and structure the personal life across the world. Just how we can fashion our families and relationships, raise and care for our children and loved ones, live with our bodies and develop our emotions, be men and women, and experience our diverse sexualities differs widely across the inequalities of time and space. I argue in this chapter that the link between these inequalities and the intimate/personal life have not generally been given sufficient attention, and that we need to develop ways of capturing and analyzing this. This is not the first chapter, by any means, to try to do this, but it is a relatively rare concern and should be examined more extensively and intensively in the future.

To take an extreme example, intimacies under systems of slavery or caste may be very tightly structured and defined. Who can marry whom, when one can have sex, how to be a man or a woman, the very sense of identity that marks who one is, and even the restrictions placed on the body – all these must set quite profound limits to intimacies. Issues of bride marriage, child marriage, arranged marriages, and forced marriages all raise their head. Likewise, under systems of abject poverty the experience of love, the body, and sexuality may be extremely restricted. Of course, even under these systems, people resist and withdraw, rebel and accommodate, and struggle actively to build their own ways of handling intimacies. They always have some kind of “agency”; however, the choices and the actions are indeed severely limited. This is in stark contrast to the worlds described by contemporary social theorists of late modernity – which often sense both a modern world of growing choice and individuality, alongside a postmodern one characterized by a full panoply of variant lifestyle options which seem to have no limit. In these worlds,

it seems agency arrives full-blown trumpeting multiple choices for a better life. We have, it seems, to live our own life.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes senses this contrast strikingly when she talks about the situation in Brazil:

The rich fare better over all and at all stages of life, just as men fare better than women. The rich are “exempted” from the struggle that is life and appear to lead enchanted lives. Their days and nights are given to erotic pleasures (*sacanagem*) and to indulgence in rich and fatty foods; yet rarely do their bodies show the telltale signs of moral dissipation and wretched excess: bad blood and wasted livers. The poor, that can hardly afford to *brincar* (have fun, also used with reference to sex play) at all, are like “walking corpses” with their *sangue ruim*, *sangue fraco*, *sangue sujo* (bad, weak, dirty blood); their ruined and wasted livers (*figado estragado*); and their dirty and pus-filled skin eruptions, leprosy, yaws, and syphilis. These illnesses come from “inside,” they are not sent from God but come from man, the wages of extravagance, sin, and wretched excess. The body reflects the interior moral life; it is a template for the soul and the spirit. (1992: 189)

In this chapter, then, my interest lies in both “inequalities” and “intimacies” – and both are contested and problematic ideas. The latter – intimacy – is often restricted to our romantic and sexual life; but I use the term to refer to an array of arenas in which we “do” the personal life – doing bodywork, doing gender, doing relationships, doing eroticism, and doing identities. The array of arenas helps us to see the multiple forms of intimacies while focusing on “doing,” which enables us to see the social world persistently as actively achieved, as processual, as an accomplishment, and not an entity simply fixed and given (Jamieson 1998; Plummer 2003, Ch. 1).

The former – inequalities – conventionally is used to depict matters of economic inequality, but this is only one dimension of a range of *institutions of social divisions* – class and caste, race and ethnicity, gender and sexualities, age and health – that work to pattern the doings of the intimate life. We know now from feminism, antiracism theory, queer studies, postcolonialism, and the like that inequalities are organized along a number of dimensions and that these are major vectors through which we live our lives. Low income, patriarchy, age stratification, heterosexism are all structures – dealt with elsewhere in this book – that generate different patterns of interconnected inequalities. Just how they work also depends upon a number of *social processes of exclusion and inclusion* – like violence and care, enrichment and pauperization, empowerment and disempowerment, marginalization and mainstreaming, and silenced and presented voices. All this needs to connect to the *subjective experience of inequalities* – how people actually experience these inequalities on a personal and everyday-life level. This can lead us to study the ways in which people can be placed in hierarchies of esteem. It leads us to look for the ways in which people can be ignored and rendered invisible. It will document how they can be “kept waiting,” and made to live through “symbolic assaults to [a] sense of self worth and efficacy” (Anderson and Snow 2001: 399). Drawing from a broad, symbolic-interactionist perspective, Anderson and Snow suggest an array of questions:

What are the different ways in which systems of stratification manifest themselves at the micro, interactional level of social life? What are the consequences of these differences for those who experience them? How do they affect one’s sense of self and self esteem?

Table 4.1 The matrix of inequalities

<i>Institutions of social divisions</i>	<i>Processes of social exclusion</i>	<i>Experiences of inequalities</i>
Class	Opening/closing spaces	Lack
economic capital	Increasing/decreasing choices	Degradation
social capital	Empowerment/disempowerment	Defilement
cultural capital	Marginalization	Deprivations
symbolic capital	Stigmatization	Invisibility
Gender	Ghettoization	Aloneness
Ethnicity	Violence and terrorism	Fear
Sexuality	Exploitation	Low self-worth
Age	Domination	Lack of respect
Health		Insecurity
		Shame
		Humiliation
		Brutalization

And how do people negotiate and manage the affronts, insults and other manifestations of inequality as they go about their everyday routines? (Anderson and Snow 2001: 396)

Much of this is implicit also in Bourdieu's discussion of kinds of capital – especially the social, cultural, and symbolic where inequalities (and distinctions) are omnipresent. Such issues have been discussed previously in books like Sennett and Cobb's classic *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (1977), Lillian Rubin's *Worlds of Pain* (1977), Jodi O'Brien's and Judith Howard's *Everyday Inequalities* (1998), Laura Kaye Abraham's *Mama Might Be Better off Dead* (1994), and Pierre Bourdieu's *The Weight of the World* ([1993]1999). Taking all these dimensions together I call this a *matrix of inequalities*. Table 4.1 sketches this out as a framework for future thinking.

Intimacies, then, are structured very differently in situations of equality and inequality. In the former, there is a great emphasis upon choice – an emphasis that increasingly is linked to the rise of “postmodern” or “late modern worlds.” In the latter, there is very limited choice. Indeed, in these worlds, the intimate life is often linked to disempowerment, brutalization, coercion, and a massive lack of autonomy. In my view, advocates of the postmodern see only a very partial, if nevertheless increasingly important, picture of the way the global, social world is organized. It is to be found especially, but not wholly, amongst the young and wealthy of the Western world who are starting to develop their own postmodern values (Gibbins and Reimer 1999; Inglehart and Norris 2003a, b). It remains a very limited perspective for most.

In Search of Intimate Citizenship

Part of this interest in intimacy has led to the increasingly significant recent debates over “intimate citizenship.” The past 20 years have seen new theorizing over citizenship. Applied to intimacies, citizenship implies the rights and obligations surrounding different *intimate life styles*, the participation of different *intimate*

groupings, and the recognition of people's different *intimate identities*. Ideas around intimate citizenship have been increasingly placed on the political agenda. In much of the Western literature on this, great emphasis has been placed on citizenship as *the right to choose*: to choose your partner, your sexual activities, whether you have a child or not, or what you do to your body. Often couched in the language of "sexual citizenship" (Evans 1993; Richardson 1998; Weeks 1998; Bell and Binnie 2000), "sexual rights" (Petchesky 2000), or "intimate rights" (Plummer 2003), it is a citizenship of choices. In this chapter I will look briefly at some of this seemingly escalating array of *choices* as part of what theorists Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2003) and Bauman (2001) have called the "individualized society." While recognizing the growing importance of this society, there is also a need for intimate-citizenship debates to focus upon the more traditional role of *inequalities* in considering citizenship. Although elsewhere I have argued the need for intimate citizenship in the wealthy, Western, postmodern world, I am now asking the question: Can we have intimate citizenship in an unjust world?

Moreover, this problem is at the heart of this exploratory chapter. The problems of intimacies, choices, and inequalities exist in profoundly different forms amongst different groups in the same society as well as across different parts of the world. In the high-income, "rich" Western world, the problem is often one of rapid change, growing diversities, increasing choices, and a deep sense of conflict and crisis engulfing all this (but not everywhere: as is well documented, there are huge pockets of poverty in the Western world – see Devine and Waters 2004). In the low-income "poor" rest of the world, the problem is usually one of unchanging traditions, deep exploitation, abject poverty, and a closure of any sense of power and choice (but, again, not everywhere: there is also some extreme wealth and privilege in poor countries). In the former, the political struggles are over gay rights and marriages, new forms of assisted-reproductive technologies, feminist campaigns over sexuality and the body, and new patterns of sexuality, from sadomasochism to "live sex acts." In the "poor" world, the struggles are over inequality that highlights selling body parts, sexual slavery, the death of children at early ages, living with HIV and all kinds of illnesses, executions for criminal sex, female-genital mutilation, forced and arranged marriages, and so on. They seem, and indeed are, very different worlds of intimate inequalities.

Therefore, I will now turn to the postmodern citizenship of choice and then to the more traditional citizenship of equality and redistribution (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Two kinds of citizenship

<i>Citizenship of equalities</i>	<i>Citizenship of choices</i>
Low incomes	High incomes
Traditional	Postmodernizing
Social exclusion	Social inclusion
Strong stratification	Lifestyle politics
Restricted choices	Structured choice
War on poverty	Moral conflict
Redistribution	Recognition, dialogues

Sources: Giddens (1991); Gibbins and Reimer (1999); Fraser and Honneth (2003); Inglehart and Norris (2003a).

Finally, I will suggest how the term “citizen” may be of value in looking at these tensions and problems. In all of this, I am merely making preliminary skirmishes into new and somewhat uncharted territories.

The Postmodernization of Intimacies in Rich Worlds: Choice, Change, and Conflict

At the heart of intimacy debates, in the rich world, lies a sense of massive and accelerating changes. Here we have intimacies being digitalized, technologized, globalized, medicalized, commodified, and destabilized. With it, we find society increasingly losing any one grand narrative of how to live the personal life. This is the age of “reinventing the family” (Beck-Gernsheim 2002), “liquid love” (Bauman 2001), “global sex” (Altman 2000), “the demoralization of society” (Fevre 2000), “the clash of sexual civilizations” (Inglehart and Norris 2003a, b), and “the death of character” (Hunter 2000). Here we witness the growth of individualization and the seeming advance of “choices.” It seems that almost everybody believes they have a right to choose how to live their personal life. As Ulrich Beck says:

We live in an age in which the social order of the national state, class, ethnicity and the traditional family is in decline. The ethic of individual self-fulfillment and achievement is the most powerful current in modern society. The choosing, deciding, shaping human being who aspires to be the author of his or her own life, the creator of an individual identity, is the central character of our time. It is the fundamental cause behind changes in the family and the global gender revolution in relation to work and politics. Any attempt to create a new sense of social cohesion has to start from the recognition that individualism, diversity and skepticism are written into Western culture. (1999: 165)

Now Ulrich Beck not only overstates – a regular feature of his analyses as a lot of people in the Western world experience no such choice – he also seems to neglect the vast bulk of the world’s population. His is a predominantly “masculinist,” overly abstract, Western model. Still, he is right in claiming that in some pockets of the Western world, all manner of new dilemmas in the intimate life do indeed confront us. Thus, in this late modern world, many of us increasingly may take for granted that:

- If we want to get married, we most surely have the right to choose our partner and will not be expecting others to tell us whom to marry. This includes the right to lesbian and gay registered partnerships and marriages (e.g., Weeks et al. 2001).
- If we want to separate, divorce, or remarry – provided there is adequate moral continuity and care, and protection for the best interests of any child – we should not be stopped (Smart and Neale 1999).
- If we want to have a child, we most surely have the right to have one (and more: if we do not want one, we have the right not to have one). If we want a child, and cannot have one, then we can surely get one – even if by assisted conception, fertility clinics, and sperm banks (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995; Becker 2000).

- If we have desires (gay, lesbian, polyamorous, transgendered, fetishistic, or even sadomasochistic), then surely we have rights to them – providing, that is, we do not hurt anybody along the way (Bell and Binnie 2000).
- If we are not happy with our bodies then, once again, we have the right to change them. This could mean cosmetic plastic surgery; it could mean transgender medical intervention; it could mean purchasing much-needed body parts for medical treatment; it could even mean the right to freeze our bodies for future storage (Haiken 1997; Gray 2001).
- If we are not happy being part of the gender we have been born into, then we again may have rights to change it (Whittle 2000).
- If we are not happy with any of our identities, then we can change them, too (Gergen 1991).
- If we are aging, we should have the right to choose how to live our lives in the latter years.

The list goes on. To make suggestions of such presumed “rights” in most countries, even a hundred years ago, would have been impossible. Even today, in most countries, these are not considered feasible. Most cultures today do not begin to offer such choices. Still, elsewhere (and in some detail) I have charted the uneven rise of new forms of intimacies in a newly unfolding social world (called variously many names, such as “second modernity” and “liquid society”² – and each bringing their own nuances). I have suggested the enormous conflicts they are generating and discussed how certain resolutions to such conflicts may be found through the ideas of intimate citizenship, dialogues in pluralized public spheres, and grounded moralities (Plummer 2003). To give the quickest listing of examples, the kinds of intimate issues that concern me, under the heading of the postmodernization of intimacies, would include the new issues around infertility and “designer babies,” such as the conflicts over surrogate motherhood, test-tube babies, in vitro fertilization (IVF), egg donation, artificial insemination by donor (AID/ID), gamete and intra-fallopian transfer (GIFT), cloning, the freezing of the fetus, embryo research, the commercial market in babies, and the decline of male fertility along with fertility boosting. Also on the agenda are conflicts over the new “families of choice,” single parenting, lesbian and gay partnerships, living alone, divorce, “out of wedlock conception,” cohabitation, and multiple stepfamilies. There are issues, too, around sexualities: no longer is penis–vagina coital sex the only or main option as we make choices about nonprocreative, nonpenetrative, nonreproductive, “recreational,” “safer” sexualities: everything from telephone sex and masturbation to cybersex and sadomasochism, “fist fucking,” and the fetish scene. Likewise, there are conflicts over different kinds of femininities and masculinities (the so-called “gender wars”) and newer concerns over bisexualities and polyamory, gender blenders, queers, lesbian daddies, dyke boys, drag kings, and transgender warriors. There are also “choices” to use the many new technologies that can transform that most central organ of intimacy: the body. These include the options of new information technologies, medical implants, cosmetic surgeries, new medications like the impotency wonder drug “Viagra,” and the miracle “morning after” abortion drug. It is a New World and new language of people as “cyborgs,” as becoming “posthuman.” Just what does this mean; and do we really want to become *posthuman*? (Fukuyama 2002; Habermas 2003).

What is very apparent about many of these new lifestyle choices is the way they are embedded in deep (moral, but especially religious) conflicts that occur interpersonally, between groups, nationally, and internationally. Moral conflicts about how to live the personal life are central to current thinking about intimacies. To take just one example: the new reproductive technologies (NRTs or assisted conceptions). Some religious groups will contest them on moral grounds. Some feminists will champion them on the grounds that the NRTs will serve to liberate women from their bodies. Other feminists will condemn them as tools that further the control and regulation of women's bodies and lives. Some will see the need for regulation. Others will be happy with a marketplace free-for-all in which frozen sperm, eggs, and even embryos can be bought and sold. Ultimately this is all part of a wider debate over women's rights to choose or not. For the radical feminists, consent is not possible in an "un-free society." "For feminists must go beyond choice and consent as a standard for women's freedom. Before consent, there must be self determination so that consent does not simply amount to acquiescing to the available options" (Raymond 1994: 103).

Central to much of these new intimacies, then, is the way in which they are seen both as matters of individual choice and as matters of rights. There is a proliferation of socially patterned – often market driven – "choices." Postmodern worlds put our individual needs at the center of our lives and make us opt for a lifestyle. It is a politics of lifestyle, not class (Giddens 1991). Yet, as I have already hinted, there are clearly problems with all this. There is both a tyranny of choice and a paradox of choice by which we may become overwhelmed with the decisions we have to make about our lives – indeed, enough sometimes to make ourselves overly anxious, depressed, and ill (Schwartz 2004). We may also enter the realm of false needs – where a host of unreal choices confront us. These are not really "free choices" at all; for the choices themselves are patterned socially. We are structured into a world of "choices" and "individuals" driven by markets.³

However, more than all this, it is also clear that *these "choices" are not equally distributed*. At one extreme, there are situations where there would seem to be no choices at all – or only severely minimal ones. In situations of slavery, imprisonment, or even abject subsistence poverty, "choices" are most decidedly *not* on the agenda – although there may be a myriad of ways devised to survive on a day-to-day basis.⁴ At the other extreme, there do seem to be situations of massive choice – the extremely wealthy may have options for choice that go far beyond most people. (The world's richest three people have a wealth that is greater than that of the 43 poorest nations!) Many people living in high-income societies and rich groups do indeed see their lives as wide open to choice.⁵ Yet, in truth, inequalities of all kinds invade them. Rickie Solinger has put this well in her discussion of women and abortion in the United States and it can be generalized out to most of our choices. She says:

The contemporary language of choice [in the abortion debate] promises dignity and reproductive autonomy to women with resources. For women without the language [they] are a taunt and a threat. Where the language of choice is applied to the question of poor women and motherhood, it begins to sound a lot like the language of eugenics; women who cannot afford to make choices are not fit to become mothers. (2001: 223)

So even within the postmodern worlds of presumed choices, there are clearly problems.

Intimacies, Traditionalism and Inequality in Low-income Societies

It is not hard to see that many of the changes around intimacies mentioned previously can be found in every part of the globe – from controversies over one-child families in China to debates on the role of women in Islamic states. Nevertheless, once we move into discussions of intimacy in other parts of the world, a significant change has to be taken on board. We are now addressing countries where the basic economic conditions of life make intimate relationships very different and, often, much harder. Debates on citizenship are much less developed. As I say elsewhere, “It is hard to discuss the legitimacy of ‘choices’ around lesbian and gay marriages in cultures where most of the population lives on the breadline (and indeed where much of homosexuality may be open to execution!). It is hard to discuss the ‘contested bodies’ of the rich when the bodies of the poor are diseased, dirty, and dying in their millions” (Plummer 2003). There is a certain luxury – even smugness – about “intimate citizenship” debates when confronted with grinding poverty and growing inequalities.

To talk of the rights of lesbians and gays to have registered partnerships, get married and raise children seems a luxury in the face of many countries where lesbians and gays can be put to death for simply being recognized. To talk of the rights and choices of the infertile to take advantage of the often costly new reproductive technologies may again be a luxury when much of the world lives on the brink of starvation, watching their children die at birth and being unable to afford to raise children in any way. To talk of the rights and choices to become cyber-citizens engaging in new forms of cyber-sex on the worldwide web is surely yet another luxury when most of the world has no access to such communications. (Plummer 2003)

For much of the world’s population, choices over a new intimate life are not remotely on the agenda.

Worse: some of the choices may actually militate against them. The choices of the rich may work against the poor. Thus, people in the rich parts of the Western world who adopt children from the poor parts of the world may well not be acting in the interests of the poor. The choice to have body parts in the Western world may be at the cost of the sale of poor bodies in low-income societies. The selling of sex, by sex workers in Thailand, may provide some money for the poor families of Thailand, but really it is contingent upon the sexual needs of the wealthy Western world. In addition, it is not just between countries – we can also see that choices within the United States or the United Kingdom are much greater for the wealthy and hardly exist for the poor. To speak of a woman’s right to choose may not make much sense for poor women who have few spaces of choice and no money to make them happen.

The questions that now need to be addressed in low-income societies, then, are largely different. They need to be seen against a background of intimacies shaped in conditions like those reported regularly by the United Nations. Thus, a recent report states that:

Across the world we see unacceptable levels of deprivation in people’s lives. Of the 4.6 billion people in developing countries, more than 850 million are illiterate, nearly a

billion lack access to improved water sources, and 2.4 billion lack access to basic sanitation. Nearly 325 million boys and girls are out of school. And 11 million children under age five die each year from preventable causes – equivalent to more than 30,000 a day. Around 1.2 billion people live on less than \$1 a day (1993 PPP US\$), and 2.8 billion on less than \$2 a day. Such deprivations are not limited to developing countries. In OECD countries more than 130 million people are income poor, 34 million are unemployed, and adult functional illiteracy rates average 15%. (United Nations Development Programme 2003)

Under such conditions, the luxury of postmodern intimacies is rarely on the agenda. Poor people have to daily confront corruption, violence, powerlessness, and insecure livelihoods. They may well have a much diminished sense of self, struggling to create relationships in worlds of great hardships, suffering a personal rage and inadequacy.⁶ Here are some voices of the poor speaking, taken from Narayan (2000): just what can their intimate lives be like?

Poverty is pain; it feels like a disease. It attacks a person not only materially but also morally. It eats away one's dignity and drives one into total despair. (A poor woman, Moldova)

Children are hungry, so they start to cry. They ask for food from their mother and their mother doesn't have it. Then the father is irritated, because the children are crying, and he takes it out on his wife. So hitting and disagreement break up the marriage. (Poor people in Bosnia)

Poor people cannot improve their status because they live day by day, and if they get sick then they are in trouble because they have to borrow money and pay interest. (Tra Vinh, Vietnam)

Security is knowing what tomorrow will bring and how we will get food tomorrow. (Bulgaria)

There is no control over anything, at any hour a gun could go off, especially at night. (A poor woman in Brazil)

Poverty is like living in jail, living under bondage, waiting to be free. (A young woman in Jamaica)

It is neither leprosy nor poverty which kills the leper, but loneliness. (Ghana)

When you are poor, nobody wants to speak with you. Everyone's sorry for you and no one wants to drink with you. You have no self-esteem and that's why some people start drinking. (A middle-aged man in Bulgaria)

If we knew that there would be an end to this crisis, we would endure it somehow. Be it for one year, or even for ten years. But now all we can do is sit and wait for the end to come. (A woman from Entropole, Bulgaria)

In slums in Malawi, the physical conditions were so bad and hopeless that the poor said: "the only way we can get out of poverty is through death." A resident of Nova California, a slum in Brazil, said:

The sewage runs in your front door, and when it rains, the water floods into the house and you need to lift the things . . . the waste brings some bugs, here we have rats, cockroaches, spiders, and even snakes and scorpions.

Table 4.3 Intimacies in high- and low-income societies?

	<i>High-income</i>	<i>Low-income</i>
Bodies	Purchase of body parts Purchase of bodies Cosmetic surgeries Slimming body Luxuriant body	Sale of body parts Sale of bodies Female genital mutilation Diseased body Abject body
Families	Families of choice Living alone Divorce	Forced marriages/arranged Centrality of family Child mortality Mail-order brides
Sexualities	Gay rights Female sexualities	Gay negativism Hostilities
Gender	Masculinities Femininities	Clear prescriptions
Reproduction	Assisted conception and new reproductive technologies	Birth control

Sources: Giddens (1991); Gibbins and Reimer (1999); Fraser and Honneth (2003); Inglehart and Norris (2003a).

In the Kyrgyz Republic, poor people said that they were forced to take many risks to survive, including stealing (with the risk of getting caught) or borrowing money (with the risk of becoming indebted).

The rich do not have to take this risk, they have money to protect themselves, and they also have power.

You grow up in an environment full of diseases, violence and drugs. . . . you don't have the right to education, work or leisure, and you are forced to "eat in the hands of the government" . . . so you are easy prey for the rulers. You have to accept whatever they give you. (A young woman, Padre Jordano, Brazil)

What kind of intimate life is possible in worlds of pain experienced like this? Table 4.3 suggests some contrasts.

To take one example: Social scientists have recently taken more and more interest in "bodies" and embodiment. A somewhat neglected feature of this, however, is what Iris Young has called the "scaling of bodies" (Young 1990). Bodies change across space and time, and much of this also may be linked to bodies in poor and rich countries. What we could call "poor bodies" may be linked to dirt (sanitation), disease, death, danger, and diet (or lack of it); while bodies in high-income countries ("rich bodies") engage with "body projects" such as dieting, exercise, training, body modification – from tattoos and haircuts to plastic surgery to transgender surgery and on to cyborgs (Shilling 1993). If intimacies are grounded in bodies, then the scaling of bodies gives very different meanings and responses in rich and poor worlds.

The growth of trafficking in body parts is indicative of this. Everything from skin, bone, and blood to organs and genetic materials of "the other" is now up for sale,

and this global trafficking is almost invariably in one direction: from the poorest to the richest. Often justified in terms of “choices,” this is part of a process of bodily commodification.⁷ As two people remarked, in seeming desperation:

I am willing to sell any organ of my body that is not vital to my survival and which could help save another person’s life in exchange for an amount of money that will allow me to feed my family. (Ad placed in the *Diario de Pernambuco*, Recife, Brazil, by Miguel Correia de Oliveira, age 30)

Please, I need money to get dentures, and am a senior desparet [sic] for money. Want to sell a very good kidney. Am desparet for money for teeth. Am a senior citizen in excellent medical shape, but need \$ for dentures. My husband and I have no dental plan. (Email from E.B., Oak Hills, California, to N.S-H@ Organs Watch, January 26, 2001) (Scheper-Hughes 2002b: 42)

Nancy Scheper-Hughes has chronicled the rise in this process of bodily commodification and the sale of organs and puts it dramatically:

Continuous throughout these transactions across time and space is the division of society into two populations, one socially and medically included and the other excluded, one with and one utterly lacking the ability to draw on the beauty, strength, reproductive, sexual, or anatomical power of the other. . . . Commercialised transplant medicine has allowed global society to be divided into two decidedly unequal populations – organ givers and organ receivers. The former are an invisible and discredited collection of anonymous suppliers of spare parts; the latter are cherished patients, treated as moral subjects and as suffering individuals. Their names and their biographies and medical histories are known, and their proprietary rights over the bodies and body parts of the poor, living and dead, are virtually unquestioned. (2002b: 4)

Ironically, at the same time as the poor are driven to sell their body parts, so the better off can spend small fortunes in the growing industry of cosmetic surgery. As we have already seen, in 2001, for example, it was estimated that Americans spent around \$9 billion on plastic surgery and cosmetic procedures, with about 8.5 million procedures (an increase of 48 percent over 2000), according to the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery. (See also Haiken 1997 for an illuminated history of these procedures.)

Another issue that social scientists have found of more and more interest is the global interconnectedness of work and the impact this has on the intimate life. One part of this is the work of “caring,” especially looking after other people’s children or older family members. There is nothing new about the idea of people caring for members outside of their own families: what is new is the international dimension this has now taken. Thus, Arlie Russell Hochschild has written about “global care chains” in which a series of personal links appear between people across the globe “based on the paid or unpaid work of caring.” “A third world supply of mothering helps create a first world demand for it” (2000: 140), as women (and it is largely women, though children are involved, too) leave their home countries, families, and aging parents to find work in other countries, often caring for the children of wealthier families. What is striking here is the migration of millions of poor women (“the feminization of migration”) from low-income societies to richer ones – serving as maids and nannies, looking after other people’s children (while their own children are often left behind in the country of origin), providing elder care, doing house-

work, and sometimes providing sex. They are routinely women of color – Mexican in the United States, Algerians in France, and Asians in the United Kingdom. They are kept in the background, but often work extremely long hours in poor conditions with minimal incomes⁸ – which in turn they have to return to their own families in other countries, families in which their own children are often neglected and poor. They may witness extreme situations (sex, drunken violence, and so on) but the more mundane problems come from worrying about the child all the time, rarely having holidays or breaks, getting low pay, and living in very poor accommodation. Meanwhile, they worry about their own families “back home” that are often becoming weaker and weaker. Maybe worst of all is the sense of general invisibility with no real employment contracts: it is often vulnerable and demeaning work. Intimacy is invisibility, and a nonperson does the work (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). Moreover, all this suggests major shifts in the dynamics of world families, while creating dilemmas for first-world feminism: how liberated women with good jobs can employ poor women from low-income societies in this way with little conscience.

A final striking example, the intimate divide, may be found in what Zillah Eisenstein (1998) has called the information “have and have nots” and Castells has called the “digital divide,” which now pervades the intimate life. The “new intimacies” can be conducted on mobile phones and through cyberspace, the politics of new intimacies can be galvanized through web networking, and choices may seem to abound everywhere. For most people, however, this is not remotely possible. Not only are there major differences within countries (the United States, for example, reproduces most of the old inequalities of class and ethnicity through Internet availability and access – see Castells 2001: 249–51), but also there are massive global differences. As Castells says:

In September 2000, of a total of about 378 million Internet users (representing 6.2% of the world's population), North America's share stood at 42.6% and Western Europe at 23.8%, while Asia represented 20.6% of the total (including Japan), Latin America 4% and Africa a meager 0.6% (with most being in South Africa). (2001: 260)

The figures here are changing all the time, but what is clear is that there remain large regions where almost nobody has direct access to these cyber-realities. They do not have any choice over this: there are no lines of communication and the costs would be prohibitive (there is often little access to the more ordinary telephone).

Choice and Inequalities

We can draw many of these tensions over intimacies together briefly by suggesting that:

- If, in some parts of the world, people have choices about who to marry, when to divorce, and whether to have gay partnerships, in other parts of the world, the choice may be restricted to arranged marriage, forced marriage, child marriage, and mail-order brides – all of which is often no choice at all.

- If, in some parts of the world, people have choices about keeping their bodies fit, buying cosmetic surgery, and accessing drugs that enable their bodies to remain well, in other parts of the world, the choice may be restricted to selling their body parts to eke out a meager existence and merely subsist – or die – with a frail body.
- If, in some parts of the world, people have choices about the work–life balance and ways to maintain a high standard of living, in other parts of the world people are driven to sell their own labor looking after other people’s children and families across the world, sending the money home to help their own families survive.
- If, in some parts of the world, people have choices over fertility and reproductive problems to purchase or gain access to new reproductive technologies, in other parts of the world, the choice may be restricted to selling their wombs, sperm, or babies to others while also finding their own children going to war or dying at early ages.
- If, in some parts of the world, people have choices over their sexualities – being able to afford to buy sex if necessary in other parts of the world, the choice may be limited to the need to sell sex and engage in sex trafficking.
- If, in some parts of the world, people have choices over their mobility – jet-setting across the world, becoming tourists in resort hotels, opting for sex tourism – others have little such choice. If they move, it may be as part of the new slave trade, the migration of refugees, or those fleeing genocide.
- If, for some, there is an opening up of access to all kinds of new communication technologies – from phone and mobiles to cyberspace and the net (for most people) – there is no choice of access at all. Zillah Eisenstein speaks of the information “have and have nots,” while Manuel Castells calls it the “digital divide.”
- If, in some parts of the world, women have choices over their agency, in other parts of the world, the choice may be restricted or nonexistent.
- And if, in some parts of the world, people may find their identities to be stabilized, uncertain, fluid, and open to change, in other parts of the world, the issue of identity may hardly present itself.

It turns out that the choices that seemed to abound everywhere are simply not remotely possible for most.

For some, there is an opening up of options and answers to the question of how to live a life. This is close to what Giddens has called a lifestyle politics. For others, these choices are very limited – indeed, the notion of lifestyle and lifestyle politics seems almost nonexistent. What we have is a politics of inequalities and a politics of choice and it leads us to contemporary debates on citizenship and politics.

The Clash of Intimacies: The Case of Same-sex Relations

We have seen, then, some really contrasting features in the ways intimacies are organized socially and how they are patterned through choices for some and through inequalities for most. Many of these inequalities are organized profoundly through

patriarchy (as in the case of coercive marriages and sexual violence), heterosexism (as most obviously in the case of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered lives), and racism (as is the case with much of AIDS). A problem here, though, is that such inequalities may be positively encouraged. Intimacies are often strongly contested, part of the culture wars or even the so-called clash of sexual civilizations. Additionally, these conflicts are implicated in the organization of inequalities.

To take a major example: sexual minorities (Altman 2000). In many countries around the world today the issue of equality of lesbians, gays, transgendered people, and so forth, before the law, is taken seriously in an attempt to reduce invidious inequalities. Indeed, the claims being made go further than could have been imagined, say, 40 years ago: to legalize “registered partnerships,” “families of choice,” or even “marriages.” Partnership laws currently exist in Denmark (1989, amended 1999), Norway (1993), Sweden (1994, in force 1995), Iceland (1996), the Netherlands (1997, in force 1998), France (1999), and Germany (2001). Only in the Netherlands, though, is marriage and adoption formally recognized as well. Currently, partnership laws are also being considered in Finland, Portugal, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Spain.

But it is also the case that in many countries sexual minorities may be bullied, harassed, and mocked, discriminated against in work and school, subjected to unfair arrest and imprisonment, treated as ill, rendered the victims of “hate crimes,” fined, flogged, tortured, raped, and executed. They also may be driven into self-loathing and suicide. More than 70 countries have laws that criminalize homosexual relations. In Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Chechnya, gay sex can lead to the death penalty. From Europe to Africa, the Americas to Asia, case after case of torture, ill treatment, violence, and discrimination against lesbians and gay men is documented. In Columbia, “death squads” routinely target and kill gay men and transvestites as local authorities promote *limpieza social* (social cleansing). The death squads operate without fear of prosecution as the gunmen themselves are often police officers and because gays are regarded as “disposable people.” There are also very many cases of transgender-rights activists – “the ultimate gender outlaws” – being abused across the world.⁹ In short, sexual minorities are at the receiving end of a gross lack of equality in the acceptance of different kinds of sexualities. Yet such inequalities in some societies are championed by state and religion. There is not even a sense that this is a form of inequality. Indeed, it is seen as an appropriate religious or moral response to treat such people differently.

While there are many sources of this heterosexism and homophobia, a prime legitimating mechanism has come through religions of all kinds. Be it the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Islamic faith, or many others, there is a clash over intimacies. We could argue that, in postmodernizing societies, there is a growing concern with choices over the ways to live lives in families, an openness to gay and lesbian marriages, an interest in the new reproductive technologies, a desire to equalize relationships between the genders and to enhance democratic intimacies: true, there are also conflicts over all these things. We also could argue that in other, more traditional, societies, marriages are often forced, there are severe penalties for adultery including death, there is an abhorrence of many sexualities, and a strict hierarchical setting to the relations between men and women. Indeed, some scholars have argued that there is a sexual clash of civilizations:

At this point in history, societies throughout the world (Muslim and Judeo-Christian alike) see democracy as the best form of government. Instead the real fault line between West and Islam, which Huntington's theory completely overlooks, concerns *gender equality* and *sexual liberalization* . . . the values that separate the two cultures have much more to do with Eros than demos. (Inglehart and Norris 2003a: 65; 2003b)

There is, however, a serious risk of creating "the other" as "traditional societies" – and I do not wish to do this, because there are complexities across the board. The real conflicts seem to me to be authoritarian or fundamentalist tendencies in all countries and progressivism or liberal tendencies. Religions themselves are usually fractured along these lines (Hunter 1991; Huntington 1996).

Intimate Citizenship in an Unjust World

I have painted a somewhat dark picture. In high-income societies, we see the post-modernization of intimacies bringing major conflicts and what might be called "the politics of choice." In low-income societies, we see – against a background of abject poverty – the ways in which intimacies are shrouded in problems such as AIDS, global care chains, forced and child marriages, sex trafficking, the commodification of bodies, and what is called the "politics of redistribution." Of course, the line between low-income and high-income societies is not a hard and clear one.¹⁰ For many people everywhere, the intimate life is a problem.

As I suggested in the opening of this article (and have developed in more detail elsewhere [Plummer 2003]), the concept of "intimate citizenship" is one tool for starting to look at such issues. Traditionally, citizenship has meant being *recognized as belonging* and *participating* in a group where one is expected to do certain things – *obligations* – in return for certain *rights*. One achieves the status of citizen through this and, following from T. H. Marshall's (1950) influential discussion, three domains of rights have usually been seen as central: legal, political, and welfare – recognizing them as part of a slow process of achieving the democratic state. Since Marshall's time, the world has both moved on and regressed – ideas around citizenship have been extended and even postmodernized, whilst inequalities across the globe have shown little sign of abating.¹¹ It is hard to see much of the world as even minimally meeting the legal, political, and welfare requirements of citizenship. Yet, now the new citizenship debates have highlighted an array of other domains of citizenship – from cultural to feminist, from global to cybercitizen – and at the same time have produced more complex ideas, which problematize the very notions of boundaries that were more or less assumed in earlier work. This is not the place to detail all this (see Isin and Turner 2002). Suffice to say that citizenship now highlights a plurality of rights, responsibilities, recognition, and participation connected to inequalities, but also is linked to a "differentiated universalism." This raises the problems of universalism and differences and the need to clarify the problems of shifting moral boundaries. Citizenship is contingent upon building recognized identities around which rights and responsibilities are developed. It highlights inequalities and those excluded from citizenship definitions. New forms of rights often are connected to new forms of identity community, and social movements. New areas of citizenship are developing outside the traditional ones of law, politics, and welfare

that now can draw from a wider range of politics (including those of redistribution and recognition (cf. Fraser 1997)).

Where, then, does “Intimate Citizenship” stand in all this? It may be seen as part of a developing sociology of intimacies that highlight doing gender, eroticism, relationships, reproduction, feelings, and identities. Elsewhere, I have suggested that it

is concerned with all those matters linked to our most intimate desires, pleasures and ways of being in the world. Some of this must feed back into the traditional citizenship (of civil, political and social rights); but equally much of it is concerned with new spheres, new debates, and new stories. Its starts to provide a normative frame – and maybe even a legal one – in which people can make decisions around the *control (or not) over* one’s body, feelings, relationships; *access (or not) to* representations, relationships, public spaces etc.; and *socially grounded choices (or not) about* identities, gender experiences, erotic experiences. (Plummer 1995: 151)

It does not imply one model, one pattern, or one way. It is a loose term that comes to designate a field of stories, an array of tellings, out of which new lives, new communities, and new politics may emerge (p. 152). It is a “sensitizing concept . . . open and suggestive” (2003: 13) and suggests a bridge between the personal and the political. It “recognizes emerging intimacy groups and identities, along with their rights, responsibilities and the need for recognition in emerging zones of conflict, and suggests new kinds of citizen in the making” (2003: 66). It designates “public discourse on the personal life.” Traditional models of citizenship are more aligned to the politics of redistribution; postmodern models are more aligned to the politics of choice.

Postmodern, intimate-citizenship debates look at recognizing emerging “intimacy groups and identities” – their rights, responsibilities, and recognition in emerging zones of conflict – and suggests new kinds of “citizens” in the making. Among these may be the cybercitizens, the new reproductive citizens (surrogate mothers, “lost fathers,” “test-tube citizens,” and the like), new family citizens (including post-divorce citizens, children and stepfamily citizens, grandparent citizens, single-parent citizens, and the elderly citizens), as well as the transgendered citizen, the fetishistic citizen, and even the S & M citizen, and (being aware of the controversy this must bring) the pedophile citizen. I invent such a listing a little tongue in cheek; but to say such things does create an awareness of who is “in” and who is “out,” and whose rights and responsibilities we may need to look at more closely. The pedophile, for instance, is one modern figure that most people would probably agree should not have citizenship rights – that may indicate a mark for the far end of the boundaries of intimate citizenship we can accept.¹²

I call all this “the Intimate Citizenship Project” and Table 4.4 suggests some of the key problems it raises. We need to look at social changes and the conflicts that are growing everywhere; the shifting pluralized public spheres and the voices that get heard; and the new grounded-moral narratives that need to be put into dialogue to search for common ground.¹³

Yet these are distinctively postmodern (or late modern or liquid, and so forth) worlds. They claim much that the world has no access to and cannot even begin to see as a possibility. More than this, many societies may well find that the suggestion that they should engage within these debates is to become involved in a kind of postmodern colonialism. There is a terrible assumption that where the rich and

Table 4.4 A preliminary paradigm for the analysis of intimate citizenship: “The Intimate Citizenship Project”

A sociology of the personal life	What are “intimacies” in the early twenty-first century?
Change and the construction of “new intimacy” debates	What are the major social changes (in late modernity?) taking place around intimacies and in them; how deep, how many, what consequences? Describe, clarify, and explain such arenas and debates.
Culture wars and moral conflicts: cultures of contested intimacies	What are the key positions on contemporary moral conflicts both within and between groups? What is the nature of these conflicts (their rhetorics and arguments)?
Inventing intimate citizenship	How are older versions of “citizenship” being reworked? Chart the precarious meanings of “ <i>intimate citizenships</i> ”; and the rise and organization of such languages, rhetorics, claims (around relationships), genders, sexualities, bodies, emotions, and identities. Interrogate these new “citizenship” debates, and delineate the new kinds of citizens and identities they bring. How do they establish boundaries – and what is the nature of postmodern boundaries?
The new pluralized public spheres	What changes are happening in the public sphere in which citizenship debates take place? What are its main arenas, and how is it being animated for different groups? How are the new public spheres shaped and how are these new voices heard (some dominate, some have a space, many are silenced)?
Postmodern ethics and the grounded moralities of everyday life: What are grounded moralities?	How to study and learn from the “narrativization” process of grounded moralities?
Public identity narratives	How can <i>dialogue</i> take place between different groups and their stories? How can the limits of dialogue be identified? How is critique best accomplished?
Dialogic citizenship and common grounds	How might conflicts be resolved within dialogues over intimate citizenship? Are there “ <i>common grounds</i> ”?

Table 4.4 *Continued*

The globalization of intimacies	Are intimacies becoming globalized? What are the global public discourses around intimacies, and how do they relate to universals of <i>human rights</i> ? How do they differ in high- and low-income societies and how do they flow between them?
Inequalities and intimacies	How are inequalities linked to intimacies? <i>What are intimate inequalities</i> ? What does inequality do to the intimate life – how does it structure it and give it subjective meaning?
Evaluative	What are the positive (utopian) versions of all this and the negative (dystopian) versions? Can (should) a utopian image prevail? Intimate inequalities and social choice. What are the links to social inequalities?
Practice	What choices over their families, bodies, genders, and sexualities do they have? What rights, recognition, obligations, and participations do they have? What pluralized public spheres do they function within? How are their morally grounded life stories told and heard? What ethical principles guide their lives? What common grounds can be found for dialogue?

the Western world are now, so shall the world follow. Here, once again, we face the problems of universals and the clash of differences, but now perhaps on a more global scale.

There are more traditional pathways to intimate citizenship, which are lodged largely in a politics of redistribution. Dialogues around intimate citizenship are embedded in worlds of inequalities, with some people marginalized and excluded. It is hard, if not impossible, for unequals to dialogue equally. Recognition of this inequality needs to be part of the dialogic process. Elsewhere, I have suggested some key ways of enhancing dialogue – to respect and recognize who you are talking with, to establish reflective solidarity, to avoid the argument culture, to connect arguments to wider cultures and to emotionally embedded lives, to avoid monologic conflicts, and to search for common grounds.

The idea of intimate citizenship was born as a way to look at conflicts generated over the postmodernization of intimacies in parts of high-income societies. Initially it may seem to have a more limited usefulness in looking at lower-income societies and groups. Initially, it will mean taking very seriously the rights of people in low-income societies to their bodies, their feelings, their relationships, and their children. Already, we see some attempts at establishing such rights through the work of the United Nations, the World Women's Movement, UNICEF, The International Lesbian and Gay Movement, and others.¹⁴ Equally, a focus on facilitating voices, enhancing choices, and reshaping the public spheres of rights in low-income societies are all challenges for the future.

What is required here is a dual analysis, one which, keeping a firm hold on what I have called the matrix of inequalities, looks at the simultaneous growth of “choice” and the prevalence of restrictions in intimate lives. Once low-income societies and the poor of rich societies are brought into the picture, the concept of intimate citizenship starts to demand further clarification. Looking at issues of abject poverty, forced marriages, sexual slavery, the commodification of bodies, and so on, intimate citizenship takes on wider meanings. For here are people who often have *little control over* their bodies, feelings, and relationships; *little access to* representations, relationships, public spaces, and so forth; and *few socially grounded choices about* identities, gender experiences, and erotic experiences. And yet, while the idea of citizenship may work reasonably well once certain levels of affluence, individuality, and power have been attained, there is a long way to go before it can work well among groups and societies where basic human rights have not yet been attained.

Hence attaining intimate citizenship may be seen as a luxury in societies where basic legal, political, or welfare rights have not been established. I do not see it like this: surely the right to pursue a “personal and intimate life” of some contentment must be a basic feature (and maybe the defining feature) of human existence? We can perhaps start from the premise – common enough these days among human-rights theorists – that there are minimal *capabilities necessary for human functioning and flourishing*. Human beings have capacities for life, indeed “the intimate life,” that need to be enabled. Meeting basic human requirements must be followed by an attempt at “human flourishing” on a personal level.¹⁵ Without being sentimental, we need to articulate and be clear about the values and moral guidelines we wish to draw upon, in a world of postmodern ethics (Bauman 1993). I am not making claims for grand absolutes here. Rather, the goal is to produce grounded-moral stories of lives as they experience their intimacies and from which we can learn “how to live.” Such values might include *recognition, care, love*,¹⁶ *redistribution, freedom, and democracy* (e.g. Twine 1994; Honneth 1995; Fraser 1997). Social “science” needs to be normative and to have a role in the twenty-first century; it needs to become much more concerned with moral and political debate.

Notes

- 1 These vignettes are drawn from Scheper-Hughes (2002b); Channel Four’s documentary series *How to Have Babies the Lesbian and Gay Way* (broadcast on Channel 4 on January 29, and February 4, 2004); Ken Loach’s film *Bread and Roses*, which provided a striking drama around the “Janitors for Justice” strikes that took place in Los Angeles in 1999; and Elijah Anderson (1999).
- 2 The terms *Liquid Society* and *Individualized Society* are titles of books by Bauman (2000, 2001). For other examples, see *The Transparent Society* (Vattimo 1992), *World Risk Society* (Beck 1999), *Global Age* (Albrow 1996), *Information Age, Network Society* (Castells 1996), *The Planetary Society* (Melluci 1996), *The Surveillance Society* (Lyon 2001), *The McDonaldization of Society* (Ritzer 2000), *The Exclusive Society* (Young 1999), and *Late Modernity* (Giddens 1991).
- 3 Bauman has called this the “individualized society” and Beck “the individuated society.”
- 4 As discussed, for example, by Cohen and Taylor (1976; 1992) or Goffman (1962).
- 5 The distinguished liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin, in a celebrated quote on freedom, remarks:

I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's [sic] acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were from outside. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. (1969: 131)

- 6 A striking background work on all this is the qualitative study *Voices of the Poor* (Narayan 2000). This records the voices of approximately 60,000 poor men and women from over 60 countries around the world. With striking similarity, poor people describe repeatedly and in distressing detail the impact of poverty. The large majority of poor people included in *Voices* said they are worse off now, have fewer economic opportunities, and live with greater insecurity than in the past.
- 7 Scheper-Hughes writes further:

Working in various sites in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Israel, the Netherlands, South Africa, Turkey and the USA, we have identified the following issues: (1) race, class and gender inequalities and injustices in the acquisition, harvesting and distribution of organs; (2) widespread violation of national laws and international regulations against the sale of organs; (3) the collapse of cultural and religious sanctions against body dismemberment and commercial use in the face of the enormous market pressures in the transplant industry; (4) the emergence of new forms of debt peonage in which a commodified kidney occupies a critical role; (5) the coexistence of "compensated gifting" of kidneys within extended families by domestic workers and by hopeless prisoners in exchange for secure work and reduction in prison sentences; (6) popular resistance to newly mandated laws of presumed consent for organ donations; (7) violations of cadavers in hospital morgues and police mortuaries in which organs and tissues are removed without consent for barter or sale; (8) wasting of viable organs in the context of intense competition between public and private transplant units; (9) medically substantiated allegations of "kidney theft" from vulnerable patients, mostly poor and female during routine surgeries. (2002b: 35)

- 8 As Ehrenreich and Hochschild say: "In Hong Kong, for instance, the wages of a Filipina domestic are about fifteen times the amount she could make as a schoolteacher back in the Philippines" (2003: 8).
- 9 A good documentation of all this is to be found in Amnesty International (2001) as well as in the New Internationalist summary of much of it (Baird 2001). For up-to-date details, see the websites of Amnesty International and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission.
- 10 For ease, I have excluded medium-income societies – like the former Soviet bloc – from my discussion here. Yet these do seem to be countries that are facing more and more "trouble."
- 11 Over and over again, Western academics make claims for their own countries, which would not really stand scrutiny if applied to other countries, or indeed to poorer groups in their own. It may indeed be the case that there is some kind of "trickle down" effect, and the need for rights amongst the wealthy may presage an extension to other groups later. (Indeed, the issue of lesbian and gay rights is a partial test case for this . . . as is contraception and abortion.) This is a common enough argument. And it may be that we have to deal with issues surrounding new reproductive technologies or lesbian and gay rights simply because they are now on the agenda in the rich worlds. However, a

major critique of “intimate citizenship” stems from a classic problem with citizenship theories: their inability to handle the problem of inequalities and indeed their tendency to add to processes of social exclusion. They do this by deciding who is inside as a citizen and who is outside. Feminists, for example, have amply demonstrated the ways in which women were initially excluded; more recently, the gay movement has shown this too. By incorporating them, we find citizenship is stretched but then new groups appear who are not included. When placed in the context of globalization, we find that large numbers of the world’s poorest seem to be excluded. These are not the global citizens who are perceived to jet around the world, running the United Nations, NGOs and TNCs (transnational corporations) – quite the opposite. To talk about the world’s poor is to immediately enter the world of noncitizens where much of what I have been discussing above makes very little sense.

- 12 Controversial as this may be, I would say pedophilia still needs to be within the debates about intimacy as it raises so many issues – of childhood sexualities, of consent and coercion, of affection and violence – that these days are taboo (Levine 2002).
- 13 The field of “violence against women” has also come to the fore. As Rosalind Petchesky et al. have commented, the basic international, human-rights vocabulary now includes not only “the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and the means to do so,” but also freedom from “violence against women and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation” including “systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced pregnancy”; freedom from genital mutilation; “the right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence”; and the right “to have a satisfying and safe sex life” (Petchesky 2000).
- 14 See for example Petchesky (2000); Nussbaum (1999); and the websites ilga.org/index, and so forth.
- 15 Martha Nussbaum’s important work, for example, suggests ten Central Human Functional Capabilities: life; bodily health and integrity; bodily integrity; senses/imagination/thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation – living in relation to self and others; other species – living with concern for; play; and control over one’s environment (Nussbaum 1999: 41). This is a long, ambitious listing and it clearly (for me) touches on some preconditions for living a flourishing intimate life. Indeed, without them it is hard to see how we can. This also raises very starkly the problem of universals. It is unfashionable these days to claim universals – but I would have to ask which culture really could make claims against any of these in general? There may be specific disagreements (whether one should have the right to hold property, for example) but it is hard to comprehend the rejection of any one of these principles once broadly articulated.
- 16 Twine (1994: 32). He makes a significant list of its key features: trust, reciprocity, altruism, commitment, sacrifice, tolerance, understanding, concern, solidarity and interdependence.

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Chapter 5

Domination, Resistance, and Subjectivity*

BARRY D. ADAM

A generation ago this might have been a paper about *oppression* and *liberation*, but these terms draw on a vocabulary now viewed as too simplistic and too presumptuous. The oppression–liberation binary implicitly indexes a war between exploiters and exploited, and postulates a radically *other* world by way of alternative. It comes from a discourse and problematic that peaked in societies of the North/West in the 1960s, decayed through the 1970s, and became *passé* in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet bloc that took with it the underpinnings of Marxian language.

Still, the question of the nexus between power and subjectivity has been a central preoccupation of philosophy and social theory for a very long time and is not about to go away. From Hegel's master–slave dialectic to the power/knowledge complexes embedded in Foucault's notion of governmentality, the ways in which something called power/domination/inequality and self/subject/agent interact and shape each other remain unavoidable, indeed fundamental, issues of our era. Over the last decade, the latest manifestations of this question have circled around how best to conceptualize the changes wrought in a post-Soviet era of globalization. Are "we" (meaning typically the inhabitants of advanced industrial societies) changed, transformed, or reconstituted not only as historical beings at a macro level, but also at a micro level in terms of our bodies, intimacies, identities, and aspirations? What does conformity, complicity, or resistance mean in the context of social mechanisms of the production and reproduction of inequality on a worldwide scale?

The answers to these questions (insofar as they are recognized as viable or legitimate questions at all) are multiple, and are themselves socially located in hierarchies of power and influence. On one side is a sometimes triumphalist rhetoric reconfirming the competitive, rationalist, and implicitly male individual ensconced in Western liberalism and law. On the other is a series of critiques of the always already fully adult, rights-bearing, contract-making *citizen* and *consumer* presumed by liberal democracy and the capitalist marketplace. The former view enjoys virtu-

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ally hegemonic status as the preferred speech of business and government, and circulates as the basic “common sense” of corporate mass media – that is, in what Althusser termed the *ideological* and *repressive state apparatuses*. It is a rhetoric held together, supported, and promoted through the neoliberal reforms of the Thatcher and Reagan administrations and their successors, in their “vindication” in the resolution of the Cold War through the fall of Soviet Communism, and through the propagation and enforcement of its precepts around the world by such international institutions as the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization. Neoliberal theories of society are perhaps least willing to accord a place to a domination/resistance question because everyone either *is* or *should be* an autonomous, “free” individual. To the degree to which they are not, they are to be brought to this status through education, rehabilitation, or more ambivalently through charity, social service, or foreign aid.

The critics have long worked to expose the underside of this neoliberal ideology by proposing notions of subjectivity contextualized in social processes of domination and in/capacitation, sustained by or isolated from social networks and resources, and in the process of being more like, or less like, the fully capable and assertive subject presumed as Western *man*. Rereadings of the texts of classical liberalism have shown how dependent notions of Western individualism are on constructions of typically non-White, colonized, and disenfranchised *others*, on taking away the autonomy of wage laborers in creating the conditions for the autonomy of their masters (Gramsci 1971; Sohn-Rethel 1978b), and how much they presume and reproduce patriarchal relations of female subordination (Clark and Lange 1979). The rhetoric of neoliberal individualism rests most comfortably with the most privileged members of society who more often have the luxury of feeling free to do and have what they want, but the more marginal people are from these opportunities, and the more restricted their life chances, the more salient becomes the nexus of power and subjectivity.

The Modern–Postmodern Divide

The fall of Soviet socialism (and the migration toward “market socialism” in China and Cuba) drained away much of the imagined power of a Marxian alternative, yet pre-, neo-, and post-Marxisms remain a repository of significant thinking about the nexus of social inequality with subjection and with subjective empowerment. At its worst, some versions of Marxism simply presume the Western rational man as its subject in history, postulating that a fully “liberated” class of workers would spring forth by overturning the exploitative relations of capitalism. But many other trends in Marxism, most notably those associated with the Frankfurt School and such Western Marxist thinkers as Antonio Gramsci, offered more nuanced conceptions of the subject in capitalist society. For Theodor Adorno, there could be no presocial subject in the sense of a preformed, essential, and unsullied humanity just waiting for the moment to dissolve oppression; rather, the inhabitants of twentieth-century capitalist societies were necessarily formed by the society around them. Adorno, Max Horkheimer (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972; Horkheimer 1974a,b), and Herbert Marcuse argued that capitalist societies had instituted a rationality of

their own – an *instrumental rationality* – that swept up the generations born into it. Instrumental rationality made sense as the logical working out of capitalist dynamics; the problem was that capitalist dynamics were neither reasonable nor humane. Struggling in their era with the rise, then legacy, of fascism, Frankfurt School theorists lacked confidence in both liberal progressivism and traditional Marxian ideas of the historical inevitability of the triumph of a better world of either virtually equal, autonomous individuals, or societies finally free of exploitative inequalities. Erich Fromm (1941) turned toward psychoanalysis to understand a subject location tied to obedience and deference to authority; Adorno, Levinson, and Frenkel-Brunswik (1964) undertook studies in anti-Semitism and the “authoritarian personality,” and Marcuse (1964) decried the “one-dimensional man” caught up in equating the good life with the multiplicity of commodities offered by postwar capitalism. For Marcuse (1955), capitalist societies provided “repressive de-sublimation,” that is, a channeling and cultivation of human needs and desires through the glamour of advertising and commodity fetishism. Among Frankfurt School theorists, then, is a Western subjectivity that is managed, bedazzled, and unreflective of the larger power system of which it is a part. Despite the Western Enlightenment or modernist vision of a progressively freer, rational, person who increasingly moves in a world of choice and has greater mastery over her lifeworld, the Frankfurt School warns that the social inequality generated and reinforced by capitalism has itself come to produce a sufficiently compliant citizenry to keep the whole system functioning.

For Gramsci, the problem is to challenge the received folklore of “common sense” and popular religion reproduced by the hegemonic coalition of church, state, and capital in order to realize the Enlightenment vision where:

[S]tructure ceases to be an external force which crushes man, assimilates him to itself and makes him passive: and is transformed into a means of freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political form and a source of new initiatives. (1971: 367)

Gramsci envisioned an empowerment process where the experiences of injustice suffered by workers and peasants could become the foundation for an alternative cultural formation and popular ideology that would be critical of the maxims and views of ruling forces, and indeed become a mobilizing force for revolutionary change. Both Gramsci and the Frankfurt School took as a central objective, the *de-reification* of capitalist orthodoxies, that is, a breaking apart of the illusion that the system of social inequality and domination prevalent in capitalist societies was simply “natural” or necessarily “the ways things are,” such that it was widely apprehended as something that simply had to be coped with and could scarcely be changed. These Western Marxist thinkers, then, moved well beyond any simple hydraulic vision of power and oppression, where the powerful repress the powerless in a contest of wills, toward an analysis of how people’s consciousnesses, practices, and sense of self-efficacy are constituted by an array of constraints and conditions such as: the life chances available to them given their location in a social structure, the idea systems circulating around them with which they make sense of their experiences, and the ways in which historical processes shift the whole array.

Post-Marxian and post-Foucauldian theories have since subjected the various modern narratives of Enlightenment subjectivity to intensive deconstruction. In a

context where the various oppositional foci of class struggle, nationalism, and decolonization have come to a denouement not so much in "liberation," but rather in new formations of subjection and human agency, the aspiration for the self-reflective person, with individual and collective mastery over their own fate, has come into disrepute. While the proponents of neoliberal globalization assure us that there is nothing to worry about, because the free, autonomous individual has already arrived in the form of the citizen in representative democracies and the consumer in the global marketplace, the critics look about for signs of "resistance," "social justice," and "democratic alternatives." In one arena, the post-Marxists prospect for new signs of historical agency, in another, postmodernists dissect agency itself. All are delving "under" or "behind" the citizen/consumer to try to discover the generative pathways to subjective empowerment (or sometimes to deny there are any) in such places as body, desire, and language. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) rework much of the Marxian tradition to produce a completely open-ended field of contending meanings and identities that may or may not coalesce into collectivity. Jürgen Habermas turns toward the "lifeworld" as the ground for an alternative to state and capital, and finds in language itself an immanent movement toward "communications community." Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992) extend Habermas to embrace "civil society" as the site for a response to inequality, and out of this territory arises a large literature (most notably centered around Alain Touraine, Claus Offe, and Alberto Melucci) on new social movements.

Michel Foucault's project to understand "how subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted" (1980: 97), and thus to take up an intellectual agenda for "an insurrection of subjugated knowledges" (p. 81), has at times been lost by his successors' intent to knock down any references to states, capital, oppression, emancipation, or solidarity as just so many "grand narratives." Deconstructionist tools have proven effective in taking up some of the core issues in the reproduction of inequality and the positioning of subjects in hierarchical systems. They have helped expose the ways in which such binaries as taxpayer/welfare mother, Black/White, male/female, and heterosexual/queer are wielded to legitimate privilege and reconfirm a moral order that makes social inequality "natural" and "right."

It is perhaps possible to discern different tendencies in what might be loosely termed the postmodern camp, each with implications for the nexus of domination and resistance. One trend gathers under the "governmentality" rubric of the late Foucault (1988, 1991), where there is a desire to understand how government and "empowerment" work themselves out in institutional and sub-institutional relationships, without presuming a new "cultural dope" who is simply the victim of elite ideologies (Cruikshank 1999). Jana Sawicki (1998: 94) identifies two trends in the feminist use of Foucault: "to isolate disciplinary technologies that subjugate women as both objects and subjects, and . . . [to] acknowledge domination, but centre on cultures and strategies of resistance to hegemonic regimes of power." The governmentality literature, however, has tended to let go of linkages to global political economy in following Foucault's admonition to examine how "political practice . . . transforms the conditions of existence and systems of functioning of discourse" (1991: 68). It also comes perilously close to "rediscovering America again" as it arrives back at "a phenomenology of everyday life which comprehends the choices made by people within the practical and material constraints of their

subordination which, then, re-create or alter that subordination" (Adam 1978: x), a topic with a rich research tradition though it has not coalesced into a recognized academic field. (For an early review of this literature, see Adam 1978.)

Another trend has pursued the disintegration of the Western subject to its ill/logical conclusion and has led to fierce debates inside both social movements and scholarly circles as to the viability or artificiality of supposedly unifying identities like women, gay, people of color, and so on (Gamson 1995). Many of these debates come out of the recognition that hierarchies of privilege arise yet again "even" in self-proclaimed emancipatory movements, where the problems of inequality and empowerment are far from resolved, but rather displaced to yet another layer of complexity. But in a stinging rebuttal to the deconstructionist assault, Patricia Hill Collins (1997: 13, 21) charges that the "postmodern view of power that overemphasize[s] hegemony and local politics provide[s] a seductive mix of appearing to challenge oppression while secretly believing that little of note can be accomplished. . . . If traditions are discredited as mere 'stories' told by 'different voices,'" she argues, "oppression and other macro social structural variables not only recede into the background, they implode and are encapsulated with a post-modern view of hyper-reality."

Indeed, some of the leading postmodern theorists seem to find themselves carried by deconstruction along an analytic pathway that leads to a place that forecloses reference to subjection or the global power structure. Jacques Derrida, for example, in *Specters of Marx*, writes:

Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the "end of ideologies" and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth. (1994: 85)

What is most remarkable about this statement, which could happily reside in a text endorsing all the parameters of left modernism, is its inconsistency with the rest of the book, which is otherwise taken with a close deconstructive reading of Shakespearean texts. Similarly, Patricia Clough concludes a compelling work in postmodern feminism that deconstructs the foundations of the modernist and liberationist project with these unanswered queries:

Is there a standpoint from which a globalizing political economic analysis can be made? How can various political movements be articulated in terms of globalizing effects of political economy; how can the difference within the subject and differences among subjects be articulated in these terms? (1994: 171)

Zygmunt Bauman (1992: ix) characterizes postmodernism as a "site-clearing operation," but the risk run by deconstruction is that its intellectual efforts fall back into a world which marches on and, once the "site" has been "cleared" of Western, Enlightenment, modernist narratives, what curiously still remains by default is the neoliberal individual (Fraser 1989: 91). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri warn:

The structures and logics of power in the contemporary world are entirely immune to the “liberatory” weapons of the postmodernist politics of difference. In fact, Empire too is bent on doing away with those modern forms of sovereignty and on setting differences to play across boundaries. Despite the best intentions, then, the postmodernist politics of difference not only is ineffective against but also can even coincide with and support the functions and practices of imperial rule. The danger is that postmodernist theories focus their attention so resolutely on the old forms of power they are running from, with their heads turned backwards, that they tumble unwittingly into the welcoming arms of the new power. (2000: 142)

In other words, the postmodern romance with locality, hybridity, and mobility is entirely consistent with trends in global capital.

The unsatisfactory outcome of these trends lies in their inability to speak to Althusser's original concern with how the constitution of subjectivity in contemporary Western societies contributes to the “reproduction of the means of production.” Hegemonic discourses are scarcely primal causes in constituting subjects; rather they require propagators and beneficiaries. It remains necessary to explain why they flourish or wither in particular societies and eras, and why some succeed in “hailing” subjects and why others fail. The challenge today is to examine “how subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted” in sociohistorical contexts. Globalization is reworking the ways that the capitalist world system, social movements, civil societies, and sets of individuals move and interact, and the domination–resistance nexus remains no less vital a problem now than before.

Contemporary Visions of Subjectivity in Social Theory

All of these conceptions of the domination–resistance nexus intend to say something about how history is moving in the current period, but they also engage with this history by entering into it with some potential to act as self-fulfilling (or self-negating) prophecies. The Western rational, autonomous individual is both an image of subjectivity and a rhetoric, which to some degree generates that subjectivity, lays down roots more in some social territories than others, and is taken up more by some social constituencies than others. As Patricia Clough remarks at the conclusion of her review of feminist thought:

The writings of African-American feminists, feminist post-colonial critics, queer theories, and Third World feminists document the way in which social movements are struggles over the resources for establishing authority – struggles over the values that shape both what counts as reality and which subjectivities are to be viewed as normal, authentic, even desirable. Social movements are struggles over legitimizing modes of reading the social – contentions over hegemony and counter hegemonies. (1994:168–9)

Each account of subjectivity, then, is more than description, but also (to use Althusserian language) a “hailing” of the subject with a potential to impact how lives are lived. Stuart Hall's work (1988) has been particularly perceptive in documenting how Thatcherism succeeded in reinstantiating national subjectivity through neoconservative rhetoric, often transforming popular grievances into warrants for her neoliberal agenda. Writing on the inferiorization–subjectivity nexus is neces-

sarily also an intervention in it, and very often a warning or an appeal concerning the survival mechanisms of domination.

Over the last decade, new images of subjectivity have emerged in social theory, which reach for a recharacterization of inequality dynamics for the current era. In this section, I gather some of these leading images into four loose collections, meant more as a heuristic device than a claim for rigorous commonality. Each of these collections, which tend to read as virtually universal claims about our times, more likely “works” for, and expresses the “experiences” of, some social constituencies better than others. Each also potentially articulates with, or displaces, alternative subjectivities and thus “struggles over legitimizing modes of reading the social.”

The itinerant, unrooted, “disembedded” subject

Perhaps the best exponent of this vision is Anthony Giddens, who identifies an “expansion of disembedding mechanisms – mechanisms which prize social relations free from the hold of specific locales, recombining them across wide time-space distances” (1991: 2). Disembedded subjects, now shorn of the once-familiar signposts of family, community, and nation, are engaged in the process of self-invention, struggling to induce coherence in the biographical narrative holding together the self, and reconstructing intimacy through the “pure relationship” (Giddens 1992). The disembedded subject of globalization appears to be the latest incarnation of the anomic, yet interdependent, subject of late nineteenth-century industrialism. In a particularly Durkheimian passage, Giddens remarks: “Unpredictability, manufactured uncertainty, fragmentation: these are only one side of the coin of a globalizing order. On the reverse side are the shared values that come from a situation of global interdependence, organized via the cosmopolitan acceptance of difference” (1994: 253).

The disembedded subject appears to share an affinity with the subject of Ulrich Beck’s “risk society,” suffering not so much from an overbearing social structure as from too little social structure, and exposed to a new range of “hazards and potential threats [that] have been unleashed to an extent previously unknown” (Beck 1992: 19). For Bauman, “in the fluid stage of modernity, the settled majority is ruled by the nomadic and exterritorial elite” (2000: 13). Power and domination have been displaced and camouflaged as relations of ruling have become indirect; “fighting back” loses meaning in an environment where enemies cannot be identified and accountability is difficult to establish. Whereas the great social theorists of the late nineteenth century typically critiqued an alienated, urban, industrial society (at least implicitly) in the name of a lost community of mutually supportive members, in “fluid modernity” that referent is finally lost:

As to the communitarian dream of “re-embedding the disembedded,” nothing may change the fact that there are but motel beds, sleeping bags and analysts’ couches available for re-embedding, and that from now on the communities – more postulated than “imagined” – may be only ephemeral artifacts of the ongoing individuality play. (p. 22)

The disembedded subject echoes too in the widespread use of Judith Butler’s (1990) idea of *performativity*. Though Butler (1993) has attempted to curb a too volun-

tarist notion of performativity, the contingency, constructedness, and (potentially) self-reflective inhabitation of gender and sexuality conveyed by the term, also forwards a sense of an unanchored subject able to set its own course and ready to break out of hypostatized discourses.

These scenarios echo somewhat Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus* of the new petit bourgeoisie, characterized by its ethos of self-cultivation, "making pleasure a duty for children and parents alike" and its "dream of social flying, a desperate effort to defy the gravity of the social field" (Bourdieu 1984: 369–70). It is most clearly consonant with the experiences of a great many privileged, "first world" people with the resources to travel and communicate (the "jet set," *flâneurs*) and having an overwhelming wealth of options. Might the *habitus* perceived by Bourdieu in the 1960s have been the harbinger of a much larger trend, or might the disembedded-subject narrative continue to be rooted in a particular social constituency? If mobility and a rootless crossing through diverse cultural niches are the fundamental experiences of this subject location, then this narrative may also find resonance among international migrants and refugees, from engineers to farm workers, seeking to find a place for themselves in more hospitable environments. While the itinerant professional classes may now be managed more through seduction than social control (Bauman 1998), the latter remain caught between the forces of political and economic empire, which create strong incentives for people to migrate toward the moneyed metropolises, and First World states that expend a great deal of effort in fixing people in the political-economic niches that best suit international capital. Whether "high modern," "fluid modern," or postmodern, this virtually free-floating subject seems most detached from the exigencies of inequality as it is swept along in the currents of globalization. The power of globalization *produces* rather than *represses*; this is a new version of being "condemned to freedom," and its articulation with more traditional hierarchies of social inequality is unclear. Has the disembedded subject displaced the oppressed subject? Is it an overlay, a cross-cutting location, or perhaps simply a privileged disregard of those with severely constrained life chances who have none of the "luxury" of mobility?

Networked, defensive community members

Unlike the disembedded subject, the subject in Habermas's (1987a,b) thoroughly modernist account is hard-pressed to navigate among powerful structures. Like the postmodernists, though, Habermas too turns to the "local" and finds in the "lifeworld" an alternative to the twin powers of state and capital:

The lifeworld forms a horizon and at the same time offers a store of things taken for granted in the given culture from which communicative participants draw consensual interpretive patterns in their efforts at interpretation. (1987a: 298)

Out of these "consensual interpretive patterns," people organize to defend their quality of life from government and corporate interference, and thus become the preeminent constituency for the so-called "new social movements." One has the sense in reading Habermas of rooted, networked community members, besieged by state and capital, hanging on to traditions they value but which they recognize are

under threat. Exempting only feminism as “in the tradition of bourgeois-socialist liberation movements,” Habermas (1987b: 393) characterizes the new social movements as basically movements of “defending and restoring endangered ways of life.” Like the postmodernists, Habermas looks toward language as a constitutive ground for subjective agency, but instead of finding a bewildering array of incommensurable discourses, as does Jean-François Lyotard (1988), he postulates an immanent movement toward communication, and thus toward a reassertion of democratic accountability and civil society (Cohen and Arato 1992).

Habermas’s phenomenological touchstone of the lifeworld preserves a sense of alternative never fully taken over by state and capital; it also relies on a core idea running from Rousseau to Marx, of a domain that is almost prepolitical and pre-social where “experience” remains a wellspring of creativity and resistance. Like the disembedded subject, the Habermasian subject may include different class levels: both middle-class “concerned citizens” seeking “quality of life, equal rights, individual self-realization, participation, and human rights” (Habermas 1987b: 392) and community members whose “placedness” is more a function of lack of resources and state boundary controls than a valuation of local culture and support networks. They may often be obliged to cope with globally connected state and capitalist elites who treat them as disposable “human resources.” Habermas’s strong sense of the political and economic realms weighing heavily on the citizens of advanced capitalist societies retains a link to structural definitions of life chances, and thus to inclusion of the dispossessed among the sites of resistance.

“Lifeworld,” however, is an opaque, formal term in Habermas’s text; all of its inhabitants appear to be rational, verbal, articulate, and ready and able to hear the voices of other members of civil society. Though Habermas (1989) is not entirely sanguine about the health of civil society, there is no inquiry into the de/formations of subjectivity itself as forged in various sites of subordination. The characterization of the lifeworld as something of a protected refuge warding off colonization by outside forces rings suspiciously of a patriarchal romance about family and household (Fraser 1989) and scarcely begins to deal with the ways in which subjects are always already fully engaged with, if not “colonized” by, capital and state. Furthermore, the rather schematic use of the idea of “civil society” does not take account of the internal power dynamics of this realm, nor of the multiple publics that contend with each other there, or are excluded from it (Fraser 1990). From a governmentality perspective, a precolonized facet to the lifeworld would be an unlikely discovery as subjects are necessarily a part of, and depending on the theorist, perhaps also “more” than the power complexes around them, at the same time.

Emergent, newly connected identities in formation

A third collection of images of contemporary subjectivity discerns new identities and (at least potentially) collectivities coming into being that address more the “recombining” than the anomic qualities advanced by Giddens (Maffesoli 1995). This includes cyberworld connections, personal and cultural identities grounded in taste and desire, and international solidarity networks. There tends to be a “culturalist” and a “structuralist” account of these processes, accounts that speak too infrequently to each other. One version of the culturalist thesis stresses how these

identities may be managed “from above” through the international culture industry: MTV, CNN, Hollywood, etc. The more structural account argues that these subjectivities are not simply free-floating or voluntarist, but rather forged by the world system. Changing socioeconomic conditions generate the conditions for new subject locations, at the same time as state and state apparatuses, such as policing, as well as commercial and corporate production, continue to condition subordinated identities (Omi and Winant 1994; Adam 2001).

Marxian visions identified the subject locations generated by capitalism as the places in which a counter-hegemonic and anticapitalist working class would emerge. It was possible to distinguish “progressive” from “reactionary” forces through a moral and teleological framework that designated historically rising classes with a structural interest in opposing capitalist exploitation as the “force of history” (Sartre 1968). On the other hand, social theorists have grounded new social movements in a diverse set of origins. Besides Habermas’s postulated defense of the lifeworld, they have been identified as an extension of the modernist impulse as they engage in “modernizing civil society in the sense of undoing traditional structures of domination, exclusion, and inequality rooted in social institutions, norms, collective identities, and cultural values” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 508). Modern world-systems theorists (Arrighi et al. 1989; Wallerstein 1989; Amin et al. 1990) have associated them with crisis tendencies in core capitalist countries, setting them alongside antibureaucratic movements in the semi-periphery and fundamentalism in the peripheries.

Standpoint epistemology has sought to locate resistant subjectivity, especially feminism, along the social fault line between “relations of ruling” and women’s experiences (Smith 1987, 1990), a view that has attracted postmodern criticism for presuming too much commonality of experience among women. Cultural approaches have tended to cut off the subject locations for the new social movements from any form of political economy in favor of an argument that they are a form of politics of recognition or identity. Gay and lesbian movements have been especially presumed to be “merely cultural” phenomena (Butler 1997; Fraser 1997a,b), a view which very much underestimates structural prerequisites for the emergence of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered subjectivities (Adam 2002).

Unlike the disembedded or lifeworld-based subjects that focus more on how “things fall apart” and convey a sense of loss over time, this collection of precepts discerns new forms of sociability, if not community. Though many of these populations have endured extended periods of subordination with little alternative than to accommodate or resign themselves to their inequality, they have over time found their way toward “an insurrection of subjugated knowledges” and toward reworking and transforming the structures around them that have reinforced traditional inequality.

Displaced, “squeezed,” or threatened subject locations

Reactionary responses seem to attract less interest in social theory, but the history of fascism provides a repository of research on a power/subject nexus that is far from “over” (Moore 1966; Sohn-Rethel 1978a; Abraham 1981; Hamilton 1982; Dobkowski and Wallimann 1983; Blackburn and Eley 1984). Social groups expe-

riencing declining social status or whose economic niche is being dissolved by the world economy may be particularly vulnerable to a politics of resentment, defensiveness, and reaction in the forms of symbolic crusades, fundamentalism, or authoritarianism. Studies of right-wing violence in contemporary Europe and the United States show the continuing power of these social mechanisms and the ongoing reproduction of these subject locations in the contemporary world (Steinmetz 1994; Diamond 1995; Rupert 1997). Fundamentalisms “have spread most widely among those who have been further subordinated and excluded by the recent transformations of the global economy and who are most threatened by the increased mobility of capital” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 150), and reactionary nationalism has resurfaced as a defense mechanism in several post-Soviet locales, where the onslaught of the world-system has threatened vulnerable populations.

In Giddens’s paradigm, the far-right response is a form of pathological reaction formation to the challenge of disembeddedness and self-reflection. For Habermas, it is perhaps just an extreme manifestation of defense of the lifeworld; it would require filling in the specific content of the lifeworlds of its adherents to make sense of this response. Reactionaries are the obverse of the newly emergent identities and often perceive the latter as their “enemies,” holding the latter’s apparently rising social status as evidence of their responsibility for the former’s misfortune. Displaced, squeezed, and threatened subject locations can include those with relatively little but who nevertheless have a “fear of falling” (Ehrenreich 1989), as well as elites who have the power to wreak considerable damage.

Conclusion

Preoccupation with the nexus between subjectivity and social inequality has a lengthy history in social theory. It has a lineage in the founding problems which gave rise to sociology, that is, industrializing disruption and the reorganization of European and American societies, theorized in the classics of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Tönnies, and Simmel.

People negotiate the set of life chances available to them in their *habitus*. The challenge is to understand the ways in which discourses enter into coping strategies to structural constraints such that people become subordinated, contained, and disempowered, or, on the other hand, perceive possibilities, resist, mobilize, and step into what Touraine (1988) calls *historicity*. Discourse, experience, and structure need to be brought together as analytical tools for the documentation of the dynamics of subjectivity.

Contemporary visions of subjectivity, which have occupied increasing attention in social theory at a time when Marxian perspectives have been in decline, tend to underplay the “harder,” more violent manifestations of subordination, and their effects on consciousness (Adam 1993). Versions of an increasingly prevalent transnational, itinerant subject scarcely address the strengthening barriers that forcibly suppress the mobility of those outside the advanced capitalist nations at such sites of confrontation as Tijuana, the Rio Grande, Ceuta and Melilla, Lampedusa, or the Cook Islands, all of which capture and incarcerate would-be migrants from the Third to the First World. Nor do they provide much insight into the formation of a sense

of agency in a context where even the limited civil rights and material resources of working-class people in the host country are withheld from those whose presence is deemed illegal (Sassen 1998; Westwood and Phizacklea 2000). There exists a rich empirical research literature dealing with forms of consciousness and resistance made im/possible by severely restricted life chances in contemporary studies of postcolonialism (Nandy 1983), peasants (Scott 1985), gender and work (Chancer 1992; Skeggs 1997), Appalachian workers (Gaventa 1982), and subordinated peoples (Adam 1978), as well as an older literature devoted to concentration camp experiences (Cohen 1954), slavery and colonialism (Fanon 1967; Memmi 1969), and racism (Grier and Cobbs 1968; Kardiner and Ovesey 1972; Sartre 1973), to name just a few. Yet it is a literature with few shared theoretical paradigms and apparently little mutual awareness of related bodies of work. Cumulatively, it points away from nostalgic renderings of lifeworlds to be defended and raises harder questions about the ways in which societies characterized by extremes of power and wealth can be made to work at least insofar as they produce (and are reproduced by) pacification, compliance, and deference among their subjects.

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Part II

Epistemology, Method, and Inequality

Chapter 6

Conceptualizing a Critical Race Theory in Sociology

TARA J. YOSSO AND DANIEL G. SOLÓRZANO

Discussion of race and racism in the social sciences has a long tradition. W. E. B. DuBois's often quoted line from *The Souls of Black Folk*: "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line" (1989 [1903]: 29) takes the discussion of race and racism back to at least the turn of the nineteenth century. Indeed, a century after this great American social scientist predicted that racism would continue to emerge as one of this country's key social problems, researchers, practitioners, and students are still searching for the necessary tools to effectively analyze and challenge the impact of race and racism in US society. Discussions about race and racism have been either pushed to the margins or effectively destabilized. While those on the political right attempt to dismiss the permanence of racism and strategically move the discourse toward a colorblind society, some liberal and even left-leaning scholars criticize work that addresses issues of "race," stating that it is merely a social construction and a byproduct of capitalism.

In this context, we argue that we must discuss race because racism continues to have very real consequences on US society at both the institutional (macro) and the individual (micro) levels. Eurocentric versions of US history reveal race to be a socially constructed category, created to differentiate racial groups and to show the superiority or dominance of one race over another (Omi and Winant 1994; Banks 1995). Race can be viewed as an "objective" phenomenon until human beings provide the social meaning. The social meaning applied to race is based upon and justified by an ideology of racial superiority and White privilege. That ideology is called racism and Audre Lorde defines racism as "the belief in the inherent superiority of one race over all others and thereby the right to dominance" (1992: 496). Manning Marable defines racism as "a system of ignorance, exploitation, and power used to oppress African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, Pacific Americans, American Indians, and other people on the basis of ethnicity, culture, mannerisms, and color" (1992: 5). Marable's definition of racism is important because it shifts the discussion of race and racism from a Black/White discourse to one that includes multiple faces, voices, and experiences. Embedded in the Lorde and Marable definitions of

racism are at least three important points: (1) one group deems itself superior to all others, (2) the group that is superior has the power to carry out the racist behavior, and (3) racism benefits the superior group while it negatively impacts the subordinate racial/ethnic groups.

These two definitions take the position that racism is about institutional power and people of color in the United States have never possessed this form of power. Beverly Tatum further reminds us: “Despite the current rhetoric about affirmative action and ‘reverse racism,’ every social indicator, from salary to life expectancy, reveals the advantages of being White” (1997: 8). Harlon Dalton has argued that it is important for Whites “to conceive of themselves as members of a race and to recognize the advantages that attach to simply having white skin” (1995: 6). Andrew Hacker has raised the question: Can we place a price on being White in the United States? (see 1992: 31–2). The racial/ethnic advantages and privileges of being White in the USA can be an important part of the discussion and analysis in the sociology classroom (see Hacker 1992; Allen 1993; Scheurich 1993a,b; Sleeter 1993, 1994; Dalton 1995; Halewood 1995; Bonilla-Silva 2001).

John Calmore (1997) asserts that what is noticeably missing from the discussion of race is a substantive discussion of racism. We agree that a conversation about race without talking about racism and White privilege decontextualizes those places where race and racism enter our lives in macro and micro ways (Lawrence 1987; Davis 1989). The field of sociology has consistently been at the forefront of work asking critical questions about race, racism, and social inequality. Our goals for this chapter are to provide readers with insight into how we came to utilize critical race theory (CRT) as an analytical framework, and to encourage sociological research on race and inequality to more explicitly draw on this powerful analytical lens. We agree with Derrick Bell, who has asserted, “it is time to ‘get real’ about race and the persistence of racism in America” (1992: 5).

Our Journey to Critical Race Theory

As professors of color conducting work in the sociology of education, we had been utilizing various frameworks to address issues of educational equity and social justice. We each began to develop our own critical consciousness (albeit a few decades apart) through the work of scholars and activists that would fall under the umbrella of Ethnic Studies. For Solórzano, participating in the Chicano civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s and working as a high school teacher and community college professor in the 1970s complemented his readings of Malcolm X (Haley 1965), Rudy Acuña (1972), and Paulo Freire (1970, 1973). Although born in the 1970s, the activism and scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s allowed Yosso academic opportunities in the 1990s – including access to Chicano Studies university courses, tutoring, and mentoring. The research and policy work of previous generations demonstrated severe social inequalities affecting students of color, immigrants, and English-language learners. Yosso was able to put some of the work of scholars such as Pat Zavella (1991), Carlos Cortés (1985), and Mario Barrera (1979) into practice as a bilingual aid in local public schools and in her work as an instructor in Upward Bound and migrant education programs.

Collectively, our interdisciplinary training and practical experience led us to utilize the critiques provided by approaches such as the Internal Colonial model (Bonilla and Girling 1973; Blauner 2001); Marxism (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Barrera 1979); Chicana and Black feminisms (Anzaldúa 1987; hooks 1990; Hurtado 1996; Hill Collins 1998); and cultural nationalism (Asante 1987) to document and analyze the educational access, persistence, and graduation of underrepresented students. Even with all of their strengths, each of these frameworks had certain blind spots that limited our ability to examine racism.

Solórzano was first introduced to CRT when he came across a June 23, 1993 issue of the *Chronicle of Higher Education*¹ and read the article written by Peter Monaghan (1993) titled, “‘Critical race theory’ questions role of legal doctrine in racial inequality: Lani Guinier, ill-fated Justice Depart. nominee, is one of its traditional adherents.” This “critical race moment” inspired Solórzano to re-envision a more focused approach to analyzing and challenging racial inequality in higher education.² As described in the article, CRT seemed to be a framework that could examine some of the questions that the individual models he had previously used did not quite address. At the time, Solórzano noted that CRT seemed like a new way of looking at race and racism, and yet he knew he had seen similar approaches before. Indeed, it was in his experiences in Ethnic Studies and Sociology that he had “seen it.” Solórzano’s engagement with CRT shaped Yosso’s graduate school experiences as she tried to struggle through a PhD at a university that treated race and racism as a marginalized Black/White issue that was only peripherally relevant to educational policy, pedagogy, or curriculum. Over the last 10 years, our intellectual collaborations with CRT have led us to recognize that we still draw on the same theoretical models from the 1960s and 1970s by: (1) acknowledging their limitations and (2) applying their collective strengths to the study of race and racism in education.

Toward a Critical Race Theory in Sociology

Although social science has traditionally confirmed the salience of race in US society, many critical race theorists are going beyond the view that race is a dichotomy based on social construction or biological factors (Bell 1992; Delgado and Stefancic 1995). They recognize that race is central to people’s lives and are likewise placing race at the center of their work (Dalton 1987). These scholars are not utilizing race as a variable that can be controlled, but instead are focusing on the real impact that racism has had and continues to have within American society.

CRT draws from and extends a broad literature base, often termed “critical theory,” in law, sociology, history, ethnic studies, and women’s studies (Delgado and Stefancic 1995). In paraphrasing Brian Fay (1987: 4), William Tierney has defined critical theory as “an attempt to understand the oppressive aspects of society in order to generate societal and individual transformation” (1993: 4). Kimberlé Crenshaw (2002) explains that in the late 1980s, various legal scholars felt limited by work that separated critical theory from conversations about race and racism. Alongside other “Outsider” scholars (Hill Collins 1986), Crenshaw was “looking for both a critical space in which race was foregrounded and a race space where critical themes were central” (Crenshaw 2002: 19). Mari Matsuda defined the CRT space as:

the work of progressive legal scholars of color who are attempting to develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in American law and that works toward the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating all forms of subordination. (1991: 1331)

Figure 6.1 outlines CRT's family tree through our own lenses of experience. In prior work we described a genealogy of CRT that links the themes and patterns of legal scholarship with the social science literature that seems to have informed CRT scholars (Solórzano and Yosso 2001). Here, we take a more personalized approach that reflects our own intellectual history that led us to CRT and beyond.

In its post-1987 form, CRT emerged from criticisms of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. One of the criticisms was the inability of the CLS scholars to incorporate race and racism into their analysis. Indeed, these same critiques of "critical studies" had been taking place in Ethnic Studies and Women Studies Departments. These Departments were struggling to define and incorporate cultural nationalist paradigms, internal colonial models, Marxist and neo-Marxist, and feminist frameworks into their race- and gender-based intellectual and community work.

Critical race theorists began to pull away from CLS because the critical legal framework restricted their ability to analyze racial injustice (Delgado 1988; Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Crenshaw 2002). Initially, because CRT focused on civil rights legislation in terms of Black *vs.* White, other groups have since expanded the CRT family tree to incorporate their racialized experiences, as women, as Latinas/os, as Native Americans, and as Asian Americans. For example, LatCrit, TribalCrit, and AsianCrit are natural outgrowths of CRT, evidencing Chicana/o, Latina/o, Native American, and Asian American communities' ongoing search for a framework that addresses racism and its accompanying oppressions beyond the Black/White binary (Ikemoto 1992; Chang 1993, 1998; Chon 1995; Delgado 1997; Williams, R. 1997; Brayboy 2001, 2002). Women of




Figure 6.1 CRT's family tree.

color have also challenged CRT to address feminist critiques of racism and classism through FemCrit theory (Caldwell 1995; Wing 1997, 2000). In addition, White scholars have expanded CRT with WhiteCrit, by “looking behind the mirror” to expose White privilege and challenge racism (Delgado and Stefancic 1997).

Our work in CRT is informed by the scholarship of Latina/o Critical Race (LatCrit) theory. LatCrit theory extends critical race discussions to address the layers of racialized subordination that comprise Chicana/o, Latina/o experiences (Arriola 1997, 1998; Stefancic 1998). LatCrit scholars assert that racism, sexism, and classism are experienced amidst other layers of subordination based on immigration status, sexuality, culture, language, phenotype, accent, and surname. Alongside these scholars, we argue that the Black/White binary is a paradigm of understanding US race relations in terms of the African American and White experience (Valdes 1997, 1998). The use of the word “binary” describes the two-dimensional limit that is placed on discussions about race and racism. Like the work of Marable (1992), we argue that racism in the United States intersects with other forms of subordination described above (Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Montoya 1994; Espinoza and Harris 1998; Johnson 1999).

We recognize that African Americans have experienced a unique history of racism and other forms of subordination in this country, yet we also acknowledge that other people of color have their own histories that likewise have been shaped by the intersecting forms of subordination. By offering a two-dimensional discourse, the Black/White binary limits our understanding of the multiple ways in which African Americans, Native Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, Chicanas/os, and Latinas/os experience, respond to, and resist these forms of oppression. Indeed, racism and its intersections with other forms of subordination shape the experiences of people of color very differently than Whites (Bell 1986, 1998; Baca Zinn 1989; Essed 1991). Overall, the popular discourse in the USA, as well as the academic discourse, continues to be limited by the Black/White binary. We hope that a CRT in sociology will aid those whose efforts continue to expand this dialogue to recognize the ways in which our struggles for social justice are limited by discourses that omit and thereby silence the multiple experiences of people of color (Ellison 1990).

While we are informed by CRT and its genealogical branches, we continue to draw on our interdisciplinary training and theoretical models whose popularity may have waned since the 1960s and 1970s, but whose commitment to speaking truth to power continues to speak to contemporary social realities. Informed by scholars who continue to expand the literature and scope of discussions on race and racism, we have developed a working definition of CRT in education, adapted originally from the LatCrit Primer (1999) and that we adapt here for the field of sociology:

Critical race theory (CRT) is a framework that can be used to theorize and examine the ways in which race and racism implicitly and explicitly impact on the social structures, practices, and discourses that affect people of color. Important to this critical framework is a challenge to the dominant ideology, which supports deficit notions about communities of color while assuming “neutrality” and “objectivity.” Utilizing the experiences of people of color, a CRT in sociology also theorizes and examines that place where racism intersects with other forms of subordination such as sexism, classism, nativism, monolingualism, and heterosexism. CRT in sociology is conceived as a social justice project that attempts to link theory with practice, scholarship with teach-

ing, and the academy with the community. CRT acknowledges that social institutions operate in contradictory ways with their potential to oppress and marginalize coexisting with their potential to emancipate and empower. CRT in sociology is transdisciplinary and draws on many other schools of progressive scholarship.

From this working definition, at least five themes of CRT inform our work as social scientists in the field of education:³ (1) The intercentricity of race and racism; (2) the challenge to dominant ideology; (3) the commitment to social justice; (4) the centrality of experiential knowledge; and (5) the utilization of interdisciplinary approaches. These five tenets provide a guide to developing a CRT in sociology.

The intercentricity of race and racism with other forms of subordination

CRT starts from the premise that race and racism are endemic, permanent, and a fundamental part of defining and explaining how US society functions (Bell 1992; Russell 1992). Yet, as Robin Barnes has stated, “Critical Race Scholars have refused to ignore the differences between class and race as a basis for oppression. . . . Critical Race Scholars know that class oppression alone cannot account for racial oppression” (1990: 1868). Specifically, CRT acknowledges the intercentricity of racialized oppression – the layers of subordination based on race, gender, class, immigration status, surname, phenotype, accent, and sexuality (Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Valdes et al. 2002). Here, in the intersections of racial oppression, we can use CRT to search for some answers to the theoretical, conceptual, methodological, and pedagogical questions related to communities of color.

The challenge to dominant ideology

CRT challenges White privilege and refutes the claims that educational institutions make toward objectivity, meritocracy, colorblindness, race neutrality, and equal opportunity. Critical race scholars argue that these traditional claims act as a camouflage for the self-interest, power, and privilege of dominant groups in US society (Calmore 1992; Solórzano 1997). A critical race methodology in social science challenges notions of “neutral” research or “objective” researchers and exposes deficit-informed research that silences, ignores, and distorts epistemologies of people of color (Delgado Bernal 1998; Ladson-Billings 2000). Anthony Cook explains, “[I]t is this profound critique of norms, background assumptions and paradigms, within which Black progress and regress take place, that gives Critical Race Theory its critical bite” (1992: 1010).

The commitment to social justice

CRT is committed to social justice and offers a liberatory or transformative response to racial, gender, and class oppression (Matsuda 1991). We envision a social justice research agenda that leads toward the elimination of racism, sexism, and poverty and the empowerment of people of color and other subordinated groups. Critical race researchers acknowledge that social institutions operate in contradictory ways with

their potential to oppress and marginalize coexisting with their potential to emancipate and empower. It is at this point where the pedagogy of Paulo Freire (1973) is most useful for critical race scholars. Indeed, Freire's (1970, 1973) work to empower oppressed groups through critical literacy consciousness-raising projects began with "naming the problem" or, as critical race theorists say, "naming the injury." Likewise, CRT recognizes that multiple layers of oppression and discrimination are met with multiple forms of resistance (Solórzano and Delgado Bernal 2001).

The centrality of experiential knowledge

CRT recognizes that the experiential knowledge of people of color is legitimate, appropriate, and critical to understanding, analyzing, and teaching about racial subordination. In fact, critical race theorists view this knowledge as a strength and draw explicitly on the lived experiences of people of color by including such methods as storytelling, family histories, biographies, scenarios, parables, *cuentos*, *testimonios*, chronicles, and narratives (Bell 1987, 1992, 1996; Delgado 1989, 1993, 1995a,b, 1996; Olivas 1990; Carrasco 1996; Solórzano and Yosso 2000, 2001, 2002b; Solórzano and Delgado Bernal 2001; Delgado Bernal and Villalpando 2002). CRT exposes deficit-informed research and policy that silence and distort the experiences of people of color and instead focus on their racialized, gendered, and classed experiences as sources of strength (Solórzano and Solórzano 1995; Valencia and Solórzano 1997).

The utilization of interdisciplinary approaches

CRT insists on analyzing race and racism within both historical and contemporary contexts (Delgado 1984, 1992; Olivas 1990; Gotanda 1991; Garcia 1995; Harris 1995). In addition, CRT utilizes a transdisciplinary knowledge base to guide research that better understands the effects of racism, sexism, and classism on people of color. Rather than be limited by a strict, singular disciplinary focus or merely draw on the overlapping areas between various disciplines, CRT goes beyond disciplinary boundaries to learn from scholarship in each of the areas of ethnic studies, women's studies, sociology, history, law, psychology, film, theater, and other fields.

These five themes are not new in and of themselves, but collectively they represent a challenge to the existing modes of scholarship. Many in the academy, in community, and labor organizing, or in other aspects of community activism and service that look to challenge social inequality will most likely recognize the tenets of CRT as part of what, why, and how they do the work they do. CRT names racist injuries and identifies their origins. In examining these origins, CRT finds that racism is often well disguised in the rhetoric of shared "normative" values and "neutral" social scientific principles and practices (Matsuda et al. 1993). However, when the ideology of racism is examined and racist injuries are named, victims of racism can often find their voice. Further, those injured by racism and other forms of oppression discover that they are not alone in their oppression. They become empowered participants, hearing their own stories and the stories of others, listening to how the arguments against them are framed, and learning to make the arguments to defend themselves.

Critical Race Counter-Storytelling

One of the methods of CRT that help analyze the role of race and racism through the experiences of people of color is a technique with a long tradition in the social sciences, humanities, ethnic studies, women's studies, and the law – storytelling. Richard Delgado (1989) uses a practice called counter-storytelling. Delgado argues that counter-storytelling is both a method of telling the story of those experiences that have not been told (i.e., those on the margins of society) and a tool for analyzing and challenging the stories of those in power and whose story is a natural part of the dominant discourse – the majoritarian story.⁴ CRT can challenge deficit “majoritarian” approaches to sociology through counter-storytelling, oral traditions, historiographies, *corridos*, poetry, films, *actos*, and humor. CRT asks: Whose stories are privileged in academic discourse, mass media, and social policy contexts and whose stories are distorted and silenced? US history reveals that White upper/middle-class stories are privileged and treated as normative while the stories of people of color are marginalized (Gutiérrez-Jones 2001). We further ask: What are the experiences and responses of those whose stories are often distorted, silenced, and marginalized? In documenting the voices of people of color, CRT in sociology works to tell their stories.

Although CRT scholarship arguably serves counter-narrative functions in general, some scholars seek to be more explicit in presenting their research through the genre of storytelling. There are at least three types of such counter-stories evidenced in the CRT literature: autobiographical stories (Espinoza 1990; Williams 1991; Montoya 1994), biographical stories (Lawrence and Matsuda 1997; Fernández 2002), and multimethod/composite stories (Bell 1987, 1992, 1996; Delgado 1995a,b, 1996, 1999, 2003; Solórzano and Yosso 2000, 2001, 2002a,b; Solórzano and Delgado Bernal 2001; Delgado Bernal and Villalpando 2002).

Critical race counter-stories can serve several pedagogical functions: (1) they can build community among those at the margins of society; (2) they can challenge the perceived wisdom of those at society's center; (3) they can open new windows into the reality of those at the margins by showing the possibilities beyond the ones they live and by showing that they are not alone in their position; (4) they can teach others that by combining elements from both the story and the current reality, one can construct another world that is richer than either the story or the reality alone; and (5) they can provide a context to understand and transform established belief systems (Delgado 1989; Lawson 1995). Storytelling has a rich and continuing tradition in the African American (Berkeley Art Center 1982; Bell 1987, 1992, 1996; Lawrence 1992), Chicana/o (Paredes 1977; Delgado 1989, 1995b, 1996; Olivas 1990), Native American (Deloria 1969; Williams, R. 1997), and Asian American (Wakatsuki Houston and Houston 1973; Hong Kingston 1976) communities.

For our purposes here, we focus on multimethod/composite stories. Composite counter-narratives draw on multiple forms of “data” to recount the racialized, sexualized, classed experiences of people of color. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss assert, “The generation of theory requires that the analyst take apart the story within his [her] data” (1967: 108). Our counter-stories add to the storytelling tradition and address racism in higher education through composite characters that embody

the patterns and themes evidenced in social science data. Our approach to the critical race counter-story method borrows from the works of Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin and Dolores Delgado Bernal. Strauss and Corbin utilize a concept called theoretical sensitivity and refer to it as “a personal quality of the researcher . . . the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and capability to separate the pertinent from that which isn’t” (1990: 41–2). Delgado Bernal’s (1998) notion of “cultural intuition” adds to Strauss and Corbin’s notion of theoretical sensitivity in that it “extends one’s personal experience to include collective experience and community memory, and points to the importance of participants’ engaging in the analysis of data” (1990: 563–4). Using Strauss and Corbin’s theoretical sensitivity and Delgado Bernal’s cultural intuition, we create counter-stories from: (1) the data gathered from the research process itself, (2) the existing literature on the topic(s), (3) our own professional experiences, (4) our own personal experiences, and (5) our collective experiences and community memory.

For example, in the following counter-story excerpt, our first form of data came from primary sources, namely focus-group interviews conducted with undergraduate and law students of color at three major universities, in conjunction with the University of Michigan Affirmative Action case (see Solórzano et al. 2000; Allen and Solórzano 2001; Solórzano and Yosso 2002b). We searched and sifted through these data for examples of the concepts we were seeking to illuminate, such as experiences with and responses to racism and sexism (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Drawing on the experiences of undergraduate and graduate African American, Native American, and Latina/o, Chicana/o students, we sought to examine race, racism, White privilege, and the racial tipping-point phenomenon. We also wanted to demonstrate how affirmative action had been weakened from its original intent. The policy was initially developed to serve as a means to remedy racial discrimination and, thereby, integrate true racial diversity (pluralism) into higher education.

Next, we looked to other sources for secondary data analysis related to these concepts in the social sciences, humanities, and legal literature. For this particular counter-story, we used the social science data to analyze the legal documents leading up to and including the law school case at the University of Michigan (e.g., opinions and dissents in the 1978 *Bakke vs. University of California*, the 1954 *Brown vs. Board of Education*, and the 1947 *Mendez vs. Westminster* cases). In sifting through this literature, we began to draw connections between our previous readings on desegregation and racial tracking and the relevant focus-group interview data (Oakes 1985; Valencia 2003). Finally, we added our own professional and personal experiences related to the concepts and ideas. Here, we not only shared our own stories and reflections, but we also drew upon the multiple voices of family, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances.

Once these various sources of data had been compiled, examined, and analyzed, we created composite characters to help tell the counter-story. We attempted to get the characters to engage in a real and critical dialogue about our findings from the interviews, literature, and experiences. In the tradition of Freire (1973), this dialogue emerged between the characters much like our own discussions emerged – through sharing, listening, challenging, and reflecting.

We share below an excerpt of this counter-story that engages Claudia,⁵ a Chicana civil rights attorney and professor at a California university, in a dialogue with the

late Justice Thurgood Marshall and a community activist from the spirit-world, Ms. Ruby Puentes.⁶ These three characters are attending a session of the University of Michigan Law School affirmative action trial in January 2001.⁷ We ask the reader to approach the counter-story as a pedagogical case study, listen for the story's points and reflect on how these points compare with her/his own version of reality (however conceived). We bring the reader into this story already underway in a federal courthouse in Detroit, Michigan as our three characters engage in dialogue about the continuities of racism in US history:

Justice Marshall interjected, "History repeats itself, Claudia. Remember Michael Olivas' (1990) comments on Derrick Bell's (1995) *Space Traders* chronicle? He talks about how the USA has welcomed and rejected Mexicans and Asians according to socio-political convenience. And this is like Bell's (1987) 'interest-convergence theory,' because civil rights legislation has only been implemented to the extent that Whites have benefited. Again I am reminded that affirmative action as a social policy of limited goals and timetables only lasted for 10 years, from 1968 to 1978. In the 1954 *Brown* case, individual states took the court's mandate to 'desegregate with all deliberate speed' and focused on the word 'deliberate' rather than 'speed,' to slow down and hinder racial integration of the public schools. In contrast, as soon as *Bakke* (1978) was ruled on, many colleges and universities couldn't move fast enough in their rush to dismantle the limited 'set aside' affirmative action programs they had in place. Whites had become nervous. They felt threatened. *Bakke* ended that 10-year stint of 'set-aside' affirmative action programs, even though we had barely begun to see some results from those goals and timetables. Despite the fact that in California limited 'race-based' affirmative action ended in 1997 (with passage of Proposition 209), Whites still perceive students of color enrolling at universities to be 'less-qualified.' The legal debate hasn't even begun about the 'set-asides' that are available to Whites, just because they are White. The courts should be discussing the unequal educational playing field leading up to university admissions processes. They should also discuss why White students are given disproportionate access to AP/honors classes, and an overall comprehensive college preparatory curriculum. And it would also be important for the courts to note that White students benefit from the tradition of family legacy admissions. . . ." Ms. Puentes added, "But instead of those discussions, we will most likely hear more misinterpretations of Dr. King's dream, because ignoring the realities of racism and pretending that we live in a color-blind society converges with the interests of those who benefit from racism. The elimination of White privilege begins by educating and empowering people of color."

I nodded my head in agreement as I continued jotting down notes. I began to think about ways to articulate Justice Marshall and Ms. Puentes' comments for my own opening remarks in the California case. I smiled at the thought that we made a really great team. I felt humbled to have such prophetic colleagues. (see Solórzano and Yosso 2002b)

Margaret Montoya writes, "Stories by and about Outsiders resist the subordinating messages of the dominant culture by challenging stereotypes and presenting and representing people of color as complex and heterogeneous" (2002: 244). Our work attempts to tell such "Outsider" stories (Hill Collins 1986). This counter-story excerpt demonstrates how we create dialogue that critically illuminates concepts, ideas, and experiences, while incorporating the tenets of CRT. We hear Justice Marshall describing that race matters because the legacy of racism is a contemporary reality that shapes US society. We also listen to Ms. Puentes' concerns that

discourse about racism has not gone far enough. In addition, we reflect along with Claudia as she is trying to digest this critical race analysis that challenges more traditional discussions of affirmative action. Clara Lomas explains that this tradition of listening to and recounting *testimonios* (life experiences) of subordinated groups is a “genre of action.” She asserts that:

a story does something to the storyteller; it does something to the listeners/readers, the spectators: It has the capacity to transform them . . . In making sense of the text as a whole the reader is forced to go outside the text itself and examine the real world in relation to the text. (2003: 2–3)

Lomas describes storytelling as having the capacity to transform all those who engage the text (e.g., visual, print, verbal). In format and content, our counter-stories attempt to build on the transformative capacity of narratives. By offering a radically different vision for communities of color, critical race counter-stories can shatter the naturalness of White, male, and class privilege.

Challenging Racism, Revealing Cultural Wealth

Because we have described CRT as an analytical framework with at least five main tenets, it is helpful to think about these tenets as a guiding lens that can inform our research in communities of color. Specifically, CRT can be utilized as a primary lens to address research questions, teaching approaches, and our policy recommendations regarding social inequality. Indeed, CRT is grounded in the experiences and knowledge of communities of color. Such a theory unapologetically centers the research lens on race and racism’s intersections with other forms of subordination.

As we look through a CRT lens, we critique deficit theorizing and data that may be limited by its omission of the voices of people of color. We assert that CRT helps researchers, teachers, and policy makers “see” the cultural wealth (as opposed to deficits) in marginalized communities. Yet CRT also insists that we take the responsibility to build reciprocity in to our research, teaching, and policy so that we do not attempt to disrespectfully “mine” these culturally wealthy communities. Deficit-informed research often “sees” deprivation in communities of color. Utilizing CRT as an analytical lens helps us approach research with a critical eye to identify, analyze, and challenge distorted notions of people of color as we build on the cultural wealth already present in these communities.

Culture influences how society is organized, how the curriculum is developed, and how pedagogy and policy are implemented. In sociology, the concept of culture for students of color has taken on many divergent meanings. Some research has equated culture with race and ethnicity, while other work clearly has viewed culture through a much broader lens of characteristics and forms of social histories and identities. We view the culture of students of color as a set of characteristics that are neither fixed nor static. Culture refers to behaviors and values that are learned, shared, and exhibited by a group of people. Culture is also evidenced in material and nonmaterial productions of a people. For example, with students of color, culture is frequently represented symbolically through language and can encompass

identities around immigration status, gender, phenotype, sexuality, and region, as well as race and ethnicity. The cultures of students of color can nurture and empower them (Delgado Bernal 2002). Focusing on research with Latina/o families, Luis C. Moll, Cathy Amanti, Deborah Neff, and Norma Gonzalez (1992), Carlos Vélez-Ibáñez and James Greenberg (1992), and Irma Olmedo (1997) assert that culture can form and draw from communal *funds of knowledge* (Gonzalez et al. 1995; Gonzalez and Moll 2002). Likewise, Douglas Foley notes research revealing the “virtues and solidarity in African American community and family traditions” as well as the “deeply spiritual values passed from generation to generation in most African American communities” (1997: 123).

Our description of cultural wealth begins with a critique of the ways sociologists Bourdieu and Passeron’s work (1977) has been used to discuss social and racial inequity. In education, Bourdieu’s work has often been called upon to explain why students of color do not succeed at the same rate as Whites. According to Bourdieu, “cultural capital” refers to an accumulation of cultural knowledge, skills, and abilities possessed and inherited by privileged groups in society. Bourdieu asserts that cultural capital (i.e., education, language), social capital (i.e., social networks, connections), and economic capital (i.e., money and other material possessions) can be acquired two ways, from one’s family and/or through formal schooling. The dominant groups within society are able to maintain power because access is limited to acquiring and learning strategies to use these forms of capital for social mobility (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977).

Therefore, while Bourdieu’s work sought to provide a structural critique of social and cultural reproduction, his theory of cultural capital has been used to assert that some communities are culturally wealthy while others are culturally poor. This interpretation of Bourdieu exposes White, middle-class culture as the standard by which all others are judged. We argue that cultural capital is not just inherited or possessed by the middle class, but rather it refers to an accumulation of specific forms of knowledge, skills, and abilities that are *valued* by privileged groups in society. For example, middle- or upper-class students may have access to a computer at home and, therefore, can learn numerous computer-related vocabulary and technological skills before arriving at school. These students have acquired cultural capital because computer-related vocabulary and technological skills are valued in the school setting. On the other hand, a working-class Chicana/o student whose mother works in the garment industry may bring a different vocabulary, perhaps in two languages (English and Spanish) to school, along with techniques of conducting errands on the city bus and translating gas and electric bills for her/his mother (see Faulstich Orellana 2003). This cultural knowledge is very valuable to the student and her/his family, but not necessarily considered to carry any capital in the school context. This leads us to ask: Are there forms of cultural capital that marginalized groups bring to the table that traditional cultural capital theory does not recognize or value?

CRT shifts the center of our focus from White, middle-class culture to the cultures of communities of color. In doing so, we also draw on the work of sociologists Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro (1995) to better understand how cultural capital is actually only one form of many different aspects that might be considered valuable. They proposed a model to explain how the narrowing of the income or

earnings gap between people of color and Whites is a misleading way to examine inequality. They argue that one's income over a typical fiscal year focuses on a single form of capital and that the income gap between Blacks and Whites is narrowing over time. On the other hand, they examine separately the concept of wealth and define it as the total extent of an individual's accumulated assets and resources (i.e., ownership of stocks, money in bank, real estate, business ownership, and so on). They then argue that while the income of Blacks may indeed be climbing and the Black/White income gap narrowing, their overall wealth, compared to Whites, is declining and the gap is diverging.

Thus, traditional Bourdieuan cultural capital theory has parallel comparisons to Oliver and Shapiro's (1995) description of income in that it places value on a very narrow range of assets and characteristics. This narrow view of cultural capital, as defined by White, middle-class values, is more limited than wealth – one's accumulated assets and resources. We propose that *cultural wealth* encompasses accumulated assets and resources found in communities of color (see Villalpando and Solórzano in press). Cultural wealth includes various forms of capital such as aspirational, navigational, social, linguistic, familial, and resistance capital (see Auerbach 2001; Delgado Bernal 2001; Solórzano and Delgado Bernal 2001; Stanton-Salazar 2001; Faulstich Orellana 2003; Villalpando and Solórzano in press). Deficit scholars such as E. D. Hirsch (1988, 1996) bemoan the lack of cultural capital, or what he terms "cultural literacy," in low-income communities of color. As previously discussed, research utilizing a deficit analytical lens places value judgments on communities that often do not have access to White, middle- or upper-class resources. In contrast, a CRT lens allows us to focus on and learn from the cultural wealth of communities of color.

CRT identifies individual indicators of capital that have rarely been acknowledged and used as assets in examining the cultural and social characteristics of communities of color. Cultural wealth is found in the histories and lives of communities of color and has gone unrecognized and/or unacknowledged. CRT centers the research, pedagogy, and policy lens on communities of color and calls into question White middle-class communities as the standard by which all others are judged. CRT therefore can begin to recognize multiple forms of cultural wealth within communities of color. Figure 6.2 demonstrates that community cultural wealth is an array of cultural knowledge, skills, abilities, and contacts possessed by socially marginalized groups that often go unrecognized. Communities of color nurture cultural wealth through at least six forms of capital: (1) Aspirational (i.e., dreams for the future, see Auerbach 2001); (2) Familial (i.e., pedagogies of the home, see Delgado Bernal 2001); (3) Social (i.e., networks, see Stanton-Salazar 2001); (4) Navigational (i.e., maneuverability, see Auerbach 2001); (5) Resistant (i.e., oppositional behaviors, see Solórzano and Delgado Bernal 2001); and (6) Linguistic (i.e., language style and content, see Faulstich Orellana 2003).⁸

Aspirational capital draws on the work of Patricia Gándara (1982, 1995) and others who have shown that Chicanas/os experience the lowest educational outcomes compared to every other group in the USA, but maintain consistently high aspirations for their children's future (Delgado-Gaitan 1992, 1994; Solórzano 1992; Auerbach 2001). These stories nurture a culture of possibility as they represent "the creation of a history that would break the links between parents' current occupa-




Figure 6.2 Community cultural wealth (adapted from Oliver and Shapiro 1995).

tional status and their children's future academic attainment" (Gándara 1995: 55). Aspirational capital is evidenced in those who allow themselves, and their children, to dream of possibilities beyond their present circumstances despite the presence of real and perceived barriers and, often, without the resources or other objective means to attain those goals.

Social capital is directly connected to navigational capital because it addresses the peer and other social networks developed to assist in the movement through social institutions, such as schools (Stanton-Salazar 2001). Scholars note that, historically, people of color have utilized their social capital to maneuver through the system, but they often turned around and gave the information and resources gained through the navigation process back to their social networks. Mutualistas or mutual aid societies are an example of how, historically, immigrants to the USA and, indeed, African Americans, even while enslaved, created and maintained social networks (Gómez-Quíñones 1973, 1994; Gutman 1976; Sánchez 1993; Stevenson 1996). In her book *Teaching to Transgress*, bell hooks notes that this tradition was the motto of the National Colored Women's Association, "lifting as we climb" (1994). Social capital can be understood as networks of people and community resources that help one navigate through society's institutions.

Familial capital connects with a commitment to community well-being and expands the concept of family to include a broader understanding of kinship. Acknowledging the racialized, classed, and heterosexualized inferences that comprise traditional understandings of "family," familial capital is nurtured by our

“extended family.” It may include immediate family (living or long passed on) as well as aunts, uncles, grandparents, and friends we might consider part of our “family.” From these kinship ties, we learn the importance of emotional, moral, educational, and occupational consciousness in maintaining a healthy connection to one’s community and its resources. Familial capital includes funds of knowledge (Moll et al. 1992; Vélez-Ibáñez and Greenberg 1992) and pedagogies of the home (Delgado Bernal 2002), as well as the emotional, moral, educational, and occupational consciousness learned from our kin (Elenes et al. 2001; Lopez 2003).

Navigational capital refers to the ability to maneuver through social institutions not created with communities of color in mind. Strategies to navigate through racially hostile university campuses draw on the concept of academic invulnerability, or students’ ability to “sustain high levels of achievement, despite the presence of stressful events and conditions that place them at risk of doing poorly at school and, ultimately, dropping out of school” (Alva 1991: 19). Scholars have examined individual, family, and community factors that support Mexican American students’ academic invulnerability – their successful navigation through the educational system (Alva 1995; Arrellano and Padilla 1996). In addition, resilience has been recognized as “a set of inner resources, social competencies, and cultural strategies that permit individuals to not only survive, recover, or even thrive after stressful events, but also to draw from the experience to enhance subsequent functioning” (Stanton-Salazar and Spina 2000: 229; see also Yosso 2003). This reflects the process of developing “critical navigational skills” (Solórzano and Villalpando 1998). We assert that academic invulnerability and resilience do not take place in a social vacuum, but are influenced by one’s social location (Zavella 1991). Navigational capital, then, refers to a set of social-psychological skills that assist individuals and groups to maneuver through structures of inequality. This acknowledges individual agency within institutional constraints, but it also connects to social networks that facilitate community navigation through places and spaces including schools, the job market, and the health care and judicial systems (P. Williams 1997).

Resistant capital acknowledges the work of Tracy Robinson and Janie Ward (1991) in examining a group of African American mothers who were consciously raising their daughters as “resisters.” Through verbal and nonverbal lessons, these Black mothers taught their daughters to assert themselves as intelligent, beautiful, strong, and worthy of respect to resist the barrage of societal messages devaluing Blackness and belittling Black women (Ward 1996). Similarly, Sofia Villenas and Melissa Moreno (2001) discuss the contradictions Latina mothers face as they try to teach their daughters to *valerse por si misma* (value themselves and be self-reliant) within structures of inequality such as racism, capitalism, and patriarchy. In analyzing students’ efforts to transform unequal conditions in urban schools, Daniel Solórzano and Dolores Delgado Bernal (2001) reveal various forms of Chicana/o student resistance and the continuity of this resistance as demonstrated by the 1968 East Los Angeles high school blowouts and the 1993 UCLA hunger strike for Chicana/o Studies. Solórzano and Delgado Bernal (2001) show that resistance may include different forms of oppositional behavior, such as self-defeating or conformist strategies that feed back into the system of subordination. However, when informed by a Freirean critical consciousness (1970), or recognition of the struc-

tural nature of oppression, and the motivation to work toward social and racial justice, resistance takes on a transformative form (see Solórzano and Yosso 2002c). Therefore, resistant capital refers to the willingness to challenge inequalities (Giroux 1983). Transformative resistant capital can be evidenced in those who recognize structures of racism and are motivated to transform such oppressive structures (Pizarro 1998; Villenas and Deyhle 1999).

Linguistic capital learns from over 35 years of research on bilingual education that emphasizes the value of supporting fluency in more than one language and the connections between racialized cultural history and language (Cummins 1986; Anzaldúa 1987; García and Baker 1995; Macedo and Bartolomé 1999). Linguistic capital reflects the idea that students of color arrive at school with multiple strengths, including language and communication skills. In addition, just as there are different vocal registers we each draw on to whisper, whistle, or sing, linguistic capital acknowledges that youth of color must often develop and draw on various language registers, or styles, to communicate with different audiences. For example, Marjorie Faulstich Orellana examines bilingual children who are often called upon to translate for their parents or other adults and finds that these youth gain multiple social tools of “vocabulary, audience awareness, cross-cultural awareness, ‘real-world’ literacy skills, math skills, metalinguistic awareness, teaching and tutoring skills, civic and familial responsibility, [and] social maturity” (2003: 6). Linguistic capital refers to these intellectual and social tools attained through communication experiences in more than one language and/or style.

As demonstrated by this discussion of cultural wealth, CRT listens to and observes people of color from the perspective that these individuals, families, and communities are places with multiple strengths. Recognizing the knowledge students of color bring with them from their homes and communities into the classroom can also be facilitated through the tools of multiple disciplines. In addition, CRT challenges scholars to strategically utilize interdisciplinary methods to present research findings in unconventional and creative ways. Such research would listen to and learn from those whose knowledges traditionally are excluded from and silenced by academic research. A CRT approach to sociology, then, involves a commitment to conduct research, teach, and develop social policy with a larger purpose of working toward social and racial justice.

Mapping Cultural Wealth through Community Case Studies

Because a CRT framework involves a commitment to social and racial justice, it insists that we speak to the nexus of theory and practice or critical race praxis. While praxis may include pedagogy, it refers more broadly to the multiple forms of action informed by CRT (see Delgado Bernal 1997 for often-overlooked forms of praxis, such as women’s leadership, characterized by organizing and raising awareness). Critical race praxis means that defining and describing community cultural wealth is not enough. We must also ask: How might one find a community’s cultural wealth? We assert that this is done through community asset mapping.

To guide our approach, we adapt John Kretzman and John McKnight’s (1993) strategy for asset-based community development called asset mapping. Kretzman

and McKnight argue that, historically, the research approach to understanding and empowering communities has focused on their needs, deficiencies, and problems. Asset mapping challenges approaches to research that draw on deficit notions of communities of color. Research that fails to examine and question the structural inequalities of communities of color often ends up *deficit mapping* under the guise of “race-neutral” research. In contrast, asset-based research is grounded in the recognition that a unique combination of assets exists in each community. Indeed, an asset-based strategy emphasizes the development of policies and practices grounded in the capacities, skills, and assets of people and their neighborhoods.

A community asset refers to anything that makes a neighborhood a better place to live. Community assets may be identified as *organizational* (e.g., a civil rights or immigration advocacy group), *individual* (e.g., a community elder), *cultural* (e.g., an arts-based youth program), *business* (e.g., a bookstore/café), *educational* (e.g., a library), or *environmental* (e.g., a walking park/playground). Starting from the premise that communities of color are culturally wealthy places (Solórzano and Villalpando 1998; Villalpando and Solórzano, in press), critical race *asset mapping* is the process of finding and making inventories of these assets. Critical race praxis would insist on utilizing these *community assets* and bringing them into our schools and classrooms.

One way that we engage students in this process of identifying community cultural wealth and asset mapping in communities of color is through community case studies (Barnes et al. 1994). The community case study draws on Freire (1970, 1973) to engage students in problem-posing methodology and pedagogy (Solórzano 1989; Smith Maddox and Solórzano 2002). Such a pedagogical approach means that students are viewed as active agents engaged in the discovery and development of their own knowledge. Students co-construct knowledge with their teacher and others. To achieve this objective students are taught in a multimethod, dialogical format. This approach leads students to feel that their thoughts and ideas are important enough to warrant a multimethod dialogue with teachers and others. Finally, teachers are seen as facilitators that students can challenge, just as they would challenge the ideology and values of the dominant social class.

Drawing on the work of Freire (1970, 1973), Charles Lawrence (1992), and other critical race theorists, we approach the case study by centering on the experiences of people of color. Pedagogically, critical race case studies provide a vehicle for listening to individual and family oral histories and observing community life (Lynn 1999). This personal and cultural knowledge gives students and educators insight into the ways in which their prospective students, clients, and neighbors think, interact, and communicate with others and how youth and family culture often clash with those of social institutions (Ladson-Billings 1999). Embedded in this critical race praxis are tools for helping students to identify and name the societal and systemic problems students of color face, analyze the causes of the problem, and find solutions to the problem (Freire 1970).

The community case study project supports a social justice curriculum and pedagogy as students go through the problem-posing process seeking community assets and cultural wealth as opposed to community deficits and cultural poverty. Specifically, students develop an empirical, ethnographic, and visual description of the community. They then identify assets from the point of view of various segments of

the community (e.g., organizations, elders, businesses, educational centers). Next, students come together to discuss, reflect, and analyze the cultural wealth that exists in the various communities. Finally, students incorporate the cultural wealth into the knowledge, curriculum, and pedagogy of the classroom.

As we speak of critical race praxis and the CRT struggle to end social inequality, we recognize the work of Andre Gorz (1967). He outlines three types of social “reforms”: *reformist*, *nonreformist*, and *revolutionary*. First, he explains that a *reformist reform* maintains the structures of domination. Such a policy might work to reform a school bureaucracy, only to make the bureaucracy marginalize students of color more efficiently (e.g., high-stakes testing policies). Second, according to Gorz (1967), a *nonreformist reform* challenges the structures of domination and improves people’s lives in the present, but simultaneously leaves them in a better position to gain more improvements in the future (e.g., affirmative action policy). The key here is that the *nonreformist reform* works to challenge inequalities from within the system. As a result, the system itself is not changed. Third, a *revolutionary reform* challenges the structures of domination and leads to a radical transformation of society (e.g., Cuban Literacy Campaign of 1961). While we concede that, at best, much of our work probably falls into the category of *nonreformist racial reform*, we maintain our hopes for and continue to struggle toward *revolutionary racial reform*. Developing and implementing critical race policy would offer an important contribution in this struggle to “advance toward a radical transformation of society” (Gorz 1967: 6). A critical race policy challenges traditional policies and legislation from a perspective that humanizes people of color and draws on their experiences as strengths to learn from and build on, not deficits to correct.

Discussion

If senior anthropologists feel that the discipline’s crown jewel [culture] has been ripped off by cultural studies, faculty and students in ethnic studies programs often feel that cultural studies is an only slightly disguised effort to restore white male authority in areas where ethnic studies programs have a chance of speaking with some authority. If certain majority scholars distance themselves from cultural studies by saying it is nothing more than ethnic studies writ large, certain minority scholars counter that the covert agenda of cultural studies is to allow white authority to co-opt ethnic studies programs. (Rosaldo 1994: 527)

Renato Rosaldo’s quote above raises an important question of genealogy: Who has been doing work addressing the intersections of racism and are we going to acknowledge this work? Questions and theories about culture and identity, about race and racism, and gender and sexism have been a part of the work and discourse of ethnic and women studies disciplines for decades. Rosaldo’s critical insight indicates that, at best, work in ethnic and women studies has not been adequately acknowledged and, at worst, has been appropriated by scholars in related fields. Rosaldo also speculates that this lack of recognition must be an attempt to “restore white male authority in areas where ethnic studies programs have a chance of speaking with some authority” (p. 527). Rosaldo’s concerns resonate among social scientists who often do not see the work of scholars of color cited as part of the

literature known as “critical theory.” This is ironic since this field is supposed to be an empowering framework for oppressed peoples.

Richard Delgado raises a similar question in the area of civil rights law in his 1984 article, titled “The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature,” and again in his 1992 “The imperial scholar revisited: How to marginalize outsider writing, ten years later.” Delgado examines civil rights scholarship and exposes a racial citation pattern, wherein White authors (Imperial Scholars) cite each other and are much less likely to cite scholars of color. Delgado observes a:

scholarly tradition [that] consists of white scholars’ systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority scholars from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The mainstream writers tend to acknowledge only each other’s work. It is even possible that, consciously or not, they resist entry by minority scholars in to the field, perhaps counseling them, as I was counseled, to establish their reputations in other areas of law. (1984: 566)

We assert that this “scholarly tradition” appears to be evident in the social sciences as well. Just as some Whites do not often venture into communities of color to do research, some White scholars do not often venture into ethnic-specific journals or texts to read the work of scholars of color (see Graham 1992; Rosaldo 1994).

We know some may try to excuse this pattern by arguing that “scholars of color just do not publish as much as Whites.” However, we refute this notion. Instead, we believe there may be at least two reasons for “racially selective citing”: (1) Whites either do not know where to go, or (2) they know where to go, but they choose to ignore the scholarship. Delgado reminds us that “this exclusion does matter; the tradition causes bluntings, skewings, and omissions in the literature dealing with race, racism, and American law” (1984: 573). We agree and note that these omissions limit work in social theory, pedagogy, and policy (Villalpando and Delgado Bernal 2002).

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that CRT is not a passing trend, the latest buzzword, or a “new concept” (Perea et al. 2000). In contrast, CRT draws from the strengths of multiple disciplines, epistemologies, and research approaches (Scheurich and Young 1997; Lopez and Parker 2003). The following sums up CRT – what we do, why we do it, and how we do it:

- *What do we do?* We focus our work on addressing the many forms of racism and their intersections with sexism, classism, and other forms of subordination.
- *Why do we do it?* The purpose of our work is to challenge the status quo and push toward the goal of social and racial justice.
- *How do we do it?* Utilizing a transdisciplinary approach, we work by listening to, reading about, and documenting the experiences of people of color.

CRT is critical and different from other frameworks and can address macro and micro forms of racism throughout our social system because: (1) it challenges the traditional paradigms, texts, and separate discourse on race, class, gender, language, and immigration status by showing how they intersect to impact our understanding of people of color; (2) it helps us focus on the racialized and gendered

experiences of communities of color; (3) it offers a transformative response to racial, gender, and class oppression; and (4) it utilizes a transdisciplinary, historically contextualized knowledge base to analyze various forms of and responses to racial inequality. CRT reminds us that as social scientists, we must:

- *see* those who are invisible to most people;
- *hear* the pleas of those who have become voiceless and forgotten;
- *act* on those conditions that keep people invisible, voiceless, and powerless;
- *challenge* theories that marginalize people of color;
- *maintain* an unflinching and unapologetic commitment to social and racial justice.

Notes

- 1 The *Chronicle of Higher Education* is a weekly newspaper that addresses the latest news and information in the field of higher education.
- 2 A decade after being introduced to CRT, we were part of an expert witness research team working on behalf of the student of color Intervenors to demonstrate the need for ongoing affirmative action at the University of Michigan. Ironically, the US Supreme Court delivered its ruling on June 23, 2003.
- 3 While each individual tenet of CRT is not “new,” synthesizing these tenets into a CRT framework in education is relatively recent. For instance, William Tate’s (1994) autobiographical article represents (to our knowledge) the first use of CRT principles in education; a year later, Gloria Ladson-Billings and William Tate (1995) wrote “Toward a critical race theory of education”; two years later, Daniel Solórzano’s (1997) essay applied CRT to a specific subfield of teacher education. William Tate (1997) furthered our understanding of the history of CRT in education. The field was expanded significantly with the *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 1998 “Special Issue on Critical Race Theory in Education.” Parker, Deyhle, and Villenas’ book (1999) was followed by individual scholars presenting on panels at professional conferences across the country and publishing their work in various journals. In 2002, the journals *Qualitative Inquiry*, edited by Lynn, Yosso, Solórzano, and Parker, and *Equity and Excellence in Education*, edited by Lynn and Adams, dedicated a special issue to CRT in education.
- 4 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic have defined the majoritarian mindset as “the bundle of presuppositions, perceived wisdoms, and shared cultural understandings persons in the dominant race bring to the discussion of race” (1993: 462).
- 5 For a more in-depth description of Claudia and her educational experiences, please refer to Solórzano and Yosso (2000).
- 6 We use the character of Ruby Puentes as our spiritual bridge to Ruby Bridges, the young African American elementary student in Norman Rockwell’s 1964 painting, titled *The Problem We All Live With*, who is being escorted to school in New Orleans by two federal Marshals as part of a 1950s federal desegregation court order. The English translation for Puentes is Bridges. In both Spanish and English, bridges can be literal structures that connect various places or figurative structures that connect different ideas. Such metaphorical bridges/puentes can offer insight into the struggles and coalitions developed by people of color past, present, and future.
- 7 The federal case is titled *Grutter et al. vs. Bollinger*. The counter-story excerpt here is based on (1) research gathered during the year 2000, (2) existing social science and humanities literature, (3) our own professional experiences, (4) our own personal experiences, and (5) our collective experiences and community memory.

- (a) Campus Racial Climate at the University of Michigan–Ann Arbor: A Case Study. This is an expert report written in conjunction with the Intervenor in the case Gratz et al. *vs.* Bollinger et al., October 2000.
 - (b) Affirmative Action, Educational Equity and Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School and its Undergraduate Feeders. An expert report commissioned by the Student Intervenor in Grutter et al. *vs.* Bollinger et al., September 2000.
 - (c) A Case Study of Racial Microaggressions and Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, Berkeley. A report commissioned by the Plaintiffs in Castañeda et al. *vs.* UC Regents et al., August 2000.
- 8 We appreciate the assistance of Rebeca Burciaga in helping conceptualize and develop this cultural wealth concept. Specifically, her input was critical in identifying linguistic and familial capital.

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Chapter 7

Environmental Racism: Inequality in a Toxic World

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It has become increasingly clear that where social inequalities exist in society, environmental inequalities also prevail. In fact, our basic ideas about what constitutes social and racial inequality must be reevaluated in light of this reality. Human societies do not exist in a vacuum, divorced from nature. On the contrary, human settlements have always been dependent upon natural resources. Moreover, since ancient times, social inequalities produced relationships whereby marginal and less powerful groups of people were concentrated in the least desirable residential and occupational environments (Melosi 1981). This has frequently included ethnic, racial, and religious “minority” groups.

Since the early 1970s, a growing number of scholars have become concerned with the distributive impacts of environmental pollution on different social classes and racial/ethnic groups. Hundreds of studies established a general pattern whereby environmental hazards are located in such a way that the poor and “people of color bear the brunt of the nation’s pollution problem” (Chavis 1993: 1). Known variously as environmental racism, environmental inequality, or environmental injustice, this is a social phenomenon that is the focus of a great deal of scholarly attention today.

During this same period of scholarly interest in environmental racism, a powerful social force – the environmental justice (EJ) movement – emerged from within communities of color and poor and working-class, White communities around the United States that have been inundated with air, water, and soil pollution (Gottlieb 1993; Bullard 2000). The neighborhoods, playgrounds, schools, and workplaces where these populations “live, work, and play” (Alston 1990) have been disproportionately burdened with: toxic and hazardous waste from leaking underground storage tanks, oil spills and mine tailings, chemicals stockpiled in metal drums, and nuclear waste stored in special facilities (Gedicks 1993; LaDuke 1999); pollution from industrial smokestacks, agricultural facilities, congested freeways, and bus depots (Hurley 1995; Bullard et al. 2000); legally and illegally dumped garbage (Bullard 2000; Pellow 2002); and chemical hazards associated with a range of occu-

pations in the agricultural, health care, janitorial, basic manufacturing, textile, and high-technology sectors (Johnson and Oliver 1989; Wright and Bullard 1993; Pellow and Park 2002). Thus, the environmental justice movement is a political response to the deterioration of the conditions of everyday life as our society reinforces existing social – particularly racial – inequalities. As environmental degradation expands, we can expect that more and more communities will suffer a similar fate, *and* join in this effort. This movement has laid a foundation for environmental and social justice politics in the twenty-first century.

This chapter reviews some of the most important research developments in the field of environmental justice studies and offers some critical analysis of the breakthroughs and remaining gaps in the literature. But first I will place environmental justice studies within the framework of racial formation theory and consider the innovative methodologies that make this area of study unique and of great sociological value.

Theories of Race

Two of the greatest contributions environmental justice scholars have made to sociology are: (1) articulating a dimension of racial inequality and social conflict that was virtually unacknowledged before the 1970s; and (2) producing new and critical knowledge in collaboration with laypersons and informants, thus redefining sociological practice itself. In this section I consider the relationship between the sociology of race and the sociology of environmental racism.

Some scholars have rightly argued that the EJ literature is characterized by a strange fact: the vast majority of research on this topic is largely focused on some aspect of racial inequality, yet there is almost no consideration of well-established social-scientific theories of race and racism (Pulido 2000). It is as if statistical correlations alone are enough to prove or disprove the presence of racism and no discussion of institutional racism is necessary. While there are exceptions to this rule (Bullard 1996; Mills 2001), the overwhelming majority of EJ studies make no mention of long-standing theoretical frameworks on racism from the social sciences. I argue that, because environmental justice struggles reveal a great deal about the nature of racism more generally, it behooves scholars to link these two bodies of knowledge more effectively. Moreover, EJ scholars have already developed a literature on a dimension of racial inequality that speaks to the larger literature on racism; they just have not made the connection explicit.

Perhaps best known among sociological theories of racism is the racial formation model, proposed by Omi and Winant (1987). Omi and Winant define racial formation as “the process by which social, economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings” (1987: 61–2). They also introduce the term “racialization” to describe the “extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group” (*ibid.*). Finally, Omi and Winant use the concept “racial projects” to capture the essence of political struggles among and between racial groups. These racial projects are marked by material/structural practices that divide groups by access to various resources (social inequality), and by

discursive practices and ideologies that serve to justify these group hierarchies. Racism has shaped the very geography of American life, they argue. And in order to understand racism one must also understand the sociohistorical context in which it has emerged.

Environmental racism and class inequalities impact populations in a *relational* fashion. That is, one group's access to clean living and/or working environments is often made possible by the restriction of another group's access to those same amenities. For example, while residents in communities of color battle industry, city hall, and the courts over decent-paying, safe jobs and locally unwanted land uses, those jobs and communities where White, middle-class and affluent populations are located remain the most ecologically protected (Pulido 2000). There is a limited supply of ecologically desirable space and jobs in urban areas. White, middle-class residents and decision makers possess a greater capability than do people of color and low-income residents to secure these valued spaces and do so, effectively restricting access to these goods. Furthermore, when industries pollute communities and are characterized by occupations with high-level toxic exposures, these phenomena are generally "out of sight, out of mind" for White, middle-class populations because most major polluting facilities are in "other" neighborhoods and toxic work is often "hidden" inside factory walls or perhaps in people's living rooms (as in the case of home-based piecework for private industries). Neighborhood battles over environmental quality reveal that ecological concerns in the United States continue to provide evidence of racialization, as struggles for clean and safe environs become "racial projects" (Omi and Winant 1987) as much as they are controversies over zoning, planning, and land use.

When people of color are concentrated in toxic jobs, this suggests that these populations occupy a "group position" of inferiority vis-à-vis White communities (Blumer 1958). As studies have demonstrated, many firms develop cultures that define certain jobs as suitable only for Whites and jobs suitable only for immigrants and people of color, just as is done for "female"- and "male"-specific jobs and tasks (Johnson and Oliver 1989; Hurley 1995). These practices serve to maintain ecological, spatial, and racial privileges for White, middle-class persons – a form of "social closure" (Parkin 1979). Thus group position is not only a marker of where a population stands in the social pecking order, but it also produces social closure in the form of the racialized spaces that certain groups are expected to occupy.

Following racial formation theory, I find that the "content and importance of racial categories" are closely associated with social, political, and economic practices that relegate people of color to the least desirable living and working environments. This racial ecology determines which populations are viewed as "fit" for particular environments and specific places. Such a system also constructs populations of color as means to profitable ends (i.e., labor) and/or as barriers to progress (e.g., native peoples occupying resource-rich lands) vis-à-vis White citizens' access to natural, social, economic, and political resources. Linking racial formation with environmental justice struggles, one can argue that the exploitation of people of color and natural resources has been tied together inextricably throughout this nation's history and remains at the foundation of racial domination in the United States today. For example, from studies of Native American struggles against extractive industry (LaDuke 1999; Gedicks 2001), to research on the social and environ-

mental impacts of state and federal energy policies (Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss 2001; Mutz et al. 2002) and urban recycling projects (Weinberg et al. 2000), the links between the use and destruction of natural resources and the oppression of people of color and low-income populations are strong.

In this framework we begin to see environmental racism not merely as an extension of racism or a form of racist practice, but rather as the core of racism itself. Moreover, we can redefine racism as not just “a system of oppression of . . . people of color by white Europeans and white Americans” (Feagin et al. 2001: 3) but a set of practices wherein people of color and natural resources are manipulated for the benefit of White Europeans and White Americans. So racism can no longer be restricted to those attitudes and institutional practices that produce inequalities between and among people and societies; we must also consider the material and natural resource base that makes these practices possible and that is also a part of the discourse of domination. Hence, the material/structural inequalities associated with racism have been framed and supported by discourses and ideologies about people and nature, by major institutions throughout modern history – the state, corporations, the media, and universities, to name only a few. Through such discursive and material/structural practices, people of color have become the targets of White supremacist “racial projects” and the natural environment has served as the resource base for such practices. Environmental justice studies open our sociological eye to new ways of understanding racism, social inequality, and natural resource conflicts.

One way that EJ scholars have done this is by drawing on innovative methodological approaches to research, methods that challenge divisions between scholars and laypersons, and between university-based knowledge systems and community-based knowledge systems.

Breaking Disciplinary Boundaries, New Methodologies

Action research

A growing movement of scholars and community advocates maintains that a new methodology must take root in the academy to respond to the crises and needs of communities. This methodology is *action research* (also called *advocacy* or *participatory research*) – the theory and practice of making the scholarly enterprise more rooted in and relevant to lay communities (Fals-Borda 1985; Fischer 2000). Action researchers argue that scholars ought to view communities not just as populations of research informants, but also as partners in the research endeavor. Action research involves changing the relationship between scholar and layperson so that academics, students, research informants, and the public are all stakeholders in the knowledge production process. Action research is also arguably a way to maintain and ensure the sustainability of the university itself.

Feagin and Vera (2001) point out that sociologists have a long, yet largely unacknowledged, tradition of working on action efforts in vulnerable communities in the United States and around the world. More than 150 years ago, sociologist Karl Marx wrote that, “philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways;

the point, however, is to change it" (Marx 1962). Activist-scholars like W. E. B. DuBois continued this tradition by authoring outstanding works of scholarship while advocating and making social change (1992 [1935]). Building on this history of "liberation sociology," Feagin and Vera contend that the "ultimate test of social science is not some type of propositional theory building but whether it sharpens our understanding and helps to build more just and democratic societies" (2001: 264).

Participatory research is about changing the relationship between scholars and laypersons, redefining scholarship itself, and developing new forms of activism. It is also about transforming the university as a social entity: "We need to revamp our institutions, to tread where we have not dared to tread before" (Bryant 1995: 213). If university administrators continue to be less receptive about these ideas, they will likely be forced to heed them, as community advocates and elected officials continue to pressure ivory-tower elites as to the relevance of their work to the real world.

Moreover, many scholars argue that social scientists, in particular, have an obligation to engage the world and offer our analytical skills with the aim of improving society. As Philo and Miller state,

[A] large part of humanity is being obliterated by the social, material and cultural relationships, which form our world. It can be painful and perhaps professionally damaging to look at such issues and to ask critical questions about social outcomes and power But for academics to look away from the forces which limit and damage the lives of so many, gives at best an inadequate social science and at worst is an intellectual treason – just fiddling while the world burns. (2001: 79)

Environmental justice studies and action research

Much of the academic and policy research on environmental racism was spurred on by the presence of environmental justice groups demanding scientific documentation of the pollution problems facing communities of color. This is clearly borne out in the internal histories of many of the landmark studies of environmental racism, as scholars were called in to research problems on behalf of, or in solidarity with, activist organizations (see, for example, Bullard 2000; Pellow 2002; Pellow and Park 2002).

As early as the 1970s, environmental justice advocates were regularly engaging polluting corporations, regulators, the courts, and elected officials in city councils, state legislatures, the US Congress and even the White House over the disparate racial and socioeconomic impacts of pollution across the nation. Equally exciting was the fact that activists were also working closely with academia in their efforts to document and gain scientific acknowledgement of the problems of environmental racism and environmental inequality. These collaborations produced new research questions and new political alliances. In numerous cases, the labels "activist" and "scholar" have been challenged and transformed as many activists have become lay researchers ("scholar-activists") and many scholars have become advocates around EJ concerns ("activist-scholars").

Participatory research is a methodology with great appeal to scholars and activists seeking to advance the cause of environmental justice, while also restructuring the relationship between communities and universities:

Participatory research has emerged as a research paradigm of liberation for those overburdened with toxic and hazardous waste and for those who want to be liberated from the shackles of racism, poverty, and despair . . . both the means and ends of participatory research are determined by the community or those most affected by environmental injustice as equal partners. [Traditional] [A]cademic researchers find this difficult to embrace because previously they have been in total charge of the means and usually the ends. (Bryant 2002: 310)

Through numerous participatory research ventures and the emergence of lay experts on a host of environmental issues, EJ activists and their allies have challenged the very foundation of the scientific method and the positivist paradigm of the science community (Brown and Mikkelsen 1990; Fischer 2000). Recent participatory efforts include: studies of air pollution in Southern California's communities of color (Morello-Frosch et al. 2002); research on high technology's social and environmental impacts around the globe (Pellow et al. 2003); and analyses of public health impacts of transportation pollution in New York City (O'Fallon et al. 2000; Shepard 2000). In each of these cases, academics produced scholarly work in solidarity or collaboration with community advocates and with an eye toward trying to "solve the problem at hand" (Bryant 1995: 213).

Environmental justice studies is a field marked by a unique predominance of activist-scholars doing this kind of research. It represents one of the best hopes for democratizing the scholarly enterprise in particular and the university as an institution more generally. Moreover, the focus on the nexus between social inequality and ecological degradation affords environmental justice studies the opportunity to redefine theories of race and racism more broadly. I believe environmental justice studies is able to bridge these theoretical, methodological, and social divides because it is necessarily an interdisciplinary field and because it emerged simultaneously from the joint efforts of activists and scholars to document, theorize, and solve a set of problems. In the next sections I present a discussion of the literature on environmental justice studies and offer critiques and a consideration of new directions.

Studies of Environmental Racism and Environmental Justice Struggles

Research on environmental inequality dates back to the 1970s, when scholars were reporting significant correlations between socioeconomic status and air pollution in US urban centers (Freeman 1972; Asch and Seneca 1978). Hence, for 30 years we have had quantitative and empirical evidence of social disparities in the distribution of pollution in the United States. Beginning in the 1980s, researchers focused more directly on the links between pollution and race, via studies of the proximity of hazardous waste sites to communities of color (United States General Accounting Office 1983; United Church of Christ [UCC] 1987). This research demonstrated that race was the best predictor of where hazardous waste sites would be located in the United States, prompting the use of the term *environmental racism* to characterize these disparities. It is important to note that these two landmark studies of environmental degradation and racial inequality were both carried out in a political context defined largely by environmental justice activists: (1) the US General Accounting

Office's study was carried out after civil rights and environmental activists called on the federal government to conduct a study of racial disparities in toxic facility siting in the southern United States (at a protest against a PCB landfill in Warren County, North Carolina the year before); and (2) the UCC study was conducted by social scientists and civil rights leaders who were also engaged in protest and action around EJ struggles.

This body of work was followed by an explosion of studies in the 1990s (which has continued into the 2000s) on a host of questions, including analyses of: (1) the relationship between race, class, and environmental hazards (Bryant and Mohai 1992; Anderton et al. 1994; Krieg 1998); (2) the emergence of the EJ movement via case studies of community resistance against toxics (Bullard 1993, 1994, 2000; Bryant 1995; Cole and Foster 2001; Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss 2001); (3) the social forces driving and influencing environmental inequalities (Lavelle and Coyle 1992; Boone and Modarres 1999); (4) the historical trajectory of environmental injustices in particular geographic contexts (Been 1993; Bullard 1996; Pulido et al. 1996; Pastor et al. 2001); and (5) the spread of environmental inequalities/racism beyond the United States to the global South (Mpanya 1992; Adeola 2000).

The overwhelming finding in this body of research is that poor and people-of-color populations host a disproportionate burden of pollution in the United States. While there are hundreds of studies supporting this conclusion, some of the major efforts include:

- In its 1971 annual report, the US Council on Environmental Quality observed that low-income populations and people of color were disproportionately exposed to significant environmental hazards (Getches and Pellow 2002).
- A 1983 Congressionally authorized General Accounting Office study revealed that three out of four off-site, commercial hazardous waste landfills in the southeast United States were located within predominately African American communities, even though African Americans made up just one-fifth of the region's population. The report concluded that it was unlikely that this uneven distribution of waste in African American communities was the result of race-neutral decision making (United States General Accounting Office 1983).
- A 1987 study, *Toxic Wastes and Race in the US*, conducted by the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice. This was the first national study to correlate waste facilities and demographic characteristics and it found that race was the most significant factor in determining where waste facilities are located in the United States. Among other findings, the study revealed that three out of five African Americans and Latinos live in communities with one or more uncontrolled toxic waste sites, and 50 percent of Asian Pacific Islander Americans and Native Americans live in such communities (United Church of Christ 1987).
- Sociologist Robert Bullard published *Dumping in Dixie*, the first major study of environmental racism that linked hazardous facility siting with historical patterns of residential segregation in the southern United States (2000). While researching this book, Bullard and his team were working with several community-based organizations and activists with grievances against polluters.

- A 1990 Greenpeace report on incinerator siting practices concluded that communities with *existing* incinerators had people-of-color populations 89 percent higher than the national average, and communities with *proposed* incinerators had people of color populations 60 percent higher than the national average (Getches and Pellow 2002). Greenpeace has always worked with scientists on environmental research projects and has, in recent years, continued to produce research in the field of environmental justice studies.
- A 1992 study published in the *National Law Journal*, “Unequal protection: The racial divide in environmental law,” uncovered significant disparities in the way the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) enforces the law: “There is a racial divide in the way the US government cleans up toxic waste sites and punishes polluters. White communities see faster action, better results and stiffer penalties than communities where Blacks, Hispanics and other minorities live. This unequal protection often occurs whether the community is wealthy or poor” (Lavelle and Coyle 1992). This study, therefore, provided some indicators of the *causes* of environmental racism: government inaction and officially sanctioned discrimination at the hands of corporations. This report also underscored that *racism* impacts people of color at all socio-economic levels.
- A 1992 edition of the *EPA Journal* and a 1992 EPA report entitled *Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All Communities* highlighted the agency’s efforts to acknowledge and remedy the problem of unfair and unequal environmental policy making (United States Environmental Protection Agency 1992). These two publications were largely the result of advocacy efforts on the part of scholars and community-based leaders to persuade regulators to acknowledge the problem of environmental racism and to do something about it.

This body of work forced scholars, policy makers, and the public to rethink existing academic and lay definitions of environmental and racial inequality, and transformed the science that we use to study these problems.

While all of the above studies are important, some of the most revealing research centers on the causes, or driving forces, behind environmental inequality. This work has been particularly instructive because it provides an explanation for the current crisis of environmental injustice and it often challenges common wisdom regarding the origin of the problem. In case studies, these authors demonstrate how racism, classism, and our changing knowledge of environmental hazards interact to burden different populations with risk over time. Most importantly, these studies reveal that stakeholders are constantly jockeying for quality living and working environments and that concerns over social stratification and environmental quality are ever-present in the minds of urban planners, corporations, workers, and residents. A few examples of this kind of research will illustrate the points.

Place-specific explanations of environmental racism/inequality

While environmental racism and inequality are national – even global – phenomena, it unfolds and impacts people differently across space, depending on any

number of factors. In their recent study of the state of Massachusetts, Faber and Krieg (2001) argue that a combination of White and middle-class flight to the suburbs, a rise in the number of people of color in the central cities, and increases in illegal dumping and the siting of incinerators produced environmental inequalities in that state. This study was released with a major media effort in order to influence policy makers who might be persuaded to ameliorate the situation that numerous communities in Massachusetts were facing. As is true of many other EJ scholars, the authors of this study often work closely with EJ activist organizations when conducting their studies.

In their research on the state of Louisiana, Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss (2001) argue that the primary cause of environmental inequalities is an alliance among the private sector, the state, and other “growth machine” interests to create a “good business climate” that favors profit over public and environmental health. The authors conclude that each particular EJ struggle may reveal driving factors that are unique to that specific context. For African American, Vietnamese, and Native American communities in the state, the process by which environmental inequalities emerged was distinct. For example, in the case of some African Americans in Louisiana, they face environmental racism not only as a result of contemporary racist environmental policies, but also because many polluting corporations occupy land that was once the site of slave plantations, land where the descendants of slaves and sharecroppers now live.

In a study of Native American resistance to environmental racism, Churchill (2002) argues that what distinguishes these populations from many others in North America and elsewhere is that they occupy places protected (officially at least) by international *treaties*. Native American tribes are semi-sovereign peoples with legal rights over natural resources unlike any other group in North America. Ward Churchill, Al Gedicks, and Winona LaDuke are all activist-scholars, whose advocacy and research have deepened our understanding of the race–environment nexus by insisting on the centrality of indigenous peoples in these global conflicts and by reminding us that internal colonialism and imperialism are still core factors in contemporary racial formation and nation-state functions. Thus, context, place, and history matter a great deal.

In a study of Torrance, California, Sidawi (1997) demonstrated that, as a result of racially biased urban planning during the last century, Chicanos faced the highest levels of exposure to industrial pollution in that city when compared to any other ethnic group. Similarly, Boone and Modarres (1999) argue that, in Commerce, California, although hazardous industry was sited in close proximity to Latino populations, zoning and urban planning practices had as much, if not more, to do with industrial location decisions as demographics and racial politics. As they state, “demographics alone are not responsible for the concentration of manufacturing in Commerce” (Boone and Modarres 1999: 165). They emphasize the importance of “place-specific analysis” to determine the root causes of environmental inequalities.

Macro-level explanations for environmental inequality

While discriminatory zoning practices and laws certainly contribute to environmental inequality, Bullard (1996, 2000) demonstrates that all of the city of

Houston's municipal landfills are located in African American neighborhoods, despite the *absence* of any zoning laws. In this case, he maintains that there was de facto zoning by Houston's powerful White city leaders, who viewed African American neighborhoods as appropriate sites for waste disposal. Bullard concludes that racism is a general organizing principle of city and county politics in the United States.

Compounding the institutional racism in politics, Pastor et al. (2001: 19) argue that a lack of "pre-existing racially based social capital" also places communities of color at a disproportionately higher environmental risk than White communities. Communities with lower voting rates, lower home ownership rates, and lower levels of wealth and disposable income are more vulnerable to high concentrations of polluting facilities than other neighborhoods. Unfortunately, for communities of color, these characteristics are often highly correlated with race. Bullard's (1990/2000) classic study *Dumping in Dixie* supported this claim more than a decade ago with evidence that polluters follow the "path of least resistance" when seeking cost-effective dumping sites. In Bullard's estimation, the basis for these choices is institutional racism, which, in turn, "influences local land use, enforcement of environmental regulations, industrial facility siting, and, where people of color live, work, and play" (Bullard 1996: 449). Those communities most capable of mounting effective collective resistance tend to be better educated, have greater levels of income, and fewer people of color. Building on this record of evidence, Lake concludes that environmental inequalities "arise from the unequal power relations controlling the organization of production in capitalist societies" (1996: 169).

Thus, researchers from a range of disciplines have concluded that the causes of environmental racism are varied and complex. They include:

- the tendency for corporations and governments to "follow the path of least resistance" in the location of toxic facilities and other hazards (Bullard 1993, 1994, 2000). In other words, polluters are more likely to pollute near the poor and people of color because these populations wield less political clout and have less social capital, thus reducing the cost of doing business;
- housing market dynamics that often bring people of color in close proximity to environmental hazards (Been 1993). This can include redlining and other practices that produce residential segregation and simply limit mobility options for people of color (Faber and Krieg 2001);
- the lack of meaningful community involvement in environmental policy making (Cole 1992);
- the absence of people of color and low-income communities from the mainstream environmental movement (Gottlieb 1993; Bryant 1995). This typically includes groups like the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the National Wildlife Federation;
- racially discriminatory zoning and planning practices in urban areas (Bullard 2000; Bullard et al. 2000).

The overarching social force that runs through each of these causes is *institutional racism*. That is, even when institutions (governments, corporations, and agencies) make decisions that appear to be race neutral in their intent, they often produce

racially unequal impacts. The free-market approach to zoning in the city of Houston is a case in point (Bullard 2000). Other forms of institutional racism simply involve blatant practices that favor certain communities and disadvantage others. The US EPA's racially disparate enforcement of federal laws across different communities is one example (Lavelle and Coyle 1992). Thus at the micro- and the macro-sociological scales, environmental inequalities are linked not only to biased environmental policy making, but more broadly to racially biased institutional practices.

More to the point, the exploitation of the environment and human populations is always linked. As Churchill (2002) argues, the struggle for land has always been the hallmark of politics in North America. And in the United States, the struggle for land and the environment has always been bound up with the struggle for racial supremacy among Whites and peoples of color (Almaguer 1994). The root causes of environmental racism, therefore, are the racist-capitalist social systems that simultaneously exploit peoples of color and the ecosystem to produce profit and White supremacy. Thus, whether consciously or not, environmental justice scholars have initiated a quantum leap – a revolution, really – in our theorizing about racial formation, while providing data and other critical support for the political revolution going on in communities struggling for environmental justice. This revolution must simultaneously extend to colleges and universities, where academics and students are challenging institutions to embrace democratic values and practices.

New Directions: Beyond Facility Siting Conflicts

The above studies also indicate that environmental justice problems are linked to several other issue areas that social scientists have begun to explore: housing, transportation, the workplace, natural resources, immigration, and gender.

Housing

Since most environmental justice conflicts have occurred over facility siting, housing and real estate markets also play a prominent role. When neighborhoods become inundated with pollution, people of color are less likely to be able to move “up and out” into cleaner communities. Whites, on the other hand, are more likely to be able to buy their way into more desirable areas (Pulido 2000). Housing markets reflect long-standing patterns of excluding people of color from certain neighborhoods, keeping them concentrated in other, less desirable communities. The using of restrictive covenants, redlining, real estate sales and lending practices, and outright violence have produced these patterns (Bullard et al. 1994; Massey and Denton 1993).

Housing quality itself is also a contributor to environmental health problems. Fully 90 percent of all lead poisoning sufferers are African American and Latino children; lead poisoning often occurs within the household through exposure to lead-based paint or dust (Wright and Bullard 1993). The US EPA estimates that indoor air pollution is, on average, several times greater than outdoor air pollution. Finally, drinking water quality is poor in most major cities and rural areas.

Transportation

Recent research also has begun to make links among race, environmental quality, and transportation systems. Robert Bullard and his colleagues at the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University have traced the history of America's two-tiered, racially biased transportation infrastructure: from early conflicts over separate but equal accommodations; through the "urban renewal" that followed development of the interstate highway system that disrupted, displaced, bisected, and by-passed many inner city neighborhoods; to today's "auto addiction" and sprawl that exacerbates the problems of pollution and ecological damage (Bullard and Johnson 1997; Bullard et al. 2000). This research is invaluable because it focuses on the spatial processes that facilitate a broad range of environmental inequalities while adding needed depth and substance to recent policy debates around (sub)urban sprawl.

The workplace

Social science research on environmental inequality has slowly begun to embrace the question of workplace toxins and their impact on people of color (see Wright and Bullard 1993; Pena 1997; Taylor 1997). This is a crucial area of study. Workplace hazards have plagued laborers throughout the twentieth century; unions like the United Mine Workers, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union have fought for occupational health and the improvement of basic working environment conditions.

While mostly distinct from EJ studies, a number of researchers find that working-class persons, people of color, and immigrants confront greater threats from toxic exposure on the job than their White counterparts (Johnson and Oliver 1989; Robinson 1991). Perhaps this is not surprising, as these populations have historically occupied the lowest status, highest risk, and lowest paying jobs in this society (Taylor 1997). For example, throughout much of the twentieth century, while African Americans comprised no more than 20 percent of the steel industry's workforce, they constituted 90 percent of the employees concentrated in the coke ovens – those sites known to be quite dangerous because of the preponderance of benzene emissions, a toxin linked to leukemia (Wright and Bullard 1993). Similarly, throughout Silicon Valley's history, immigrants and people of color worked under the least desirable, most toxic conditions across several different systems of production, most recently involving hazardous employment in the high-tech computer sector (Pellow and Park 2002). The agricultural sector is also a site of intense environmental exposure among workers. More than 90 percent of the farm labor workforce in the United States is comprised of people of color and immigrants. These workers are routinely exposed to pesticides, contributing to a job-related fatality rate of around 1,000 per year and an illness rate of more than 300,000 per year (Perfecto and Velasquez 1992; Moses 1993).

When scholars make links between toxics in communities and the workplace our understanding of environmental inequality becomes deeper, broader, and more useful to theory building. In every way, the workplace is an environmental justice issue.

Natural resources

Surprisingly, despite the fact that EJ studies is a field ostensibly focused on both social and ecological concerns, there has been little emphasis on the importance of natural resources in this literature. This is now beginning to change. As Mutz et al. write:

[T]he inequitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of environmental protection reaches well beyond the facility siting and pollution focus of the traditional environmental justice movement. Charges of inequity involving natural resources extraction, management, and preservation are heard increasingly throughout the nation. (2002: xxxi)

Natural resource conflicts often arise from public lands disputes or struggles on Native American reservations (Gedicks 1993). As noted earlier, many Native American communities have distinct claims on natural resources that are protected by treaty rights. However, I maintain that even most urban EJ conflicts are at least indirectly about natural resource management, in addition to the range of social and political justice concerns involved. Struggles over incineration in East Los Angeles, for example, are also struggles over how to dispose of or conserve post-consumer and postindustrial products made from natural resources. Similarly, conflicts over pollution emissions from chemical factories in Louisiana's "Cancer Alley" are also about how to reduce and prevent the pollution of land, air, and water.

Camacho (1998), Mutz et al. (2002), and Ageyman et al. (2003) include a number of case studies of environmental injustices and their relationship to natural resources such as water and land. These volumes are among the first to transcend the traditional waste facility siting approach to environmental inequality with an emphasis on ecosystems. This research is important not only because it grounds EJ studies within the core concern over the relationship between people and natural resources, but also because it opens the door to a much more serious investigation into the ways in which our understanding of race and racial inequality have been influenced by society's treatment of ideas about the natural world. In other words, sociological theories of race and race relations might be significantly altered if we considered seriously the roots of racism in society's relationship to the environment. This is important because as so much of the current research on institutional racism emphasizes discrimination in employment, housing, education, and everyday social interactions (Bullard et al. 1994; Feagin and Sikes 1994; Feagin et al. 2001), we may lose sight of the fact that each of these institutions is supported by systems of intense natural resource extraction and use. For example, if we consider the legal case involving charges of racial discrimination against African American employees at Microsoft Corporation, we should also not forget that, without petroleum, steel, silicon, coltan, and billions of gallons of water and toxic chemicals, this corporation's very existence – and its extensive internal racial hierarchies – would not be possible. Natural resource exploitation remains at the *core* of the support system for racial domination.

Immigrants and environmental racism

Even though recent immigrants to the United States are among the most socially vulnerable, politically powerless, and economically exploited populations among the

total population, surprisingly little research addresses the links between immigrant communities – specifically immigrant workers – and environmental justice issues. Increasingly, though, scholars are paying more attention to these populations. For example, studies or reports by Gottlieb, Hunter, Hurley, and Perfecto and Velasquez have begun to document the intense exposure to toxics in immigrant communities and workplaces. Perfecto and Velasquez (1992) were among the first researchers to recognize the struggle of farmworkers who are exposed to pesticides as an environmental justice issue (although, of course, farmworker activists have recognized this as a problem since at least the 1970s). Hunter's (2000) study is the first to provide contemporary empirical evidence that foreign-born and non-English-speaking populations in the United States are much more likely to live next to toxic waste sites than the average native-born resident. Hurley (1995) and Gottlieb (1993) provide insight into how these inequalities among immigrant populations emerged in urban areas in the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The issue of immigration and EJ conflicts is also important because, in contrast to any other period in US history, the majority of newcomers today are of non-European origin – they are people of color. And while during earlier waves of immigration in the nineteenth century, many European newcomers were not yet racialized as “White,” they eventually were allowed to become White over time (Roediger 1991). For the majority of today's immigrants, given the continuing significance of race and racism in this nation, this means that their level of vulnerability to social and environmental risks may be heightened.

Gender as a factor in environmental justice conflicts

The concentration of people of color in hazardous, health-compromising jobs is well documented. However, the relegation of women – particularly immigrant women and women of color – to hazardous spaces is a core component of this process and deserves equal attention. EJ scholars have made solid contributions to our knowledge of gender and environmental conflicts by considering the importance of mobilizations by women, particularly mothers, against community-level environmental hazards (Krauss 1993; Brown and Ferguson 1995). But there has been less consideration of the possibility that gender matters in terms of which groups are concentrated in toxic environments (i.e., the same way that racial inequality operates). This is perhaps because traditional environmental justice studies are highly limited in their potential to illuminate the links between gender and toxic exposure. Most of these studies correlate race or class with toxic waste sites, using census data. The problem is that, while communities can be described, and neatly separated, as “poor/low-income,” “working class,” or “African American or Latino” and so forth, few “female communities” appear on any map. So, by their very design, these traditional EJ studies overlook the fact that women are regularly targeted for – and suffer from – environmental inequalities. Yet, certain “communities” feature women concentrated in close proximity to toxics: workplaces all around the world are highly gender segregated with occupants who labor with chemicals day in and day out. Toxic workplaces offer precisely the type of data that traditional EJ studies are unable to access. EJ studies would benefit immensely from an investment in research on the intersections among gender, space, and toxics. Drawing on theories of “inter-

sectionality" (Taylor 1997) and the concept of a "matrix of domination" (Collins 2000) – that is, the way that the above factors intersect to position certain populations in positions of power and others in positions of vulnerability – would advance our thinking in this area of inquiry. Some scholars are now charting new territory on the link between gender and toxics (see Pellow and Park 2002) but much more needs to be done.

Conclusion

The field of environmental justice studies has succeeded in challenging traditional, narrower definitions of environmental problems and racism and has placed these issues on the academic and policy agenda for the twenty-first century. Additionally, these scholars have broken new ground while building on the progressive tradition of participatory research collaborations between academics and laypersons. By integrating studies of race with research on the environment and by linking scholars with the lay public, environmental justice studies has built bridges across significant theoretical, methodological, and social divides. And, while sociologists have been the most prominent among scholars studying this phenomenon, the field of EJ studies has broadened to include anthropology, geography, history, political science, law, ethnic studies, women's studies, economics, philosophy, epidemiology, engineering, toxicology, public health, medicine, and literature. EJ studies truly is a multidisciplinary field that has permeated the entire academy and had major impacts on policy making and institutional responses to the need for environmental and human health protection.

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Chapter 8

Labor-market Inequality: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Class

IRENE BROWNE AND JOYA MISRA

Economic processes represent a driving force behind social inequality within and between nations. Across the globe, wages and conditions of employment remain tied to gender, race, ethnicity, and citizenship (Blau et al. 1998). While many economists claim that human capital and forces of supply and demand explain differences in workplace rewards across groups, ample evidence suggests that employment opportunities also are based on the power of the dominant gender, race, and class groups to organize social institutions to their benefit (see Altonji and Blank 1999 for a review). Black and multiracial feminist sociologists stand at the forefront of developing sophisticated understandings of *how* gender, race, and class matter in generating inequality. These scholars assert that gender, race, and class *intersect* to create unique constellations of disadvantage and privilege throughout a society.

In this paper we review sociological scholarship on intersections of gender, race, and class in the labor market. Our focus on labor markets leads us to emphasize theories of intersectionality in terms of stratification systems. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, we discuss theories of “intersectionality” developed by sociologists, addressing two questions: (1) what are the broad themes and questions raised in theorizing intersectionality, and (2) what are the challenges posed for researchers who attempt to test claims of intersectional theories with empirical research?

In the second section, we ask whether there is evidence that gender, race, and class intersect in the labor market. We begin with an investigation of empirical studies of intersectionality to explain wage inequality. The “wage gap” is arguably the premier indicator of economic inequality between groups. In addition, studies of wage inequality provide an illustration of the challenges posed by intersectional theories in quantitative research on labor markets.

Next, we turn to research on intersections within power and authority within the workplace. The issue of authority provides a window into how intersections of race, gender, and class are implicated in reproducing power within organizational settings. These studies are based on both qualitative and quantitative evidence and

represent a move toward specifying the organizational contexts in which intersections of privilege and disadvantage might flourish.

Finally, we look for evidence of intersectionality within a particular occupation – domestic labor – where gender, class, race, ethnicity, and citizenship are particularly visible and salient in organizing work. While studies of intersectionality in wages and authority are centered primarily on the United States, domestic labor affords an opportunity to examine intersectionality in the context of the global economy. In addition, much research on domestic labor has taken a qualitative approach, allowing for more of a focus on the *experience* of intersections.

We argue that within the particular occupation of domestic labor, intersections are clear and undeniable and we discuss the relevance of the findings on domestic labor for other occupations and industries. Our review of the literature lays the groundwork for the concluding section, in which we stress the importance of developing “mid-range” intersectional theories that can be investigated with empirical data.

Theoretical Explanations of Gender, Race, and Class Intersections: Themes and Questions in Theorizing Intersectionality

This section covers four important themes in sociological theories of intersectionality: categories as socially constructed, the “matrix of domination,” intersectionality permeating all levels of social life, and the ubiquity and contingency of intersectionality.¹ As will be demonstrated, these themes raise questions and present theoretical challenges that scholars continue to debate.

Gender, race, and class as socially constructed

Writings by sociologists on the intersection of gender, race, and class draw heavily from feminist theories of gender and Black- and multiracial-feminist theories.² These theoretical strands concur that, rather than reflecting “natural” differences, “gender” and “race” are socially constructed categories that are historically and culturally contingent (Espiritu 1992; Brewer 1993; Omi and Winant 1994; Mullings 1997; Glenn 1999). Like class, the social construction of gender and race is based on cultural meanings and representations as well as concrete, material practices (Glenn 1999; West and Fenstermaker 2002).

Scholars demonstrate that the meanings attached to class, gender, and race categories are mutually constitutive to uphold power hierarchies. That is, gender is “racialized” and “classed” and race is “gendered” and “classed” to create dominant and subordinate social positions (Ferdman 1999). For instance, social definitions of “femininity” that include attributes such as “passivity” and “weakness,” actually are based on expectations for White, middle-class women. “Passivity” and “weakness” are not part of definitions of “femininity” within Black communities, except perhaps for certain upper-class, Black women. Nonetheless, Black women historically have been held to the White, middle-class standard of femininity within mainstream social institutions. Not fitting this social ideal, this trope maintains

Black women's subordinate status in the *race* hierarchy (Collins 2000a). At the same time, conformity to the social ideal keeps middle-class, White women in the subordinate *gender* status.

The emphasis on the ongoing creation of meaning leads some scholars to draw upon ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionist theory to focus on how gender, race, and class are created simultaneously through social interaction (Weitz and Gordon 1993; West and Fenstermaker 2002). However, an emphasis on social interaction may ignore the institutional bases of power that undergird gender-, race-, and class-relational hierarchies (Collins et al. 1995; Gimenez 2001). Gender, race, and class are enacted through a variety of social institutions that work to maintain inequality.

The matrix of domination and importance of structure

Some intersectional theorists attempt to delineate the structural bases of power through which gender, race, and class intersect. For example, Patricia Hill Collins identifies four domains of power that comprise the matrix of domination. The *structural* domain – which “organizes oppression” – involves the major social institutions and the control of economic and political resources. These institutions are regulated through the *disciplinary* domain, which includes the bureaucratic organization of institutions and “techniques of surveillance” (2001: 280). Unequal power is justified through the supporting ideologies promulgated through the *hegemonic* domain. Finally, intersectional privileges and oppressions insinuate themselves into the most intimate aspects of life through the *interpersonal* domain.

Intersectionality permeating all levels of social life

Collins (2000a) joins other intersectionality theorists in stressing that intersections of gender, race, and class permeate all levels of social life – from the relations between nation-states in the global economy, to sexual relationships, to individual identity (Weber 2001). Within each of these levels, social dominance is based on subordinating the “other” category (Glenn 1999), that is, the positions in the gender/race/class hierarchies are relational (Hurtado 1989; Glenn 1999). Through the intersection of these categories, individuals can experience both dominance and oppression simultaneously (Collins 2000a).

Sociologists concerned with stratification processes have long struggled with the difficulties of theorizing about the relations between levels of social organization and interaction, particularly between structural processes and social-psychological dynamics. Intersectional theories have not solved this question, but have added an important dimension to the debates and a critique to existing theories of social inequality that examine only one axis of oppression.

Intersectionality as ubiquitous or contingent

Given that the combination of gender, race, and class permeates all interactions and institutions, some scholars conclude that intersectionality is “ubiquitous” (Weber 2001). Adams asserts that while gender, race, and class “may be analytically

distinct relations,” they are “inseparable in practice” (1998: 581), and Yoder and Aniakudo refer to gender, race, and class as “omnirelevant, inseparable and confluent” (1997: 325). Similarly, Himani Bannerji (1995) argues that rather than trying to separate gender, race, class, and nationality analytically, we must take into account the simultaneity of these social relations.

However, some scholars developing intersectionist theories argue that under certain conditions, one social identity will take precedence over the other identities in influencing behaviors and outcomes (King 1989; Glass 1999; Collins 2000a: 280). That is, intersectionality is contingent upon particular historical and local conditions. It is then the formidable task of theory to specify these conditions (Browne and Misra 2003).

For example, in their study of gender and ethnic differences in employment opportunities and wages among Israeli immigrants, Raijman and Semyonov (1998), show that ethnicity and gender together are salient in producing labor-market advantage and disadvantage for recent immigrants. However, after five years, ethnicity no longer matters in determining occupational prestige, but gender remains important.

Thus, intersectional theorists agree that class, race, ethnicity, gender, and so forth all shape the experiences of individuals. Some see these intersections as varying in their impacts on a range of outcomes, while others argue that each element is always equally important. As will be discussed, some of these differences may reflect differences in conceptualization, epistemology, and method.

Challenges in Testing Claims of Intersectionality with Empirical Research

The theoretical contributions of intersectionality have shaped the way many researchers understand the social world profoundly. Much of the theorizing on intersectionality is interdisciplinary, drawing from traditional humanities fields, such as philosophy and English, as well as newer interdisciplinary fields, such as African American studies, women’s studies and queer studies (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981; Butler 1990; Guy-Sheftall 1995; hooks 2000). Given the legacy of excluding women of color from academic positions and grounding feminism in activism, many of the ideas of Black-feminist theory and multicultural-feminist theory have developed outside academia (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981; Lorde 1984; Collins 2000a).

The rich and diverse sources for theorizing intersectionality pose challenges when sociologists attempt to apply these ideas to design their research. Conceptualizations that work well in the humanities – such as the notion of gender, race, and class as fluid, unstable, and constantly contested (Butler 1990) – are often difficult to translate into empirical studies of human behavior (Bettie 2003).

This section considers two main challenges in testing claims of intersectionality with empirical research. First, conceptualizing intersectionality, and particularly concepts of class, may be very difficult. Second, as alluded to previously, differences in epistemologies and methodologies may lead to very different interpretations of intersectionality.

Conceptualization and measurement

In order to use empirical evidence to test the claims of intersectional theories, it is necessary to define race, gender, and class before collecting the data. Indeed, researchers cannot test the claims of intersectionality unless there are clear definitions of class, race, and gender – or a clear delineation of competing definitions for the theory.³

Conceptualizations and definitions of race and gender are by no means easy to develop because, as social constructions, they vary considerably by context (King 1989; Glenn 2002). However, while theorizing about and conceptualizing gender and race in the intersectional literature is detailed, rich, and nuanced, definitions of “class” appear much more incomplete and ambiguous (Acker 1999). Indeed, the complexities of defining class have sparked a heated debate among sociologists. Some argue that “class analysis” and an attempt to create useful class categories should be abandoned (Pahl 1989; Pakulski and Waters 1996), while others call for redefining class to capture the complexity – suggesting that occupations are constitutive of class categories (Grusky and Sorensen 1998).

Although the problem of defining class is not unique to intersectional theories, our concern is that most intersectional theorists do not even engage in debates regarding how to define class. If “class” intersects with gender and race, then presumably differences between classes matter in important ways. Yet, the intersectional literature has not developed a comprehensive theory delineating the specific criteria for distinguishing *between* class categories and determining the *boundaries* between the classes (Acker 1999; Gimenez 2001). Kennelly (2004) contends that many intersectional analyses consider class only in terms of how race and gender may combine to shape class outcomes, rather than recognizing that class may shape race and gender outcomes as well.

Current scholars advocating an intersectional perspective rely on a hodgepodge of categories to describe social class. Some use the Marxist or socialist-feminist language of “relation to the process of production and reproduction” when discussing class (Brewer 1993; Collins 1993; Weber 2001; Romero 2002a), not necessarily articulating what types of production relations differentiate one class from another beyond the worker/owner distinction. Instead, they tend to invoke the categories “poor; working class; middle class; and elite” to identify distinct classes.

Simply relying on broad categories of classes, without explicitly theorizing class, is problematic. For example, class may be defined as simply a “position” in a stratification system or as a contested relation between groups (Gimenez 2001). The former definition of class is consistent with “functionalist” theories, which see “class” position as corresponding with an individual’s efforts and talents and necessary for the smooth functioning of society (Davis and Moore 1945). Most intersectional theories would refute these meritocratic assumptions and be more inclined to view class as a contested relation between groups. However, without explicitly developing a class analysis, or discussing how class relates to race and gender, empirical intersectional research is limited. For instance, if a researcher fails to find an intersection between class, gender, and race, it is possible that the problem lies in the definition of class. What one researcher might identify as two, distinct, class locations, another researcher might see as a single class position.

Epistemologies and methodologies

Related to the problem of conceptualization and measurement, a second overarching problem involves the epistemological and methodological understandings researchers apply. Key among these understandings is differences between the underlying assumptions of some quantitative and qualitative approaches. Feminist approaches to methodology generally critique standard (“positivist”) models of methodology. They argue that it is essential to begin from women’s experiences, rather than using taken-for-granted categories and discounting experience as a source of knowledge (Smith 1987; DeVault 1996).⁴ Epistemologically, these approaches reject the attempt to develop universalistic theories that explain social life. They also reject the notion that research should be “objective,” instead arguing for reflexivity in methodology (Smith 1987, 1990; Harding 1987; Mann and Kelley 1997; Collins 2000b).⁵

Indeed, many Black-feminist theorists reject the positivistic approaches and, instead, highlight Black women’s experiences as a valid basis for knowledge (Brewer 1993; Collins 1999). Patricia Hill Collins (1999) argues for an epistemology that recognizes all knowledge is based on “partial truths”; thus, knowledge that admits it is partial is more trustworthy than knowledge that presents itself as simply true. As Collins notes, “The overarching matrix of domination houses multiple groups, each with varying experiences of penalty and privilege that produce corresponding partial perspectives, situated knowledges, and, for clearly identifiable subordinated groups, subjugated knowledges” (2000a: 234).

Intersectional researchers are committed to viewing the world not simply through the categories and understandings created by the dominant groups in society. Instead, intersectional researchers attempt to reconceptualize society by taking into account the perspectives and experiences of those in marginalized groups – whose voices and experiences have been ignored or do not “fit” with standard accounts. Indeed, multiracial-feminist perspectives draw attention to the problems in feminist approaches that neglect the particular situations of men and women of color (Collins 2000a).

Many researchers view qualitative methods as much more effective in reconceptualizing and excavating the experiences of marginalized groups (Cancian 1993). These researchers argue that qualitative approaches, particularly those based on ethnography and interviewing, may open up understandings by beginning from the perspective of those being studied. Yet, some researchers point out that biases also may be inherent in these qualitative approaches (Cannon et al. 1988; Stacey 1988; Wolf 1996).

Others argue that quantitative methods may be as effective as qualitative methods, particularly when researchers do not simply reproduce existing quantitative measures, but consider how measures may be biased and used to reproduce certain inequalities (Sprague and Zimmerman 1993; Smith 1990). Indeed, some researchers argue that quantitative approaches may be more convincing to policy makers as well as others and may lead to significant empowerment for marginalized groups (Narayan 1989; Reinharz 1992).

As shall be demonstrated, the answers – to the questions of how to test the claims of intersectionality and what these tests reveal – depend upon the epistemological

Table 8.1 Median annual earnings among individuals employed full-time, full-year, by gender and race or ethnicity, 2002

<i>Race or ethnicity</i> ¹	<i>Gender</i>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
White (non-Hispanic)	43,696	31,602
African American	31,495	27,005
Asian	41,843	31,724
Hispanic	25,921	21,963

Source: 2003 Current Population Survey (CPS).

¹ Race/ethnic groups include only those individuals who listed a single category. Including individuals listing multiple categories of race on the CPS does not substantially change the numbers.

and methodological assumptions of the researchers and the particular labor market arena under scrutiny. Paid domestic work represents an arena in which class differences between women are unambiguous and intersections of gender, race, and class are ubiquitous. However, domestic work is only one particular occupation. As the following section on studies of wage inequality demonstrates, not all research projects identify triple intersections of gender, race, and class.

Empirical Evidence Regarding Intersectionality

Wages

Both economists and sociologists focus on wage gaps as an essential element of labor-market inequality. Most intersectional research on wage inequality is quantitative in approach and provides measurements of wages and salaries. Intersectional researchers then examine how wages differ by racial/ethnic, gender, and class groupings, primarily using survey data. The researchers try to explain the differences that emerge.

Looking at wages for full-time workers, there is a clear hierarchy of wages by gender and race that illustrates intersectionality (Tables 8.1 and 8.2). Within each race/ethnic group, men earn more than women (the gender gap in pay). The gender gap is widest for the groups earning the greatest income (Whites and Asians) and narrower for some of the lowest-earning groups (African Americans and Latinos). However, comparing across groups, the gender gap breaks down. For instance, White women earn more than most Latino men, and Asian women earn more than White women and African American men (Table 8.2). Additionally, the “Asian” category should be interpreted with caution, as it includes high-wage earners (e.g., Japanese) and extremely low-wage earners (e.g., Hmong). Similarly, the “Latino” category includes very different groups (e.g., Cubans and Dominicans).

Education, one indicator of class, appears to be key in explaining much of the wage inequality across race and ethnic groups (England et al. 1999). Research on

Table 8.2 Earnings gap, by gender and race or ethnicity, 2002

<i>Gender, race or ethnicity</i>	<i>Earnings as a ratio of the earnings of</i>	
	<i>White men</i>	<i>Coethnic men</i>
Women		
White (non-Hispanic)	.72	.72
African American	.62	.86
Asian	.73	.76
Latina	.50	.85
Men		
White	–	–
African American	.72	–
Asian	.96	–
Latino	.59	–

wage inequalities tends to find a consistent and strong pattern of the intersection of gender with education and race with education, respectively. The processes affecting the shape and extent of inequality are different for workers with high educational attainment compared to low educational attainment. This is consistent with the claims of many multiracial feminists – if gender and race intersect, then this could take different forms depending on social class.

However, the finding that education “intersects” with gender and race, respectively, supports two conflicting theories of labor-market inequality. While intersectional theorists would interpret “education” as an indicator of social class, education could be an indicator of human capital also – that is, “ability and skill.” Human-capital theory runs counter to intersectional claims that “class” embodies relationships of domination and subordination infused throughout society. Rather, the human-capital perspective views educational attainment as the result of individual decisions to invest in labor-market skills (Becker 1956). Thus, evidence for the *triple* intersection of gender, race, and “class” is less well established. Few scholars have looked at wage inequality by all three of these social categories in combination.

Morris et al. (1994) map separately the changes in the distribution of wages from 1967 through 1987 for Black women, Black men, White women, and White men. In this study, “class” can be inferred by position on the wage distribution, comparing those at the top with those at the bottom. The authors tested two predominant theories of increasing wage inequality. The “skill-mismatch” thesis posits that there will be an increase in workers earning high wages as improved technology expands the need for highly skilled workers. The “polarization” thesis predicts an increasingly “U-shaped” distribution of wages for each group, as both high-wage and low-wage jobs grow with the “new economy,” while jobs in the middle diminish. The authors found that the patterns of change in wage distribution were distinct for Black women and that neither theory explained trends for this group. In

the 1980s, Black women saw a rise in the proportion of low-paying jobs without the concomitant increase in high-paying jobs.

While this study provides strong support for the “intersectionality” thesis for changes over time in distribution of wages between high and lower earners, cross-sectional studies with geographic comparisons of gender and race wage gaps present more mixed results. Cotter et al. (1999) find little evidence for “intersectionality,” concluding that race and gender represent two independent systems of inequality. In their study, when the gender wage gap is high in a metropolitan area, it is high for all racial/ethnic groups. This result is particularly robust for those at the low end of the income distribution. While Cotter et al. report some evidence for intersectionality at the top of wage distribution, these results are unreliable due to small sample sizes for women and men of color.

McCall contests the blanket assertion of “separate systems.” Her analyses of gender and race wage gaps, across local-labor markets, also takes education into account. McCall (2001a,b) finds that the “race-stratification system” and “gender-stratification system” are neither completely independent nor completely interacting. Some economic conditions have similar effects on race inequality regardless of gender. For both men and women, industrial structure (unionization, casualization of work) is the main source of Black/White wage inequality, while the percentage of immigrants in a local-labor market has the strongest effect on Asian/White and Latino/White inequality. However, she also finds that there are economic conditions uniquely influencing a particular gender and race group. The “both independent/and intersecting” conceptualization of class, race, and gender is consistent with the claims of multiracial-feminist theory, which refute the dualistic either/or approach to understanding gender, race, and class (Collins 2000a).

Overall, studies of individual-wage processes support McCall’s findings that there are some distinct patterns for women of color, but also similarities to coethnic men (the “race-stratification system”) and to White women (the “gender-stratification system”) (Kilbourne et al. 1994; Bound and Dresser 1999; Corcoran et al. 1999; England et al. 1999). In two of the few studies addressing the question of gender and race intersections in determining individual-wage rates, Kilbourne et al. (1994) and England et al. (1999) compare Whites, African Americans, and Latinos. They find that education and experience explain a large portion of the race gap in earnings for both men and women, although the size of the effect is larger for women than for men. None of the gender gaps in pay for any race/ethnic group can be explained by differences in education and experience. Instead, across race/ethnicity, the male–female pay gap is produced by the gender segregation of occupations (England et al. 1999). However, occupational segregation appears to hurt Black women more than White women in terms of wage inequality (Kilbourne et al. 1994) and Black women receive lower increases in their wages with greater experience and seniority. As a result, experience and seniority explains much less of the gender gap in pay among African Americans than it does among Whites or Latinas (England et al. 1999).

Studies that aggregate diverse groups at the national level miss important processes that are specific to particular labor markets and particular groups (McCall 2001a,b). The specific configuration of opportunities by gender and race are influenced by local patterns of residential segregation by race and class (Massey and

Denton 1993), occupational segregation by gender and race/ethnicity, the industrial mix of the local economy and the demographic composition of the local labor force (McCall 2001a). Therefore, economic restructuring would be expected to affect each group uniquely within particular labor markets. For instance, studies of how the decline in manufacturing led to the deteriorating position of Black men in the United States relative to White men assume that women's concentration in services protected them from economic restructuring (Wilson 1996). While this generalization holds for all White women and Black women in *some* regions, young Black women living in the Midwest experienced a drop in wages when manufacturing jobs left these central cities (Bound and Dresser 1999). Similarly, Puerto Rican women in New York and New Jersey lost jobs and wages with economic restructuring, while recently arrived female Mexican immigrants in California were incorporated into low-wage factory jobs (Myers and Cranford 1998). Studies that move beyond the Black-White framework to incorporate other people of color show the importance of immigration and citizenship for some groups, which adds greater complexity to the race/class/gender nexus (Kibria 1990; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994, 1997). For instance, Cintron-Velez (1999) shows that within the same city (New York), Puerto Rican women with similar skills encountered different labor-market opportunities depending on when they arrived in New York.

In sum, much evidence supports the claim that race and "class" (education), and gender and "class" (education) intersect in the labor market, although the interpretation of this finding is disputed. Research evidence also points to *some* amount of race/gender intersections and race/gender/class intersections in wage inequality. However, the existence and degree of intersections depends on how wages are measured, which groups are compared, and how the relationships are modeled. To arbitrate between these mixed findings, better theories are needed that identify the conditions under which class, gender, and race will intersect to produce wage inequities (Brewer 1993; Cotter et al. 1999).

Class, race, gender, and workplace authority

Differences in wages also can be attributed to differences in levels of and returns to authority. Workplace authority can be defined, following Weber, as legitimate power within the workplace. Such authority is related to higher levels of job satisfaction, autonomy, and income, as well as a variety of psychological rewards and political behaviors (Smith 2002).⁶ As with wages, little scholarship directly and explicitly examines whether the intersection of class, race, and gender explains variation in workplace authority. Studies focused on workplace authority use both quantitative methods (measuring differences in authority) and qualitative methods (examining the experiences of workers in different workplaces and their perceptions about opportunities for advancement).

Class is related centrally to authority at work; those with higher-class backgrounds are more likely to find themselves in positions with authority. At the same time, workers who advance into jobs with higher levels of authority may increase their class standing (Kraus and Yonay 2000). Therefore, class status is both a cause and consequence of workplace authority. While Marx emphasized the conflict between owners and workers, Dahrendorf (1959) argues that in a postindustrial

society, authority is indeed the most central influence on class divisions and relations.⁷ Earnings inequality appears to be deeply related to differences in authority.

Class also intersects with race and gender in interesting ways regarding work authority. Research consistently has shown that there are differences in both authority attainment and returns to authority. Human capital – that is, education, training, skills, and experience – do not explain these differences adequately (Smith 2002). Minority men and women and White women appear to require higher levels of human capital than White men to reach the same levels of authority (Kluegel 1978; Wolf and Fligstein 1979; McGuire and Reskin 1993). In addition, as Ryan Smith summarizes, “Minorities and women receive a lower income return than do Whites and men for occupying similar positions of authority, and such disparities are more acute at high levels of authority and among those who exercise control over monetary resources and control over personnel” (2002: 535).

Controlling for human-capital levels, women are less likely to attain positions with significant decision-making power and receive lower authority returns than men (Kanter 1977; Wolf and Fligstein 1979; Jaffee 1989; Jacobs 1992; Reskin and Ross 1992; McGuire and Reskin 1993; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a,b; Wright et al. 1995; Rosenfeld et al. 1998; Baxter and Wright 2000; Kraus and Yonay 2000; Smith 2002). Women also receive lower authority returns to education and experience than men; indeed education has the most positive effects for women at the lowest levels of authority, while men benefit most from education at the highest levels of authority.⁸ Some research suggests that women are more likely to attain authority positions at the bottom of the hierarchy and they have more difficulty moving into top positions (Jacobs 1992; Reskin and Ross 1992; Smith 2002). This phenomenon, often termed the “glass ceiling,” argues that it is progressively more difficult for women to advance to higher levels of authority. However, some cross-national research suggests that while there *are* fewer women at the top of organizations, difficulties in attaining authority do not intensify at higher levels of the hierarchy (Wright et al. 1995; Baxter and Wright 2000).⁹

Occupational segregation also affects workplace authority by gender. Jobs dominated by women often are intrinsically devalued, but also are characterized by lower levels of authority (Wolf and Fligstein 1979; Maume 1999a; Kraus and Yonay 2000). Interestingly, authority gaps between men and women appear to be least in jobs dominated by men (Ranson and Reeves 1996; Kraus and Yonay 2000).¹⁰ High levels of women in an occupation suppress opportunities for advancement for both men and women (Smith 2002). However, men are much more likely to achieve decision-making authority than women in jobs dominated by women (Maume 1999b; Kraus and Yonay 2000; Smith 2002). Christine Williams (1992, 1995) effectively shows in her study of men in traditionally women-dominated occupations, that men in these fields benefit from a *glass escalator*, which pushes them upward into management positions.¹¹

Significant research exists on questions of workplace authority and race, though much of this literature focuses on the experiences of Blacks and Whites (Kluegel 1978; McGuire and Reskin 1993; Smith 1997, 1999, 2002). Minorities are less likely to be in positions of authority (Kluegel 1978; Mueller et al. 1989; Smith 1999; Smith and Elliott 2002), while the racial gap in authority has actually increased since the 1970s (Smith 1999, 2002; Wilson 1997a). Indeed, Wilson (1997a,b) and

Ryan Smith (1997) argue that the larger racial gaps at higher levels of authority suggest a “glass ceiling” effect for middle-class African Americans. Pathways leading to authority are more circumscribed for Blacks than for Whites; African Americans depend more heavily on their experience and human-capital skills for opportunities for advancement, while Whites advance through more informal channels, including social networks (Wilson 1997a). Collins (1997) notes that minorities are tracked into racialized management assignments, as in community relations, and locked out of mainstream and higher management jobs (see also Maume 1999b). Racial differences in authority also are more pronounced in the private sector (Kluegel 1978; Mueller et al. 1989; Wilson 1997a).

Blacks additionally receive lower returns when they attain authority (Wright and Perrone 1977; Kluegel 1978). Racial differences in returns to authority are most pronounced at the highest levels of authority and are not explained by racial differences in educational attainment (Smith 1997, 1999; Wilson 1997b). Disturbingly, Wilson (1997b) and Ryan Smith (1997, 1999) show that since the 1970s, there has been *no change* in these differential returns to authority. Counter to assumptions that middle-class Blacks have escaped racial inequality (Wilson 1978), such research suggests that middle-class Blacks continue to suffer from limited opportunities for advancement.

An increasing number of studies attempt to explore the intersection of race and gender in attainment of and returns to authority, but there is a less explicit focus on class (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a,b; McGuire and Reskin 1993; Maume 1999b; Browne and Tigges 2000; Smith and Elliott 2002; Browne and Rauscher 2004). For example, a number of studies have shown that White men are more likely to attain authority and receive higher returns to authority than White women, African American men, and African American women (McGuire and Reskin 1993; Maume 1999b; Browne and Tigges 2000). Indeed, African American women appear to be the least likely group to hold managerial and decision-making positions. As Wilson notes, “African American females are segregated into jobs that offer the fewest opportunities for authority attainment and its attendant rewards” (1997b: 610). This research clearly supports an intersectional approach that claims that class, race, and gender intersect to shape experiences in the labor market.

Yet, many of these studies simply compare differences between race and gender groups, rather than theorizing how class, race, and gender jointly condition these processes. As McGuire and Reskin (1993) note, gender and race simultaneously structure access and returns to authority. These intersections are not merely additive; there are distinct differences between White men and White women, which may not hold between African American men and women; there are, similarly, differences between White men and African American men, which may not hold between White women and African American women. Maume’s (1999b) fine-grained study shows that while African American men, White women, and African American women advance to authority positions at slower rates than White men, this is due to different causes. White and African American women are more likely to suffer from being in jobs segregated by race and gender, while African American men suffer from other blocked mobility opportunities, such as low evaluations from their supervisors. Maume (1999b) also shows evidence for a glass escalator, which does not benefit men, *per se*, but *White men*. Browne and Rauscher (2004) similarly argue that the race and gender composition of jobs may directly affect oppor-

tunities for authority. In their study, they find very different patterns for supervisory positions for White men, White women, African American men, and African American women, based on the gender and race composition of the jobs.¹² As they forcefully state:

The analyses show that race and gender must be studied in tandem. For instance, if we only had looked at the relation between gender and supervision, we would find that White women are only slightly more likely to be supervised by women than by men, but we would completely miss the pattern that White women are only supervised by *other White* women and men. If we only considered race differences in supervisory hierarchies, we would see that White men are more likely to be supervised by Whites, but we would overlook the pattern that *women* – White or Black – only rarely supervise White men. (2004: 31)

These different patterns in authority and returns to authority by class, race, and gender may be explained by theories of homosocial reproduction or social closure. Homosocial reproduction suggests that managers recruit managers that are like themselves (Kanter 1977; Maume 1999a; Kraus and Yonay 2000). Managers do not explicitly discriminate against other groups, but subconsciously gravitate toward and reward those that are most similar to themselves, in part because rapport is easier to establish. Social closure argues instead that White men try to protect their dominant positions within organizations (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a,b; Wilson 1997a; Maume 1999a). It may be seen as a combination of discrimination and preservation of privilege (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a; Browne and Rauscher 2004). Either perspective may help explain how class, race, and gender combine to create inequality by class, race, and gender. Whether through homosocial reproduction or social closure, as Browne and Rauscher argue, “maintaining the status hierarchy would mean that as a *direct result* of their race and gender combined, Black women would be restricted to supervising other Black women” (2004: 18).

While all of the research on workplace authority makes an important contribution, the research that attempts to understand the complex intersections between class, race, and gender is the most precise. Race and gender may all have particular effects on workplace authority; but this cannot be generalized from the experience of White women to fit all groups of women or be generalized from the experience of African American men to fit all African Americans or all minorities. As intersectional research shows, recognizing the subtle patterns by race and gender may help explain previous contradictory research findings. In addition, while many researchers explore workplace authority having implicitly theorized class – by examining the “high” and “low” ends of the hierarchy in different firms or occupations or education’s influence on authority – a more explicit analysis of class would surely lead to even better explanations of variations in workplace authority.

Domestic Work: Embedded in Hierarchies of Gender, Race, and Class

While gender, race, and class may shape labor-market experiences differently in diverse settings, domestic work is a site in which intersections of the hierarchies of gender, race, and class are particularly evident. Indeed, scholarship in this area tends

to be qualitative in nature and emphasizes the intersections among gender, race/ethnicity, class and nativity, language, and citizenship status in the experiences of domestic workers and their employers (Rollins 1985; Glenn 1986, 1992; Dill 1988; Kousha 1995; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Milkman et al. 1998; Momsen 1999; Romero 1999, 2002a; Anderson 2000; Ibarra 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Parreñas 2001). By focusing on domestic workers' experiences, this research helps reconceptualize relations of power (between employers and their workers) and shows how race, gender, class, nationality, and citizenship inequalities are reproduced, maintained, and reinforced through the labor process (Romero 2002a). While some of the research on domestic work has taken a social-psychological approach to understanding the power dimensions in these relationships (Rollins 1985; Dill 1988), other research focuses attention on the fact that these are employee-employer relations in workplaces (Romero 2002a).

Class differences are evident in domestic work. Employers, who are reluctant to distinguish their own homes as workplaces, may not recognize the power relations of domestic work (Rollins 1985; Glenn 1986, 1999; Romero 1999, 2002a; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001). Due to the nature of their work, workers witness class differences in experiences and opportunities on a daily basis.¹³ Employers enjoy higher-class status than workers, although employers may vary from the very wealthy – with a staff of domestic workers – to even some working-class families – who may employ monthly or biweekly help (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001). At the same time, the class level of domestic workers varies significantly – a highly paid nanny may earn twice or three times the amount of a babysitter working the same number of hours a week. Yet, the class differences between employers and workers drive the system of domestic work. For example, in their quantitative study, Milkman et al. (1998) show that the cities with the highest level of household-income inequality are those with the highest growth in domestic work.

Domestic workers also illustrate the dynamic nature of class relations, particularly for immigrant workers. Many immigrant domestic workers come from more privileged class backgrounds in their home countries, as the poorest workers do not have the money needed to emigrate (Ibarra 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Parreñas 2001). These workers may have worked in professional positions in their home countries and face contradictory class mobility by emigrating and entering into domestic work. Workers experience downward status mobility, even as they may experience upward financial mobility (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Parreñas 2001). Indeed, immigrant domestic workers may employ servants to care for their families in their home countries, creating complicated hierarchies of privilege (Anderson 2000; Parreñas 2001). Employers may ignore or not respect the education and background of workers, in order to maintain their sense of authority and the exploitation of their workers (Rollins 1985; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Romero 2002a).

Class also intersects with gender, particularly in the gender relations between women who supervise domestic workers and the workers themselves (Rollins 1985; Glenn 1986; Romero 1999, 2002a). While the employers reflect gender inequality, insofar as women remain responsible for ensuring that the work is done, these women benefit from class inequality by hiring other women to handle the work assigned to them. As Rollins (1985) noted in her groundbreaking study, women employers may deploy a type of generous, protective, and even loving maternalism.

Yet, this maternalism is as disrespectful to the autonomy of the worker as a paternalistic relationship is.

Workers and employers also wrestle with different and changing gender norms. Employers may feel a sense of guilt or loss, because they are not providing care for their families directly. Such emotions may be channeled into complicated relationships with their workers (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001). At the same time, domestic workers often must transgress gender norms, by caring for families other than their own (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Glenn 1999; Chang 2000; Parreñas 2001). These workers may criticize women employers for *choosing* to work outside the home, even as they themselves are forced to work outside the home to support their families (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997).

Class and gender also intersect with race, ethnicity, and nationality. Employers develop hierarchies of racial and ethnic preference, for example preferring to employ White nannies or Latina maids, while also having different expectations based on race/ethnicity (e.g., White nannies watch children, while Latina nannies also clean) (Wrigley 1995; Ibarra 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, Romero 2002a).¹⁴ Indeed, employers often prefer certain racial/ethnic groups based on stereotypes about these groups' submissiveness.

Citizenship and nationality also play a central role in the labor process for domestic workers. With the surge in the global economy, there has been a significant expansion of immigrant domestic workers in North America, Europe, the industrializing countries in Asia and oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. Domestic workers are drawn from various parts of the globe, creating an "international division of reproductive labor" (Anderson 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Parreñas 2001). In addition to exploitation of workers based on racial or ethnic differences, immigrant workers may be particularly exploited on the basis of nationality or citizenship status.

Employers of domestic workers may prefer immigrant workers, perceived as more "docile" and willing to work for lower wages (Momsen 1999). Indeed, some studies suggest that employers are more hesitant to employ immigrant domestic workers that speak the dominant language (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Parreñas 2001). Such hierarchies devalue immigrant workers while also blocking native-born, minority women from access to these positions.

Employers also use nationality and citizenship status to rationalize paying immigrant workers less than native-born workers. They argue that immigrant workers would live in much greater poverty in their home countries (Hossfeld 1990, 1994; Romero 1999; Ibarra 2000). Wages may even be based on wage potential in the worker's country of origin, rather than fair wages within the host country (Heyzer and Wee 1994).¹⁵ The vulnerability of noncitizen workers, particularly illegal immigrants, allows employers greater latitude to exploit their workers. Private employers often disregard employment laws for pay, taxes, working conditions, and benefits (Heyzer and Wee 1994; Romero 1999, 2002a; Chang 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Rosales 2001).

Employers use intersecting ideologies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship, and gender to justify exploiting women of color; these processes then help maintain and reinforce an inequitable system of employment. The experiences of domestic workers provide a stark example of the matrix of domination. The employers of domestic workers are at an advantage directly from their ability to hire domestic

workers; freed from the need to do this labor, they have greater opportunities for leisure and for earning (higher) wages in the labor market (Glenn 1999). Romero highlights this process, emphasizing that the link between privilege and disadvantage is most clear in the way that “the higher quality paid reproductive labor the employers’ families receive produces as a direct consequence lower amounts of unpaid reproductive labor in their own families” (2002a: 21; 2002b). The intersectional approach illustrates that the higher living standards of White middle- and upper-class women have depended on the lower living standards and exploitation of lower-class, racial/ethnic minority and immigrant women (Glenn 1999).

Domestic work illustrates the omnipresent nature of the intersection of gender, race, and class within a particular labor-market sector. In part, the qualitative nature of most of the research has helped identify how gender, race, ethnicity, class, nationality, and citizenship are all relevant and interconnected in explaining the labor-market experiences of domestic work. Class cannot be measured simply, as the class status of workers may vary, for example, as they immigrate. Similarly, measures of race and ethnicity and nationality and citizenship rely on specific contexts. This research reflects the complexity of considering these intersections analytically, while also demonstrating how carework is devalued and workers’ devaluation is linked to their statuses in a hierarchy of gender, class, race/ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship.

Conclusion

Labor-market research, incorporating an intersectional perspective, has enriched our understanding of economic inequality by calling into question studies of gender that fail to account for race and class as well as studies of race that fail to account for gender and class. Generalizations based on a single, social category or identity (e.g., gender) should be established empirically rather than assumed. However, we also advocate more research in which the simultaneous interplay of gender, race, and class is *demonstrated*.

To assess the claims of intersectional theories empirically, scholars need to develop more precise theories of class and to specify conditions under which intersections are most likely and least likely to occur (Browne and Misra 2003). This is a tall order. The assumptions of intersectional perspectives that gender, race, and class intersect at all levels of social life presents a difficult challenge for social theorizing. Intersectional research runs into a number of inherent problems in both conceptualization and analysis. Conceptualizing and measuring class (Dahrendorf 1959; Wright 1978; Acker 1999; Gimenez 2001), as well as race/ethnicity, gender, and citizenship (Glenn 2002); the structure/agency question (England and Browne 1992; Wrong 1999); and the relations between identity, interactions, and institutions (Ridgeway 1997) have plagued sociology for decades.¹⁶

Indeed, looking at the triple intersection of gender, race, and class creates the same theoretical dilemmas that sociologists encountered when attempting to understand dual gender/class and race/class intersections. Empirically, many scholars have found it difficult to theorize class and gender, when women’s class status is so tightly related to marital status and unpaid labor at home (Acker 1999). Similarly, it is difficult to untangle race and class; there are few very wealthy African Americans and

few extremely poor Whites whose conditions resemble those of extremely poor African Americans (for instance, poor Whites are more likely to live in rural areas rather than urban neighborhoods of concentrated poverty).¹⁷ Many other scholars have attempted to understand the importance of “race” and “class” in determining the life chances of different groups (Wilson 1978; Feagin and Sikes 1994; Omi and Winant 1994).

In addition to the challenges associated with theorizing “dual intersections” and “triple intersections,” methodological dilemmas appear as well. Our review suggests that evidence for “intersectionality” is much more apparent with qualitative studies, such as the analyses of domestic work, than with quantitative research. Assessing dynamic intersections of class, race, and gender may be difficult to do through quantitative measures, though reflexive quantitative researchers have made some headway in this regard (see, for instance, McCall 2000).

Intersectional scholarship continues to develop. While there are a number of important examples, the research of Miliann Kang serves as an excellent model for intersectional studies (1997, 2000, 2003). In her work, Kang observes Korean-owned nail salons in three neighborhoods in New York, including a predominantly White, middle-class, commercial neighborhood; a racially mixed, middle-class, residential neighborhood; and a primarily African American, low-income neighborhood. Combining participant observation research and interview research, Kang explores service provision in a global, postindustrial economy, considering the interactions and relationships of Korean immigrant workers, Korean immigrant owners, and a variety of customers in different settings. As Kang argues, “by understanding the lived experiences of specific individuals and groups, in specific sites, in particular historical moments, the broader context of race, class, and gender oppression and their forms of intersection can be more concretely documented and more meaningfully conceptualized” (2000: 7–8). By taking a comparative approach to understanding the complexity of race, gender, and class intersections, Kang is able to develop thoughtful conceptualizations of the intersection, by empirically demonstrating rather than assuming the shape of those intersections.

While Kang (2003) focuses on an urban US setting, the work of Laura Raynolds (2001) demonstrates how an intersectionality perspective can be useful in understanding labor-market processes in a quite different setting: agricultural production for a transnational corporation in a developing country. Relying on field research and analysis of company employment records, Raynolds examines changes in production relations between 1989 and 1995 within a pineapple firm in the Dominican Republic. In 1989, the non-Dominican (“foreign”) management in the pineapple firm hired mostly women for the full-time work on the pineapple plantation, paying them extremely low wages.¹⁸ Although agricultural work was defined as “men’s work,” the women needed the income for their families.

With the decline in pineapple exports in the mid-1990s, the firm shifted its production strategies to cut costs. Wages were now paid at piece-rate, and work crews were recruited through Dominican “contractors” relying on local patronage systems. The local contractors preferred men and so women were excluded from the jobs. With the piece-rate system, agricultural work on the plantation was recast as a “masculine proving ground” (Raynolds 2001: 22). The patronage systems were based on race/ethnic ties within the community as well as gender. By relying on

Dominican contractors to hire and regulate labor, the non-Dominican management fostered loyalty to the company.

The work of Kang (2003) and Raynolds (2001) highlights the relevance of intersectional perspectives to understanding how class, race, and gender are implicated in the global economy in diverse economic sectors. We argue that it is important to continue to theorize and analyze the intersections of class, race, and gender – both qualitatively and quantitatively. While qualitative-methodological approaches may allow us more complex and dynamic models of the intersections, quantitative research on labor-market inequality must be further specified to consider the intersections of class, race, and gender. Quantitative studies provide empirical leverage on changes in the level and extent of inequality over time or across geographic areas (McCall 2001a). These data are necessary for developing and evaluating effective policy measures (Aldridge 1999; McCall 2001a). As sociologists, we must strive to develop better understandings of these processes of inequality and our analysis suggests that research that specifies these intersections is more precise and accurate.

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Notes

- 1 We take these themes from our companion paper, “The intersection of gender and race in the labor market,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29 (2003): 487–513.
- 2 Intersectional approaches also may examine how other statuses – sexuality, ability, age, ethnicity, nationality, and so on – intersect with gender, race, and class. While we focus upon gender, race, and class in this chapter – with some discussion of nationality and citizenship – we recognize the importance of considering these more complex intersections.
- 3 Without clear definitions, it is nearly impossible to interpret research results. Are the results simply an artifact of a particular way of “measuring” a construct or a valid test of the theory (Stinchcombe 1968)?
- 4 We view epistemology as the study of how and what we can know; methodology as theorizing about research practices; and method as the specific tools used by researchers (Harding 1987; DeVault 1996).
- 5 For example, Dorothy Smith (1987, 1990) argues that researchers must make their own experience the starting point for all investigations, in order to subvert positivistic-research structures that serve the interests of the ruling groups in society.
- 6 While there are multiple approaches, many studies emphasize differences between formal authority, supervisory authority, and decision-making (or managerial) authority. Different measures of authority lead to significant variations in how class, race, and gender matter to authority (see Smith 2002).

- 7 Wright (1978) similarly conceptualizes class to include authority.
- 8 As Ryan Smith claims, "education has a much stronger effect on authority chances of men than women . . . each additional year of education has upwards of two to three times the effect for men as for women on authority outcomes" (2002: 531).
- 9 Baxter and Wright claim that women face greater disadvantages in acquiring authority at lower levels of the hierarchy; they also suggest that "removing gender-related obstacles to getting into the authority hierarchy would appear to be a more pressing task than removing obstacles to promotions in the upper reaches of authority structures" (2000: 289).
- 10 However, Maume (1999b) found that men's promotion chances increase in jobs dominated by men, while women may be more likely to experience blocked opportunities and are more likely to leave their jobs when working in jobs dominated by men.
- 11 Another question asked by researchers focused on gender and authority attainment is whether women choose jobs with less authority (e.g., mommy-tracks) due to greater family responsibilities or because they value workplace authority less – perhaps due to differences in gender socialization (Smith 2002). Yet, cross-national research provides very little evidence that women self-select out of positions of authority (Wright et al. 1995; Smith 2002). In addition, research on family relationships suggests that while women that are mothers are less likely to attain authority, men who are fathers are *more* likely to attain authority.
- 12 Smith and Elliott's (2002) study explores the effects of ethnic concentration on authority hierarchies for White, Asian, Latino, and African American men, as well as White, Asian, Latina, and African American women. Their findings reinforce Browne and Rauscher's (2004), but suggest that rather than a "glass ceiling," women and minority men suffer from the effects of a "sticky floor." Smith and Elliott argue that authority chances are shaped by whether one's ethnic group dominates only entry-level positions or also higher-level positions within an organization. These patterns vary by gender and ethnic group, although their study does not fully develop the implications of their findings from an intersectional perspective.
- 13 For example, Hondagneu-Sotelo notes, "Unlike the working poor who toil in factories and fields, domestic workers see, touch, and breathe the material and emotional world of their employers' homes. They scrub grout, coax reluctant children to nap and eat their vegetables, launder and fold clothes, mop, dust, vacuum, and witness intimate and otherwise private family dynamics" (2001: ix).
- 14 Domestic workers themselves may absorb hierarchies of racial and ethnic preference – often preferring to work for Whites rather than racial or ethnic minorities.
- 15 For example, Heubach (2002: 172) notes that in Germany, Polish household workers may earn twice as much as Bulgarian workers, reflecting the wage discrepancy between the two nations. Heyzer and Wee (1994) present similar data for workers from a variety of Asian countries in Singapore.
- 16 For labor-market processes in particular, a more rigorous theorizing of class is essential. As Acker notes, "Capitalism cannot be deconstructed away. . . . [W]e need an analysis of capitalism to comprehend what is happening [to people]. Class is a linking concept that can mediate between the generalized and global expressions of capitalist processes and the concrete experiences of ordinary people who are simultaneously with these processes and producing a changed reality" (1999: 53).
- 17 This tight interweaving of race and class led Milton Gordon, in 1964, to suggest that the concept "ethclass" be used.
- 18 Raynolds does not specify the country of ownership of the management, presumably to maintain confidentiality of the firm and respondents.

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Chapter 9

What Counts? Definition, Measurement, and Legitimacy in Studies of Homelessness

MALCOLM WILLIAMS

Homelessness is a good example of the intersection of inequality issues and research. Although universally recognized as a key social problem in both Western and developing countries, it presents enormous challenges in respect of definition and measurement. These problems of definition and measurement must be resolved at least minimally so that homelessness can be tackled effectively. In any given locality those responsible for tackling homelessness need to have the best possible data on how many homeless people there are as well as something of their characteristics (e.g. age, gender, housing, and economic situation) (Chamberlain and MacKenzie 1992: 274). This requires quantitative and enumerative approaches rather than the qualitative studies that have predominated in much homelessness research. Qualitative studies, whilst providing important “thick description,” are limited in scope and generalizability and can lack legitimacy in policy circles.

Homelessness presents specific methodological difficulties, yet many of these are encountered in other fields of social inequality. For example, as I describe later, usually the homeless must be treated as a “rare and elusive” population – a feature they share, for example, with certain types of drug users, refugees, and transsexuals. Thus, although this chapter is about issues in defining and researching homelessness, many of the issues discussed can be generalized to other kinds of social inequality.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section begins with a discussion of the difficulties encountered in defining homelessness. It is not a state that can be dichotomized with “not homeless,” but is instead a heterogeneous concept that manifests itself in diverse ways at different times and in different societies. Even within particular societies, rarely is a description of homelessness agreed upon and, consequently, various interest groups, such as government, local politicians, campaigning organizations, and the homeless themselves, develop different definitions.

The second section of the chapter begins by examining the methodological issues arising from definition and, secondly, notwithstanding these, issues of identification and enumeration of homeless populations. The section then goes on to discuss some enumerative methodological strategies, such as headcounts and multiple captures.

The latter will be given more detailed attention and illustrated with a case study from two towns in Great Britain.

The final section considers the usefulness of homelessness as a taxonomic concept and suggests some alternative ways of conceptualizing the definitional question. This chapter in turn suggests that it has important implications for method and briefly sketches out some alternative methodological approaches.

Defining Homelessness

Defining homelessness usually is seen as a technical difficulty or a political issue. It is both of these things, but underlying each is a deeper sociological problem of what counts as a "home." Home as we understand it in all of its usages is an alien concept to nomadic peoples. Using the word "home" in respect of such peoples would convey a broad sense of space and place, possibly the use of mobile structures, and mediated by seasons, divisions of labor, and life cycle. Normally only when people are settled can home (or its absence), in the narrower sense, take on meaning. Even then the word "home" is used in a number of ways and can relate to the geographical location where people live (a country, a town etc.), where their family resides, or where they were born. In Western countries, increasingly, home is an individualized concept linked perhaps to autonomous personal space (Dupuis and Thorns 1998). The old adage "home is where you hang your hat" has some sociological purchase. As Christopher Jenks notes:

After 1960, as more and more Americans began living alone by choice, the idea that you had a home only if you lived with your family began to lose its grip on the American imagination. By the late 1960s many Americans thought they had a home if they had a fixed address where they could leave their possessions, return whenever they wanted and sleep in peace. (Jenks 1994: 3)

The quote from Jenks implies two sociological trends in Western countries: first, the move from the concept of home as a social bond or identity and, second, a move toward its association with a physical structure. Note that these are trends toward, not a wholesale replacement of, social or communal definitions of home. Thus physical objectification or individualization can vary enormously between and even across societies. Consequently, individuals themselves, though often occupying similar positions in relation to their housing situations, will come to define or construct their identities differently. For example, long-time residents of Salvation Army hostels may regard those hostels as "home" (Williams 2001). Indeed, elderly residents of these hostels are really only likely to leave to go into care, and any move to another permanent, individual, arrangement may well be traumatic.

In developing countries, such as India (or even in some Western cities), pavement or street dwellers can colonize large areas and turn them into communal spaces that become "home" (Diener and Diener 2001). Such dwellers are not necessarily destitute, by the standards of such countries, but may be migrants from even poorer physical conditions in rural areas; many may be working. There are, then, many examples of individual and communal circumstances whereby any attribution of the definition of homelessness would be external and even unwelcome.

Conversely, in Western countries, dwellers in urban squats or those who live in housing with short or insecure tenancies may see themselves living in suboptimal housing conditions and regard their situation as “homelessness.” Yet such people are not always seen by officialdom as homeless. Indeed, as argued later, the limits of such definitions are difficult and arbitrary.

None of this is meant to imply that homelessness is purely a subjective concept, but rather that the context of place and individual circumstances will serve to influence how people think about their own situation.

A second and important sociological component of homelessness definitions is how societies themselves come to think about the issue. In the popular mind in Western countries, homelessness often is equated with sleeping rough, living out in the open, in structures such as tents or benders – what is sometimes referred to as “rooflessness” (Hutson and Liddiard 1994: 27). Such states, whether considered to result from individual choice or caprice, or from unavoidable social circumstances, usually are seen as unacceptable. Consequently, a considerable allocation of resources is given over to eradication of rough sleeping. The Rough Sleeper Unit (RSU), in England, could claim in 2001 that:

The Prime Minister’s target to reduce rough sleeping by at least two thirds by 2002 has been met early according to new figures released by the Government’s Rough Sleeper Unit (RSU) today [07/12/2001].

The number of people sleeping rough in England has fallen by 71 per cent over the last three years. It is estimated that 532 people now sleep rough in England compared to 1,850 in 1998. (Rough Sleeper Unit 2001)

Undoubtedly such initiatives are laudable in many ways (though, as shown later, the numeric claims might be seen as dubious), but they may say much more about political exigencies than any concerted effort to move beyond popular conceptions of homelessness.

The RSU is not the full extent of the UK’s government’s initiatives on homelessness (see the UK Government Homelessness website http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_homelessness/), but it is the most publicly visible and further cements the popular linkage of homelessness with lack of shelter. Politically and methodologically, it produces a neat dichotomy between rough sleepers and the rest of society. This may work to some extent politically, but methodologically it is flawed. I will discuss this later. At a superficial political level of homelessness visibility it works, provided enough resources are allocated, but at a deeper level it will fail if the antecedents of rough sleeping are not recognized. The deeper level is that there is no dichotomy between rough sleepers and the rest of the population. Metaphorically, just like a leaky boat filling with water, urban streets will fill with rough sleepers once the bailing-out initiatives stop or are reduced. This is because visible rough sleepers inhabit one end of a continuum of housing need. Whilst only a small number of people will sleep rough for long periods, many of those in sub-optimum housing situations will sleep rough for at least some of the time.

Now, whilst it is true that political exigencies have often driven governments toward emphasizing the situation of rough sleepers, it is equally the case that there cannot be one single uncontested political definition. Furthermore, even when one

arrives at a definition that might be acceptable to the widest possible constituency, it does not follow that such a definition is operationalizable in any enumeration. An all-encapsulating definition of homelessness that is politically inclusive, sociologically robust, and measurable is elusive. This is especially so if such a definition is meant to apply across cultures, but even when the ambition is to provide such a definition in respect of homelessness in Western societies this is still very difficult. The rest of this chapter will focus only on the issue of definition and measurement in Western societies.

Examples of definitions of homelessness

Definitions of homelessness may have three purposes, though these are not mutually exclusive. First, there are definitions that aim to identify homeless people for policy or legal purposes. Such definitions may be enshrined in law, or may be definitions more locally defined or interpreted by municipal authorities or NGOs. These can be seen to fall along an ideological explanatory continuum, which in turn usually gives rise to a second continuum of simplicity–heterogeneity.

Thus, the ideological (or political) continuum does not of itself lead to definition, but rather provides explanations that will shape how homelessness is defined. At one end of this continuum there are individualist explanations of homelessness, which blame homelessness on the fecklessness (or at least the choices) of individuals. At the other end of the continuum, structural conditions are invoked in which the individual is seen as a victim of economic or social circumstances. The policy response in the first case is likely to be minimal and may consist of initiatives (such as the RSU), which tackle visible homelessness such as rough sleeping. The rhetoric in this case has often been to deny *a priori* that there are large numbers of homeless and then attempt to fit the narrowest definition in order to limit the scope of policy intervention. Certainly at a local authority level and sometimes nationally, this approach characterized the Thatcher government's approach to homelessness in the United Kingdom in the 1980s (Evans and Duncan 1988; see also Malpass and Murie 1999, Ch. 5 for a description of housing policy under the Thatcher government). Conversely, the structural explanation usually will recognize the heterogeneity of the antecedents of homelessness and lead to broader definitions encompassing a wider range of housing need (Chamberlain 1999: 1).

The second purpose is to produce definitions that arise from sociological explanations of homelessness. These differ from more ideological policy definitions in that they arise from the analyses of academics or government analysts. Of course, such analyses and their emergent definitions will likely inform ideological definitions (and indeed vice versa) (Pleace and Quilgars 2003). Equally, they may form the basis of the third purpose of definition, that of measurement. The Bramley and ABS definitions discussed later are of this kind.

Measurement definitions, as is the case with sociological ones, are not ideologically neutral, but usually are produced in order to undertake enumerations for a government or an NGO (nongovernmental organization). Nevertheless, such definitions may be inconvenient to advocates of positions at either or both ends of the ideological continuum. Definitions drawn narrowly will find smaller numbers of

homeless people in any enumeration than those drawn more broadly. Moreover, measurement definitions may be derived from operational criteria, but more usually are a product of prior political decisions about what should be measured.

The following examples illustrate the three purposes discussed; they also can be placed along a continuum of simplicity–heterogeneity.

In England and Wales the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 (consolidated into the Housing Act of 1985) defines homelessness as lacking secure accommodation free from violence, or threat of violence. The Act identified particular priority groups who can be designated homeless and, in its application, gives wide discretion to local authorities. It specifically excluded those deemed to have made themselves “intentionally homeless.” Despite later legislation, this remains substantially the position today, with a significant variation between authorities in numbers accepted as homeless (Office for National Statistics 2000).

Moreover, the definition of homelessness can be subject to a variety of interpretations by local authorities. The 2002 Homelessness Act gave local authorities much more flexibility in framing local policy, as well as additional powers to exclude applicants on the basis of “unacceptable behaviour” (Laurie 2004: 50). Though there have been no recent studies of how the law is interpreted and definitions derived, the Department of Environment sponsored a study, conducted in the 1980s, of local authority responses to homelessness that showed that the legislation was interpreted in widely different ways (Evans and Duncan 1988). For example, all metropolitan authorities in the study reported that they would house childless battered women, compared with 80 percent of nonmetropolitan authorities and 76 percent of London authorities (1988: 17). Just under one-fifth would accept young, single applicants. Finally, there was wide variation amongst the authorities in how they interpreted the concept of “intentionally homeless.” This was exemplified by the finding that half of the authorities surveyed viewed moving to seek employment as becoming intentionally homeless.

The legal definition that was the subject of Evans and Duncan’s research is a narrow one that is not intended to capture heterogeneous states of homelessness and in practice is more about providing shelter, often through short-term measures as accommodating people in hostels or “bed and breakfasts” (cheap hotels). Quite apart from policy and measurement limitations resulting from its narrowness, the variability of its application meant that local authority statistics on numbers of those homeless have weak validity and reliability. For example, statutory data from the early and mid-1990s showed a great deal of variation in local authority reporting practices. Some authorities counted as homeless all those who reported themselves as homeless, others only counted those who met the local interpretation of the Act, whilst some authorities counted only those whom they “housed” (Williams and Cox 1994: 12).

Most countries that operate a national census of population attempt to enumerate homeless people. The methods and definitions used vary considerably from headcounts of rough sleepers to comprehensive attempts at enumeration based on fairly wide definitions. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in the 1996 Census conducted one such enumeration.

This definition was originally proposed by Chamberlain and MacKenzie (1992) and identifies three segments in the homeless population:

Primary homelessness

People without conventional accommodation, such as people living on the streets, sleeping in parks, squatting in derelict buildings, or using cars or railway carriages for temporary shelter.

Secondary homelessness

People who move frequently from one form of temporary shelter to another. It covers: people using emergency accommodation (such as hostels for the homeless or night shelters); teenagers staying in youth refuges; women and children escaping domestic violence (staying in women's refuges); people residing temporarily with other families (because they have no accommodation of their own); and those using boarding houses on an occasional or intermittent basis.

Tertiary homelessness

People who live in boarding houses on a medium- to long-term basis. Residents of private boarding houses do not have a separate bedroom and living room; they do not have kitchen and bathroom facilities of their own; their accommodation is not self-contained; and they do not have security of tenure provided by a lease (Chamberlain 1999: 1)

This measurement definition endeavored to encapsulate the Australian Supported Accommodation Assistance Act (1994) policy definition; however, the two did not match entirely. The Act additionally defined as homeless those who were unhappy with their accommodation (for example, it might damage their health or be too expensive), or those at risk of being homeless through eviction or domestic violence and so on. These latter states were deemed unmeasurable in the Census; however, the Census did include in its measurement definition people in boarding houses that were unlikely to have been considered homeless under the Act (Chamberlain 1999: 2). The Australian policy definition of homelessness clearly falls at the broad end of the continuum, but it, like the narrower UK definition, is not entirely operational, though for quite different reasons.

A somewhat similar, but even broader, sociological definition to that of Chamberlain and MacKenzie was proposed by Glen Bramley:

- 1 People literally without a roof over their head, including those regularly sleeping rough, newly arrived migrants, victims of fire, flood, severe harassment or violence, and others.
- 2 People in accommodation specifically provided on a temporary basis to the homeless (hostels, bed and breakfast, and so forth).
- 3 People with insecure or impermanent housing: this includes other ("self-referred") hotel and bed-and-breakfast residents, licensees and those in holiday lets, those in tied accommodation who change jobs, tenants under notice to quit, squatters and licensed occupiers of short-life housing, and owner occupiers experiencing mortgage foreclosure.
- 4 People shortly to be released from institutional accommodation, including prisons, detention centers, psychiatric hospitals, community or foster homes, and other hostels, who have no existing alternative accommodation or existing household to join.
- 5 Households sharing accommodation involuntarily.

- 6 Individuals or groups living within existing households where either (i) relationships with the rest of the household, or (ii) living conditions are unsatisfactory and intolerable for any extended period.
- 7 Individuals or groups living within existing households whose relationships and conditions are tolerable but where the individual/groups have a clear preference to live separately, including cases where the “potential” household is currently split but would like to live together (Bramley 1988: 26).

Bramley’s definition falls into the second “academic” category and is one of the most encompassing. It ranges from acute rooflessness to more chronic conditions of housing need. Though it can be seen as a “gold standard,” in terms of capturing most suboptimum housing states, its operationalization as a measure is more difficult. Certainly some of the housing states would be hard to identify within a relatively short enumeration of any kind (6 and 7 especially) and several of the definitions (e.g. “intolerable”) are very subjective and difficult to operationalize.

Methodological Issues of Enumeration

The previous discussion and examples demonstrate the difficulties of securing a definition of homelessness that can be operationalized into a reliable and valid measure for the various constituencies. Perhaps more importantly, such definitions should have as much validity as possible for the homeless themselves. Though a worthy goal, this latter seems unachievable because, as previously noted, individuals will interpret the same objective circumstances quite differently. This has led many to criticize the idea of enumerative studies (or sometimes even quantitative studies more generally). In some cases this is because operational definitions cannot capture the subjective experience of homelessness and in others because the discourse of number based on poor enumeration will influence political discourses negatively (Clope et al. 2001). The first kind of criticism is a doctrine of despair. There are undoubtedly enormous difficulties in capturing the subjective views of an individual’s situation, but this is not entirely impossible. Moreover, it is hard to conceive of any organization directing resources to problems of homelessness without some numeric data that estimate the size of the problem. The second kind of criticism is certainly a valid one but, equally, it is a good reason to develop more effective enumeration strategies. The following section of the chapter reviews some approaches to enumeration that have been used in the last few years.

The commonest method remains the headcount of people defined as homeless. Headcounts use a variety of definitions of homelessness but most concentrate on recording rough sleepers. Definitions of rough sleeping do vary somewhat, but the following from the UK Rough Sleeper Unit (RSU) captures a fairly consensual description.

People sleeping, or bedded down, in the open air (such as on the streets, or in doorways, parks or bus shelters); people in buildings or other places not designed for habitation (such as barns, sheds, car parks, derelict boats, stations, or “bashes”). (Rough Sleeper Unit 2003)

Official headcounts of rough sleepers have been carried out in Britain on a regular basis since 1995 and have been criticized from both political and methodological

perspectives (Cloke et al. 2001). They continue, however, to be funded heavily by government and are now carried out across the country.

There are four key problems with headcounts of rough sleepers. First, as indicated previously, those sleeping rough are only ever a small proportion of homeless people, no matter how one defines homelessness beyond rough sleeping. Furthermore, as noted above, there is good evidence to suggest only a hard core of people sleep rough for long periods; however, many more "homeless" people will sleep rough at some point (Anderson et al. 1993: 44–5).

Second, there is the problem of undercount. Most criticisms of rough sleeper counts (or indeed other more broadly defined headcounts) will alight on this issue. Undercount can occur for several reasons. Enumerators may lack experience or local knowledge and some counts use homeless or formerly homeless people to help overcome this problem. It has been suggested that such people could have both better knowledge of where rough sleepers might be found and be able to establish better empathy with them once located. This strategy has met with some success, though often rough sleepers will not stay in the same places for long and "local" knowledge can deteriorate quickly. When experienced enumerators are available, guidance notes usually will discourage them from searching inaccessible or dangerous places. Indeed, Crane and Warnes note that street counts in London "do not attempt to include people sleeping rough in parks, basements or inaccessible areas" (1997: 17).

When numbers of rough sleepers enumerated are lower than expected, it is sometimes suggested that prior knowledge of the count has led the rough sleepers to move elsewhere or "hide" during enumerations. Cloke et al. (2001: 268) cite an example of this alleged behavior in Taunton, England. However, in subsequent counts in the Plymouth research (and later in Torbay) this was "controlled" for by withholding the date of the count from the enumerators until the night of the count; however, it did not substantially increase the numbers found.

Apart from difficulties of visibility, rough sleepers may move around within the designated enumeration area or, indeed, move out of it altogether. Mobility of rough sleepers almost certainly leads to undercount, but it can likewise lead to the third problem in headcounts, that of overcount.

Overcount occurs when rough sleepers, as a result of moving around or of identification errors by enumerators, are counted more than once. Indeed, undercount and overcount can happen simultaneously in the same enumeration. Some people are missed, whilst others are counted twice; and because the size of the total rough sleeper population in any given area is not known, knowing whether undercount or overcount has occurred is impossible. This uncertainty can be, and is, exploited by those who would prefer to see more, or fewer, rough sleepers (or homeless people more generally) (Cloke et al. 2001: 263).

The fourth problem is that of bias or unreliability in counting. Virtually all definitions, however simple and sharply drawn, require enumerators to make a decision as to whether the person is "in scope" – that is, homeless according to measurement definition. Bias occurs when an enumerator deliberately inflates or deflates his/her count. Though hard to prove, one might surmise that inflation is not uncommon, given that many enumerators are volunteers, with an ideological interest in demonstrating the existence of large numbers of homeless people. Unreliability can occur alongside bias, or quite separately, when enumerators, or those

interpreting enumeration data, make mistakes and record “false positives” or “false negatives” when identifying the homeless (Shaw et al. 1996: 78).

Moving beyond headcounts of rough sleepers

As Cloke et al. (2001) suggest, headcounts of rough sleepers are powerful rhetorical tools. Those sleeping rough are very apparent by their condition and this accords with the popular perception of homelessness. Nevertheless, some studies or enumerations move beyond simple headcounts of rough sleepers. These may combine simple headcounts with data from hostels and other temporary accommodation on the enumeration night. Indeed, this is the method the UK RSU has moved toward (Rough Sleeper Unit 2003), whilst others use more sophisticated strategies of enumeration.

Many quantitative studies of homeless people have not attempted to undertake enumeration, but use alternative sampling strategies to describe the characteristics of homeless populations. During the 1990s many such studies were conducted in United States and European cities (see, for example, Lynn 1992; Burt 1999; Marpsat and Firdion 1999). One such example was the 1996 ICCR (Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research) study of homelessness in Vienna. This research used a “stratified-sampling method,” but the sample from which this was stratified was a convenience sample obtained from “service facilities for the homeless and typical areas where homeless people can be found. That is, 21 facilities for the homeless, ranging from emergency shelters to transitory homes, three railway stations, and two busy subway stations” (Kofler 1999: 208).

The ICCR study could demonstrate the characteristics of the sample (sex, age, marital status, geographical origin, duration, and so on) and these data are undoubtedly valuable (Kofler 1999: 207). However, it is not possible to generalize to a population. Indeed, the population is defined only vaguely as those homeless in Vienna.

Headcounts or sampling methods based upon qualitative inferences about populations (such as the ICCR study) are undertaken because – at least until recently – it was held that there were insurmountable methodological problems in either defining a statistical population of the homeless, or attempting to enumerate that population. These problems existed regardless of the definition adopted.

The homeless are a rare and elusive population. These are statistical terms and have no ideological overtones. The “rarity” is simply the expression of the statistical fact that, however defined, the homeless will consist of only a few people per thousand of the population. The greater methodological difficulty is that the homeless are an elusive population.

Whilst citizens with an atypical characteristic, say an unusual surname, will also constitute a rare population, they will not usually be elusive, as their names will appear on a list of some kind, such as a list of voters or taxpayers. Within certain limits their numbers can be known fairly accurately, and sampling strategies, such as stratified random sampling, can be used. Homeless people are very unlikely to appear on such lists and, even when they do, their exceptionality means they do not provide an accurate estimate of population size, nor constitute a basis for accurate sampling. The elusiveness is produced by the lack of a settled abode, geographical mobility, and changed housing status over short periods. Qualitative research on housing careers or pathways demonstrates that a typical homeless trajectory will

involve a number of physical locations and moves in and out of various kinds of housing situation (Hutson and Liddiard 1994; Timmer et al. 1994).

Given the methodological difficulties of headcounts and the awareness of researchers that the homeless are a rare and elusive population, it is surprising that more work has not been done to develop more sophisticated methods of enumeration. Peter Rossi began such work in Chicago in the United States in the 1980s (Burt 1999: 267–8). Rossi's method assigned every block in the city a probability of low, medium, or high for finding people homeless during a single night count. A stratified probability sample of blocks was then selected. Homeless people found "were then assigned a weight based on the probability of the block being selected and the number of blocks in the stratum" (Burt 1999: 269). This study was repeated in Chicago and similar methods were used in studies in California and Washington DC. In each study, the number of homeless found was lower than homeless advocates had predicted and may go some way to explaining why the method was not adopted more widely. Nevertheless, though the method is certainly an improvement on simple headcounts, it still does not eliminate the difficulties of undercount, overcount, or double counting. The next method described does claim to control for these difficulties, but at the time of writing had not been used widely.

Capture-recapture

Ecologists, wishing to count animal populations, have long experienced the difficulties of counting rare and elusive populations. A well-used strategy in zoology is that of capture-recapture (also known as mark-recapture). The method depends on "capturing" a sample then recapturing it at a later point, noting the overlap between the two captures (Shaw et al. 1996). Variations of this in human populations include comparing two "lists" for overlap, or gathering original data in the population through identifying individuals. This approach has been used widely in epidemiology, drug use (Frischer et al. 1991), and mental illness (Fisher et al. 1994). Whilst its use in homelessness research was anticipated, notably by Shaw et al. (1996), its application in city-wide studies so far is limited.

Capture-recapture utilizes information from duplicate cases to enable the number of people otherwise unobserved to be calculated (Bishop et al. 1975; Sudman et al. 1988; Fisher et al. 1994: 27). The technique rests on the principle of two or more independent observations of the same population. The observations can be simultaneously of two sources that represent approximately the same population, or they can be of the same source at two time points. In the latter case, the observations should be at approximately the same time. In order to estimate the size of the population (N_t), the researcher needs to know the number of persons observed at the first count (N_1), the number of persons observed at the second (N_2) (or subsequent counts), and the number observed at both (M) (or each of subsequent) counts. Thus the estimate of the population (N_t) is:

$$N_t = (N_1 \times N_2) / M$$

The capture-recapture problem can be represented in a contingency table (Bishop et al. 1975: 231), where N is the total number of individuals in the population under consideration, N_1 the number of individuals in the first sample, N_2 the number in

Table 9.1 The capture-recapture model

First sample	Second sample		N_1
	Present	Absent	
Present	M	N_{12}	
Absent	N_{21}	Missing	
	N_2		

Source: Diagram based on Bishop et al. (1975: 231).

the second sample, and M the number in both the first and the second samples. The number of individuals observed in the second sample but not the first is $N_{21} = N_2 - M$, and the number observed in the first sample but not the second is $N_{12} = N_1 - M$. Thus the contingency table is 2×2 with one empty cell (see Table 9.1).

The model rests upon three key assumptions. First, each member of the population must have the same probability of capture within each sample, though circumstances may change that probability for an individual in subsequent samples. These kinds of changes in probability across samples do not, however, affect the model detrimentally. Second, dependency between samples should be avoided. An observation of an individual in one sample should not have any effect on the observation of that individual at the second or subsequent counts. Finally, the overall numbers in the population should not be different at the time of each sample. If operationalized efficiently, the approach has the ability to overcome the problems of undercounting and double counting. The important question is, can this be achieved?

The statistical basis for the approach is straightforward; the difficulty in efficient operationalization lies in making sure the previous assumptions hold. When two independent and reliable lists, from the same period in time, are compared for duplicate cases, the resulting estimates can be regarded as reliable, because the population is unlikely to have changed much and there is no dependency between the samples. The probability of appearing on a list also often can be derived. Likewise, these assumptions can be more readily upheld when counting and tagging animals. Because of the problem of incompleteness, the “list” approach is not viable in homelessness research, but as Shaw et al. (1996) describe, the alternative approach presents various difficulties.

The first of these concerns the question of “tagging.” Quite obviously, one cannot “tag” homeless people in the same way as animals in zoological research. This, then, raises methodological issues of recording. Individual details or “identifiers” must be recorded, which then leads to both methodological difficulties and an ethical dilemma. The ethical dilemma is the question of whether one should be recording data of this kind at all (even if it is to be made anonymous). Individual objections to the recording of the data, if upheld, would invalidate the entire project; thus researchers and policy makers must decide whether the public good outweighs objections about infringements of individual liberties. For some even the term “capture-recapture” is distasteful and they suggest that the alternative of “contact-recontact” might be used. However, in the research described it was felt that unnecessary confusion would result from introducing a further term to describe the same methodological approach.

The methodological problems are those of dependency, validity, and reliability. Dependency is where there is a causal connection between presence in one sample and presence in subsequent samples. The problem between samples is an especially difficult one, mainly because we cannot know all of the ways in which presence in one sample may be related to presence in another. For example, a client of a bed-and-breakfast "hotel" or a hostel will almost certainly be there as a result of referral from an agency such as a local authority. Therefore, if the two samples are taken at these locations, those referred to bed-and-breakfast hotels or hostels quite obviously will have a greater probability of recapture.

As previously noted, the quintessential feature of homeless populations is their "open" character. Again, this is a problem that cannot be wholly overcome and for this reason it is important that time series samples are approximate to each other. Secondly, the model will rest on the assumption that the population will be relatively homogeneous and not subject to large fluctuation through large-scale migration, births, or deaths.

Finally and perhaps most crucially, the validity and reliability of the samples will depend on how consistently and accurately the observations (the "tagging") are made (Shaw et al. 1996: 78). The validity of the samples is directly related to the definition issue. All observations must utilize the same definition of homelessness, which in itself must be a measurable characteristic. However, even with valid definitions, inaccurate recording of data or misclassifying of observations will compromise the sample's reliability. Clients presenting to agencies must be accurately "screened" to check that they fit the definition of homelessness adopted. Shaw et al. (*ibid.*) note that lack of validity and reliability will be manifested through recording "false positives" and "false negatives," whereby the former are those persons not homeless (but erroneously classed or recorded as such) and in the latter those people who are homeless (but are not so classed or recorded).

Capture-recapture: Case studies from Plymouth and Torbay

Capture-recapture was used with some success in enumerations of homeless populations in two south-coast towns in Great Britain (Williams and Cheal 2001, 2002). Plymouth is a dockyard and industrial city with a population of 250,000; Torbay is an agglomeration of resorts and fishing port with a population of 124,000. Each has a large rural hinterland. Both are migratory destinations, the former as a regional focus for employment and the latter attracting a great many young seasonal migrants.

A two-sample approach to counting was used, but because this produces a time-point estimate it can give no information about process. Consequently, in these enumerations the capture-recapture was repeated three times in each town through a one-year period. The enumerations therefore provided data on numbers of homeless in one-week periods during summer, fall, and winter and, consequently, comparative data on seasonal change in each town. Additionally, the enumeration provided some basic data on the characteristics of the homeless.

The latter information was derived from the identifiers required in order to construct the capture-recapture model. These identifiers were: date of birth, sex, initials, current "accommodation," and length of time in the town on this occasion.

The identifiers could then be cross-checked and sorted; then the number of times a person was enumerated during the one-week periods could be recorded. Successful recording is crucial to producing a reliable capture-recapture model and in Plymouth and Torbay was achieved through recruiting agencies with which those defined as homeless would make contact. The agencies ranged from services for the homeless, to benefits agencies, the police, hospitals, Salvation Army, hostels, bed and breakfast hotels, and cheap cafés. Agencies were provided with screening instruments and data were entered onto a simple monitoring form, which was accompanied by definitional guidelines. As Shaw et al. point out (1996: 76), no screening instrument is 100 percent valid and there will always be “false positives” and “false negatives.” That is, some people will be identified wrongly as fulfilling the descriptive definition of homeless, whilst others are wrongly identified as not. Likewise, reliability through a consistent application of definitions across the agencies cannot be guaranteed; however, efforts to maximize validity and reliability were furthered through a project researcher briefing agency staff and providing a set of written definitional guidelines.

Similarly, assumptions about dependency cannot be verified entirely; however, because monitoring forms each carried an agency identifier, particular recaptures – *within a sample* – could be checked for causal connections between agencies. Likewise, because both samples (at each count) were taken within the same week, causal connections between presence at one agency and presence at another could be checked, which the relatively small numbers recorded facilitated. In both studies, at each count, less than 400 cases were recorded.

In both Plymouth and Torbay there was political pressure to conduct headcounts alongside capture-recapture. These were carried out and produced lower comparative estimates when only research and local authority staff were used and higher ones when volunteers from advocacy organizations participated.

Capture-recapture, as a method of counting homeless populations, is considerably more sophisticated than headcounts and though it is not without its methodological weaknesses, as a local fit-for-purpose method it seems to be the most robust available. That it has not been used more widely thus far is perhaps attributable to political pressure from government for quick and easy headcounts; in addition, its results are harder to conceptualize. For example, longitudinal capture-recapture (as described previously) produces three different kinds of homeless estimates: the total number of homeless estimated over the study period; the estimate of homeless at each enumeration; or a mean of the estimates over the study period. This is an advantage because more than any other enumerative approach, it clearly illustrates the heterogeneity of homelessness as a *process*.

The Process of Homelessness

The method of capture-recapture used in the studies produced longitudinal data that enabled tracing movement in and out of homelessness. In both towns, there was evidence of movement into and out of (what is defined as) homelessness.¹ Tables 9.2 and 9.3 show the numbers of people recorded at more than one enumeration. In both

Table 9.2 Cases recorded at more than one enumeration in Plymouth

<i>Enumeration</i>	<i>n</i>	
1 & 2	211	43% of enumeration 1 cases
1, 2, & 3	134	27% of enumeration 1 cases
2 & 3	176	39% of enumeration 2 cases
1 & 3	21	4% of enumeration 1 cases

n = E1: 479; E2: 440; E3: 404.

Table 9.3 Cases recorded at more than one enumeration in Torbay

<i>Enumeration</i>	<i>n</i>	
1 & 2	58	17% of enumeration 1 cases
1, 2, & 3	12	4% of enumeration 1 cases
2 & 3	53	17% of enumeration 2 cases
1 & 3	33	10% of enumeration 1 cases

n = E1: 347; E2: 305; E3: 296.

studies “turnover” is very high, suggesting that being “homeless” is a relatively short-lived experience for many; however, what is especially interesting are those people recorded at enumerations 1 and 3, but not 2. These are the people who escaped visible homelessness only to return to it at a later date. In Plymouth this was 4 percent and in Torbay, 10 percent. This does not necessarily suggest that these people obtained secure accommodation only to lose it again, but simply that they moved out of a condition locally defined as homelessness, only to return to it later. Circumstances in the interim may not have improved much and what these data more likely indicate are fluctuations in the pathways of individual housing need.

In both locations, sex distribution was around 70 percent male and 30 percent female and, whilst it might be inferred that the migration patterns of the homeless in the two locations differed, a considerable number of those homeless in both places were born in Plymouth/Torbay or had lived there for much of their lives. On these variables there was similarity, but there were important differences between the locations as to where the homeless were “living” at the time of the enumerations. The most significant of these was that in Plymouth many more homeless were staying in hostels, while in Torbay more were in temporary accommodation – including squats and Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMOs).

Some antecedents of homelessness

In both locations, the capture-recapture enumerations were supported additionally by quota sample surveys aimed at investigating the antecedent circumstances of the

homeless. It must be remembered that such a sampling method for the surveys would have been impossible had the researchers not known the size of the homeless population or the distribution of the values of key variables, such as sex and age. In Torbay, the supporting survey was of those living in HMOs, while in Plymouth, it was a broader-based survey of those in a range of homeless or housing-need situations. The choice of the survey focus was derived from the predominant form of "accommodation" the homeless populations in each town were living in when enumerated.

Housing history data from the HMO survey strongly supported the view that what was defined as homelessness, for the purposes of the enumeration, was the visible tip of an "iceberg" of housing need. Residents of HMOs often have tenancies of less than six months, and for the most part such accommodations are considered temporary and are often of poor quality. Eighteen percent of those interviewed in the HMO survey had lived at their current address under one month and a further 36 percent 6 months or less. The respondents were not optimistic about how long they could stay, either: 10 percent said they could remain one month or less and a further 12 percent thought they would have to leave in less than 6 months. Seventy percent were on tenancies of 6 months or less and 29 percent had no tenancy agreement at all. Most of those people in short-term tenancies were there because they had no other option. For most of those categorized in both studies as homeless, a move to short-term private tenancies would be the only possible escape from their housing need, yet such an escape would seem to be precarious.

More than half of the HMO dwellers were under the age of 25 and had moved to HMOs directly from parental or foster homes. The Plymouth survey did not sample from HMO addresses; instead, it was a subsample of the total of those enumerated as homeless. Although hardly any of this group were currently living in HMOs, over 30 percent had previously done so.

Although the term "HMO" is a United Kingdom one, the phenomenon of short-term, poor-quality, rented housing is common in a number of countries. Such housing seems to be the origin of many of those classified (under most descriptions) as homeless and the destination of many who have escaped homelessness. It seems reasonable to assume that such accommodation also may be an intermediate destination between episodes of homelessness. Definitionally and methodologically, it is evidence of a range of housing-need states, whilst the enumeration data demonstrate that movement to and from these states may be rather fluid.

Residence in short-term poor-quality rented housing may be a predictor of homelessness; that is, a high proportion of such residents are at risk. However, it is not the only antecedent condition and it may itself be combined with many other antecedent conditions. For example:

- Amongst the younger age group there was a representation of single parents and couples with children, but their antecedent circumstances were similar to the 26–40 age group.
- The 26–40 age group often were quite different, constituting family groups or single men, and in some cases single women with children. Their biographies were quite different from the younger age group. Broadly speaking, they consisted of:

- *Couples with children and single parents.* Many of these were staying in “bed and breakfast” hotels, often as a result of evictions from family homes. Single parents were mostly women with one or more children and were often homeless as a result of relationship breakdowns, or evictions from the family home following relationship breakdowns.
- *Single males.* In this age group they were very diverse, though a characteristic of those in the Plymouth survey was that most had spent some time in an institution (discussed later).
- Those over 44 and particularly the elderly had had very diverse housing careers. Many had been “homeless” for a considerable period (some living in the Salvation Army hostel in Plymouth in excess of 20 years). They were more likely to have health problems and more likely to sleep rough on a more regular basis.
- Seventy percent of the Plymouth survey sample had been in an institution² at some time, but these institutions varied enormously and particular kinds of people were more likely to have been in certain kinds of institution. For example, those who had been in the armed forces (21 percent) were predominantly male and over 26 years of age. Those who had been in a young offenders’ institute or children’s home were of both sexes and usually under 26 (though some of the older groups had experienced these institutions along with other ones). All of those who had been in a drug unit (5 percent) had been in some other form of institution as well, as had most of those who had been in an alcohol unit (7 percent).

Is there any such thing as homelessness?: Definitional and methodological complexity

The Plymouth and Torbay studies, whilst demonstrating that one could enumerate homeless populations whilst avoiding the pitfalls of overcount, undercount, or double counting, nevertheless demonstrated the heterogeneity of homelessness as a condition and of its antecedents. The methodological approach used depended on an operationalization of homelessness that, whilst broader than most, was nevertheless driven by pragmatic measurement considerations. However, by combining the enumerations with sample surveys it was possible to learn much of the antecedents of homelessness. Two conclusions can be drawn: First, substantively, homelessness is not a useful taxonomic term because, as indicated previously, it may be used for different ideological purposes, possibly prejudicial to those in housing need; and second, this must lead to more holistic and more encompassing research strategies.

Housing need pathways and processes

One attempt to break out of the definitional impasse of homelessness is to use the concept of housing “careers” or “housing pathways” (Fitzpatrick and Clapham 1999: 174). Fitzpatrick and Clapham used this approach to explain the housing situations of young people in Glasgow. The approach is a dynamic one that looks back to housing histories, but also takes into account the future direction of a house-

hold. The approach is sensitive to life-course events and recognizes that some trajectories may be downward, but others upward.

The Plymouth and Torbay research indicated that both outcome states and antecedent conditions were so heterogeneous that in the first case, the “homeless” population – however one defined it – could not be clearly isolated from a more general population and, in the second case, the pathways into the diverse range of housing situations that were characterized as homelessness were heterogeneous. One could sum up the situation by saying that outcome A (say, living in a hostel) may be arrived at by pathways 1, 2, 3, . . . n . Conversely, none of these pathways are deterministic in terms of outcomes. Thus pathway 1 could give rise to outcomes A, B, C, . . . Z. For example, some homeless young people come from situations of family breakdown but not all do, and many youngsters who leave home in such circumstances avoid homelessness altogether until later in life (Williams and Cheal 2001: 250). Does this make family breakdown a causal factor for such people? Just how far back can antecedent conditions be claimed as causal factors? Alternatively, it could be said that the younger a homeless person is, the more likely they will move in and out of homeless states. But this statement will change if the definition of homelessness is broadened. If, for example, research categorized all HMO dwellers as “homeless,” then the opposite would be true. Younger people stay homeless for longer and do not move in and out of such states!

Homelessness is not a thing but a process of different kinds of severe housing need resulting from a wide range of individual circumstances. Although in the studies reported here, the intention was to measure and describe homelessness, the conclusion must be that what was measured and described was the manifestation of a complex process. Homelessness cannot be defined successfully, though housing *pathways* can be described and possibly taxonomized as processes, which intersect with other pathways such as employment, interpersonal relationships, offending behavior, and so forth.

Housing need research

The previous “leaky boat” analogy applies to all forms of quantitative homelessness research, even that using capture-recapture. However one defines the term “homelessness,” there will be an ideological or methodological cut-off that will exclude many housing states. This would be less problematic if the housing states were the key characteristics that defined individuals; however, for most individuals housing states are outcomes or even symptoms. Research methods need to capture the heterogeneity of housing pathways, but also need to intersect with the measurement and description of other kinds of pathways or processes. Thus, ideally, housing need research needs to exist within a matrix of other research and to have both breadth and depth.

This section concludes with some brief methodological proposals:

- *Multiple captures.* The Plymouth–Torbay research described above used a two-capture longitudinal design to measure the number of “homeless” people within defined local authority areas. This method has potential for extension in a number of directions:

- Geographical extension simply extends the geographical boundaries to include other defined areas (e.g., local authority areas such as counties, departments, districts, etc.) thus better capturing geographical mobility. This is particularly important in large urban centers, and the inability to capture over larger geographies may well methodologically compromise the method.
- Longitudinal extension. By extending the number of captures over time, a better picture of process, through housing pathways, may be discovered. In practice this is somewhat easier than geographical extension. Once recording procedures are established and agencies committed to recording, enumerations could take place on a regular basis over a much longer period. This would allow researchers to estimate periods spent in different housing states and estimate the type and level of risk of a deterioration in housing conditions for individuals.
- *Intersecting captures.* In the research described above, the screening definition was “homelessness,” but capture-recapture has been used to enumerate other rare and elusive populations (Frischer et al. 1991; Shaw et al. 1996). Such populations often overlap with those in severe housing need. Thus an enumeration of (say) intravenous drug users would include many people in severe housing need and, conversely, those in severe housing need are more likely to be intravenous drug users than members of the general population. Simultaneous triangulated captures of both populations (or, in principle, three or more populations) can demonstrate the extent of the intersection of these populations. Subsequent analyses using, for example, path analysis or multilevel models (Snijders and Bosker 1999) can do much to describe the extent and nature of the complex social processes that underlie manifestations such as housing need or drug use in rare and elusive populations.
- *Linking enumerations.* Housing need goes beyond the rare and elusive populations variously described as homeless. Capture-recapture, as shown, is used to count those that do not appear on lists such as those for voter registration, local taxation, and so on. However this nonappearance neither indicates the limit of severe housing need, nor does it apply continually or consistently to individuals. In other words, it should be possible to join enumerations using capture-recapture with those gleaned from other lists. A local authority could simultaneously conduct an enumeration of the kind described previously alongside a housing need study in the general population. The latter have been commonplace for some time in the United Kingdom (van Zijl 1993) and mostly use lists of addresses as a sampling frame. The subsequent survey can describe the nature of the housing need in the “settled” population, estimate its size, and quantify risk factors of severe housing need in that population.
- *Case-based research.* Fitzpatrick and Clapham’s housing pathways research illustrated the potential for housing history research with individuals. Their work was qualitative, but data from a qualitative case approach can be used to produce taxonomic models of housing histories. This method has not yet been applied in homelessness research, but has met with some success, using

cluster analysis techniques, on individual offending histories (Williams and Dyer 2004). This approach matches characteristics on a likeness basis and allows the researcher to model which antecedents are likely to produce which outcomes.

Conclusion

It is unlikely that the term “homelessness” will fall out of use in either political or academic circles in the near future. However, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that it is an ideologically and methodologically problematic concept. It is heterogeneous, but more than that, it is a continuum of housing need outcomes that may have little relationship to each other, either in their manifestation or their antecedents. This presents a range of definitional and methodological problems. The homeless can be enumerated with varying degrees of success, depending on the method used, but, as suggested in the final section of the chapter, more sophisticated methods are perhaps needed to measure *housing need*, from its manifestation in the settled community across to those who are roofless.

Homelessness intersects with many other social issues and problems, and the methodological issues pertinent to it are important to the investigation of other social problems for two reasons. First, there are methodological similarities, such as rareness or elusiveness, in many deprived or oppressed groups. A methodological problem experienced or solution found researching one group will likely have lessons for those researching other groups. Second, such groups do not exist in isolation and, as implied previously, to research one issue (such as homelessness) is inevitably to produce data about other intersecting issues. The methodological approach to the research of any particular social problem needs to be located in a matrix of research so that the sum of research on social problems might accumulate.

Notes

- 1 The definition of homelessness adopted in the Plymouth and Torbay studies required that a person be:
 - staying in a hostel;
 - staying in bed and breakfast;
 - sleeping rough;
 - staying in a squat;
 - staying temporarily with friends;
 - staying in nonresidential institutions (such as hospitals) where no other accommodation was available;
 - staying in residential institutions catering for those excluded from, or unable to secure, other accommodation (e.g., homes for young offenders, women’s refuges etc.)
- 2 This includes foster homes (21 percent).

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Part III

Family, Community, and Education

Chapter 10

Children and Inequality

JULIA WRIGLEY AND JOANNA DREBY

Inequalities exist among children and also between children and the adults who shape (or try to shape) their worlds. The inequalities between children broadly reflect the basic class, race, and gender divisions within their societies, although in some countries those inequalities are mitigated when it comes to children, and in others they are intensified. These inequalities have most often been studied as aspects of the political economies of different countries, with researchers focusing on such issues as employment levels, government tax and transfer policies, and patterns of race and gender segregation in housing, schools, and communities. Research institutes – such as the National Institute for Children and Poverty and the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse & Neglect – calculate and compare child poverty rates, trends in child abuse and neglect, and various other health indicators among children.

The collective inequalities between children and adults have been approached differently. In an emerging “new” sociology of children, ethnographers have analyzed interactions between children and adults and explored children’s efforts to create their own social worlds (Thorne 1993; James et al. 1998; Corsaro 2003). These researchers emphasize children’s relative autonomy and ability to structure their lives and carve out spaces for themselves. In this perspective, children are not adults-in-waiting, but people with their own goals and strategies for reaching them, whose own culture and modes of interaction deserve examination on their own terms (Barker and Weller 2003). As researchers have begun reconsidering the adult lenses through which they have traditionally viewed children, this has opened their eyes to the variety and distinctiveness of children’s worlds and cultures as partially created and understood by children themselves.

Studies of children in poverty once greatly outstripped those of children as social actors struggling for autonomy vis-à-vis adults. As late as 1974, there was not a single ethnography of young children in English (Corsaro 2003: 220). This changed over the next few decades, as children joined other subordinated groups who had once been voiceless but whose role in making their own history and culture had

been “discovered.” In this newly revitalized research tradition, children are viewed as cognizant, determined, and resourceful decision makers who operate in settings where their power may be limited, but who strive to make the most of what they have in gaining some measure of control over where they go, how they spend time, and how they gain access to resources within families.

By the turn of the twenty-first century, the “agency approach” had gained so much ground that one commentator worried that the structural approach would be nearly driven from the field. Urging ethnographers not to underestimate the profound impact structural conditions of poverty have on children’s lives, he called for a dialogue between the approaches (Qvortrup 1999). That dialogue has not happened to any significant degree. Some scholars have striven to connect family childrearing strategies or educational environments to systems of social class reproduction (Lareau 2003; Lewis 2003), but researchers have rarely tied analyses of children’s own independent actions to larger systems of structural inequalities. These two traditions each have considerable vitality, illuminating important aspects of the social world, but they are rarely brought into relation with each other (Qvortrup 1999). To date, the structural analysis of children’s place in the political economy of societies, and the microanalysis of children’s autonomous lives, address different issues with different methodological approaches.

In this chapter, we will review the contributions of each approach in illuminating patterns of inequalities and will suggest ways they could be fruitfully integrated. We will turn first to analyses of economic inequality as it affects children (and creates inequality among them) and will consider the extent to which children’s political powerlessness is consequential in affecting their share of economic resources. We will then discuss the implications of economic inequalities between children for access to institutional resources in the USA, including quality schooling and health care, highlighting how these inequalities potentially shape the vastly different worlds in which children operate. Finally, we address the “new” sociology of children’s concern with children’s power vis-à-vis adults. By evaluating the extent to which children of different backgrounds gain access to resources within families and maintain control over consumption, we bring lessons learned from political-economic research’s agenda of inequalities between children to bear on how we understand children’s daily lived experiences. We bring a similar analysis to bear on children’s freedom to navigate space and to shape their own cultural worlds of peer relations.

Poverty and Children’s Political Vulnerability

Historically, children have been highly vulnerable in conditions of poverty and war. When food was short, infants and young children were most likely to die, yielding missing generations in nations that suffered famines. When armies needed to be mustered for war, young males just past childhood were sent to battle, or even children themselves, as in the child armies of some contemporary war-torn countries. When families suffered from severe poverty, adults experienced lives of deprivation, but infants’ very survival could be threatened. Whatever the level of distress and difficulty caused by poverty and powerlessness among adults, the risks were even greater for the still more powerless generation below them.

In the United States of the twenty-first century, children are buffered from some effects of inequality, but suffer disproportionately from others. Children have some legal, social, and economic protections: It is a crime to abuse or neglect them, beyond a certain rather ambiguous point, and they also must be supplied with basic medical care (Waldfoegel 2001). The United States does not send children to war, although it does send those just past childhood; it does not sell them into slavery or allow them to die from starvation. It does not deprive them of schooling, although the quality of schooling for the children of the poor may be far below that of schooling for the children of the rich (Anyon 1997). There are laws against child labor, and even when children do work, they very rarely do so as replacements for adults who are not working. They may work alongside adults in family enterprises or, as teenagers, to earn for their own spending or, sometimes, to contribute to family resources. In these respects, children can be understood as having gained a gradual extension of citizenship rights, as they have acquired a legal personhood that guarantees them certain state-enforced rights that cannot be abrogated even by their own parents. In a developed society, they have a right to schooling, to freedom from forms of abuse or neglect that go beyond certain state-determined limits, and the right to basic medical care.

There are other respects, however, where US children suffer from greater extremes of inequality than do their parents and other adult members of society. Children in the USA experience more concentrated poverty than do members of other age groups. They face higher levels of racial segregation in the institutions in which they spend most their time – the schools – than adults do where they spend most of their time, the workplace. While children are generally supplied with basic health care, inequalities in the provision of medical services, and in the conditions for healthy living, take their greatest toll on the young, with infant mortality rates in the USA for African Americans roughly twice those for Whites. The young also face extremes of inequality in the circumstances in which they launch into adulthood. The children of the middle and upper-middle class enjoy sheltered years on attractive college campuses with their age mates. Yet, the teenage children of the poor must try to find scarce jobs for the unskilled that usually offer low wages, little job security, and no health insurance or pension plan (Burtless and Jencks 2003). Even more basically, children's citizenship rights do not benefit them, as do those of adults. Children cannot vote, form alliances, or, for the most part, effectively lobby for their own interests in the larger political arena. They are dependent on adults to protect their political interests in both the long and the short term.

A glance at the social systems of the Western industrialized states shows that governments have protected children's interests to varying degrees and that children's long-term interests, in particular, are vulnerable to being undermined in favor of the needs and interests of the politically mobilized. Even among countries with similar gross domestic products, there is wide variation in how children fare economically. Compared to 14 Western European countries, the United States stands out for its extremely high rate of children's poverty and also for the depth of that poverty (Rainwater and Smeeding 2003). Children fare better in Western European countries largely because of transfer payments, making them less reliant on the economic success of their parents than is the case in the USA, where such reliance is near-total. The state does little to redress household inequalities in the USA, while this is a major part of its role in most Western European countries.

Poor children in the USA – the politically excluded

Children in the United States suffer disproportionately from poverty. In 1994, they accounted for only a little over one-quarter of the total US population, but comprised 40 percent of those below the poverty line (Lichter 1997: 123). This is a much higher rate of child poverty than in most developed countries. It compares, for example, to poverty rates of less than 5 percent in Germany and Sweden (Rainwater 1995). Children of single mothers fare particularly poorly in the United States compared to other developed countries (Lichter 1997). Researchers have relied on data compiled by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to evaluate children's overall economic well-being, compared to that of other groups in the populations of different countries. The LIS has compiled data on many facets of income, expenditure, and adult labor market experiences for developed countries for the years from 1967 to 1999. Using this dataset for 13 countries, Smeeding (2002) calculated the distribution of incomes among households with children compared to those without. He found that, generally speaking, in rich countries households with children had lower incomes than those without them. This varied by country, however, and in the Scandinavian countries and Denmark households with children did better, while in the United Kingdom and the United States, they did worse (2002: 11).

More importantly, the United States has by far the largest gap between its poor children and its average or median child. In the United States, poor children (those below the 10th percentile) have only 35 percent of the income of the median child, while the average across 13 rich countries is 55 percent (Smeeding 2002: 11–12). Despite the USA having high levels of absolute wealth, its poorest children fare badly even when absolute incomes are considered. Only in the United Kingdom are poor children worse off in terms of real income (p. 17). Further, the gap between rich and poor children in the United States is very large. When the real income of children below the 10th percentile is compared to that of children in the 90th percentile, there is a gap of \$40,327 per child, by far the largest gap in any of the countries studied. The real income gap of \$40,327 in the United States means that low-income families have resources of about \$9,800 per child, assuming all resources are evenly split among household members. In contrast, high-income families have over \$50,100 to spend on each child (Smeeding 2002: 14).

Differences of this magnitude in dollars available per child can greatly affect children's well-being. They can make available a higher quality of schooling, a safer, more attractive neighborhood, and can help pay for the plethora of activities that fill the schedules of affluent children (Lareau 2003). Given overall US wealth, combined with great inequality in the distribution of income, Smeeding concludes that, "The United States is likely the best place to be born a rich child" (2002: 17). The absolute level of resources available to such a child surpasses that available in any of the other 13 highly developed nations. The relative and absolute advantages of such a child are increased by the likelihood of being born into a small family and of having two parents with high levels of education and earning power due to assortative mating. High-earning men tend to have high-earning wives. The proportion of the top 20 percent of male earners with working wives increased by one quarter between 1979 and 1996; those wives doubled their earnings over the period (Burtless and Jencks 2003: 13). With high levels of resources, affluent families often

choose private over public services, increasing their opposition to public spending. Further, increased income inequality between families appears to affect the broader political climate, leading to increased economic segregation and state increases in college tuition costs (2003: 34).

In the United States, high levels of poverty and inequality arise from several sources. First, the United States has many low-wage jobs, so that even those in the labor force may not earn enough to avoid poverty (Jantti and Danziger 1994). Second, the government does not provide sufficient benefits to lift low-wage earners out of poverty, unlike the situation in some Scandinavian countries. Many of the working poor in the United States receive virtually no transfer payments. Even during the economic boom of the 1990s, the United States had a larger pool of low-wage workers than most other developed countries (Smeeding et al. 2000: 19). The subsequent recession has increased the size of this pool. The wages of the working poor are particularly important in determining levels of child poverty because working-age adults are likely to have children at home.

Children and the elderly: A difference in political clout

Of the different facets of economic inequality, one that is most subject to political intervention concerns the balance between poverty among children or the elderly within countries. This varies between countries but, overall, the elderly have the lowest poverty rate among all age groups in the world's 19 richest countries (Smeeding et al. 2000). Among these 19 countries, only the United States had high rates of poverty among both children and the aged. The poverty rate among the elderly would have been significantly higher if it had not been for government transfer payments, which are more generous for the aged than for children. Mirowsky and Ross summarize the situation, reporting that, "Despite low income and high medical needs, America's elderly enjoy lower levels of economic hardship than any other adult age group" (1999: 567). They suggest that this could be largely due to the elderly having universal benefit coverage while young parents have means-tested benefits.

The elderly experienced high levels of poverty until the development of social insurance schemes in developed countries. These did not create wealth, but they enabled most of the elderly to live above the poverty line. They also created a powerful political constituency for the maintenance of such programs, while the political voice for children has been weak. In a provocative analysis, Thomson (1996) argues that youth lacks a stable political constituency. As the birth rate has fallen, many households have no children, while those who do are often scrambling to earn a living and get themselves established while also looking after their children, which tends to reduce their interest in political activity. The result, he suggests, is that "the older half of the electorate has time for political activity, and a simpler and more unified view of what is in its own interests than is ever possible for the young" (1996: 206). In almost all the Western countries, the Depression and World War II spurred broader, more inclusive forms of politics and benefit plans, which benefited children. As the impact of the crises of the 1930s and 1940s faded, the natural political advantage of the aged has since reasserted itself, with the result that in developed countries of all political descriptions and histories there has been a pulling back from "the many benefits of the voiceless young" (1996: 207).

In an analysis of American inequality, Burtless and Jencks (2003) emphasize that developed countries are similar in many ways but differ in the extent of economic inequality they exhibit. They conclude that these differences stem from political causes. In some countries, economic inequalities are reduced through government action, and in other countries, this happens much less, or barely at all. Burtless and Jencks also sound an alarm: Once inequality becomes extreme, as it has in the United States, it could reach a point where it becomes “irreversible” (p. 45). In an age of television advertising and direct mailing, money has led to the professionalization of politics. The rich acquire crucial leverage as candidates troll for cash. Candidates beholden to them may, in turn, authorize changes in tax and benefit programs that further advantage the rich who helped elect them. The United States already has the largest income gap between rich and poor children among the developed countries, but if Burtless and Jencks’s concerns are borne out the gap could grow as part of a general extension of inequality.

The balance has been shifting against children, not so much through concerted political action as through the elderly having the vote and being mobilized, while children have no direct voice; their parents have the vote, but often do not exercise it and have little political unity when it comes to protecting the interests of children as a political constituency. Ironically, it is the new sociology’s concern with children’s agency, or lack thereof, that best explains how it is that the economic inequalities among children grow unchecked in the United States. While children may have the power to shape certain aspects of their daily-lived experiences, their voice has been virtually nonexistent in political organization.

The Costs of Inequality

Some researchers have argued that money is not particularly important in determining children’s life chances (Mayer 1997). This may be true of relatively small differences in family incomes, but the profound income inequalities among children in America can be consequential in many ways (Lichter 1997). These can include reduced physical health, less chance to develop academic skills, and increased depression, stress, and vulnerability to abuse in families struggling to cope with making ends meet. Lichter (1997: 122) points out that the problems caused by poverty tend to be long-term, with their full effects lasting over the child’s lifetime and sometimes extending even into the next generation. Here we will look at three aspects of inequality that have a long-run bearing on children’s lives, those occurring in neighborhoods, in education, and in health.

Family income affects the quality of neighborhoods families can afford to live in, which in turn can affect many aspects of family functioning. Roughly half of poor families live in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty (Wood 2003). The number of children living in the most severely distressed neighborhoods in the USA increased from 4.7 million in 1990 to 5.6 million in 2000 (O’Hare and Mather 2003). The most severely distressed neighborhoods were defined as those with high percentages of poverty, female-headed households, high school dropouts, and working-age males not in the labor force. Of the children living in these poorest of all neighborhoods, 55 percent are Black and 29 percent are Hispanic.

Social scientists continue to argue about the extent to which neighborhoods affect children's well-being (Small and Newman 2001), but some consensus has emerged on mechanisms by which neighborhood effects operate. Neighborhoods with high crime levels lead parents to be highly restrictive toward their children and, especially, their daughters (Furstenberg et al. 1999; Lopez 2002), which can lead to confinement in the home, loneliness, and the burden of household chores and sibling care (tasks more often escaped by brothers). This restricted life may spur girls to do more schoolwork than boys, but it can also impose costs in terms of personal autonomy and ability to engage in activities (Wood 2003). Researchers have found that teenage boys are more influenced by neighborhood circumstances than girls are and that high-SES (socioeconomic status) neighborhoods more effectively deter children from entering into delinquent behavior (Levanthal and Brooks-Gunn 2000).

Middle-class African Americans often share neighborhoods with much poorer residents, mainly because of racial segregation in housing. In such situations, they worry about the effects of crime on their children; they worry not only that their children may become victims of crime, but also that they may be drawn to the consumer goods offered by those operating in the illegal economy (Pattillo-McCoy 1999). Neighborhoods that are seen as dangerous or undesirable impose several additional costs. They can greatly limit increases in home equity, which have allowed residents of more affluent neighborhoods to build up substantial household wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Conley 1999). This in turn can be highly consequential for children's ability to obtain resources from parents for college or, ultimately, for setting up households of their own. Undesirable neighborhoods also can impose costs in that employers may be wary of young people coming from neighborhoods known as high crime areas; merely putting such addresses down on applications may doom applicants from the outset (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000).

Unequal access to education

Neighborhoods can also affect children's access to good schools. Social class differences in schooling are large, affecting test scores, dropout rates, and college attendance (Alexander and Gosa 2003). They are sustained in part by neighborhood differences. While many magnet and special admission schools have sprung up in big cities, it often takes bureaucratic skills and connections to access them. Those who fail to do so may enter their neighborhood schools as default institutions; the most skilled and motivated students may have departed to more valued schools, leaving demoralized former classmates and teachers behind (Devine 1996). Further, elementary schools continue to be largely organized by neighborhood attendance zones, making neighborhood crucial in the early years of schooling when reading and math skills are first being established (or not). The importance of neighborhoods in affecting access to good schools can be seen by the premium houses in "good" school districts command compared to those in districts viewed as bad. Parents pay to obtain good schools for their children, even in an officially free system. In practice, quality schools tend to be rationed by price, not of tuition but of housing.

Social class inequalities can also affect parents' ability to advocate for their children in the schools (Lareau 2000). Teachers may not respond well to parents they

see as lacking the proper deportment or knowledge; working-class parents are also likely to work long hours at inflexible jobs, making it impossible for them to visit schools when trouble strikes or to get to know teachers (Bracey 2001). When parents cannot easily be advocates, children's troubles or minor transgressions may become way stations out the door, as institutions are freer to push them out than they are with better-defended children.

For racial minorities in the USA, class inequalities merge with racial segregation to create schools of concentrated disadvantage (Wrigley 2003). The public schools of the big cities of the North and West never desegregated. Organized White communities fiercely resisted efforts to create truly integrated schools (Wrigley 1998). High levels of White flight have now made the issue moot in most cities. In the South, the civil rights movement won striking desegregation victories. By the 1970s, the public schools of the South were more desegregated than those of any other region (Yun and Reardon 2002). With more equal access to schools, Black students began to close the racial gap in schooling, making "tremendous progress in educational achievement and attainment" (Alexander and Gosa 2003: 4). This progress has stalled, however, and sizable Black/White gaps in schooling still remain. This may be due in part to resegregation of the schools in the South. The process of resegregation is continuing, even though many districts had already become highly resegregated by the late 1980s (Yun and Reardon 2002). Alexander and Gosa note that:

It took forty years of hard work and much suffering in the wake of *Brown v. Board of Education* for the country to make modest headway in the struggle to achieve meaningful desegregation in the nation's public schools; it appears it will take far less time for those hard-won victories to slip away. Recent studies find black students more segregated from white than they were in 1968. (2003: 17)

In the United States of the twenty-first century, college degrees have become ever more important in securing access to jobs with benefits and living wages. Outsourcing jobs and changes in technology have raised the risk that jobs could disappear in large numbers (Wessel 2004). College degrees are no guarantee of safety in a world where a good job is always vulnerable, but offer the best prospects for escaping the huge low-wage labor pool. College attendance, though, is highly class-based. Family income significantly affects poor children's chances of going to college (Burtless and Jencks 2003). Even though the value of a college degree has been rising (with those with BA degrees earning more than twice as much as those with only high school diplomas [Russell 1991]), young people from poor families have not responded by increased attendance. Instead, they seem deterred by the rising costs of tuition at state colleges. Mayer (2001) found that in the states where income inequality grew the most, college tuition costs also rose the fastest. Burtless and Jencks (2003) suggest that this could be due to a general political effect of growing inequality that transcends the costs of poverty to individual families.

Disparities in health

Children face another cost of inequality in differential access to health care and to safe environments. African American women are twice as likely to have low birth-

weight babies as White women and infant mortality rates for Blacks are almost twice those for Whites, 14.3 compared to 7.2 per 1,000 live births (Freedman et al. 2000). There is a strong social class effect on birth weight; White women who are poor have an 80 percent greater chance of having a low birth-weight baby as White women who are not poor (Wood 2003). Poor children's risks continue after the neonatal period, with higher rates of deaths from accidents, higher rates of hospital admissions, more days of disability, and lower parental ratings of their children's health status (Wood 2003). Deaths from accidents are particularly linked to low socioeconomic status. Injuries account for more than 40 percent of deaths to people under age 25 in the United States; in families where the household head did not finish high school, there is a 65 percent greater risk of injury mortality than in families where the head got a diploma (Hussey 1997).

Even in countries with universal health care, such as New Zealand, children born into poverty have worse health into adulthood than their more fortunate peers; this relationship holds even when the once-poor children have improved their socioeconomic status in adulthood (Poulton et al. 2002). In the United States, the lasting health effects of poverty are likely to be greater due to limited access to health care. Class, race, and ethnicity mediate children's access to health insurance and, thus, preventative health care. Twenty-three percent of native-born Whites do not have health insurance compared to 56 percent of native-born Black or Hispanic children (Jensen 2001). Rates of health care coverage among immigrant groups make class and racial disparities clear. More than 60 percent of child immigrants from Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Laos, and Cambodia lack health insurance. The children of more prosperous immigrant groups fare somewhat better, with 18 percent of children from the Philippines and 23 percent of children of Indian immigrants lacking health insurance (Jensen 2001: 52–3).

Poor children also have higher rates of obesity than middle-class children – due both to poorer nutrition, including heavy reliance on fast food, and to more hours spent watching television (Dietz and Gortmaker 1985). This in turn predisposes children to chronic health conditions, such as Type II diabetes, once seen mainly among adults. Poverty often entails a degradation of the body, with adults aging faster and becoming more careworn than their more affluent counterparts. Children can display their poverty in bad teeth and untreated illnesses, the “not so ‘hidden injuries of class’” (Adair 2002).

The effects of poverty, in short, are cumulative and go to the heart of what it takes to function in a modern society: the ability to draw upon neighborhood resources or at least not be exposed to daily risks; the ability to get a good education; and the ability to maintain health. Poor health can be worsened by unsafe neighborhoods, where children stay indoors for safety and suffer from lack of activity. Poor-quality schools often offer minimal extracurricular activities for students, especially when contrasted with the many and rich offerings of private schools or those in affluent suburban communities, where students may be encouraged to write and produce plays, to learn musical skills, or to write for school publications. The paucity of activities reduces students' chances to bond with teachers or to develop an attachment to the school. Poor and working-class students are often painfully aware that they occupy a low position in the status hierarchies of their schools and they know that their parents can do little to help them (Eckert 1989; Brantlinger

1993). Finally, when it comes time to apply to college, they are often on their own, with minimal help from counselors compared to the resources that are poured into helping middle-class students to negotiate the application process. They have less money to pay for college and often must contemplate attending while also working full-time. These daunting obstacles lead many to not attend at all and even larger numbers to attend briefly and then leave without degrees (Burtless and Jencks 2003). This in turn takes a major toll on their economic prospects. Without degrees, they are likely to enter the large low-wage labor pool of unskilled workers, with wages so low that they cannot earn enough to support a family (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). The unionized jobs of the post-Second World War decades that allowed many blue-collar workers to have stable work lives and to earn enough to support their families are now mainly dim memories. The workplace reality for most without degrees, including especially minority and immigrant workers, is one of few or no private benefits from employers, limited or no government transfer benefits, and few ways to get ahead as more and more jobs are casualized and made insecure (Milkman and Dwyer 2002).

These vast disparities in outcomes mean that children of diverse racial, ethnic, and class backgrounds operate within vastly different social worlds from each other, making the political organization of children as a distinct constituency difficult to obtain. It also means that conceptual projects to give “voice” to children’s lived experiences – like predecessors in the women’s movement – must constantly be cognizant of whose voice, whose daily experiences, and ultimately whose social milieu they are describing.

Children and Power within Families and Institutions

The literature on children’s poverty emphasizes the structure of society and how it creates inequalities across class and racial groups. This literature, as Qvortrup (1999) noted, has been separated from a burgeoning set of studies on children’s daily lives and how they create their own systems of meaning. Sociologists that study children, as well as anthropologists and others that study children’s lived culture, have become increasingly aware of the need to understand how children comprehend, navigate, and change their worlds. They have called for new ways of seeing children, not just as objects of socialization, but also as agents in creating their own worlds and meanings. This change has been particularly striking as applied to young children, who were rarely studied ethnographically until recently; this has contrasted with the vast literature on adolescent peer culture, a literature driven by various alarms over teenage values and behavior (Coleman 1961). Researchers in the tradition of the “new” sociology of childhood have begun considering the distinctiveness of children’s worlds and cultures as partially created and understood by children themselves. This is a step in the long process of social scientists coming to understand that those whose worlds and experiences they study, whether racial minorities, women, or some other once-silenced group, are comprised of autonomous actors with their own ideas, sense of agency, and systems of meaning-making.

Analyzing children’s culture calls for more sensitive techniques than those available for the macroanalysis of society and, even more importantly, a shift in world-

view such that children are not viewed as “incomplete” adults (Corsaro 2003: 23). These researchers face the challenge of entering children’s worlds that, under the very terms of analysis, are at least partially separated from those of adults and partially autonomous. They must bring back reports from this semi-hidden territory. Watching children and talking with them, researchers have tried (with varying degrees of success) not to view them entirely through their own adult world-view. It is a difficult matter; all adults were children once, but it is hard to recapture a children’s-eye view of society and not to impose adult preoccupations upon it, especially an adult view of the future and what it might hold for them. Some ethnographers focus on observing children in a variety of settings without trying to integrate themselves into the children’s activities (Lareau 2003); this is especially true of those observing children in families, where even quasi-amalgamation with the children might be objectionable to the parents who are also being observed. Others strive to win at least marginal acceptance in children’s social circles; they usually follow a strategy of minimizing presentation of themselves as bearing adult authority and interact with children in settings outside the family (such as schools) (Thorne 1993; Corsaro 2003).

A premise in this new research focus on the agency of children is that inequalities are not only apparent between groups of children; children experience inequality vis-à-vis adults. Generally, from this perspective, childhood is considered to be a socially constructed category and children are described as a minority group, for childhood is symbolically situated in a dependent relationship to adulthood (Qvortrup 1990). Key here is children’s power, or lack thereof, in relationship to the adult world. While children can only exercise agency within the structural constraints described above, research indicates that children are in no way passive recipients of what life deals them. Rather, they strategically exert themselves in the social settings they do have access to, namely in families, peer groups, and larger social institutions like schools.

However, it is clear that at the micro level of family interaction, children of poor families have different experiences in accessing resources than their counterparts in the middle and upper classes. Additionally, boys and girls may have different experiences in negotiating access to family resources at all levels. This intersection of race, class, and gender shapes children’s agency within families as well as their ability to mobilize resources within institutions, whether informal peer-group cultures or formal institutions such as schools.

Access to resources: Children in family economies

Within families, children exhibit agency in their consumption habits, their ability to claim their parents’ time, and in their access to and control over space. A hundred years ago, children in the United States contributed significant amounts of income to their families; few families today depend on the labor of their children. The exceptions mainly occur in immigrant families, where children may work alongside parents in the fields, in small businesses, or in household labor; some older children also help teachers in overcrowded schools (Song 1999; Orellana 2001). These children still operate within the framework of a family economy, but many children in the United States make consumption claims on the household purse and also expect that they will retain control of the greater part of their own earnings.

Research on children's buying power shows how important children have become as consumers. One researcher writes, "There may be only two kinds of consumers in the world: those who have children and those who don't" (Russell 1991: 24). Companies selling video games, toys, and fast food have learned to market directly to children, spending more than \$2 billion a year to do so (Reese 1998). They advertise products on children's TV shows, some of which have become indistinguishable from advertisements. Popular fantasy characters are used to sell everything, such as movies, books, games, action figures, etc. (Wasko 2001).

The first estimate of children's buying power was not made until 1968, but marketers now recognize the size of the children's market and also consider children as independent consumers (McNeal 1990). They are crucial in the markets for clothes, candy, snack foods, soft drinks, toys, spectator sports, music, and some forms of electronic equipment. Many children go to stores by themselves before they enter elementary school. As they get older, some take on shopping for parents who are too busy or tired to do it themselves (Doss et al. 1995). Some analysts believe that changes in family structure, with more single-parent families and dual-career families, have led to children having more money-handling responsibilities than in the past, when mothers were more likely to keep a tight control of the family purse. Children have also developed more influence over family purchasing decisions. A marketing expert estimates "that kids influence between 25 percent and 40 percent of all household purchases. That means deciding not only what kind of cereal lands on the breakfast table, but also . . . what kind of computer glows in the den and what model car is parked in the driveway" (Reese 1998: 38). With even young children spending more time away from home than in the past – in child-care centers, preschools, or camps – their tastes are formed by their peers and they develop pronounced consumer preferences.

Under these circumstances, children can become consumption decision makers; but some are constrained in this role by the limited resources of their families. At one extreme, the children of the poorest families have virtually no access to resources through their families. They are often acutely aware of the costs involved in their maintenance and can be conscientious about not over-expending family resources. For example, Chin (2001) describes taking poor African American 10-year-old boys and girls in New Haven on shopping trips to the mall, supplying each kid with \$20 to spend as he or she chose. All of the children spent over half of their money on a practical item, like clothes or shoes. In addition, most of the girls used their money to purchase gifts for female family members, spending very little on themselves.

Not all children in poor families are prudent about consumption. As they get older, some strive for status in peer groups by buying prestigious items. These youngsters use "their own bodies and the accessories that adorn them as status markers and symbols of identity" (Pattillo-McCoy 1999: 146). Interviews with poor mothers, both working and welfare-reliant, indicate a great deal of anxiety at being able to provide for the fashion needs of their teens (Edin and Lein 1997). The threat of delinquency, especially in neighborhoods with booming underground economies in drug trafficking or other gang activities, enables youth to garner a greater percent of family resources than might otherwise be acceptable. Middle-class youth also derives prestige from consumer goods. From Pattillo-McCoy's "Groveland" (1999), where the young men sport Nike Jordans and the women gold earrings, to upper-

middle-class suburbs where young girls mark popularity by the brand-name clothing they wear (Adler and Adler 1998), as children become teens consumption can become the key to status.

Negotiating time and space

While older youth may exert power in controlling consumption even in poor families, younger children may focus their efforts on controlling their parents' time, rather than family spending. Lareau (2003) found that children in privileged families often dominated the family schedule with their extracurricular activities. In one extreme case, a fourth-grade boy had extracurricular activities from five to seven days a week. His parents spent weekends driving to and attending his soccer games, at times planning overnight trips to accompany him to out-of-state tournaments. Some children of career-minded parents must compete with their parents' jobs for time, especially in dual-wage-earner families when both parents find fulfillment at work (Hochschild 1997). While many parents may compensate for their absence by buying services and activities, parents in professional jobs often have greater ability to manage and control time than their counterparts in poorer families, who may work long hours at inflexible jobs. Children in working-class families may not have any ability to control their parents' schedules, especially when parents work night shifts and or piece together two low-wage jobs to cover expenses. As a result, working- and lower-class parents may not feel a particular need to entertain their children, in contrast to middle- and upper-class parents who verbally and physically engage kids in a variety of activities, either investing their own time or paying for that of others.

While social class mediates children's access to parents' time, and age and gender can shape children's attitudes regarding consumption, race and ethnicity can influence children's control over social spaces. Minority parents – particularly in low-income families – may have had negative experiences in interacting with the public institutions their children encounter on a daily basis. When parents are hesitant to deal with unfamiliar bureaucracies, children often take over. The most poignant example is found in research on immigrant children, who, due to their greater proficiency in English than their parents, are often called on to interpret at schools, doctors' appointments, and other social spaces. This shift in the balance of power from parents to children often becomes a source of conflict in immigrant families. Parents may become embarrassed when their children serve as interpreters and learn about matters considered to be personal – such as medical problems. In addition, immigrant children may use parents' reliance on them to their own ends. In one case, Menjivar (2000) describes a parent's dismay at learning that her daughter had dropped out of school three weeks after the fact: the teen used her privileged position as family-school ambassador to keep her mother from intervening. Immigrant children may be in a unique position to take advantage of their parents' subordinate position in the greater social hierarchy, but they certainly are not the only ones to do so. When minority or lower-class children have greater access to schools, welfare agencies, and other social institutions than their parents, they are likely to be able to use these institutional resources to enhance their power within the home.

An area where children may, in a literal sense, push the boundaries of what their parents want for them concerns their spatial freedom. The ability to control space is, in part, gendered, with boys typically controlling far more playground space than girls (Thorne 1993). Overall, there appears to have been a long-term trend away from adults allowing children to be in unsupervised spaces. While children in urban areas used to spend much time on the streets, they now are more likely to be in specialized spaces designed for them, such as parks, video parlors, or movie theaters. The growth in structured activities has also meant that children spend more time in adult-dominated and -supervised venues (Lareau 2003). The "stranger danger" discourse may have contributed to this trend, with children widely viewed as vulnerable and at risk of harm when on their own. A researcher who interviewed children about their spatial ranges found that they often disagreed with their parents about how far they could go (Valentine 1997).

Children, in short, have a variety of ways they can influence their own lives in their families, whether through seeking control over resources, affecting parental interactions with institutions such as schools, or striving to set their own spatial boundaries. They operate in family environments, however, which are becoming increasingly complex as divorce rates rise, stepfamilies become common, and increasing numbers of parents have children outside of marriage. Almost a third of children are born to unmarried parents (McLanahan et al. 2003) and more than half of children can now expect to spend part of their childhood with a single parent (Lerman 2002). In the United States, in particular, single-parenthood has resource implications, as meager government transfer payments do not lift lone parents from poverty. In 2000, 40 percent of children in single-parent families were poor compared to 8 percent in two-parent families. Some commentators suggest that children's circumstances would improve if parents were more or less forced into marriage, while others point out that single parenthood in other countries does not carry the same financial penalties that it does in the United States, because of higher transfer payments and better social services.

The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 has pushed many single mothers into the labor force, where they joined the low-wage labor pool. The long-term consequences remain unclear, however, as the women sought jobs when the economy was booming (Lichter and Jayakody 2002). If they lose those jobs in an economic downturn, they will not be eligible for further welfare assistance; this could lead to greatly intensified poverty and social distress for them and for their children. Beyond the economic aspects of changes in US family structure, children also face significant interpersonal challenges, as many have to adapt to parents leaving marriages or cohabiting relationships and, often, bringing new adults (and sometimes children) into their lives (Furstenberg and Cherlin 1994). Children no longer face a more or less standardized process of gradually increasing their autonomy and separating from their parents; instead, their life circumstances can change quite radically at different points in their childhoods, perhaps increasing the power of peer groups, which can be more stable than family living arrangements.

Children as creators of peer culture

Inequalities between families may shape the ways children access control over family resources. Within peer groups, however, most research in the "new" sociology of

children describes the ways children exert agency with their peers to create subcultures with their own sets of meanings and activities (Corsaro 1997, 2003; Adler and Adler 1998). These scholars generally claim that “boys (and girls) have the power, within constraints, to shape the world to their choosing” (Fine 1987: 2). However, in describing the idiosyncratic characteristics of peer-group relations, what becomes overwhelmingly clear is the extent to which children replicate adult norms and meanings in their peer-group associations. In effect, more often than not, children reproduce race-, class-, gender-, and even age-based inequalities.

Perhaps most striking is the extent to which children reproduce gender roles and gender-based norms of behavior in their peer-group activities, with children “doing gender” while playing in schools and neighborhoods (Thorne 1993). Although boys in Little League negotiate the limits of appropriate displays of aggression, sexuality, and emotions (such as frustration), they tend to reinforce adult norms of masculinity (Fine 1987). In addition, cross-gender play or “border work” in schoolyards perpetuates definitions of gender found in adult society. “Games of girls-against-the boys, scenes of cross-gender chasing and invasion, and episodes of heterosexual teasing evoke stereotypical images of gender relations” (Thorne 1993: 86). Specifically, children’s play reinforces the view that gender is a mutually exclusive, dichotomous category and exaggerates the difference between the sexes by emphasizing within-group similarities and ignoring cross-group differences.

In a climate in which dichotomous norms of gender are replicated on a daily basis, children of gay or lesbian parents and children who identify as lesbian/bisexual/ gay/transgender (LBGT) may experience particular marginalization from their peer-group interactions. Some research suggests that emotional and psychological development among children of gay and lesbian parents differs little from that of children of heterosexual parents (Patterson 1992; Stacey and Biblarz 2001). Children of gay and lesbian parents, however, often have negative experiences with their peers, with some bearing the brunt of antihomosexual sentiments on almost a daily basis (Ray and Gregory 2001). LBGT young people also do not feel safe in schools and engage in sophisticated negotiations of the presentation of self or “visibility management” (Lasser and Tharinger 2003: 233–44) in their interactions with peers. Relationships with teachers may mitigate the experiences of LBGT youth and children of gay and lesbian parents. However, while some find support from teachers makes peer interactions easier (Russell et al. 2001), others are further silenced by teachers who join peers in promoting a general antihomosexual environment (Ray and Gregory 2001).

As with gender distinctions, age categories are reinforced by the formal organizations and activities that structure children’s time. Children usually are divided up by age groups in schools, camps, sports teams and other activities where youth get together to form peer groups. In unstructured activities, however, children may mix to a much greater degree. “Yet they, too, even on their own, tend to reproduce age stratification, reserving certain kinds of friendships and levels of status for age contemporaries” (Adler and Adler 1998: 198). Research outside of schools shows that children’s peer-group activities differ according to age group. For example, in an early study Hart (1979) found that the range of spatial activity and use of the physical environment for play varied greatly across age groups, even more so than gender-based differences. Often in peer groups, subcultural expectations are applied differently to children of different ages, with younger children usually being exempt

from the ridicule of their peers when breaching group norms (Fine 1987). Thus, although children exert agency as young people through peer-group associations, they simultaneously reinforce age-based stratification in peer subcultures.

The meanings of race and ethnicity in peer groups

Children's peer-group associations also reinforce race- and class-based segregation. Racist discourse among the "slanguage" of the Little League players is common (Fine 1987) and, often, games reinforce ethnic and racial distinctions – such as on one playground where only Mexican kids could "give cooties" (Thorne 1993). Yet, while many studies examine the gender relations among peer groups, there is less research that examines how race is reinforced in children's culture. An exception is Van Ausdale's and Feagin's (2001) study of how preschool children learn about and deploy concepts of race. They often do so in ways that the adults around them either do not notice or find shocking, if they do. Another exception is Lewis's (2003) research on the different ways race is defined in three schools of different racial compositions. This research indicates that children often operationalize concepts of race and ethnicity according to the norms of the institutional environment in which they operate.

In contrast, the particular meaning and outcomes for immigrant students who feel strongly separated from American "mainstream" culture has become a focus of attention. Immigration scholars have looked at the ethnic-based, peer-group affiliations of immigrant children and have suggested that they provide significant advantages. Children of non-White immigrants may not even have the opportunity of gaining access to middle-class, White society, no matter how acculturated they become. Joining these native circles to which they do not have access may prove a ticket to permanent subordination and disadvantage. Remaining securely ensconced in their coethnic community, under these circumstances, may be not a symptom of escapism but the best strategy for capitalizing on otherwise unavailable material and moral resources (Portes and Zhou 1993: 96). As an example, Zhou and Bankston (1998) found that members of coethnic peer groups among the children of Vietnamese refugees in New Orleans experienced greater academic success and higher levels of self-esteem than youth who assimilated to native, minority-group peer cultures.

This research, on segmented assimilation, grows out of a large body of work that discusses developing "oppositional culture" among teenage children who suffer from class or race discrimination. Paul Willis (1977) initiated this strand of research with his ethnographic account of working-class, teenage boys in England who refused to conform to school rules. Instead, they gloried in their opposition, maintaining a high-spirited and taunting presence in the classroom and viewing themselves as far more mature than the conformists who buckled down to schoolwork. The boys' resistance later led them straight into the factory, an ironic result, Willis concedes, but one growing out of the limits of resistance without a larger political context. The same broad notion of resistance has been used to explain teenage, African American culture in American schools, with the students presented as maintaining collective identity – through rejecting school norms and those they associate with the larger, White-dominated society (Fordham and Ogbu 1986). This work

is controversial, as critics have charged that Black students, in particular, often exhibit considerable commitment to schooling and show few signs of generalized resistance (Downey and Ainsworth-Darnell 2002). Critics also worry that focusing on a culture of resistance could lead to viewing children as creating their own educational problems, instead of focusing on the quality of schooling available in different neighborhoods.

The long tradition of social science research on adolescent culture has now spread to younger children. Those who wrote about peer groups in teen culture usually sounded an alarm about teenagers' fecklessness (Coleman 1961). Those now writing on younger children as part of the "new" sociology of education more often herald young children's resourcefulness and creativity. This research also reveals, though, the negative sides of peer culture. Peer groups create their own social hierarchies and their own groups of winners and losers, effects that may be particularly large when class differences help structure access to resources. Peer culture, much like the adult world, is hierarchical and structured by principles of inclusion and exclusion. For members of the most "popular" clique, peer-group associations bring prestige, an active social life, and the power to influence other children. They also generate insecurity, for friendships may be short-lived as kids move in and out of the popular crowd, and members may feel constant pressure to conform to group norms to avoid being excluded from the group (Adler and Adler 1998). At the other extreme, social hierarchy in peer groups can be detrimental to the children that do not fit in, those referred to as "losers," "nerds," "geeks," or "dweebs," who may be disproportionately those from poor or working-class families or those in special-education programs (Eckert 1989; Brantlinger 1993). They can suffer stigma at a young age, often eating lunch alone or playing by themselves during recess, and lack the opportunity to develop the same social skills as kids considered to be "cool." Thus, the hierarchies that peer groups create can benefit some and disadvantage others. The "popular kids" disproportionately are from the more affluent families, partly because they have the resources to buy high-status consumption goods.

Efforts to describe the world of children, and recognize childhood as a separate and unique period of life, illustrate the degree to which inequalities between children operate in their daily lives, paralleling the ways inequalities shade the structural experiences of groups of children described in the first part of this chapter. Childhood studies, especially when concerned with inequality, do well to address the differences among children's worlds while simultaneously striving to describe a child's world as distinct from that of adults.

Childhood – the power of the institution

Perhaps more successful at restoring agency to "childhood" have been the handful of scholars concerned not with the particular lives and worlds of children so much as childhood as a social institution (Aries 1962; Zelizer 1985; Postman 1994). Phillippe Aries, a French historian, pioneered the field when he boldly declared that, "In medieval society, the idea of childhood did not exist" (1962: 128). According to his research, during the Middle Ages children, once weaned, were considered small adults able to participate in all aspects of adult society. It was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that children were understood as undeveloped

adults, deserving of a social life of their own, including special dress, games, language, and, perhaps most importantly, schooling. Childhood is a historically specific development. "It is as if to every period of history, there corresponded a privileged age and a particular division of human life: 'youth' is the privileged age of the seventeenth century, childhood of the nineteenth, adolescence of the twentieth" (p. 32).

Others have continued in this tradition to describe historically changing concepts of childhood. Zelizer (1985), for example, describes a shift in early twentieth-century America from the economically useful child to the sentimental, emotionally "priceless" child. Tracing the conflicts over child labor, children's insurance, wrongful-death suits, and adoption or sale of children, she suggests that a "profound paradox was created"; while children's economic value disappeared, "the sacred child was now routinely converted into its monetary equivalent" (pp. 210–11). In the end, the emotionally priceless child has garnered more sentimental and economic value in contemporary society.

The purpose of studying childhood as a socially constructed institution is in part to shed light on the operation of broader social structures. For Aries, the discovery of childhood is key to understanding the changes in family structure. In medieval times, when children were small adults, communal society predominated, while in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, childhood and adolescence have flourished as society is organized around tight-knit nuclear family units. For Zelizer, the economic value of the useful and sentimental child exemplifies the "complex interactions between the market and human values" (1985: 211). If changes in the concept of childhood – as a symbolic institution – help shape history, today some suggest that childhood may be losing its power to define social relationships, particularly the composition of households. Historically, the arrival of children constrained adults to get married. "It was not openly recognized as a kind of 'child power,' but functioned at the symbolic level as such. Children's symbolic power was the collective consciousness about marriage as the only place for having and rearing children. This power vanished during the 1970s and beyond" (Jensen 2001: 135). By the end of the twentieth century, illegitimacy lost its social stigma and the pressure for parents to get married before the birth of a child has significantly decreased (Gibson et al. 2003). Children are also not a rationale for sustaining a failing marriage. Individual needs of adults exert more influence on shaping family structure than the needs of children, in the collective sense.

At the same time, vast resources are expended on preserving childhood in contemporary society. The "priceless" child needs consumer goods. Yet, while children's interests are catered to by numerous social institutions, studies of marginal children, such as street children and children of very poor families around the world, suggest that childhood – in and of itself – does not influence social policy. In the end, children are not immune from economic or political crisis. In fact, there are increasing levels of child poverty in many nations, including the United States, which some attribute to increased global inequalities and the economic polarization it helps to create. For example, Mickelson (2000) describes the financial crisis in Brazil, sparked by global capitalism, as directly responsible for the increase in the number of children that live and work on the streets. Children are not only expected to work when economic crises hit; they also fight when armed conflict arises. Child soldiers

have played pivotal roles in armed conflicts such as those in Somali and Central America. Children at work or at war are not a new phenomenon; however, research shows that it is also not inevitable. In Cuba, for example, there were no street children (living or working on the streets) for many years, a situation that is only beginning to change with the introduction of the tourist industry (Mickelson 2000). Thus, while in the United States increased sentimental value of childhood has improved access to resources for many children, this does not translate into an increased ability of childhood, as an institution, to protect all children from misfortune through favorable social policy.

Conclusions

In the United States, inequalities between children from rich and poor families are the largest among the developed countries in both relative and absolute terms. The inequalities between children taken collectively and other age groups are also large. Perhaps Lichter puts it best, when he writes, "Since the 'War on Poverty' in the 1960s, literally thousands of studies have been published on the topic of poverty . . . including innumerable studies of poor children. Yet there are roughly as many poor children today as before, the rate of child poverty now is at a 30-year high, and the income gap between rich and poor children is greater than at any time in recent memory" (1997: 141). Children have acquired basic rights of legal personhood and of citizenship, rights that cannot be taken from them even by their parents, but they lack political power. Their interests can be damaged, or even just gradually eclipsed, by other, more powerful, forces operating in the public arena.

Children from poor families, and especially those from racial minorities, are likely to find it harder to establish their own families as inequality grows. Those without college degrees may be thrust into job markets where they will never be able to command wages high enough to support a family. They may also never obtain job security, as more and more jobs have become contingent and casual, without a promotional structure or benefits (Applebaum et al. 2003), and unskilled workers are being replaced by those higher up on the ladder (Baumol et al. 2003). Meanwhile, their age mates may have been among those born into the families with almost unparalleled resources to spend on their children. With dual-career households, with both parents working at high-level professional or corporate jobs, and with only a few children, abundant resources are available for those few. This has fueled a crush of students competing to get into Ivy League colleges, in a "winner-take-all" process abetted by high schools (Attewell 2001). Once the province of a traditional elite, many families now have the money to aspire to Ivies and have aimed for this throughout their children's educational careers. They anxiously supervise their children's learning and pay for expensive extracurricular activities.

The inequalities of class, race, and gender play out in rather different ways in childhood. Those of class are expressed in the sharp hierarchy of income and the even greater one of wealth in the United States. Children experience these hierarchies more intensely than other age groups. Those of class and race often intersect, with African Americans and Latinos the least able to accumulate assets (a problem greatly exacerbated by high levels of housing segregation) and also the least able to

obtain access to jobs with benefits and security. Inequalities of gender operate differently, as they occur within families, classes, and racial groups, rather than across them. They are expressed in part through restrictions in girls' freedom to control their time (with greater household burdens than their brothers) or their access to space (with limits on when and where they can enter the public realm).

Researchers who have plumbed children's lived culture and their own creation of identity and meaning remind us that children are far more than objects to be socialized by their parents. They have their own goals and strategies for reaching them, exemplified in part by their efforts to control money and space. They also develop their own ideologies and patterns of accommodation and resistance, as vividly shown by Paul Willis (1977) and other writers who have explored children's reactions to the schools where they spend most of their time each day. They create child-specific, social worlds through their peer groups and activities. Adults attempt to structure and control children's time, but ethnographers have taught us that they are only partially successful. Far from being passive recipients of adult-world rules, children are strategic negotiators with adults and other children with whom they interact.

On the research front, the structural and ethnographic spheres remain separated, with researchers specializing in one or the other and approaching the study of children from very different perspectives. The former is concerned with the structural inequalities among children and the latter with the inequalities between children as a collective and adults. While a division of labor might make sense from a technical standpoint, it does not from a conceptual one (Qvortrup 1999). It is hard to study micro interactions and to tie them to larger patterns of inequalities, but without this step, children's worlds appear to be suspended in ether, without being anchored in the realm of adult stratification. This runs the risk of homogenizing children, celebrating their ingenuity and their attempts to manage their own lives, without a sense of the specific limits and opportunities offered by different children's environments. Conversely, theories of social class that become totalizing, implying that all within certain classes behave much the same way, are likely to miss key elements of children's struggles against the adults within their own social classes and their resistance to being molded in ways that they do not like.

The major classical perspectives in sociology all consider families as the basic unit in society that collectively generates and allocates resources. To a large extent this may be true, with families sharing common interests vis-à-vis others in the society. These perspectives, though, miss conflicts of interests and struggles for autonomy within families. The feminist movement opened eyes to women's efforts to claim their own economic and social rights within families and the divorce revolution drove the message home. Families may share common interests, but only insofar as one does not look too closely and as long as the family stays intact. The same opening of eyes has only recently occurred for children. In the view of many researchers, families socialize children in whatever ways fit the parents' values and stations in life and children passively accept that socialization. The "new" sociology of children starts from a different premise: that of imagining children as possible actors on their own, who organize their own relationships according to their own goals and values.

This has been a valuable corrective, but it would be still more valuable if children were more complexly understood and depicted as being both within constant,

dynamic relations with adults and independent actors. From this perspective, they might or might not have common interests with their parents and others in their family on particular issues at particular times; this would be a matter of empirical investigation rather than an assumption. The family, in short, would be – at least provisionally – taken as a unit that could both encompass those within it as a unit and also bind together people with disparate goals. To begin to conceive of this, researchers would have to keep in mind a notion of the family as both an element in a larger stratification system and as being its own form of mini-stratification system. Children would need to be considered as both (in Zelizer's word) "precious" and also as the least powerful members of such a stratification system. They have not, until recently, been given their due as worthy of study on their own terms. New research may yield the kind of revolution of thinking about children's capacity for autonomy that occurred during the last 40 decades with changes in how women were thought about, and depicted, within families and outside of them.

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Chapter 11

Parenting and Inequality

RACHEL GROB AND BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN

“Where have I come from, where did you pick me up?” the baby asked. . . .

“[T]win-born with the morning light, you have floated down the stream of the world’s life, and at last you have stranded on my heart.

“As I gaze on your face, mystery overwhelms me. . . . What magic has snared the world’s treasure in these slender arms of mine?”

Rabindranath Tagore, from “The Beginning”

It’s hard not to love babies and young children. At least since the “century of the child” that began over 100 years ago, we have seen them as our collective future and, in many cases, as our personal legacy. We regard the babies we know or meet as innocent, immune – however briefly – from the burdens of blame and personal responsibility we place so heavily on the shoulders of adults. We pause in our harried lives to notice them, share outrage when they are mistreated, delight in their charms and accomplishments. When a baby smiles at us, we smile back.

As parents, many of us may feel, like the poet Tagore, that the world’s treasure has been snared in our arms; yet the help we all need to hold and cherish this mysterious gift is not always there. As a society, we fail to create the conditions necessary for freely chosen, healthy, and supported childbearing and childrearing. Instead, the rutted pathways that inequalities carve across our social topography are carved also into our parenting, creating inequities: among those aspiring to be parents, between mothers and fathers, between children and parents,¹ and between parents and other parents.

The purpose of this chapter is to map some of the ways that pervasive societal structures and ideologies (meta structures) produce and perpetuate social inequality within families as well as between families. It also will map some emergent alternate routes, less trodden, but promising, that we see emerging on the terrain – routes parents and communities may be starting slowly to take toward more equitable structures and initiatives.

Our navigation is guided strongly by two core assumptions. The first is that parenting and child development are fundamentally *social* and *relational* processes: that is, the nurturing that humans receive when very young absolutely is critical in shaping their life course, and the capacity of parents and caregivers to provide good, safe nurturing contexts is, in turn, dependent on the larger social and cultural environment within which families reside. The second assumption is that women and

men should be able to choose to be parents or not to be parents within a context that provides real options in all directions and that recognizes the primacy of the individual in defining for herself or himself the meaning of conception, pregnancy, abortion, and birth. Inequalities proliferate and thrive when ideologies and policies fail to ensure equal access to stimulating, safe environments – that support healthy attachments between adults and children – and the right to make real choices about whether or not – and how – to become a parent.

This chapter is organized to follow, approximately, the embedded contexts in which parenting itself unfolds. It begins, as parenting begins, with the transition to having children – a transition made material through the processes of conception, pregnancy, and birth or adoption. Then it explores the household environments where parents and children live together and, then, the community contexts surrounding the family. Finally, it examines the more diffuse sociocultural realm, especially as it influences parenting through professional discourse and practices. Within each section, just some of the many relevant axes of inequality have been highlighted. Race, class, gender, medicalization, professional expertise, and technology are the themes focused on most, at the expense of giving more attention to what recent research on work, globalization, and immigration can contribute to understanding parenting and inequality. While space does not allow us to do justice to this wide topic, even to the selected axes within each section, it is hoped that the reader will use the bibliography as a starting place for filling in the gaps.

Whose Baby, Whose Right to Choose, Whose Parenthood?

From the very start, parenthood is not an equal-opportunity endeavor. Either a man or a woman may be defined as a “parent,” but this generic descriptor for the condition of conceiving, bearing, and raising children occludes the difference between the experiences of men and women. Considering the physical facts of childbearing – the literal gestation and birthing of babies – the first difference is starkly evident: these experiences occur to women alone, to biological mothers. When the child first departs the womb and arrives in the outside world, the main relationship she or he has developed is with the biological mother. The unborn fetus hears its mother’s voice and heartbeat, feels the lilt of her walk and the patterns of her life, while the mother feels the baby move and kick and grow within.

The experience of childbearing may be viewed as “a potential source of power unmatched in modern times by any physical advantages men have” (Tangri 1976, as quoted in Lorber 1994: 6). It also may be viewed as an impediment in the effort to define female identity outside the essentializing discourse of motherhood. But whatever the interpretation, this experience certainly is not available to any members of the species except women of childbearing age. In the long run, it takes its place in a lifetime of other experiences. It may figure prominently or not so prominently depending on the mother and the child. The woman may become a primary caretaker of the child, she may give it up for adoption, or she may keep the baby but others assume the primary caretaking responsibilities. Still, the woman who bears the child has the first and most intimate relationship with that child.

In matrilineal societies, women are “acknowledged to produce and reproduce the body of society itself” (Petersen 1982: 141). Here it is the uterine relationship – the literal mingled blood of mothers and their children – that defines kinship. In the United States, we have a very different definition, one that grew out of our patriarchal focus on the genetic material, the “seed,” as the source of being. The original notion that the man’s seed, his sperm, contains the essence of the person – and that the womb is simply a place where the seed must grow – has been replaced by a more sophisticated rendition. Modern science has had to acknowledge the egg, too, as a seed and to grant women equal genetic rights to parenthood. But simply extending to women this patriarchal notion of what constitutes parenthood leaves intact a kinship system based on genetic ties – an ideology that maintains the primacy of seeds, not relationships, in defining who can claim a child. In this ethos, parenthood remains a biological and genetic fact, rather than a social process generated through days, weeks, months, years of shared space, shared rhythms, and caretaking.

This paradigm begins by undervaluing the relational importance of pregnancy and goes on to undervalue nurturing of all kinds – the nurturing offered by both men and women, by both biological and nonbiological parents. Law and public policy instantiate this paradigm and consistently create a very material inequality by privileging the genetic tie in disputes over paternity and custody. Legal decisions surrounding “surrogacy” provide perhaps the most cogent illustration: the donors of the “seeds” – the egg and the sperm – are considered to be the baby’s parents. The woman within whom the child has grown has no claim; she merely rented out a part of her body, her womb, for the period of gestation.

Procreative technologies, which now are used widely, combine this patriarchal focus on the importance of the seed with the more general imperatives of technological society: the drive to break things down into their component parts, promote efficiency, and understand all problems and challenges as analogous to mechanical problems and challenges (Rothman 1986, 1989). When childbearing is reduced in this way, production of a baby becomes a technological puzzle, an array of component parts: healthy sperm, healthy egg, environment conducive to zygote formation, environment conducive to fetal development, extraction to the outside world. The question, then, becomes how to produce each part and how to link the parts together for a successful outcome.

The ideology underlying this approach values rationality, that most critical underpinning of modernity, above all else. However, the correlate of this preference for the logical, scientific mind is a “‘theoretical disdain for the significance of the body,’ and a disdain for physical work” in general (Rothman 1989: 60). Feminist scholars have amply demonstrated that this mind/body dualism is problematic for women in many ways (e.g., Bleier 1986; Harding 1986). Yet the contention here is that it is particularly problematic for women as biological mothers. No complete replacement for the physical process of gestating a child exists, yet this aspect of parenting is denigrated, made ever cheaper, as technological replacements are devised. In-vitro fertilization, neonatal intensive care, cesarean section, surrogacy arrangements, and even replacing breast milk with formula – all of these encroach, little by little, upon the primacy of the physical nurturing process of childbearing. All these technological innovations have promised to free women from “biology as

destiny,” but this promise has failed because, crucially, the *social* production of gendered parenting roles has not changed. For example, in the 1950s when the popularity of baby formula caused breastfeeding rates to hit an all-time low, women were “freed” from the biological imperative of breastfeeding. Nonetheless, for social reasons, they became stay-at-home mothers in record numbers, presiding over shiny new appliances and neatly groomed babies. Adoption is another illustrative case. In adoptive families, mothers have no more biological connection to their children than do fathers, yet the percentage of adoptive mothers who take on traditional maternal roles is no lower than the percentage of biological mothers who do so. Reproductive technology and nonbiological parenting cannot liberate women from gender inequality in the parenting realm – unless gender roles, as such, are deconstructed, made transparent, and transformed.

Like the new reproductive technologies, the “new genetics,” too, has been hailed for its remarkable promise without sufficient regard for its social effects. It is touted as a tool unparalleled in its capacity to help prevent, to diagnose early, and to treat disease and other forms of abnormality. But, in the reproductive arena, the new genetics also has exacerbated inequalities. Take one simple example: wealthy, well-educated, delayed child bearers who had children with Down’s syndrome were the “movers and shakers” in the Down’s syndrome world – the people who could get programs, services, and the like. As prenatal testing and selective abortion have enabled the majority of such individuals to opt out of bearing Down’s syndrome children, these children are increasingly likely to be born to parents who had fewer prenatal options. These same parents also have fewer options in caring for their Down’s syndrome children once they are born, as well as less “cultural capital” to bring to bear on improving services for them or organizing on their behalf. As it has gone with Down’s syndrome, so it may be going with other prenatally testable conditions.

A pervasive and much-examined aspect of the way technology exacerbates inequalities in conception, pregnancy, and birth is medicalization. Medicalization means both the power of scientific medicine (to interpret specific events in accordance with an objectifying lens) and the steady encroachment of this model (beyond what was originally construed as the domain of medicine) (Illich 1976; Rothman 1989; Litt 2000). Medical examination, classification, diagnosis, and treatment render individuals passive, subjecting them to a “medical gaze” (Foucault 1975) that assesses them according to a set of preconceived standards (Lupton 2000). Medicalization not only co-opts, by bringing large segments of the population under professional management, but it also “disciplines” and restricts access to needed services, according to its own strictures and ideology (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1974). Arenas of human experience and expression now colonized by medicalization include: mental processes and behavior, learning styles, personal habits and, of course, conception, pregnancy, birth, and parenting.

The medicalization of conception, pregnancy, and birth has had an enormous impact on who has children and on how those children are brought into the world. On the one hand, we have made considerable progress in the last 80 years: the legalization of birth control and abortion, coupled with advances in reproductive technology, have afforded some women an unprecedented capacity to choose whether or not to have children. On the other hand, women make most reproductive choices in the medical context – under the supervision of clinicians, with their access to

services controlled by professionals. Furthermore, medicalization favors and combines with “widely held and institutionalized beliefs about who should and who should not become a parent, and under what circumstances” (May 1995: 7); about who is fit to become a parent and who is not, and together they perpetuate and magnify existing inequalities along class, race, and gender lines. In theory, any woman of childbearing age can conceive a wanted child, if she can obtain the requisite sperm. In theory, birth control and a legal right to abortion make it possible for any woman to prevent unwanted births. In reality, conception, pregnancy, and birth are mediated heavily by the intersecting influences of material resources, geography, family patterns, technology, policy, and ideology.

Birth control is an important example. Eighty years after Margaret Sanger and her fellow activists successfully secured legal access to birth control in the 1920s, contraception has come to be regarded more as a responsibility than as a right (Rothman 1989). In the prevailing view, conceiving an unwanted fetus, or one you cannot afford to care for, signals a failure of maturity and self-control. The rallying cry for abstinence, until the formation of a suitable heterosexual union, can still be heard from many quarters. But even more dominant is the idea that controlling fertility is morally correct, that those having sex are obligated to take precautions. However, this supposed exercise of “good judgment” with respect to bearing children is seen very differently in different contexts: it’s fine to have children, as many children as you like, as long as you can afford the upkeep. If you’re poor, then even one child may be considered a luxury, and having a large family – that’s sheer lunacy.

The history of the struggle to control fertility provides an excellent illustration of how public values – institutionalized in medical practices, legal standards, and human service policies – circumscribe the reproductive choices of individuals. If you reached childbearing age between 1900 and the 1970s, lived in poverty, and were non-White, you may well have been among the thousands upon thousands of women victimized by a eugenics movement determined to keep the “unfit” from reproducing. You may have gone into the hospital thinking you were getting an appendectomy and emerged forcibly sterilized (May 1995). Today, if you are adolescent, uninsured, and/or financially struggling, the medicalization of fertility will have a different meaning; it may well mean you’ll have far more difficulty gaining access to the range of available options than your middle-class counterparts. Although condoms and foam are available – for a price – across the counter, most other forms of contraception require a prescription or a procedure. A woman seeking such services is, therefore, no longer just a woman making decisions about her own fertility. She is instead a patient, subject to all the forms of domination and inequality that so persistently characterize our health-care system: limited access and inferior services for those with low incomes; professional discourse that undervalues women’s experiences and “voice”; and disregard for cultural practices that challenge the hegemony of the scientific paradigm. Women’s health activism has secured many reproductive rights, but still they fall painfully short of realizing feminist visions “of sexual experiences free of coercion [and] of reproduction as a freely chosen human activity” (Gordon 1990: 488).

Just as birth control has been constructed largely as a medical arena, shaped by the professional, male-dominated culture of medicine rather than by women seeking

control over their own reproductive lives, so too has abortion. The legal right to abortion – though under constant threat – has existed since the victories of reproductive-rights feminists in the 1970s. Yet abortion as a clinical practice, the actual act as well as the underlying values shaping our experience and understanding of it, is at least as much about reinforcing medical authority as about making motherhood voluntary. Abortions are available to women only if doctors are willing to perform them. To some women in some states, abortions are available only if their parent co-signs a consent form. Abortions are available to women only if they submit to clinic procedures, which tend to privilege the medical intervention, the suctioning process, over the significance of the decision to abort as experienced by the woman (see Simonds 1996 for discussion of feminist abortion clinics). Because pregnancy is seen primarily as a baby captured within a woman, abortion is viewed as destruction of a potential life rather than as refusal to let a fertilized egg grow or the refusal to procreate. If women controlled abortion – controlled not only the clinics but also the values and the thinking behind abortion – would there be such a dramatic distinction between contraception, not letting this month's egg grow, and abortion, not letting this month's fertilized egg grow? Or would abortion be put back together with contraception, back into the larger idea of birth control, so that we say: "Until we feel we've made a baby, an abortion is stopping a baby from happening, not killing one" (Rothman 1989: 123).

The pursuit of fertility itself is yet another aspect of parenthood worth unpacking. Between 10 and 20 percent of Americans of childbearing age struggle with infertility. But regardless of which partner in a heterosexual couple is actually infertile, it is almost always the woman who seeks treatment and she who must undergo most of the procedures (Lorber 1994: 155–6). Similarly, although media images are dominated by the middle- or upper-class couple's journey through the fertility maze, infertility is more prevalent among poorer adults (Mundy 2003). Nonetheless, access to fertility treatments is restricted to those who can afford it. With costs now ranging from \$1,000 to \$15,000 per intervention, such treatment (and, therefore, this opportunity of attaining biological parenthood) is indeed a luxury good – though a faulty one, since in the majority of cases infertility treatment does not result in sustainable pregnancy.²

The fact that increasing numbers of women eagerly engage in this costly, uncomfortable, and often emotionally devastating quest for biological parenthood is testimony to yet another current of inequality that undercuts women's autonomy in their reproductive decision-making. Women who do not have children – whether by choice or not – suffer "the stigma and isolation of being non-parents in a pro-natal society" (May 1995: 13). This is not a social burden shared equally by men, though they, too, may suffer personally if they are unable to have or raise children. However, childlessness itself is measured, both statistically and morally, in terms of women. As Linda Gordon summarizes:

Lessons to girls about how to mother are indistinguishable from those about how to be female, and they work because they rest on a fundamental female character structure formed in a culture with women's mothering as the norm. . . . Maternalism is then reinforced by patterns of sex discrimination, which, on the whole, grant women more dignity when they are mothers. (1990: 481)

Parenting in Families: Family Structure and the Gendered Division of Labor

The mind/body dualism that relegates women's physical labor as baby-makers to menial status prefigures another dualism prominent in the parenting picture: the duality of the public versus the private sphere. The former is the world of visibility, of privilege, power, and accomplishment. The latter is life's back stage, the place where emotions and bodies and household dynamics reside. Women have long been custodians of the private domain; men have long dominated the public one. Pervasive inequality stems from this long-standing division of labor – mother tending hearth and home, raising the children; father off at work earning a living. Feminist scholarship has focused extensively on how gender is constructed in the family context, since the family is a site “where gender is still seen even ideologically as a reasonable and legitimate basis for the distribution of rights, power, privilege, and responsibilities” (Risman and Johnson-Sumerford 1998).

Much has changed in the last 50 years, as huge numbers of women have entered the paid workforce and taken up citizenship in both spheres. In 1948, 31.8 percent of adult women participated in the labor force. By 1994 that percentage had nearly doubled and a full 59.3 percent of women worked (Higginbotham 1997). In 2002, 71.8 percent of mothers with children under 18 and 55 percent of women with infants were employed (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002). Of course, White women account for a disproportionate share of this growth, since women of color have long worked at low-wage jobs outside the home and children of color have long been acculturated to life in households with no stay-at-home parent. As documented by Higginbotham (1997), Romero (1992), Wrigley (1995), and others, the startling rise in female labor-force participation has had serious implications, not just for the gendered division of childrearing work addressed later, but also for the reallocation of parenting functions along class and racial lines. Increasingly, White and/or middle-class working women hire domestic laborers to take on extensive caregiving responsibilities for their children, thus “turn [ing] gender inequality into class inequality” (Wrigley 1995: 142) and intensifying long-standing patterns of racial inequality in the work arena.

Has the change in America's labor force also revolutionized the way household work is divided between men and women? Research suggests that the rate of change in the private sphere has lagged significantly behind the metamorphoses occurring in the workplace. To use Arlie Hochschild's (still applicable) phrase, society is experiencing a “stalled revolution” – failing to meet the change in women's lives with answering change to address inequality in either the social arrangements surrounding paid work or the roles men play within their households (1989: 12–13). While marriage itself is still a formidable building block in the social construction of male and female roles, it is parenthood that serves to crystallize the gendered division of labor, even in households where paid employment and housework had been apportioned in fairly gender-neutral terms prior to the advent of children (Munch et al. 1997; Sanchez and Thompson 1997).

At least two patterns of response to parenthood have been shown to exacerbate inequality between fathers and mothers. The first is what Hochschild has called

addition of a “second shift” for mothers: women retain their position in the paid labor force, working as many hours as men, yet they also remain responsible for much more than half of the child- and house-related duties (Hochschild 1989, 1997; Risman and Johnson-Sumerford 1998). Hochschild estimates that mothers with paid jobs work approximately 15 hours more per week than men – the equivalent of an extra month per year of 24-hour days (1989). This is not to suggest that there has been no alteration in the nature of fatherhood. As summarized by Segal, the research does show “a change in men’s *attitudes* towards childcare, a change in their *experiences* of fatherhood, and . . . a change in psychological perspectives on the importance of the father’s role.” What has changed little, however, is “the amount of practical work men actually do as fathers” (1990: 33). Broadening the male role to include nurturing tasks, formerly beyond its purview, merits celebration: mothers and children, as well as fathers, can only benefit from this crack in the edifice of gendered parenthood. But the reverberations of this shift also create new challenges. Men receive lavish praise for more active “mothering,” while women are often shamed both for making a “big deal” out of the housework, which still falls disproportionately on their shoulders, and for neglecting their children and their own “essential nature” by building strong careers (Hochschild 1989; Lorber 1994).

A second patterned response to parenthood is an alteration of the division of labor that prevailed in the household before the advent of children – that is, reduced paid employment and tremendously increased housework responsibilities for mothers (Sanchez and Thomspon 1997: 761). This accommodation to the needs of children exacerbates inequalities both by increasing women’s economic dependence on men and by disadvantaging mothers in the competitive world of work. Munch et al. also have shown how childrearing places women and men in separate networks, restricting “women’s social worlds by reducing both the number of people with whom women interact and the time women spend interacting with those people” (1997: 518). The disproportionate disruption to women’s personal networks during their children’s early years may have effects on their access to information, social support, and job contacts that last far beyond the period of intensive childrearing.

Despite the persistence of these and other forms of gender inequality between parents, there are signs that the seismic shifts reordering the division of labor in the public sphere also are causing shock waves in the home. As gender theorists (Fraser 1989; Lorber 1994) have illustrated, gender itself is a social construction, reinforced through a wide array of structural conditions, unexamined assumptions, and latent effects. Gender can begin to be reconstructed when its pervasiveness as a social institution, and the mechanisms undergirding it, are made explicit (Lorber 1994: 10).

In a small but significant number of instances, parents are beginning to undertake this work by challenging hegemonic conceptions of male and female roles. For example, some heterosexual couples are creating “postgender” households where the usual role prescriptions no longer apply. In one recent study, Risman and Johnson-Sumerford documented several kinds of equitable household arrangements forged by such couples. The interactions of these mothers and fathers as they create parenting and household routines are:

guided by rules of fairness and sharing within egalitarian friendships. Husbands and wives compare their contributions to family work with each other, rather than with same-sex peers. This is what differentiates them from most couples. . . . In recreating their families to perform the family work of nurturing, caring, and providing without using gender as a guidepost to direct the tasks, these couples are in the business, whether they know it or not, of recreating our social structure in feminist directions. (1998: 38)

Traditional divisions of labor also are being challenged within the rapidly growing population of lesbian and gay families with children.³ Existing research suggests that relationships between parents in these households tend to be both more cooperative and more egalitarian than relationships in heterosexual homes (Stacey 1998). For example, gay and lesbian couples tend to share chores more equally and with less conflict (p. 138). Not surprisingly, children raised in these homes are themselves less confined by gender stereotypes, more affectionate, and more respectful of social differences (Stacey 1998; Crary 2001). Households led by two same-sex parents are diverse in genesis, income, ethnic and racial identity, beliefs, cultural practices, and so on (Laird 1996). Yet in the deliberate affirmative act of embracing parenthood, these couples, as a group, have redefined families significantly, freeing the notion of kinship from the normative bonds that privilege genetic claims over the “families we choose” (Weston 1991; Stacey 1998).

Parenting in Communities: Place, Class, and Social Capital

Child development, parenting, and family dynamics are highly contextual processes, unfolding – as previously suggested – within larger communities that influence all the axes of inequality with which this chapter is concerned. The womb, of course, is the first human environment, succeeded by what Bronfenbrenner has described as a series of “embedded contexts”: the “microsystem” of people in direct contact with the child (e.g., family, friends, and teachers); the “mesosystem,” made up of the relationships between microsystems (e.g., contact between parent and teacher); the “exosystem” of larger institutions and organizations influencing the child (e.g., workplaces, school boards, and childcare councils); and the macrosystem comprised of broader sociocultural practices, beliefs, and values (Bronfenbrenner 1979). This “framework of human ecology” supplants not only narrowly biological theories of human development, but also the view of childrearing as a dyadic or interpersonal activity unfolding within that private sphere, “the family.” It necessitates, instead, looking at the relationship between parenting and the larger social environment – to understand the impact of context on the ways men and women raise their children and the reciprocal effect these practices have on contexts.

The impact of poverty itself on child development has long been documented: compared to their better-off peers, children living in poverty will experience a range of disadvantages. The fact that structures of social inequality have already been at work by the time of a child’s birth is demonstrated with sobering clarity by the statistics on low birth weight. For example, in the year 2000, 6.6 percent of births to non-Hispanic Whites were of low birth weight, while 13.1 percent of Black babies began life weighing less than 2,500 grams (O’Hare 2003: 40). Poor children suffer

more learning disabilities (8.3 percent vs. 6.1 percent), and more deficits in mental, motor, and socioemotional development (The Future of Children 1997: 58–9) than those who are economically advantaged. More recent research tries to tease out and comprehend the social processes mediating between child-development outcomes and poverty defined solely by income level (Wilson 1987; Garbarino 1992; Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Garbarino and Kostelny 1994; Huang and Attewell 1994). Of late, social-scientific interest has focused increasingly on what can be termed “contextual analysis,” or examination of the effects of neighborhoods on parenting styles and on outcomes for the children. Although research in this area is still in a formative state (Huang and Attewell 1994; Brooks-Gunn et al. 1997; Furstenberg 1999), there is sufficient evidence to suggest that neighborhoods do exert direct influence over a number of outcomes such as infant mortality, childhood IQ, school completion, and teenage births – even after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics of the individual family (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Schorr 1997).

In early childhood, community influences do not strongly affect children directly: they operate primarily through effects on parents (Aber et al. 1997).⁴ The recent literature on social capital helps us understand how parenting practices mediate between child and environment. In Coleman’s classic formulation, social capital is a resource that helps individuals achieve their goals, but it is not a material good like a car or a college diploma; rather, it is an intangible aspect of social structure that is embodied in the relations among individuals (Coleman 1988). Yet for parents, the consequences of having access to this critical good are very tangible indeed: it is social capital that allows them to make interpersonal and institutional connections for their children; to advocate effectively within childcare, school, and other organizational settings; to benefit from networks of neighbors, friends, and acquaintances who can reinforce their parenting style and look out for their children in the neighborhood. For parents, possession of social capital means that their work in raising children is embedded in a reliable network where norms of trustworthiness and reciprocity are dominant and where the social ties supporting their parenting are strong both within and outside of the family (Gephart 1997; Putnam 2000).

So how does access to social capital influence parenting practices and, thus, influence young children? One relevant mechanism appears to be what Furstenberg calls “family management,” a particular “feature of parenting through which parents construct and construe social connections for their children . . . a process by which parents build, invest, and deploy social capital – drawing on social knowledge, information and resources – in the interest of protecting and providing for their children and fostering their long-term prospects” (1999: 13). His research in Philadelphia suggests that Black families living in impoverished neighborhoods with high rates of violence employ significantly more restrictive family-management practices than White families in affluent environments. Thus:

parents with greater access to material and social resources within their communities were able to make use of collective and institutional ways of protecting their children from negative influences and promoting their achievement. Impoverished families, in contrast, were compelled to rely upon individual and in-home techniques of management unless they took special steps to find institutional resources outside their communities. (1999: 219)

Some families can and do take such “special steps,” but they are fighting against the tide every inch of the way. Economic disadvantage, low education, and the effects of doing daily battle with racism – in its many forms – translate into poor access to the social capital needed to provide one’s children with a general “leg up” and, thus, to the likely reproduction of class inequality for the next generation.

Community context and parenting practices also mediate developing, in early childhood, what Farkas (1996) terms “skills, habits, and styles.” These are closely related to “human capital” (the knowledge and skills individuals bring to bear in social and occupational arenas) and “cultural capital” (familiarity and comfort with the canons and lifestyles of the educated classes). They are also mechanisms by which culture itself is expressed and transmitted. Contrary to the contention of “culture-of-poverty” theorists, such as Charles Murray (1984; Hernstein and Murray 1996), parents across divides of class, race, and place share many of the same *aspirations* and *values* with respect to their children. Nearly all of us want our children to be healthy, to excel at school, to live in comfort and happiness, to surpass our own accomplishments. What we do not share is equal access to the *tools* (Greenstone 1991) we need as parents to interpret social situations, navigate administrative systems (e.g., schools, service agencies, and so forth), and address the challenges of everyday life in a stratified, individualistic society. Nor do we share the same capacity to transmit to our children – through, at least in part, the way we talk to them, respond to their questions, and react to their learning processes (Jencks and Phillips 1998) – the skills most likely to predispose them to succeed in pre-school, school, and community cultures – cultures that reward children who display the “skills, habits and styles” of the middle and upper classes.

Our interdependence as inhabitants of a complex “human ecology” is captured succinctly by a catch-phrase often used by the Annie E. Casey Foundation: “Children do well when their families do well, and families do well when they live in supportive communities.” The segregation of residences by race and class (Wilson 1987; Massey and Denton 1993) and the relative paucity of material, social, and human capital in poor-urban communities, largely populated by people of color, create differences in the resources adults bring to parenting and caretaking and, thus, they reproduce social inequalities along existing lines of power. Although there will always be astonishing exceptions, most children will get what they need only when their adults are freed to give it to them. Such freeing is possible only within the context of nurturing communities. Also, healthy communities can emerge only by dint of political will. This vision goes far beyond the development of individual-service programs or issue-specific policies for families: the approach must be holistic and multifaceted.

In fact, a number of community initiatives, designed comprehensively to address inequalities among populations of parents and children, have come into being over the last 10 years. Their intent is to integrate and supersede the lengthy history of reform efforts that have ranged from strategies to strengthen individual families (e.g., parenting programs) to attempts to transform places (e.g., the Great Society programs); from private charities to large public-sector initiatives; from a paradigm of “treatment” to one of “prevention” (Halpern and Weiss 1991; Schorr 1997). As described by Lizbeth Schorr:

The new synthesis rejects addressing poverty, welfare, employment, education, child development, housing, and crime one at a time. It endorses the idea that the multiple and interrelated problems of poor neighborhoods require multiple and interrelated solutions . . . combining physical and economic development with service and education reform, and all of these with a commitment to building community institutions and social networks. (1997: 319)

These initiatives are founded on the assumption that those invested in leveling the playing field for parents and children must form joint agendas across many divides: across our own many personal differences, across the boundaries of various fields (health, human services, education, economic development, community building), and across the boundaries between policy makers, professionals, and community residents. An individual actor can create a single program, perhaps, address a single issue, and make a difference for a single child. If we realize, however, that each of these is but one brick in the house we need to shelter us all, it becomes critical for large numbers of us to have an investment in the floor plan.

In these new comprehensive initiatives, structures of inequality like racism and economic injustice can no longer be viewed as distinct from, or marginal to, work on behalf of children and families. These structures have enormous impact on community-building processes. They must be acknowledged and unpacked from the outset, as groups coalesce. The new initiatives need to be formed within small enough groups so that people can feel connected tangibly to one another. Families themselves must be viewed as partners whose participation and leadership is essential. As Furstenberg puts it:

personal agency and social ecology are mutually interdependent. Parents manage the external world better when it invites them to be involved and supports their efforts. In turn, their investment in the community helps to sustain the institutions that are critical to their children's welfare. Institution building and parental involvement go hand in hand. (1999: 232)

Parenting by the Rules: Professional Authority and the Baby Experts

Sociocultural influences on communities, families, and parents are multiple and complex. Some of them have been examined previously in the context of other discussions. Here, the focus will be primarily on another axis of inequality particularly relevant to parenting and inequality: professional authority and the relationship between parents and the experts who seek to categorize, instruct, admonish, and guide them.

Because young children are not yet eligible for the "free and appropriate public education" guaranteed all school-age children, the relationship between new parents and professionals is not yet codified through the structure of the educational system. Nonetheless, parents of babies, toddlers, and preschoolers have been subjected thoroughly, over the last 100 years and more, to the advice, influence and, sometimes, legal intervention of "baby experts" – those outside authorities (usually men) who

make it their business to tell parents (usually mothers) what to do and how to do it (Ehrenreich and English 1978; Crane 2000).

Since the colonial era, childrearing has been a concern of political and religious leaders alike. It was not until close to the turn of the nineteenth century, however – with large-scale migration to the cities and the “discovery” of the child as a central actor in the family drama – that the long-standing “normative tradition of communal concern” about childrearing was transformed into a distinct social problem to be tackled by social reformers (Ehrenreich and English 1978; Halpern and Weiss 1991). During this period, in tandem with the unfolding “century of the child,” expert advice to parents blossomed in quantity, variety, and influence. Childrearing was quickly converted from instinctual-female knowledge – “the irreducible core of woman’s existence, the last refuge of her skills” (Ehrenreich and English 1978: 173) – to a new arena for exercising professional authority. Central to this transformation was the advent of a collaboration between medicine, which claimed solid dominion over the physical body, and psychology, a rapidly rising profession focused on the as yet poorly charted terrain of feelings, personality, and the inner workings of the psyche (p. 178).

Recent research, on “expert” parenting advice, catalogues recurring themes running through the literature. The themes are perennial: the need for bonding versus the need for discipline as the parents’ guiding principle (Hulbert 2003); identifying the ever-widening threats – physical, intellectual, developmental, and moral – parents must protect against for their children (Stearns 2003); and focus (steadily increasing) on the importance of cognitive development (Wrigley 1989). But whatever the specific content of the advice being dispensed, it is clear professionalization and medicalization of parenting functions has influenced both the distribution of power among parents and the distribution of power between parents and professionals.

The colonization of what Eliot Mishler terms “lifeworlds” (1984) by experts means that the experience of laypersons is delegitimized as a guide for action and that ever-broader aspects of behavior are susceptible to critique, categorization, and correction. But, as Jacqueline Litt illustrates in her study of Jewish and African American women raising children in the 1930s and 1940s, the discourse of expertise does not unify necessarily those that are its target. Rather, it can engender new kinds of inequality in the form of a “contest between social groups over status, boundaries, and acceptability” (Litt 2000: 40). Litt goes on to describe how modern ideas of childcare – contained in expert texts and enacted in service environments – functioned as a mechanism of assimilation for Jewish women, that eagerly medicalized their mothering practices (privatized childcare, sanitary living and play environments, and modern feeding techniques) to signify advancement from their parents’ immigrant culture into the American middle class. African American mothers, in contrast, had much more fragile ties to dominant medical practices and codes of parenting conduct. Confronted with racism, lack of economic opportunity, and isolation – as they migrated north – these women were condemned for practicing forms of mothering hardly deemed to be remediable. Rather than using medicalized motherhood to attain class status, they deliberately forged mothering styles that were firmly rooted in traditional practices: folk remedies, extended relations of caretaking, and reliance on the intuitive knowledge of women.

Today, expert edicts continue to force parents to “reflect on their social position and, in doing so, maintain and express their commonality with some [parents] and difference from others” (Litt 2000: 90). For example, advice that advocates exposing young children to stimulating experiences outside the home or confronting neighborhood youngsters about inappropriate public conduct, reflects the nearly ubiquitous assumption in this lexicon that families live in a middle-class environment. Such advice – and the programmatic approaches it spawns in the fields of parenting education, early intervention, and the like – fails utterly to take into account the actual living situations of poor families. As mothers recently interviewed in Yonkers, New York, put it, “I keep my kids inside. There are too many undesirables in the neighborhood,” and “You can’t tell an older kid on the block not to behave a certain way because you don’t know if he’ll hurt your kids later” (as quoted in Grob et al. 2000: 20).

These African American mothers’ responses in Litt’s research and mothers of multiple ethnicities in Grob et al.’s research certainly illustrate the human capacity to resist professional dictates.⁵ Agency remains intact, even within impressive structures of domination, but the micro politics of inclusion in and exclusion from the promise of scientific mothering also act, and act strongly, to amplify existing inequalities – once again along existing lines of domination. Propelled by recent neuroscientific findings regarding brain development in early childhood, the “parenting field” has now spawned a *new* literature on caregiving, and a *new* set of service interventions designed to instruct parents and childcare providers.⁶ A new cadre of “early childhood professionals” now has joined the ranks of medical, therapeutic, and public health workers devoted to articulating and dispensing the latest wisdom. Research is needed to analyze how this contemporary version of “baby expertise” has influenced producing and perpetuating inequality through parenting practices.

Although the discourse and practice of parenting expertise are far from unifying in their effects, they do generate specific forms of inequality between professionals and the entire class of parents. The way our society tries to “educate” parents – and, frequently, even the way it tries to level the playing field for them – tends to depoliticize. By focusing on “lifestyle” choices (such as household routines and interactive styles), the focus shifts away from structures that shape the parenting context – shortage of quality jobs, racism, discrimination against immigrants, and lack of affordable, quality childcare, to name just a few (Balslem 1993; Lupton 2001). We concentrate on what parents do, rather than on why they do it or whether it is realistic for them to do otherwise. Obfuscating the structural underpinnings of parent–child dynamics certainly disadvantages some more than others, but everyone suffers if our dominant systems fail to account for the influence of context on our parenting capacities; that is, if they fail to proceed from the assumption that families “reflect inequality rather than produce it” (Halpern and Weiss 1991: 18).

In spite of the stated intent, this chapter argues that *all* families are disempowered by professionalizing parenting programs and advice. Human-service practices evolved within the already established medical model. From their inception, they relied on the image of professionals as scientific experts; on the preoccupation with finding, diagnosing, and treating pathologies; and on the need to regress all “patients” or “clients” to a common mean defined by a White, middle-class, native-

born standard (Conrad and Schneider 1985; Crane 2000: 3). Workers who staff mental-health, parenting-education, social-welfare, and other programmatic venues “have power over families and are trained to see them as having problems and as needing to be fixed” (Crane 2000: 3). This paradigm does not adequately value lay knowledge nor the expertise about their child’s needs, strengths, moods, and health that parents themselves acquire through the messy, rewarding, daily work of nurturing and tending their children. It does not acknowledge that, while professionals may know a good deal about children in general, nobody knows more about a *particular* child than the people who care for that child, hour by hour, day by day.

In the last decade or so, we began to see a shift in the paradigms that govern understanding of the relationship between families and societal systems. Additionally, a new, competing paradigm has begun to take hold. Changes within the health and human-service fields – that began in the 1970s with, among others, the women’s health and community-health movements – are gaining momentum again under the aegis of family support. The focus of this new movement is away from hierarchical, bureaucratic service systems (that aim to correct families’ problems and deficits) toward “a set of beliefs and an approach to strengthening and empowering families and communities so that they can foster the optimal development of children, youth, and adult family members” (Family Support America 2004). The new movement’s core assumptions are that families bring strengths, not just deficits, to every situation; that every family – not just those in crisis or living in poverty – needs and deserves a range of social supports; and that it is the responsibility of a democracy to promote the well-being of families. Family-support principles undergird specific programs and practices in a range of settings, but the family-support “movement” also is committed to building strong, nurturing communities for families through comprehensive, place-based initiatives, such as those described at the end of the second section.

Conclusion

Parenting, as argued previously, is fundamentally a social process. As such, it reflects and perpetuates the profound inequalities of our larger society. This chapter has suggested that inequality is magnified by differential access to and valuing of parenthood – even before a child is conceived – and that devaluing the messy work of childbearing and childrearing results in further inequities over time. The division of household labor, after children enter the family mix, generally increases gender inequality and differential access to social and cultural capital in neighborhood contexts, and exacerbates differences along lines of race and class. The discourse of expertise and the very tangible practices it spawns in service settings and beyond serve to broaden the gulf between parents and professionals and to separate groups of parents from one another as they strive – with variable success – to find a strong foothold in the mainstream as the baby experts of the day define it.

Ultimately, sedimented structures of race, class, and gender will themselves have to be transformed before more equitable parenting processes emerge on a large scale. Until then, parents will continue to do their best by their own children, often, alas, with little more to support this hard work than their own “slender arms,” and a determination to surmount difficult odds that can be awesome to behold.

In the meantime, however, we must work to build, evaluate, and support efforts to “take parenting public” through organizing new social movements. In the instance of family support, research certainly is warranted to elucidate what it takes to go beyond simple declarations of strength and equality – like those issued by Family Support America, the Search Institute, and a wide array of professional organizations – to crafting a new, more egalitarian, reality. Is family support sufficiently contextual in its assumptions and analysis? Does it take into account political, economic, social, and geographic factors as it theorizes how various parties – providers, parents, employers, government, and community members – can take responsibility for improving the lives of families and children? Can it play a central role in shaping a national or even global “parent’s movement” able to build coalitions across barriers of race and class (Sidelman 2002)? We need to continue asking these and other hard questions to determine how family support – or other such effort – can help us build on the progress women’s health activists, feminists, and others have long struggled to make toward creating a society where we can all do justice to the children the “world’s life” has stranded on our hearts.

Notes

- 1 This aspect of parenting and inequality is beyond the scope of this chapter. See, instead, the chapter by Julia Wrigley and Joanna Dreby in this volume.
- 2 The success rate for in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and other advanced treatments rose, for women aged 34 and under, from 25 percent in 1995 to 32 percent in 1999. The rate for women aged 35–40 is not much more than 20 percent. Women in their early 40s have a less than 10 percent chance that their investment will pay off, no matter how many “rounds” they undergo (Costello 2002).
- 3 The 2000 census recorded a jump in same-sex-partner households (with and without children) from 145,130 in 1990 to more than three times that number today. Researchers estimate that between 1.5 and 5.0 million lesbian mothers reside with their children in the United States (Hequembourg and Farrell 1999).
- 4 Conversely, in adolescence social processes, such as adult supervision, the labor market, and the justice system, have been demonstrated to influence children’s actions and behavior directly.
- 5 Fraser (1989: 177–81) provides a thought-provoking taxonomy of forms client resistance typically takes – ranging from displacement and modification of official interpretations, to altering the uses and meanings of interventions, to explicit political organizing “as clients.”
- 6 One Yonkers woman interviewed in 2000 captured the popular perception that parenting advice is abundant, ever-changing, and normative when she commented, “it’s hard to keep up-to-date on all the changing health concerns and prevention efforts I should be doing with my kids” (Grob et al. 2000: 125).

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Chapter 12

Migrant Networks: a Summary and Critique of Relational Approaches to International Migration

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In recent years, research on immigration and ethnic communities has increasingly regarded networks as essential sources of social organization and resource mobilization. Scholars find the examination of networks to be valuable because such arrangements are inherently relational. Their analysis directs our attention toward the location of migrants within broader contexts – kinship groups, communities, economic activities, and nation-states – in countries of origin and settlement, and in between. In addition, the network approach is better equipped for examining migrants' experience in light of agency and structure than are single-level neoclassical and world-systems approaches that have dominated studies of international migration.

This chapter summarizes network-based approaches to international migration (as well as kindred formulations, such as social capital, and ethnic groups and communities) by drawing on a variety of case studies. It then identifies problems in the way that the approach has been applied. Finally, it concludes by asserting that many studies of migrant networks have been limited to the singular topic of resource access and, consequently, have not investigated networks' broader, noneconomic implications, such as transmitting culture, sustaining inequalities, and shaping meaning systems.

Neoclassical, World-systems, and Network Approaches to Migration

Neoclassical economics depicts wage differentials as determining migration. Its macro formulation sees migration as a consequence of geographical differences in the availability of and demand for labor, such that workers will leave countries with large supplies of labor and less capital for locations wherein greater amounts of capital and limited supplies of labor yield higher wages (Massey et al. 1993: 433). The micro neoclassical model understands migration to be determined by atomized,

choice-making individuals who go abroad with the expectation of enhanced returns on their labor.

An alternative macro model, that of the world system, attributes migration to the penetration of capitalistic relations into peripheral, noncapitalistic societies, thus creating a mobile population that is prone to traveling abroad. Rather than attributing migration solely to economic factors, world-system theorists see actions carried out by capitalists and states acting on their behalf to take advantage of land, materials, labor, and consumer markets in peripheral countries as the force driving migration (Burawoy 1976; Portes and Borocz 1989; Massey et al. 1993: 445).

The effects of the global system not only dislocate workers from traditional occupations and induce their movement abroad to find alternative means of economic survival. In addition, as a consequence of colonialism, military interventions, media saturation, and the marketing of goods, potential migrants also develop cultural, educational, ideological, and economic links to specific capitalist societies as well – India to the UK, Morocco to France, Mexico and the Philippines to the USA, and so on (Castles and Miller 1998). World-system theory sees international migration as ultimately having little to do with wage rates or employment differences between countries. Rather, it argues that migration is to a large extent the consequence of market creation and the structure of the global economy (Massey et al. 1993: 448).

Interpretations of migration derived from micro and macro neoclassical economics formulations and the world-system perspective maintain several contrasting assumptions. For example, while the choice-based, micro-neoclassical version emphasizes migrants' individual agency and attends little to the constraining impact of structure, the two macro outlooks see migration as a structurally determined process and fail to incorporate agency. However, what all three approaches have in common is that they explain migration by concentrating on a single level of analysis (be it micro or macro) rather than a confluence of multiple factors and relationships. By focusing on a single level of analysis, these models downplay the influence of human groups and relationships in motivating, supporting, directing and giving meaning to migration (Castles and Miller 1998; Faist 2000; Zelizer 2002). They also largely disregard issues of inequality in terms of work, reward, responsibility, and decision making along the lines of fundamental social categories of gender, class, age, religion, ethnicity, and legal status, which are significant sources of stratification in virtually all migrant populations, and social groups more generally (Tilly 1990; Sanders 2002). "Where economic analysis postulates only the importance of interests and resources, by recognizing [social inequalities including] gender, we can see instead how people are creating, maintaining and transforming social relations" (Zelizer 2002: 111).

Finally, in their emphasis on labor migration, both neoclassical and world-systems models obscure collective and identity-based motives for crossing borders – forced migration, military conquest, ideologically or religiously motivated travel, political and cultural links between peoples, regions, and nations; family unification, and the like. As the authors of an influential migration study assert: "World systems theorists have tended to reduce migration to labor migration and immigrants to workers, eliminating all discussions of the many different racial, ethnic or national identities which shape people's actions and consciousness" (Basch et al. 1994: 12).

By understanding international migration as a network-based process, scholars are better able to consider both macro and micro factors and integrate them into the rich fabric of affiliations that shape migration, resettlement, and enduring ties to the country of origin. The network approach emphasizes that migration is embedded in a series of political, ethnic, familial, and communal relationships and environments, including some that cross borders. Through it, we see that migrating populations often remain connected to more than one national context. Finally, network approaches understand migration as a collective process shaped by both agency and structure. Migrants are creative and resourceful, but they often confront significant, sometimes insurmountable, obstacles in building communities, adjusting to host societies, and maintaining links to coethnics at home and abroad.

For the purposes of this chapter, I use Thomas Faist's inclusive approach to the concept:

A network is defined as a set of individual or collective actors – ranging from individuals, families, firms and nation-states – and the relations that couple them. . . . Network patterns of ties comprise social, economic, political networks of interaction, as well as collectives such as groups – kinship groups or communities – and private or public associations. Network is a concept or strategy to study how resources, goods and ideas flow through particular configurations of social and symbolic ties. (2000: 51–2)

A closely related concept is social capital. Denoting the web of connections, loyalties, and mutual obligations (shared fate, solidarity, and communal membership) that develop among people as part of their regular interaction, social capital refers to the sense of commitment that induces people to extend favors, expect preferential treatment, and look out for one another's interests (Coleman 1988; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993: 1322; Granovetter 1995; Putnam 1995; Woolcock 1998). In fact, many scholars refer to networks to define social capital (Light and Gold 2000; Lin 2001).

In many cases, social capital lodged in migrant networks offers definite advantages over the detached and legalistic forms of cooperation that underlie impersonal economic exchange. This can be attributed to the flexible nature of human relationships in which it is embedded. Further, because the use of social capital tends to reinforce the relationships from which it originates, its consumption may actually increase rather than deplete its availability in a given context (Light and Gold 2000). Finally, unlike resources availed through impersonal market transactions, social capital is often delivered within an environment of human caring and concern (Gold 2002b). At the same time, however, social capital can only be created at a cost. Forms of mutual obligation involved in the maintenance of migrant networks can diminish the value of resources by limiting individual freedom, requiring assets to be shared, mandating contributions to community welfare, permitting "free riding" and the like (Leba 1985; Hechter 1987; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).

Finally, a third formulation, that of the ethnic group or community, is also interchangeable with the migrant network (Pessar 1997). For example, in *Beyond the Melting Pot*, one of the first studies of migration to understand ethnicity as contextual and network-based rather than primordial, Glazer and Moynihan described how "the ethnic group in American society became not a survival from the age of mass immigration but a new social form" that connected people to their group, not

only by ties of family and friendship but also of interest. As widely emphasized by contemporary scholars of migration networks, Glazer and Moynihan claimed that ethnic groups were characterized by the interplay of both “rational economic interests and other interests or attitudes that stem out of group history,” which thus make for “an incurably complex political and social situation” involving both sentiment and formal ties of organization, which are re-formed to reflect new situations and to create new forms of order (1963: 16–17).

When we view migration via a network approach, it transforms our understanding of it from a single event, directed toward individualistic assimilation into the host society, to a multilevel process of developing relations with a variety of groups, including fellow migrants, members of the host society, family and friends in the country of origin, and often, conationals settled in third countries (Goldring 1998; Ong 1999; Faist 2000; Portes 2001).

By considering the effects of various networks – ranging from personal contacts among family members and friends to “migration channels” (broad patterns of social linkage developed within industries, religious groups, social movements, academic networks, and cultural communities) – on migration we become able to bridge the gap between micro and macro perspectives (Findlay and Li 1998). In so doing, we appreciate that contemporary migrants travel across geographic space and national borders but, at the same time, often remain within known networks. These provide newcomers with resources and a sense of familiarity in otherwise unknown settings. As such, the culture shock associated with moving is moderated. Yes, migrants are in a different national environment. But in coming there, they are able to maintain a way of life – socially, economically, linguistically, and even in terms of diet and recreation – that is not so very different from the one they have left behind. Accordingly, the experience of migration may be quite distinct from that conjured up in established literature that assumes geographical movement necessarily yields loss of social ties, social isolation, and a diametric opposition between identities and outlooks associated with the country of origin, on one hand, and the host society, on the other (Schuetz 1944).

Reflecting the power of conational networks that bridge the country of origin and community of settlement, an Israeli real estate agent in London describes her feelings of comfort with what its members call “the Israeli swamp.”

Interviewer: Do you feel like an outsider or a minority here?

Dalia: No, because I live in here, among all the Israelis, I feel at home here. I don't feel a minority here. If we lived in a far away village with no Israelis around – I'm sure I would have felt different about this. But here – I feel really comfortable. I feel at home. (Gold 2002a: 52–3)

Reasons for Studying Migrant Networks

The recent popularity of network understandings of migration is best appreciated in light of the broader history of approaches to migration and ethnic diversity that has developed in Western societies over the last 100 years. Prior to the 1960s, most scholarship on immigration and ethnicity saw the cultural outlooks of migrating populations as either irrelevant or as a hindrance to their adjustment to the host

society. Assured in the superiority of host-society cultural forms, scholars generally concluded that in order to achieve success, migrants should adopt the practices, outlooks, language, family values, and orientations of the host society as quickly as possible. Such assimilationist views were widely shared not only by politicians and corporate employers, like the Ford Motor Company sociology department (which sought to teach workers' families Ford's version of the values and practices of the American middle class), but also by the academics and settlement house workers of the Chicago School; and even by coethnic proximal hosts, such as leaders of established religious communities, who wanted to guide the adaptation of recently arrived coreligionists who settled in the USA as well as France and Great Britain during the early twentieth century (Liptak 1989; Lissak 1989; Hyman 1998).

Since migrants' own collective practices were seen as inferior to those of the host society, analysts attended to them only as anthropological curiosities, or in order to inform what would later be described as the "culture of poverty" thesis in order to explain migrants' "irrational" or backward behavior (Banfield 1974). Exemplifying this outlook is the fact that during the early twentieth century, American intellectuals regarded immigrants as both genetically and culturally inferior. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Henry Adams, and academics, like University of Wisconsin sociologist E. A. Ross and Harvard psychologist William McDougall, were equally vitriolic. They asserted that Jews, Asians, and Southern and Eastern Europeans were racially distinct from the Northern European, Protestant population of America and believed that their interbreeding with old American stock would yield national degeneration (Dinnerstein et al. 1990; Simon 1997: 19). By the late 1920s, their demands for immigration restriction had been fully implemented (Gabaccia 1994). Given that migrants' own views and actions were either irrelevant or defective, it is easy to see why behaviorist and deterministic understandings prevailed.

Motivated by social and academic movements that have taken place since the 1960s – civil rights, immigrant rights, feminism, multiculturalism, postcolonialism and the like – scholars and activists have been increasingly interested in the experience of non-elite groups. They have brushed aside the grand narratives of functionalism, orthodox Marxism, and positivism to explore how immigrants themselves have drawn strength from their own social forms and have been able to rely upon collective resources to resist assimilationist agendas by the host societies and paternalistic resettlement programs created by coethnic elites (Blauner 1972; Smith 1990; Takaki 1993; Calhoun 1994). Since the 1960s, increasing numbers of academics and social activists in various countries have recognized that immigrant communities' outlooks and cultural practices are in many ways superior to those of the native middle class. Realms of accomplishment include fostering economic self-sufficiency and advancement, propelling academic achievement, encouraging stable family lives, supporting altruistic behavior, social support, protection from the impact of racism and discrimination, and even producing positive physical and mental health (Chiswick 1988; Caplan et al. 1992; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Further, such research demonstrates that many such beneficial communities, organizations, and networks were created or retained as a reaction to the exclusion, discrimination, and assimilationist agendas imposed upon them by the host society.

The study of networks has revealed that resource-providing solidarity and trust is in many cases an outcome of migrants' shared experience of discrimination (Light

1984). "Those who came in with some kind of disadvantage, created by a different language, a different religion, a different race, found both comfort and material support in creating various kinds of organizations" (Glazer and Moynihan 1963: 18). Realizing the positive value of migrants' own social forms, scholars began to study the way that such arrangements worked (Foner et al. 2000). Researchers found that within ethnic settings, actors rely upon social capital created by their collective membership to reach common ends. Groups' aggregated resources, including trust and cooperation, help them overcome the disadvantages of outsider status and maximize the value of their human and financial capital in order to achieve economic stability or betterment and develop supportive social environments (Light and Bonacich 1988; Bailey and Waldinger 1991; Kasinitz 1992; Zhou 1992; Gold 1994a,b).

A vast body of research, far too large to be summarized here, has identified an array of benefits delivered by migrant networks. However, selected central findings are listed below for illustrative purposes. Well-documented advantages provided by migrant networks include lower costs of travel, easier adjustment to the host society, assistance in creating businesses and finding jobs, bidirectional conveyance of financial and social remittances, protection from racism, and communal advocacy and leadership.

Assistance in migration and resettlement

Patterns of social connection between veteran migrants and coethnics already established in host societies have long been known to provide potential and new migrants with information, resources, housing, jobs, travel funds, and other benefits (Portes and Bach 1985). As a consequence, the costs and risks associated with international migration are reduced, making the benefits of border crossing available to a diverse array of those in origin communities, including persons with fewer economic resources and lower levels of status. "In communities with a well-developed migratory tradition . . . nonmigrants have access to valuable social capital that can be used to facilitate movement" (Massey et al. 1994: 1495). Once established, this pattern of cumulative causation associated with mature migration networks provides means for exchanging information and resources in both directions (Joseph 1914; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1998; Sabar 2000).

Several authors have observed that ethnic communal life features a moral element that mandates mutual obligation and pro-social behavior (Coleman 1988; Kibria 1993; Wilson 1996; Portes 1998). For example, Light reveals that welfare activities conducted by Chinese and Japanese immigrant regional associations were run on a "moralistic rather than professional" footing (1972: 110–11). As such, the migrant community, not a distant bureaucracy, was responsible for service delivery. Potential for abuse is limited, since benefits that kin and associates know are not needed will not be delivered. Ethnic obligations are understood to be mutual rather than based on charity or *noblesse oblige*. Moreover, ethnic/migrant organizations could compel coethnics to care for their own relatives, thus relieving the broader community of this burden. Along the same lines, ethnic fraternal and rotating credit associations also maintain moral authority, because membership within them is based on a good reputation. Those who fail to conform to group standards are denied access (Vélez-Ibañez 1983; Gold 1994a).

With such resources available, migrants may be more likely to settle permanently and bring family members to join them. A critical mass of conational migrants in the point of destination provides a recent arrival with a wide array of familiar services, goods, and needs – what Breton (1964) called an institutionally complete community – that allows him or her to become oriented, find a job, obtain health care, and enjoy a social life in an otherwise unfamiliar setting (Markowitz 1993).

Religious organizations play vital roles in providing communal resources to many immigrant communities, often extending assistance in both directions (Kim 1981; Min 1998; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000). Since the publication of Thomas and Znaniecki's (1920) classic study of Polish-American transnationalism, observers have noted that migrant congregations provided a whole variety of important functions, extending far beyond the realm of religion to the provision of social services and a sense of community identification (Warner and Wittner 1998). The specifically national character of the ethnic church is essential to its role in establishing links to migrant communities. In addition to their delivery of services, many religious communities require specific contributions to the public good, such as tithing, providing interest-free loans, volunteer effort, ritual giving, and the like (Tenenbaum 1993). In return, gifts are celebrated within these ethno-religious contexts (Ritterband 1991; Walbridge 1997). One beneficiary of donations is religiously based voluntary agencies (called VOLAGS in government jargon), which have played major roles in resettling refugees into countries of final destination and also in supporting refugee camps throughout the world (Salomon 1991; Gold 1992, 1995a).

Entrepreneurial resources

A sizable body of research demonstrates that migrant and coethnic networks provide their members with a wide selection of resources useful for engaging in entrepreneurship (Wilson and Allen Martin 1982; Waldinger et al. 1990; Min 1996; Rath 2002). Such benefits include information, job training, loyal employees, customers, investment capital, political representation, goods for sale, import/export services, protection from crime, and the ability to control competition (Light 1972; Portes and Bach 1985; Light and Gold 2000). Such networks range in scope from the local neighborhood to transnational arrangements (Rath 2002). The findings of this research reveal that ethnic businesses are not simply places where customers purchase goods and services and owners earn a living. Instead, they are embedded in a wide variety of communal and personal relationships that are central to collective life (Suttles 1968; Light and Gold 2000). Reflecting on the importance of his network in providing business capital is the following quote from a Soviet Jewish entrepreneur in San Francisco: "I have over 30 relatives in San Francisco and they didn't have a choice [about giving money]. They were my relatives. . . . I just said 'I gotta have it'" (Gold 1992: 180).

Job finding

In addition to assisting migrants to become self-employed, migrant networks also help their members find jobs in existing firms, whether they are owned by coethnics, members of the larger society, or by the public or nonprofit sector (Granovetter 1995). Referral by friends removes some of the uncertainty associated with finding a

job with unfamiliar employers, and reduces the chances of being abused or not paid. Friends provide transportation, show the new worker how to perform the job, and look out for his or her interests (Gold 1995b). Employers realize that this practice is beneficial for them as well. Little cost or effort need be expended when new workers are located through employees' contacts. "In the absence of unusual shortages or other strong pressures, managers fill vacancies in the easiest way . . . overwhelmingly on word of mouth – the natural cheapest route to a reliable labor supply. Information passes through informal networks of kin, friends and coworkers, which, of course, are based on ethnic, religious and racial groups and social strata" (Wilensky and Lawrence 1979: 215). Moreover, such hires are likely to be competent and reliable, since present workers must accept responsibility for them.

A growing body of research reveals that employers make hiring decisions on the basis of racial, ethnic, national, and gender preferences (Wilson 1996; Kim 1999). In the United States, employers often favor foreigners over natives, Latinos and Asians over Blacks or Whites, and the undocumented rather than legal migrants or citizens (Holzer 1987; Waters 1994; Waldinger 1996; Wilson 1996; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Since employers seek an ethnically defined workforce, they find coethnic networks to be an efficient means of locating prospective employees. Finally, Waldinger (1994: 15) demonstrates how hiring networks among Indian workers have resulted in their rapid entry into technical and professional positions in the New York City government, despite the agency's reputation as a constricted bureaucracy that changes at a snail's pace. During the 1980s, while total employment in the city's Transport Department little more than doubled, the employment of Asians increased by a factor of 4.5, ultimately accounting for a fifth of all workers.

A coethnic labor force has considerable potential for labor solidarity, and both historical and contemporary labor history is ripe with examples of the collective origination of immigrant workers – from Finnish miners and Jewish needleworkers of the nineteenth century, to Japanese farmworkers of the early twentieth century, to Latino domestic and janitorial workers of the current era (Cummings 1980; Jiobu 1988; Delgado 1993; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001).

Financial and social remittances

Networks offer a trustworthy means of providing capital to the home country to support relatives, educate children, and improve local infrastructure (Piore 1979; Levitt 2001). As a case in point, in the late 1980s, Indian and Pakistani workers remitted sums in excess of \$2 billion annually to their respective homelands, amounts that equaled the value of 15 percent of all imports for India, and 30 percent of imports for Pakistan (Castles and Miller 1993: 158). In recent years, 30 million foreign workers worldwide were believed to remit over \$67 billion annually to their homelands. If accurate, this figure would place labor second only to oil in world trade (Castles and Miller 1998: 5). For various countries, remittances are a major source of foreign exchange and are attributed with maintaining the survival and political stability of various developing societies. Funds originating in the country of origin or offshore networks can assist migrants in establishing businesses, obtaining citizenship, or implementing a foothold for later arrivals (Loewen 1971; Nonini and Ong 1997; Portes 1998; Smith 1998; Gold 2000).

Networks also provide social remittances: “ideas, behaviors and social capital that flow from one place to another” (Levitt 2001: 11). These include information about politics, gender roles, careers, styles of consumption, and the like. Under the right circumstances, information brought back by visitors and remigrants and through border-crossing chains of communication can yield innovations and transformations in social practices. For example, Levitt (2001) and Morawska (2001) demonstrate how such social remittance can create and enforce demands that government, political parties, and religious congregations be run on an efficient and ethical basis in countries of origin. Return migrants bring modern production techniques learned during employment in the host society back to the country of origin to enhance the productivity of industrial concerns (Gold 2000). Migrant networks also provide information about cultural styles that can be used to develop new businesses and social forms in countries of settlement. For example, Bhachu (2003) and Maira (2002) describe how Indian cultural practices are established in the UK and USA in a way that allows migrants to earn a living and create hip social scenes that combine elements from both the country of origin and the host society in a manner that appeals to both coethnics and members of the larger society.

Protection from hostile environments

Networks can protect immigrants from racism and discrimination. First, coethnic networks and communities provide a degree of insulation from interactions with antagonistic out-group members (Bobb 2001). Second, ethnic groups that develop self-help activities avoid dependency on external entities and reduce out-group control (Thomas and Znaniecki 1920; Cummings 1980). This is an important concern, because out-group help may be unavailable, carry restrictions, or be dispensed in a condescending manner. Established members of various national, ethnic, and religious communities have created assimilation programs for recently arrived coethnics. While such programs are sometimes paternalistic, they do deliver valuable lessons of orientation in the host society (Howe 1976; deVoe 1981; Dumenil 1991; Portes et al. 1999).

At the same time, racialized migrants with low-prestige jobs can maintain a positive self-image by traveling to the country of origin, where their philanthropic endeavors endow them with high status in their home villages (Mahler 1998; Smith 1998). Similarly, immigrant and minority children can be shielded from the mean streets and denigrating stereotypes of the host society by spending periods of time in their families’ countries of origin (Chamberlin 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Gold 2002a).

Leadership and community building

The elites of migrant communities provide leadership to coethnics for both altruistic and self-interested reasons. A major motive has been to avoid inflaming prejudice. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, established Jews in Western Europe and North America accurately predicted that a sizable influx of exotic, radical, and Orthodox Eastern European coreligionists would increase anti-Semitism in such a way as to make life more difficult for the

entire Jewish population in the point of settlement. Accordingly, they created numerous resettlement programs (Wirth 1928; Howe 1976; Pollins 1984; Hyman 1998: 122). In the United States, this included the Galveston Movement, which encouraged Jewish migrants to the United States to settle in Texas, far from New York where an enormous community had already taken hold (Gold 1999).

Migrant elites also encouraged the Americanization of coethnics, paradoxically, in order to preserve a coethnic constituency of workers, customers, and political supporters. For example, some communal leaders astutely observed that coethnic migrants were rapidly adopting American customs and, if a way of combining traditional and American social forms were not developed, the ethnic mode would cease to exist altogether. As Glazer and Moynihan (1963) and Greeley (1974) have observed, Italian and Polish ethnic identities are largely a product of these groups' experiences in the United States – not the country of origin (Portes 1998). US-based ethnic communities played an important role in the creation or transformation of these identities.

Moreover, many newly arrived immigrants affiliated on the basis of localized feelings of connection to a family, a village, a region, or a particular religious leader or movement. Host society ethnic communities and organizations played a major role in transforming these specific and localized identities into more inclusive ones that were of greater political and economic utility in the new context. Once national ethnic associations took shape, goals had to be established that would transcend local interests and sustain an inclusive identity among newcomers from diverse regional and social backgrounds. "It was precisely this need that moved national fraternalists to become one of the chief forces for generating a strong attachment" to groups' common origins, an attachment that was loose and poorly developed upon arrival (Bodnar 1985: 128).

National fraternalists encouraged Americanization also because high rates of return by immigrants would deprive ethnic enterprises of their labor force and financial base and ethnic organizations of their constituencies. Americanization, English, and sports programs were especially directed toward children. "National fraternalists reached forward under the banner of Americanization and backward under the guise of ethnic identity in order to sustain the loyalty of large portions of immigrant communities" (Bodnar 1985: 128).

Networks can bridge what economic sociologist Ron Burt (1992) calls "structural holes." Through his study of corporate managers, Burt determined that individuals able to broker beneficial information and resources between distinct, otherwise disconnected, networks were especially effective and successful at their jobs. "People on either side of a structural hole circulate in different flows of information. Structural holes are thus an opportunity to be a broker of information between people, and control the projects that bring people together from opposite sides of the hole" (Burt 2000: 4). Under the right circumstances, they can allow migrants with few resources to develop important ties to more powerful individuals and groups in various social settings. This applies both to coethnics and to out-group members, such as employers, NGOs, and the like (Howe 1976; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Gold 2002b). For example, Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001) describes how migrant women develop networks that put them in contact with affluent suburbanites seeking domestic services. Such networks bring together women from very different class backgrounds and yield mutual benefits in the form of jobs

for workers and domestic labor for employees. Menjívar (2000: 238) makes a similar assertion, suggesting that because their networks are relatively weaker than men's, migrant women "in their efforts to procure goods for themselves and their families, are induced to forge ties with people beyond their immediate milieu." In so doing, they generate weak ties and transcend structural holes, strategies that are celebrated by economic sociologists as effective means of accessing resources (Granovetter 1995).

Migrants' networks provide important footing for political leadership. Such actions are manifested in many forms, ranging from office holding to informal efforts to influence the political process on a group's behalf. As Light and Bonacich (1988), Min (1996), and others have pointed out, financial contributions from business owners' networks permit members of immigrant groups who are not eligible to vote, to exert influence over American political decision-making.

While proletarian migrants often need the political and financial assistance of middle-class coethnics, at the same time, elites rely on the coethnic rank and file as workers, customers, and political constituents and as an object for their philanthropic endeavors (Portes 1987). Historian John Bodnar (1985: 139) describes this process: "As the social distance between the classes in each group widened, those moving into higher social categories did not simply abandon those left behind." "Frequently, they made vigorous attempts to preach the advantages of hard work and efficiency they now believed explained their own success and the value of ethnic identity, an element which generated the cohesiveness necessary for many to succeed and attain positions of group leadership." Such discussion not only muted class and regional conflict within ethnic communities, but also provided a source of meaningful ties with the past and with coethnics, which was much in need during times of rapid social change.

Problems in the Study of Migrant Networks

Despite the many insights generated through the study of migrant networks, there have also been several problems with the way such investigations have been conducted. Key difficulties include a tendency to regard networks as only positive and egalitarian in effect, the practical challenges posed when scholars attempt to study the complex array of networks that proliferate in many migrant communities, and the propensity of some scholars to define migrant networks in an overly narrow manner. Finally, a recent body of writing contends that many analysts of networks have limited themselves to rational and economic concerns while disregarding the broader range of social, cultural, and symbolic issues over which networks exert influence (Zelizer 2002; Hirsch 2003; White 2003). With the correction of these flaws, our broader understanding of migrant and ethnic communities will be enhanced.

Overly positive studies

Many studies of migrant networks were initiated to identify positive aspects of immigrant collective life in order to counter the largely negative depictions thereof that were pervasive prior to the 1970s. However, careful analysis reveals pernicious

impacts as well. Waldinger (1994) has referred to these as “the other side of embeddedness,” while Portes (1998) terms it “negative social capital.” Networks clearly provide migrants with a variety of resources. However, given the diverse characteristics of emigrant populations and the varied locations in which they settle, it is important to note that these networks provide different kinds of resources to their members, reveal disparate criteria for participation, and may be more or less exclusive in permitting people to join. As suggested by Tilly (1990), Waldinger and Lichter (2003), and Portes et al. (1999), migrant networks – like other collectives – are capable of restricting membership and withholding benefits as well as providing resources. They may bestow new opportunities to some, while limiting the options of others.

Networks brought into being by immigration serve to create and perpetuate inequality. Lest anyone think that solidarity and mutual aid have nothing but gratifying results, we should recognize two things: (1) members of immigrant groups often exploit one another as they would not dare to exploit the native-born; and (2) every inclusion also constitutes an exclusion (Tilly 1990: 92).

Migrant networks sometimes involve the abuse of distressed workers and consumers, keep alive outdated business practices, and drain valuable resources from communities with few to spare. After examining the hourly returns on capital and labor invested in small businesses owned by educated Asian immigrants, economist Timothy Bates (1997) concludes that such operations should not be considered successful, as has been the contention of many sociologists but, rather, as instances of underemployment. Bates further alleges that ethnic businesses that come into being through communal funding are the most likely to fail.

Like-minded critics argue that migrant networks function not as springboards to affluence but, rather, as mobility traps to all but owners and a few high-level employees. Workers encounter low wages, long hours, and poor working conditions and are offered few opportunities to learn the host society language or other skills required to move beyond bottom-rung jobs (Bonacich 1987; Sanders and Nee 1987; Powers and Seltzer 1998). Ethnic employment also means that benefits provided by unions or government regulations are usually unavailable. Contradicting Portes and Bach's (1985) contention that employment in the ethnic enclave economy is beneficial to coethnic workers, two studies of Vietnamese refugee adaptation in the United States determined that employment in the ethnic economy was associated with low wages and lack of promotion (Desbarats 1986; Johnson 1988). Under these circumstances, ethnic solidarity may actually function as a liability to ethnic economic development, causing immigrant entrepreneurs and workers alike to seek out more favorable networks that offer relations with employers and labor or consumer markets beyond their own community (Lyman 1974; Kim 1999; Gold 2002a).

Finally, since there is an unequal allocation of social capital in society, critics point out that network membership is not immediately available to all and that collective resources can only be obtained at a cost. Forms of mutual obligation involved in gaining and maintaining access to social networks can diminish the value of resources by limiting individual freedom, requiring assets to be shared, mandating contributions to community welfare, permitting “free riding” by compatriots and the like (Hechter 1987; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). When network participa-

tion is dependent on high financial cost or ascriptive factors – such as age, gender, race, religion, class, citizenship, and the like – those lacking the appropriate attributes are effectively blocked from acquiring social capital (Tilly 1990; Portes 1998; Gold 2001).

Migrant communities and networks can and do limit social, political, and economic options for their members, and, in most cases, are unable to provide all of their members with needed resources. Ethnic elites may manipulate the broader group for their own benefit. As Menjívar's (2000) work on Salvadoran migrants demonstrates, demands made by ethnic groups on their networks sometimes result in an excessive burden on a community already marked by scarce resources, resulting in the collapse of networks at a significant cost to all involved. Recent studies have extensively documented what might be termed "the downside of social remittances," whereby migrant networks transport drug use, gang behavior, predatory sexuality, unsustainable patterns of consumption, and even terrorism from one society to another (Matthei and Smith 1998; Schein 1998; Levitt 2001; Lichtblau 2003).

Immigrant networks maintain inequalities. As Sanders asserts, "Enclave economies, like other market-driven systems, not only generate wealth, they also generate stratification. Thus the economic actions of the new immigrants should not be overly romanticized" (2002: 339). Since social capital exists within networks, its presence does not resolve problems of social inequality (Putnam 1995). Instead, a network-based understanding of social capital directs us to examine its unequal distribution. Some individuals or groups have greater access to social capital than others. Further, depending on the endowments of their members, two networks maintaining similar levels of social capital may have recourse to very different amounts of resources (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Dallalgar 1994; Wacquant 1998).

A number of scholars see ethnic economies as yielding mixed blessing in terms of inequality. For example, Waldinger (1994, 1996) Waldinger and Lichter (2003), and Waters (1994, 1999) each describe how ethnic networks provide members of certain groups with jobs and opportunities precisely by limiting others' access to these protected domains (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). As Edna Bonacich writes: "Ethnic communities can also behave as corporate entities that protect their own and treat the outside world as morally irrelevant. Anything is permissible when you deal with . . . the strangers, the outsiders, the nonmembers. . . . They can legitimately be taken advantage of" (1987: 453).

Network-based transnational ties, identities, and resources do provide some migrants with options for addressing the problems they confront, but the resources they deliver are not a cure-all (Basch et al. 1994). In fact, transnationalism may impose a whole new set of obstacles and difficulties (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Amy Chua (2003) has written about how during political transformations and economic crises, transnational entrepreneurs, including Koreans in the United States, Chinese in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, and Jews in post-Soviet Russia have been singled out as scapegoats by discontented members of host societies. Such hostility is partly the outcome of the entrepreneurs' accessing profit-making opportunities beyond the reach of established members of the receiving society (Light and Bonacich 1988; Zenner 1991). As a result, entrepreneurs and their families are

viciously attacked and the highly successful businesses they created are destroyed (Min 1996; Yoon 1997; Ong 1999).

Further, despite their extensive and well-documented transnational networks, some populations, such as Dominican and Mexican migrants in the USA, continue to face considerable hardship and impoverishment (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Hernández and Torres-Saillant 1996; Ortiz 1996; Waldinger 1996). The structural and economic conditions that lead angry mobs to loot ethnic businesses or limit the economic prospects of poorly educated migrants are largely beyond rectification through the resources and identities exchanged along transnational networks. As Wacquant (1998) argues, immigrants' social capital has little chance of making up for social deficits brought on by dramatic political and economic changes, and wholesale disinvestment by government and industry.

Leadership comes at a cost. Those who control networks can manipulate or even exploit members. Historically, various immigrant elites in the United States have discouraged labor activism among coethnic workers, while the Japanese-American bourgeoisie advocated the acceptance of discrimination and residential segregation in order to avoid creating resentment among Whites (Bodnar 1985: 140). More recently, Orlando Patterson (1977) and Paul Gilroy (2000) have written about the way that ethnic leaders and proximal hosts sometimes manipulate group identity in a manner that hinders prospects for the rank and file. In general, the fewer social and economic options available to the rank and file, the greater the power of coethnic elites over them. For example, pre-Second World War American Chinatowns featured both robust ethnic economies and despotic rulers. These interrelated conditions could be traced to the discrimination, linguistic isolation, and ethnic loyalty characteristic of such enclaves (Light 1972; Lyman 1974; Chow 1996).

More recently, some Asian immigrant groups who live and do business in inner-city environments complain that established Asian American organizations ignore their political concerns in order to avoid endangering established political coalitions with native minority populations. While African American organizations are described as unresponsive to Asian immigrants' difficulties, Korean-American activist Elaine Kim ultimately blames established Asian American groups for imposing definitions of inequality emphasized in the Black-White model that do not incorporate the experience of the recently arrived:

Recent immigrants' experience with anti-Asian violence is black and brown. . . . Asian American organizations that refuse to consider the possibility of non-white anti-Asian violence keep us trapped in old black-white paradigm of race relations, which some African American community leaders cling to, to avoid losing ground to Asians and Latinos. (Kim 1994: 87)

In a highly networked environment, both individuals and groups lacking networks are especially at a loss. As Waldinger and Lichter note, this can enhance ethnic conflict for an entire region: "[T]he embedding of immigrant networks within the Los Angeles economy . . . produces a segmented system, providing new incentives and mechanisms for contention over the ethnic division of labor and its fruits" (2003: 98).

While providing job referrals is a benefit, employers can use work-related networks to exploit immigrants. As numerous studies of ethnic labor markets demon-

strate, employers often rely on ethnic networks to access workers who are flexible, hard-working, unlikely to unionize, and willing to tolerate low wages and other forms of abuse (Massey et al. 1994; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Workers who rely on closed coethnic networks have few opportunities for better wages or work circumstances. By their acceptance of such conditions of employment, they not only minimize their own compensation but, further, may unwittingly lower wages for at least some others seeking employment as well (Fix and Passell 1994). As Krissman (2000), Calavita (1992), Sassen (1995), and others demonstrate, the benefits to employers of obtaining low-cost and recently arrived foreign workers who are highly dependent on networks can be considerable. Accordingly, employers often seek to recruit workers directly from overseas and use both legal means – such as labor certification programs – and informal methods – such as employing conational labor recruiters, to acquire them.

Immigrant networks do not always engage in an altruistic allotment of communal resources. Rather, they sometimes rely on power, coethnic knowledge, and invidious distinctions to exploit those who have the least. For example, in *Growing up American*, Zhou and Bankston (1998) demonstrate how a community of Vietnamese Catholics in New Orleans carefully marshals social capital that allows them to propel the educational success of their children. However, the study also reveals that this migrant community maximizes financial and motivational resources for its best and brightest children by denigrating the lack of success of their African American neighbors and stigmatizing as “Americanized” Vietnamese youth who associate with Blacks and emulate their demeanor.

A large body of research on ethnic networks focuses on the importance of family and kinship as the base of such organizations. Groups who have few other resources are especially dependent upon families for providing the basics of survival. Members prize their connections and develop various means for sharing scarce resources and reinforcing their connections to one another (Stack 1974; Gold and Kibria 1993; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Stepick 1998).

Some perspectives on migrant families, such as “the new economics of migration,” assume that network participation is equally beneficial for all members of migrant families (Massey et al. 1993). However, a growing chorus of research indicates that this is not always the case. Families are not simply cooperative economic units. Rather, they are made up of men and women and generational groups with different interests, needs, orientations, and resources. Consequently, families are locations of conflict and negotiation among members with regard to the allocation of prestige, responsibility, assets, decision making, group identity, and moral credibility (Andezian 1986). Family earnings are not always shared equally among family members (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992; Kibria 1993; Pessar 1999).

Several scholars concerned with gendered inequalities insist that network-based migrant economies are consistently exploitative of women and other family members (Pessar 1999; Song 1999). Within such environments, women remain within the “helper” role, while husbands reserve business assets and decision making for themselves. In the case of the husband’s death, divorce, or abandonment, women may find themselves with nothing to show for a life of hard work (Min 1998).

While agreeing that women's labor makes ethnic families more affluent, Greta Gilbertson submits that the increased affluence and leisure time generated by female labor often accrue to men:

Dominican and Colombian women do not benefit from working in Hispanic-owned firms in New York City. . . . Our results suggest that ethnic ties do not confer advantages to women workers. Thus, some of the success of immigrant small-business owners and workers in the ethnic enclave is due to the marginal position of immigrant women. Stated more plainly, enclave employment is most exploitative of women. (1995: 668)

Vietnamese women's network-based economic activities have been shown to generate significant social and financial resources (Gold 1992). However, women seldom use these to maintain autonomy or to separate themselves fully from the control of male family members and the coethnic community (Kibria 1993). Rather, refugee women remain highly dependent upon communal assets. In fact, Vietnamese women's enterprises are so reliant on coethnic and communal support that some women remain in abusive relationships in order to insure continued access to such resources. In the following quotation (collected by Hoan Bui in her study of Vietnamese-American women's experience with domestic violence), a refugee woman explains why she asked the court for lenient treatment of her husband:

I didn't want to confront the court. I hired a lawyer to represent me. I loved him, but I also wanted him to understand that I didn't accept his violent behavior, and that he was responsible for it. . . . I also didn't want people [to] recognize me at the court because I was a well-known businesswoman in the community. (Bui 2000: 135)

Networks are highly complex

In addition to difficulties posed by the assumption that networks will always have positive impacts on migrants, is the challenge associated with understanding their sheer complexity (Lyman 1974; Gold and Kibria 1993). As Sassen (1995) demonstrates, the impact of networks can be so significant for some immigrant groups that their social and economic fate is unlike that of locals or other migrant populations. Migrants are often contained within their own networked space, distinct from that associated with local geography. It determines their jobs, their gender norms, and even patterns of commuting from network-approved neighborhoods to network-accessed jobs (Dallalfar 1994; Waldinger 1996).

Like other social structures, access to migrant networks (and the resources they deliver) is a contingent process. They vary according to the characteristics of migrants, the nature of the receiving society, conditions in the country of origin, and other factors. Suggesting this complexity, the authors of an article on the networks of skilled migrants assert, "Information may be passed on to a potential migrant by one channel, motivation to move may come from another, while yet another mechanism may be the means by which migration is legally effected between one state and another" (Findlay and Li 1998: 686).

Revealing the complex nature of migrant networks even in a single industry is Margaret M. Chin's (2001) comparative study of New York garment factories. In

it, she shows how Koreans maintain impersonal relations with the skilled Latinos who staff their production-line-based factories. In contrast, Chinese jobbers curry friendly relationships with coethnic workers, in whose training they invest in order to establish a loyal and stable cast of pieceworkers.

Returning to the earlier debate about the relative merits and problems of networks for immigrant women, a broad literature suggests that there is no simple answer (Pedraza 1991). Rather, the impact of immigrant networks on women depends on the skills, values, and opportunities associated with specific groups and contexts (Gabaccia 1994). Regarding networks as exploitative of women, Phizacklea (1988) and Ram et al. (2002) assert that numerous ethnic enterprises rely on women's unpaid labor and use family traditions combined with women's lack of alternative opportunities to prevent women from gaining access to the wealth and power normally associated with income generation. "Mere work in economic activity (or even ownership of economic resources) does not translate into economic leverage – if the person derives no control of economic resources thereby" (Blumberg 1991: 22).

In contrast, another group of researchers emphasize context-based evaluation, not overarching judgments. Zhou and Logan, in their study of earnings in New York's Chinese enclave, offer the following argument:

Viewed from an individualistic perspective, the enclave labor market appears exploitative of women. But we must remember that Chinese culture gives priority not to individual achievement but to the welfare of the family and community . . . female labor force participation is part of a family strategy. It is not obvious that the Chinese immigrant community has better options in the face of limited opportunities and discrimination in the mainstream economy. (1989: 818)

A similar sentiment is expressed by Elvira Gómez, a Cuban woman who contributes to family coffers through home work in the garment industry:

It is foolish to give up your place as a mother and wife only to go take orders from men who aren't even part of your family. What's so liberated about that? It is better to see your husband succeed and to know you have supported one another. (Fernández-Kelly and García 1990: 146)

Further evidence about the complexity involved in network participation for families is revealed in the social links maintained by migrant youth. Some remain within a coethnic context and, consequently, retain access to migrant networks (Wong 1998). However, as a result of family conflicts and preferred styles of adaptation, others intentionally limit their immersion in ethnic networks. They do this by accepting native-born peers as a reference group, adopting their values and symbols, and associating with them in work, social life, and courtship (Waters 1994, 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Stepick 1998; Sanders 2002).

Migrants' choice of marriage partners offers evidence of this pattern. By the 1930s and 1940s, about a quarter of all immigrant sons and daughters married outside of their own nationality – most often to other second-generation co-religionists: Irish Catholics with Polish Catholics, Lutheran Germans with Lutheran Finns, German and Polish Jews (Gabaccia 1994: 71). With time, this propensity has

increased in terms both of numbers and of the social distance between partners. According to the 1990 Census, less than 50 percent of native-born Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or Filipina married women aged 25–34 in Los Angeles were married to a man of their own nationality (Cheng and Yang 1996: 340). Similar rates of intermarriage are reported for Latinos and Jews (Gold and Phillips 1996; Sanders 2002). The large number of migrants from diverse origins who are now involved in Evangelical churches in the United States means that migrants from disparate origins often share a common denomination (Warner and Wittner 1998; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000). This has the effect of further expanding options for intermarriage.

Limited in scope

Thomas Faist's definition of migrant networks cited early in the article stresses that migrant networks exist on multiple levels and provide connections to those both within and beyond the conational migrant population. Other definitions of immigrant collectivism, however, are more limited and often concern only fixed realms of cooperation.

While narrow definitions can simplify the process of investigation, they can also exclude important realms of social connection from the scholarly gaze. For example, while Portes' concept of the ethnic enclave has been highly influential, it has also been criticized because it focuses on patterns of economic cooperation that are defined by propinquity and coethnic cooperation (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Manning 1986; Light et al. 1994; Sanders and Nee 1996). More recent research – including several articles by Portes and colleagues – has shown that migrant entrepreneurship often relies on a globally dispersed array of resources, markets, and workers clearly not limited to specific census tracts (Ong 1999; Portes et al. 1999; Portes 2001; Gold 2002a; Rath 2002). Accordingly, the enclave formulation is limited in its ability to comprehend the transnational and cross-ethnic ties that are vital to the functioning of many migrant communities and economies.

While the enclave model has been criticized as being too local in focus, other scholars would appear to err in the opposite direction by excluding the local altogether as they circumscribe migrant networks as strictly international in scope. For example, Grasmuck and Pessar define migrant networks as, “the social relations that organize and direct the circulation of labor, capital, goods, service information and ideologies between *migrant sending and migrant receiving countries*” (1991: 13; italics added). Levitt's definition also stresses the international dimension: “Social networks are the sets of *cross-border* interpersonal ties connecting migrants, return migrants and nonmigrants through kinship, friendship and attachment to a shared place of origin” (2001: 8; italics added). By specifying that migrant networks include only international ties, these scholars would appear to rule out the consideration of coethnic ties among migrants in a given host society, or links between immigrants and non-coethnic employers, workers, or customers in point of settlement. In focusing solely on either the local or the international dimension, scholars may reduce the utility of network analysis for understanding the influence of social relations in shaping migrants' lives.

Constrained application

A final critique of the application of migrant network analysis is conceptual. In an insightful article on the treatment of culture in economic sociology, Zelizer (2002) claims that economic sociologists have frequently stayed excessively close to the traditional concerns of economists in their analyses, while ignoring the conventional realms of sociological inquest, such as culture and inequality. "On the whole, economic sociologists have recognized the presence of culture but have not integrated its analysis effectively into their own work" (Zelizer 2002: 102). As a consequence, their work has been too rational, too economic in outlook, too resistant to the influence of culture, and insufficiently concerned with inequalities and symbolic matters. In other words, many studies fail to address the broader emphasis that would be introduced by a fully sociological approach.

Seconding this position, Paul Hirsch writes of the lack of consideration of social problems in economic sociology:

When I see the term "economic sociology," I expect it will include studies of poverty, politics and inequality as well as document the works of wealth and power. But so far, our subfield has produced more studies of good fortune and privilege than of downward mobility and hard times. (2003: 2)

Revealing the rooting of network analysis within the disciplinary concerns of economics rather than sociology is Nan Lin's assertion that social capital is consciously and intentionally created and involves "investment in social relations with expected returns" (2001: 6). While this model may be appropriate for understanding conscious economic strategies of entrepreneurs and corporate managers, it is less well suited for exploring other issues and contexts.

By and large, the social capital vested in migrant networks is not created intentionally. Instead, individuals and groups gain access to social capital as an unintentional byproduct of their membership in a national, religious, linguistic, or other social group. At least for the investigation of migrant networks, James Coleman's more collective and social structural view – that "social capital . . . is created or destroyed as a by-product of other activities . . . without anyone's willing it into or out of being" – is much more appropriate than is Lin's model (Coleman 1988: 118–19).

Economics-based concerns with social networks do contribute to our comprehension of migrant communities. For example, networks furnish information and contacts that make migration possible and provide referrals to jobs and resources for migrants' entrepreneurship (Gold 1994b,c). However, networks also shape goals and norms, define commendable and condemned behavior, and shape a variety of other collective concerns. Migrants do not simply draw upon networks, communities, and other social environments to acquire economically useful information, contacts, and resources, while remaining otherwise unchanged by their context and social relationships. Rather, migrants' broader world-views and life chances are transformed and often redirected as they interact within social environments.

If migrant networks simply provided economic resources and jobs, then it is highly unlikely that we would observe so many cases wherein network participation is so closely linked to religious observance, ideological conformity, allocation of resources and effort, submission to ritual prohibitions, and other forms of normative behavior. Zelizer (2002) suggests that the work of economic sociologists would be improved if they attended to studies of networks among groups defined by ascriptive ties and disadvantages, including migrants, ethnic groups, and women.

Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996) has described the process whereby migration (along with other instances wherein ideas, images, ideologies, and commodities cross borders) has the effect of transforming people's outlooks, expectations, identities, aesthetics, styles of consumption, and sense of possibilities as "the global imaginary." From this perspective, migrant networks are not simply sources of job referrals or investment capital. Rather, they contribute to the global imaginary and, as such, profoundly alter the standpoints of those involved, opening new possibilities and directing trajectories that are not easy to predict or control.

Networks' impact on both the economic and social dimensions of migration is revealed in the following examples. Massey et al. instruct us that networks simultaneously shape potential migrants' expectations while also providing the resources that make them possible and even necessary:

Migration also changes the cultural context within which decisions are made and international movement becomes increasingly attractive for reasons that are not purely economic. Migrants evince a widely admired lifestyle that others are drawn to emulate. Although some of its attractiveness is material – based on the ability to consume goods and purchase property – the lifestyle also acquires a strong normative component. . . . In communities where foreign wage labor has become fully integrated into local values and expectations, people contemplating entry into the labor force literally do not consider other options. (Massey et al. 1994: 1500)

Hirsch (2000) makes a similar point, arguing that networks maintained by women who travel back and forth between Atlanta and Jalisco, Mexico, not only make their members aware of increased earnings and familial power available to migrants in the United States but, further, emphasize an alternative understanding of male/female relations – one highlighting closeness, the domestication and sexual fidelity of males, and emotional intimacy. According to Hirsch, this model of male/female relations is transmitted back to the country of origin, where it exerts considerable influence.

The multiform consequences of collective arrangements are also demonstrated in numerous examples wherein, as Alejandro Portes (1995) points out, networks provide resources while simultaneously constraining the ways in which they can be deployed. Numerous studies report that members of populations who are most actively involved with ethnic networks are "more ethnic" (Light and Rosenstein 1995). They are more heavily immersed in and knowledgeable about ethnic organizations, cultural skills, and practices than are conationals who find employment outside of the ethnic economy (Cohen 1969; Gans 1979; Bonacich and Modell 1980; Chan and Cheung 1985; Coleman 1988). As a case in point, despite their secular outlooks, Israeli entrepreneurs in London must conform to demanding religious rules on dress, ritual conformity, and Sabbath observance if they wish to

provide goods and services to London's Jewish population (Gold 2002a). Similarly, in their study of entrepreneurship among Pennsylvania Amish, Kraybill and Nolt (1995: 17) point out that the benefits of coethnic loyalty and cooperation are not free. The Amish rely on networked resources to achieve financial success. Yet such resources – good repute, loans, labor, tools – only become available through conformity to an extremely restrictive array of religious demands that prohibit nearly all of the practices and equipment that small-business owners normally find essential to the achievement of economic success, including “litigation, politics, individualism, commercial insurance and higher education” as well as free interaction with the outside world, the use of many forms of modern technology, and aggressive advertising (Kraybill and Nolt 1995: 17).

Conclusions

An investigation of networks allows us to understand migrants' immersion in multiple levels of collective connection and their involvement with systems of meaning in a manner that respects migrants' own creativity and is more attuned to context and inequality than that availed by neoclassical and world-systems models. However, if scholars are to fully benefit from this approach, they must avoid the pitfalls sometimes associated with the analysis of migrant networks. They need to be aware that the impact of networks is not always positive, and that these social arrangements are extraordinarily complex and, hence, difficult to study. Further, scholars need to note that the effect of migrant networks is not simply limited to the exchange of economic resources and information. Rather, like other social collectives, migrant networks shape the lives and the outlooks of their members in a wide variety of ways.

Finally, as Faist (2000) suggests, we must realize that network analysis is ultimately a method and not a theory. It tells us what to look at as we consider the collective lives of migrants. However, it does not tell us why migrants pursue the lines of action that they follow. This question can only be answered through careful observation of migrants' own actions and the contexts in which they are embedded.

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Chapter 13

Race, Education, and Inequality

CAROLINE HODGES PERSELL AND GISELLE F. HENDRIE

Although there are always individual exceptions, racial variations in educational achievement exist in countries with histories of racial domination or slavery and an enduring legacy of racial stratification. For some international comparisons, see Persell et al. (2004). If our goal is social justice for all, or at least equal rates of educational achievement and adult income regardless of race/ethnicity, then it is important to understand why these variations occur and how they might be ameliorated.

In this chapter we begin by considering indicators of educational achievement, and look at why they are important, and how they vary by race/ethnicity. We then examine existing explanations for observed variations and their limitations. In the third section we propose a composite-theoretical model that combines elements from stratification, social institutions, and social interactions within a critical framework. We think the theory proposed here can explain educational variations among many racial/ethnic groups in various nations. Finally, we explore the fit between this model and existing multivariate and qualitative research on variations in racial achievement.

Much of the research on racial differences has been based on Black–White comparisons, in part because some major longitudinal data sets did not study large enough samples of other racial/ethnic groups to analyze them separately. Wherever possible we include all racial/ethnic groups studied. We stress at the outset that race itself is a socially constructed, somewhat fluid, malleable, and multiplex concept, containing considerable heterogeneity within the categories (Omi 2001). Boundary permeability also varies widely between racial/ethnic groups, as does the extent of domination experienced.

Variations in Educational Achievement

Despite individual exceptions, there are general variations in the educational achievement of African American,¹ Latino/a, and Native American students




Figure 13.1 Differences among five- and six-year-olds, using infant health and development program data.

Source: Created from data in Phillips et al. 1998b, p.108.

compared to Whites and Asian Americans. Gaps occur in standardized test scores, grade point averages, rates of placement in gifted or special-education programs, dropout rates, and college attendance and graduation rates (Heller et al. 1982; Marks 1985; Fine 1991; Harry and Anderson 1994; Miller 1995; Kovach and Gordon 1997; Nettles and Perna 1997; Russo and Talbert-Johnson 1997; Patton 1998; Hallinan 2001; National Center for Education Statistics 2001; Losen and Orfield 2002).

Gains have been made since the 1970s, yet a gap remains and the rate at which the gap is closing has slowed or even reversed. There was a substantial lag in the achievement of African American students from 1971 to 1996, shown in test results from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). These gaps have been observed to exist before children enter kindergarten, widen as they move through elementary and middle schools, and persist into adulthood (Phillips et al. 1998a). A gap exists among five- and six-year olds' vocabulary (Figure 13.1). Analyses by Hedges and Nowell (1998), based on results from six major national surveys of high schools since 1965, show a decline in differences but a slowed rate of decrease since 1988. Despite the shrinking gap, a typical African American still scored below 75 percent of Whites on most standardized tests (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Eighth-grade Asians and Whites are reading at levels close to those of twelfth-grade Blacks and Hispanics (Figure 13.2), a four-year gap that represents an increase from first grade. There is some good news in that college attendance rates among Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics are similar (Figure 13.3), although those of Asians are higher. However, rates of obtaining a four-year college degree are much more unequal. Gains have been made since the 1970s, yet a gap remains and the rate at which the gap is closing has slowed or even reversed.




Figure 13.2 Asian and White eighth-graders read about the level of Black and Hispanic twelfth-graders.
Source: National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP) Data Tool.




Figure 13.3 More parity in college attendance than in obtaining degrees.
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, 2002–2003.

The narrowing of the gap between 1965 and 1992 was due largely to the rapid shrinking of differences at the bottom of the test-score distribution (Hedges and Nowell 1998), and Blacks continue to be underrepresented in the upper tail of the distribution of achievement test performance. Hedges and Nowell (1998) largely

Table 13.1 Indicators of how race/ethnicity are related to various educational achievements, without controls

<i>Indicator/measure</i>	<i>Results/sources</i>
Test scores on Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (PPVT-R)	Black/White gaps exist among five- and six-year olds. Blacks scored 81.86, whites 98.92 in Children of National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (CNLSY) (Phillips et al. 1998a: 108).
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Tests, 1971 to 1996.	The average Black and Hispanic twelfth-grader scores at about the same level or below as the average White or Asian eighth-grader (NAEP in Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 2003: 13).
High school degrees over time	In 1940, 41% of Whites and 11% of Blacks 25 to 29 years old had graduated from high school (a 30% gap). By 1999 the gap was 4.3% (NCES 2000 in Blau 2003: 38–9).
High school graduation rates	In 2000, including students with GEDs, 93% of Whites, 90% of Blacks, 83% of Hispanics had completed high school (NELS, Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003: 34, 109).
College enrollment of high school graduates	Gap between Blacks and Whites was about 8% in 1976, 3% in 1999, with a big increase in the gap around 1986 (Blau 2003: 39–41).
College attendance	Among NELS eighth-graders in 1988 who were about 25 in 2000, 76.5% of Whites and Blacks attended college, compared to 69.5% of Hispanics, and 94.5% of Asians (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003: 34, 109).
College graduation rates	By 2000, 16.6% of Black, 15% of Hispanic, 36% of White, and more than 50% of Asian NELS88 students had obtained a four-year college degree (NCES 2002–2003 in Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003: 34, 109).

attribute the reduction that has occurred to the relative improvements in Blacks' social class. The gains in college attendance were due more to higher rates by Black women but not Black men (Nettles and Perna 1997, cited in O'Connor et al. forthcoming: 3). Results from the early 1990s indicate that the gap had begun to widen again (National Center for Education Statistics 2000). Among other racial/ethnic groups, Asian American achievement most closely resembles (or surpasses) that of Whites, while most Hispanic Americans and Native Americans tend to cluster near African Americans (Goyette and Xie 1999; Blank 2001; Camarillo and Bonilla 2001; Nakanishi 2001; Thornton 2001). (See Table 13.1 for a summary of some other key indicators of racial/ethnic variations in educational achievement and attainment.)

Educational attainment and tested cognitive ability are significant predictors of an individual's employment opportunities and wages. Early achievement differences not only have important implications for an individual's own life chances, but also

have intergenerational consequences through the transmission of resources and values to the next generation. Jencks and Phillips suggest that:

[I]f racial equality is America's goal, reducing the black–white, test-score gap would arguably do more to promote this goal than any other strategy that commands broad political support. Reducing the test score gap is probably both necessary and sufficient for substantially reducing racial inequality in educational attainment and earnings. Changes in education and earnings would in turn help reduce racial differences in crime, health, and family structure, although we do not know how large these effects would be. (Jencks and Phillips 1998: 3–4)

Whether closing the gap in test scores is indeed sufficient to reduce larger racial inequalities remains an open question. Recent research (Moss and Tilly 2003) suggests that the labor market losses of African American males in the early 1980s and 1990s only partially are explained by the conventional wisdom that the educational gap has greater penalties in this era of globalization and technological change. Instead, Moss and Tilly learned from their systematic interviews with employers in four major US cities that as more jobs require direct interaction with the public, employers look for “soft skills,” such as communication skills and people skills, opening the door to discrimination that is seldom overt or even conscious. It also is very hard to police. Some employers, for example, expressed a concern for “race-matching” employees with likely customers (2003). Such evidence suggests that historically disadvantaged minorities may need both educational qualifications and better legal recourse.

Our threshold social-justice premise is that in a fair society neither opportunities nor results should be patterned by ascribed attributes (i.e., those obtained by virtue of one's birth, such as race, class, gender, religion, or national origin). The focus in this chapter is on racial inequalities in education, because “race has been and still is the great chasm in our society” (Fischer et al. 1996: 171). Of course, individuals occupy more than simply a racial status. The interrelation (or intersectionality) of other ascribed statuses, such as gender and class, with race is theoretically and empirically important. If opportunities or outcomes are patterned by such ascribed social attributes, there is a social-justice imperative as well as an intellectual one for understanding and rectifying such patterns. If existing theories cannot adequately explain group differences in achievement, we need to develop better explanations. Without adequately understanding why differences occur, we will not be able to develop social policies that can reduce the variations effectively. Moreover, without adequate social explanations, too many people are likely to see differential achievement as due to the characteristics of individuals or groups rather than seeing them as rooted in systemic-social arrangements. We need to understand and achieve racial parity in educational achievement because many important life outcomes are related to education. The first step is to consider what explanations have been offered and how they fall short.

Existing Explanations for the Gap and their Limitations

Three major types of explanations for racial-educational differences have been offered: genetic, cultural, and structural.

Genetic explanations

There have been recurrent efforts to offer genetic explanations for racial differences in educational achievement (e.g., the Eugenics Movement; Jensen 1969; Herrnstein and Murray 1994). In their 1994 book, Herrnstein and Murray presented evidence showing that when socioeconomic status was controlled, racial differences in educational achievement remained. They then went on to suggest that the remaining difference must be due to genetic differences in intelligence (IQ) between the races since it was not explained by social factors. However, intelligence is not a simple, one-dimensional concept (Gardner 1983, 1993; Fischer et al. 1996). Nor is it immutable (i.e., unchanging through time and experience), as evidenced by Flynn's research, which shows a rise in Western countries of roughly 15 IQ points in a single generation (1987). Neither is intelligence rooted in a particular gene. Genetic explanations lack empirical support. Race is seen by social scientists as being preeminently a socially constructed concept, rather than a biological or genetic concept. Writing about the IQ test-score gap, Nisbett (1998: 101) concluded: "[T]he most relevant studies provide no evidence for the genetic superiority of either race, but strong evidence for a substantial environmental contribution to the IQ gap between blacks and whites. Almost equally important, rigorous interventions do affect IQ and cognitive skills at every stage of the life course." Studies of mixed-race children with one White and one Black parent show that those with White mothers and Black fathers have considerably higher IQs than those with Black mothers and White fathers (Nisbett 1998: 100). Although their genetic inheritance is similar, their social exposure to activities favored by a predominantly White society differs according to the race of their mothers. If environment not genes is key, what aspects of environment matter? Cultural explanations are frequently offered.

Cultural explanations

Standing in apparent opposition to a genetic explanation for racial/ethnic differences in school achievement, sociocultural explanations tend to root the causes of unequal school achievement in the cultural values, parenting practices, and linguistic codes of families and children. Refinements of the family-environment measures discussed below, that reduce the educational gap, are consistent with this perspective. So are Ogbu's (2003) observations of greater degrees of "disengagement" from school among Black compared to White students. While cultural explanations – such as family environment, parenting practices, and student behavior – explain more of the achievement gap than do traditional measures of socioeconomic status (SES) alone, they fail to explain how such potentially important cultural differences arise. If cultural differences exist, how do they arise?

Cross-cultural research suggests the importance of contextual factors for differences in the culture, IQ, and educational achievements of different racial/ethnic groups. For example, in Japan, the ethnic-minority Buraku have lower IQs and educational achievement than the dominant, ethnic Ippan group, even though the two groups are of the same race. However, when members of both groups migrate to the United States, they do equally well on standardized tests and in school (Ito 1967; DeVos 1973; DeVos and Wetherall 1983; Shimahara 1991; Ogbu 2001, 2003; Ogbu and Stern 2001). These cross-cultural findings are consistent with evidence that

other social factors, which Herrnstein and Murray did not measure, affect different achievement levels (Fischer et al. 1996).

Both genetic and cultural explanations attribute the source of failure to children and their families and, unless the cultural explanation pushes beyond individuals to their social contexts, both have self-fulfilling potency. If people in the larger society come to believe these explanations, such beliefs may contribute to children being taught less. Both genetic and cultural explanations tend to legitimate inequalities and divert attention and reform efforts away from structural inequalities in society, which need to be considered as a source of racial differences in educational achievement.

Structural explanations

Much of the literature on racial differences in educational achievement focuses either on the attributes of individuals (gender, race, human capital, psychological traits, or culture) or on characteristics of their social situations (the schools they attend or the social networks to which they belong), without considering the relationships between individuals and their contexts, as Wilson (1998) urges. He calls for embedding individual and cultural phenomena in structural conditions.

The first condition to consider is race itself, which needs to be viewed not as an individual attribute, but as a system of social relationships that creates systematic advantages for members of one group – while the members of another group are systematically disadvantaged (see the important work of critical race theorists, such as Bonilla-Silva 1996, 2001, 2003; Omi 2001). They, like Ferree and Hall (2000), have written about gender and see race as a system of organized power in society. A risk here is that race or racism becomes a constant – racism is present everywhere, at least in the United States – and is asserted to be the blanket cause of racial differences in achievement. It is, however, very difficult to conduct research using a constant rather than a variable, a problem we seek to address later.

A group's subordinate position in a racialized system of power relations affects its measured intelligence and school achievement through three processes: (1) socioeconomic deprivation; (2) racial/ethnic segregation (which concentrates disadvantages and accentuates them); and (3) the "stigma of inferiority based on the wider society's perception of them" (Fischer et al. 1996: 174). This is an excellent framework as far as it goes. However, Fischer et al. under-theorize group racial domination and how it is enacted in education.

In an effort to explain achievement differences by race/ethnicity among first-year students at selective colleges, Massey et al. (2003) list a series of theoretical ideas, both cultural and structural, including: (1) capital deficiencies; (2) oppositional culture, also called "blocked opportunities framework," or a "caste theory of education"; (3) stereotype threat; (4) peer influence; (5) attachment theory; and (6) critical theory, segregation, and school effects. While we think they have identified some important theoretical concepts, they appear to treat them as discrete entities (while acknowledging that more than one might be operating at a time) and fail to suggest how they might be interconnected parts of a racialized system of inequalities. None of these approaches – genetic, cultural, nor structural – have explained fully (i.e., eliminated) racial differences in educational achievement.




Figure 13.4 Proposed model for explaining racial differences in educational achievement.

Proposed Model

The model proposed here (Figure 13.4) seeks to conjoin several approaches in an effort to overcome the limitations of previous work. The important theoretical work done by critical theorists in race and in education has seldom been linked with quantitative research, although it has been applied very productively in a series of rich qualitative studies (see, for example, Ferguson 2000; Lewis 2003; Tyson 2002, 2003, forthcoming). Both theory and research need to incorporate structural, cultural, and interactional elements in a unified framework. Our model does not offer a single-factor theory, but a more complex laminate of interrelated structural, institutional, cultural, interactional, and "payoff" conditions that operate cumulatively to create racial variations in educational achievement.

The model starts with the premise that racial stratification is a variable, rather than a constant, and that it is a relational concept. The racial formation theory of Omi and Winant (1986) distinguishes between race and racism. It suggests that race has no fixed meaning, but is something that is constructed continually and transformed in various social, political, and historical contexts. It defines racism as creating or reproducing "structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race," but also suggests that there are variations in "the degree of power and threat" in various racist projects.

We believe it is possible to design research that considers the relative degree of racial power present in particular contexts. Additionally, we hypothesize that the degree of racism encountered in various social contexts, as well as responses to the degree of racism, may explain differential-educational outcomes better than formulations that depend heavily on individual characteristics alone. Consequently, the first major component of the proposed framework is racialized-structural inequalities.

As a relational concept, racialized-structural inequalities rest on relationships between two or more socially defined racial groups. They can be measured in terms of the disparities in power, material resources, and social status between racial groups. From this starting premise, our framework calls for acknowledging the historical legacies of power and other differentials between racial groups, including how extensive and lengthy the domination of one or more races by another was. How elaborate were the ideologies developed to legitimate such systems of domination? Historical, social, symbolic, economic, educational, and political domination affects the current degree of racial stratification in a nation or a region of a country, which in turn affects the acquisition of various kinds of capital – including economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital (Lewis 2003), wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 1997; Conley 1999), and developing a sense of efficacy or powerlessness. Historians have documented the existence of such racial inequalities well, but their enduring impact on current educational achievement is just beginning to be studied.

Despite evidence for gains in education and occupations among racial minorities, substantial current inequalities remain in economics, politics, housing, social relationships, the agents of social control, health, life expectancy, and, the focus here, education (Bonilla-Silva 2001, Ch. 4; Collins 2004, Ch. 2). In some cases, trends toward equality have actually reversed and inequalities are increasing.

Historical- and contemporary-racialized systems are related in important ways to institutional *socialization contexts* (II in Figure 13.4), particularly neighborhoods, families, and schools. Racial stratification, ideologies, and socializing contexts shape and constrain *culture, interactions, and responses* (III in Figure 13.4) that occur between parents and children, teachers and students, parents and teachers, and among peers. All three major components in the model are implicated in creating racial differences in *educational outcomes* (IV in Figure 13.4). Their cumulative contribution is consistent with the observation that relatively small educational differences between children when they enter kindergarten grow in magnitude the longer they are in school. Finally, educational achievements are related to occupations, incomes, marital status, housing, social respect, and opportunities for the next generation, indicators of what might be called the “*payoff*” of education (V in Figure 13.4). The degree to which those payoffs are racialized (i.e., different for persons of different races), is another indication of the extent to which the social system is racialized, and it has important consequences for future socialization contexts, interactions, responses, and achievements. So it should be seen as having a feedback loop back into II, III, and IV.

Relation of the model to existing research

While no research yet has considered all five major elements of this model simultaneously, many studies have dealt with portions of the model, showing that they do vary by race or are consequential for educational achievement, consistent with the hypothesized linkages in the model. We present a sampling of that research.

The political economy of enslaving Africans has been analyzed well by numerous scholars (Greene and Woodson 1930; Woodward 1966; Walton 1972; Spero and Harris 1974; Higgs 1977; Foner 1981; Fredrickson 1981; Patterson 1982; Marable 1983; Franklin 1992; Takaki 1993; Berry 1994). The first slaves were

brought to Jamestown, Virginia in 1619 and the system of chattel slavery grew until the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. In 1866 the Ku Klux Klan began with the goal of reestablishing white supremacy – using terror and violence – and the region entered what has been called the nadir of race relations in US history, the Jim Crow Era. It was marked by legally and extralegally enforced political, economic, and social domination. Some of the concomitant educational inequalities have been analyzed well by scholars (Margo 1990; Walters and James 1992; Walters et al. 1997; Walters 2001; Collins and Margo 2003).

For example, historical racial domination created major racial differences in wealth due to low wages and institutional barriers, such as discrimination in both housing and credit markets (Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 1997; Conley 1999). Segregated housing markets meant lower rates of increase in the value of one's home, meaning slower growth in net worth. Among younger individuals, the "wealth of parents appears to explain the (racial) gap in net worth" (Conley 1999: 52).

Contemporary structural inequalities

Historical inequalities are related to contemporary structural and symbolic inequalities between groups. We consider current economic, political, penal, social, and attitudinal dimensions of racial inequality and social control, as well as new ideologies of "racelessness," because we think it is impossible to understand educational disparities without embedding them in racialized structural inequalities.

Economics. Using 1987 data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Ashraf (1994, 1995) finds that, overall, Blacks earned 49 percent less than Whites, but that the gap varies considerably across different groups.² Even with controls (which distort the unequal likelihood that Blacks and Whites have the same experiences and contexts), racial gaps in earnings were significant. The gap was lowest in the construction industry (3.9 percent), but few Blacks are in construction. In wholesale and retail trade, Blacks earned 65 percent less than Whites. In general, the racial earnings gap was greater among white-collar workers (47 percent) than among blue-collar workers (38 percent), perhaps because the range of incomes is much greater among white-collar workers. On average, Blacks earned 54 percent less than Whites in the South, compared to 33 percent less in the rest of the country. The racial gap between males was greater (40 percent) than it was among females (29 percent).

Economic inequalities are affected by political and legal practices. Persons with zero earnings and those who have stopped looking for work are not counted in analyses of average earnings or employment rates, nor are persons in institutions such as prisons, facts that mean official figures on the racial gaps in employment and earnings importantly understate the gaps (Western et al. 2002: 282, 288).

Imprisonment not only affects data on earnings and individual employment prospects, but high crime rates in a neighborhood depress the hiring of all persons who live in that neighborhood, even when they personally have no criminal record – the effect of what Western and his associates call "collective stigmatization" (Western et al. 2002: 287).

Political power. Despite some increase in the numbers of Black elected officials, many structural barriers to equal racial-political participation and representation

remain. Racial gerrymandering, multimember legislative districts, election runoffs, annexation of predominantly White areas, and at-large district elections have all been used to disenfranchise Blacks since 1965, in efforts to reduce the number of majority-Black election districts or to dilute Black votes. One piece of evidence for what has been called a "racialized state" (Quadagno 1994; Goldfield 1997) is the fact that the United States is the only country in the world that restricts the voting rights of a very large group of nonincarcerated felons (Uggen and Manza 2002: 778), a set of policies that has a disproportionate racial impact (Shapiro 1993; Harvey 1994; Fellner and Mauer 1998; Behrens et al. 2003).

Penal systems. After slavery was abolished, Jim Crow laws were written to govern racial contact, supplemented by lynching and other extralegal forms of terror. In the new system of social control, Marable (1983) notes that the state apparatus was used increasingly to maintain White supremacy – through police forces and their use of violence, high arrest and conviction rates, and the use of capital punishment for severe crimes (Bonilla-Silva 2001: 104). Following the Civil Rights Movement and the riots of 1968, after 50 years of relative stability, the American penal system began expanding in the early 1970s. Between 1970 and 1982 the prison population doubled in size; between 1982 and 1999 it tripled and incarceration rates for Blacks are about eight times higher than those for Whites (Western et al. 2002: 278). Blacks report many more experiences of police brutality than Whites; Blacks are more likely to be stopped and frisked, to be arrested, to be convicted; they receive longer sentences than Whites for similar crimes (Hagan and Peterson 1995, Ch. 1; Bonilla-Silva 2001: 105), and they are more likely to receive the death penalty. Black social-movement leaders also have been monitored closely by the police and the FBI (Bonilla-Silva 2001: 109). In short, the use of state force has largely replaced extralegal forms of social control.

Social status. Despite lower rates of openly expressed racial prejudice on social surveys, several indicators reveal that social relationships remain strongly embedded in racialized structures. While overall residential segregation is decreasing, it is increasing in the largest metropolitan regions and those with the largest Black population (McKinnon and Humes 2000, cited in Collins 2004; Iceland et al. 2002). The index of segregation was about 80 in the North and around 70 in the South (an index of 100 indicates complete segregation, according to Massey and Denton 1993). Few Whites report having close minority or Black friends (Bonilla-Silva 2003: 107; see also Bowen and Bok 1998). "According to the 1990 census, 70% of Asians and 74% of Hispanics were married to persons of the same categories as their own, in contrast to 94% of Blacks and 97% of non-Hispanic whites" (Gamoran 2001: 141). These differences in rates of intermarriage speak to both the blurring of some racial/ethnic social boundaries, but the lower permeability of others. As the previous figures suggest, Blacks are less likely than any other racial or ethnic group to intermarry (Lieberson and Waters 1988: 126, n. 50). Among interracial marriages in 2002, 71 percent were between a Black man and a White woman (US Census Bureau 2002).

Further evidence for symbolic racial inequality lies in the enduring effects of color differences (noted by Hughes and Hertel 1990; Keith and Herring 1991; Murguia and Telles 1996; Hunter 1998; Allen et al. 2000; Hill 2000, 2002; Herring et al. 2004). The daily negative experiences with racism reported by Blacks also reflect




Figure 13.5 Explanatory power of SES (socioeconomic status) vs. model including historical racial inequalities.

Source: Phillips et al., 1998a, p. 138.

racialized social inequalities (Cose 1993; Feagin and Sikes 1994). Finally, a rise in racially based hate crimes has been reported (Levin and McDevitt 1993).

Ideologies of “racelessness.” Despite overwhelming evidence for enduring racial inequalities, recent decades have witnessed the elaboration of ideologies of racelessness (Goldberg 1993; Crenshaw 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2003; Guinier and Torres 2002) that seek to deny the existence of racialized systems of inequality and even the collection of data that includes racial categories.

While contemporary researchers seldom measure the impact of historical racialized economic or educational inequalities, those researchers (e.g., Phillips et al. 1998a) that have incorporated measures of grandparental educational level, quality of mother’s high school, mother’s household size, and mother’s perceived self-efficacy, have explained more of the achievement gap between Blacks and Whites than have researchers like Herrnstein and Murray (1994) who use only parental education, occupation, and income. While limited measures of contemporary socioeconomic status explain no more than one-third of the racial test-score gap, Phillips et al. found that a broader index of family environment – including measures of historical inequalities – explained up to two-thirds of the gap (1998a: 138) (see Figure 13.5). Even this modest effort to measure historical inequality doubled the




Figure 13.6 Economic differences by race.
Source: Prepared from data in Orr 2003.

explanatory power of their model, suggesting that taking historical inequalities into account more adequately explains racial differences in achievement.

Contemporary inequalities between racial groups

A racialized social-system paradigm brings into focus racial differences in various forms of capital – economic, cultural, social, and symbolic. They cease being seen as characteristics of individuals and emerge instead as part of larger racial patterns. The distribution of various forms of capital is embedded deeply in racialized social institutions, practices, and beliefs. Not only are members of minority racial/ethnic groups³ denied equal access to all forms of capital but what they have is less valued and less easily converted into other forms of capital (Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell 1999; Lewis 2003). Lewis's qualitative research illustrates both of these important insights.

Today Blacks are disadvantaged systematically as compared to Whites on many major indicators of human, economic, and cultural capital (Table 13.2). Consider just two, earnings and wealth differentials (Figure 13.6). The model suggests that such structural disadvantages affect educational achievement and some empirical

Table 13.2 Measures of relational stratification and various forms of capital that are related to educational achievement by race/ethnicity

<i>Type of capital</i>	<i>Indicator or measure</i>	<i>Results, sources, and controls</i>
Historical human	Mother's AFQT scores	For Blacks 530, for Whites 758 in NYLSY79–2002 (Orr 2003: 291).
Historical human	Grandparents' education	For Blacks 10.58 years, Whites 11.67 years (Orr 2003: 291).
Economic	Earnings	NYLSY79–2002: 5-year average annual income of Whites was \$48,857, Blacks \$27,453 (Orr 2003: 292).
Economic	Net worth	Average net worth over five years was \$87,545 for Whites, \$16,686 for Blacks (Orr 2003: 292).
Social	Parental occupation	Average on the Duncan Index for Whites was 30.90, for Blacks 25.89 (Orr 2003: 291).
Economic	Earnings payoff of higher test scores	The 1964 average earnings of Black males were 57.5% of White male earnings. Black males with AFQT scores in the lowest 9% earned about 85% of what similar Whites earned, while Black males in the top 50% of AFQT scores earned 64.5% of what Whites earned (Cutright 1972 in Jencks and Phillips 1998: 5). Test scores were negatively related to earnings. By NLSY 1993, Blacks earned 67.5% of what Whites earned overall, and among men scoring above the 50th percentile, Blacks earned 96% of the White average (Jencks and Phillips 1998: 5–6).
Social	Racial isolation	“As Massey and Denton (1993) and others have shown, residential segregation is still rampant throughout the country and is increasing in some areas. This dynamic leads not only to segregated social networks (social capital) among parents and families but also to racially segregated schools. . . . In the end, both processes have a big impact on school racial composition and thus on school outcomes” (Lewis 2003: 164). “Social capital creates options, choices, and increased chances for good schooling” (Lewis 2003: 169).
Economic cultural	Concentrated poverty	“The white poor are much more likely than the minority poor to live in mixed-class neighborhoods, less likely to be densely concentrated in small geographical areas, and thus less likely to be segregated in high-poverty schools” (Wilson 1987, cited in Lewis 2003: 163). Orfield et al. note: “A student in a segregated

Table 13.2 *Continued*

		minority school is 16.3 times more likely to be in a concentrated poverty school than a student in a segregated white school” (1997: 11–12 cited in Lewis 2003: 163). “In a number of ways, then, macrosocial patterns of housing segregation combine with group-level differences in economic capital to leave some communities able to deploy many more resources on behalf of their children than others. In terms of both individual families and communities, economic resources clearly have an impact on the nature and quality of a child’s school experiences” (Lewis 2003: 163). “Resources are pooled along racial lines” (Orfield et al. 1997 cited in Lewis 2003: 183).
Cultural		“[A]ffects the educational experiences and outcomes of different groups within schools and classrooms” (Lewis 2003: 169).
Symbolic	Racist encounters in everyday life	Affects mental and physical health (Williams et al. 1997 in Lewis 2003). “Skin color and racial characteristics meant that (some children and adults) more often received the benefit of the doubt, a second chance, a few extra seconds to answer a question” (Lewis 2003: 186). “The concept of symbolic capital captures the way racist ideas lead us almost unconsciously to assume we know something about people before they open their mouths. It illuminates the way race shapes our evaluations, our expectations, and our interpretations. It is not merely a matter of the ‘symbolic’ order of things however. In the way it shapes life opportunities and outcomes, symbolic capital not only can have a significant influence over the quality of one’s life but can sometimes make the difference between life and death” (Lewis 2003: 186).

research is consistent with this tenet. For example, financial assets, which are influenced by historical-racial stratification, contribute to educational attainment and explain a portion of the Black–White achievement gap.

When Blacks have comparable financial assets to those of Whites, they graduate from high school at higher rates than Whites and there are no racial differences in college completion rates or school expulsion rates (Conley 1999: 80; 2001a,b). Wealth has a positive effect on achievement, even after a family’s SES is held con-




Figure 13.7 As racial inequality grows so does education gap.
Source: Roscigno 1999: 179.

stant, and wealth decreases the coefficient for race by 15 percent, thereby explaining a portion of the Black–White mathematics (and reading) achievement test-score gap (Orr 2003: 292). Wealth is more important than other indicators of SES.⁴ Furthermore, it is wealth’s association with greater exposure to cultural capital that is related to increased mathematics (and reading) achievement (Orr 2003: 294, Table 4). These are still individual-level analyses, however.

When racially structured inequality is measured, the achievement gap is greater in counties with more racial stratification. Roscigno develops a model including the local-class context and the local-racial context in which families, schools, and students are located (1999: 163). He stresses that family and school influences on educational achievement and attainment “are themselves embedded in, and partially a function of, broader structures and spatial variations in class- and race-based opportunity” (1999: 159). He finds that class context (measured at the county level) is related to race, with Blacks significantly more likely than Whites to live in communities with larger numbers of families in poverty (1999). However, what is important for the model proposed here is that Black educational disadvantage is exacerbated in areas of high racial inequality, over and above the effects of higher rates of absolute poverty (Figure 13.7). Greater racial inequality⁵ at the county level strongly depresses Black student achievement, but not White student achievement (see also Blau et al. 2001).

There are only small racial achievement differences in counties where racial inequality in the local labor market is low, in the left portion of Figure 13.7, compared to racial-achievement differences that are three times as large in the highly unequal counties. Roscigno’s findings suggest that not only the absolute level of inequality, but also relative position – specifically the degree of racial inequality in an area – affects the racial gap by depressing educational achievement of Black students. For any given county, higher values indicate greater Black disadvantage,

compared to Whites, and Black students are more likely than White ones to live in communities with higher levels of racial inequality. Local racial inequality explains “45% of the racial gap in achievement and 37% of the general patterning of achievement” (Roscigno 1999: 180).

Roscigno breaks new ground by combining representative, generalizable data at the locality, school, family, and student levels (1999: 167) and he has found something critically important: specifically how the relative rank of Blacks compared to Whites in an area has significant educational consequences. However, it is worth pushing further, theoretically and empirically. We need to expand the concept of racial stratification beyond income measures to include wealth and other factors. Other features of racialized social systems discussed by Bonilla-Silva (2001, 2003) – including inequalities in political power, social interactions, and experiences with the police and courts – generally have not yet been included in analyses of educational experiences and outcomes,⁶ but need to be if we are going to understand fully the genesis of racial differences in education.

Socializing contexts

Racial structures of inequality are related to neighborhood composition, family structure, school characteristics and processes, and educational achievement. While the child development and education literatures have noted neighborhoods, families, and schools, these literatures fail to consider sufficiently how socializing contexts are related to racialized social systems. This is what critical theory keeps reminding us is important to do and what Roscigno’s research documents.

Neighborhoods. Where families can live is very much influenced by race, wealth, and income (Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 1997; Conley 1999). Even middle-class Blacks are more likely than Whites to live in or close to low-income neighborhoods (Pattillo-McCoy 1999). Neighborhoods vary in terms of their institutional resources – including educational, recreational, and social opportunities; childcare; medical care; and employment opportunities. Both Jencks and Mayer (1990) and Ainsworth (2002) found that the presence of more adults holding white-collar, managerial, or professional jobs in a neighborhood, who might act as role models, was important for school achievement.

Several experimental studies have explored the consequences of moving low-income, inner-city, Black students to predominantly White and middle-class neighborhoods and schools. One of these was a study of the families who entered the Gautreaux program in Chicago between 1976 and 1981. This is one of the few instances where randomly selected low-income Blacks have had the opportunity to live in predominantly White middle- and upper-middle-class suburbs and attend schools there, allowing the chance to see what happens to racially and economically disadvantaged children when they live in communities and attend schools like those attended by middle-class Whites (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). They found that, compared with city movers, suburban movers were more likely to be (1) in high school, (2) in a college track, (3) in a four-year college, (4) in a job, (5) in a job with benefits, and (6) within either the education or employment systems (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000: 171). Moreover, their grades “did not differ significantly,” despite the fact that standards were higher in the suburban schools.

This and other studies found positive effects on achievement of being in better neighborhoods and/or schools. Their family structures remained unchanged, suggesting the hypothesis that the relationship between family structure, culture, and children's achievement may be mediated through neighborhood and/or school structures and practices. What is striking about the extensive research on neighborhoods are the vast disparities in what neighborhoods are available to members of different races. Many studies of neighborhood effects, however, examine only racial diversity or poverty while ignoring relational measures of racial stratification. This may be one reason why some researchers have found that neighborhood effects account for only about 5 percent of the variance in child outcomes, after many other factors are controlled (Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 2000) and why others tend to discount neighborhood factors altogether (Arum 2000).

Differences in family environments and structures. The model proposed here stresses that family structures are related deeply to racialized political, economic, policy, and penal conditions. A number of sociologists have stressed how racialized economic opportunities (Wilson 1998), differential arrest and incarceration rates (Western et al. 2002), and welfare and other public policies (Quadagno 1994) affect family structures. The chances of living in a poor and single-parent household are much higher for those who live in racially stratified and low-income counties (Roscigno 1999: 173).

Family structure, although highly correlated with income, appears to have an independent effect on children (McLanahan 1997). Marked differences exist between Black and White family structures, with approximately half of Black children born to unmarried mothers and most remaining in female-headed households throughout their lives (McLanahan 2000). McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) and Hill and Duncan (1987) found that parental-income differences account for between one-third and two-thirds of the estimated impact on schooling of living in a single-parent family. According to Robinson and Godbey (1997), single mothers spend about three hours a week less providing childcare than do married mothers. In addition, children in fatherless families lose about six hours of care per week. All of these circumstances reduce the family and community resources available to children, although Blau (2003: 105) suggests that family resources and structure are more important for Whites than Blacks, at least with respect to getting into trouble in school.

Differences in schools. Like research on families and neighborhoods, research on education has begun to elaborate and specify how schools affect achievement. What is particularly important about racialized differences in schools is the consistent finding in the sociology of education that schools matter more for disadvantaged minority children than they do for Whites and Asians (Coleman et al. 1966; Riordan 2004). We briefly consider three features of schools – structures, resources, and processes – to see how they vary by race and how they affect achievement.

Structural features of schools

School sector (public or private). Blacks are more likely than Whites to attend public school. Attending private school is related to higher chances of taking an

academic curriculum, being in smaller schools, having student bodies with higher SES, greater discipline, and higher rates of attending college (Coleman and Hoffer 1987). Catholic private schools differ significantly from the elite private day and boarding schools attended by about one percent of the most affluent members of US society (Persell et al. 1992). Public-school students were much more likely to drop out of high school than Catholic or other private-school students (24 percent, 12 percent, and 13 percent respectively) (Coleman et al. 1982). Both Coleman and Hoffer (1987) and Bryk et al. (1993) stressed the importance of a strong academic curriculum and homework for student achievement.

Contextual features (SES and racial composition). In public schools, Blacks are more likely than Whites to attend schools with larger numbers of low SES students and schools with higher proportions of racial minorities. The SES of student bodies is related to educational aspirations when individual SES is controlled (Wilson 1959), although others are more skeptical (Hauser 1971, 1974; Jencks et al. 1972). Subsequent researchers found that the academic climate of the school explained most of the variation by SES context (McDill and Rigsby 1973). Academic climate itself was correlated with school SES context, but if low SES schools had similar academic climates to those of higher SES schools, student achievement was comparable.

Many studies find correlations between the percent minority, or low income, in school and student achievement (e.g., Bidwell and Kasarda 1975; Roscigno 2000). Studies of African Americans who attend desegregated schools, usually because of desegregation court orders, find that they “are more likely to achieve at higher rates and have higher aspirations than those in segregated schools and are more likely to go on to college and secure high-status jobs” (Schofield 1989, 1991; Wells and Crain 1994). For these reasons we believe it is important to include the degree of racial diversity within the school or classroom as a variable in our model. This may be an increasingly important factor as racial segregation grows in large urban neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993) and public schools in the United States (Orfield et al. 1997; Orfield 2001).

School size. African American students are disproportionately more likely than Whites to attend large urban schools. Both school size and percent minority students in it are related to the amount of tracking in a school (Lucas and Berends 2002). The structure of the curriculum (who studies what) is related to the racial composition of a school, with Blacks and Chicano/as more likely than Whites to attend schools with curricular⁷ tracking. Track placement often is related to what is taught, what is learned, test results, and continuing one’s schooling (Persell 1977; Oakes 1985; Persell et al. 1992), but not always (Dreeben and Gamoran 1986; Hallinan 1987). Other potential contributing factors include the time teachers expect students to spend on homework (Oakes 1985) and teacher–student interactions (Persell 1977; Oakes 1985; Good 1987).

Governance. School size affects the type of governance. In large urban schools the authority of professional educators is often buttressed by bureaucratic procedures and by unionization of teachers and administrators (Rogers 1968; Rogers and Chung 1983; Persell 2000), a governance system that may be less responsive to student needs.

Class size. Blacks are more likely than Whites to be in larger classes, once special education classes are held constant (Coleman et al. 1966). Smaller classes are related to higher achievement, particularly among Blacks (Finn and Achilles 1999).

Resources

Because schools are supported by local property taxes and because there is so much housing segregation by social class and race in the United States, students that live in low-income areas are very likely to attend schools with lower per-pupil expenditures on instructional programs. Such disparities in educational opportunities affect how much children learn, how long they stay in school, their graduation rates, and the rates at which they successfully pursue further education after high school. Some (e.g., Hanushek 1989, 1996, 1997) have contested the relationship between expenditures and school quality. How the money is spent, to be sure, matters (Wenglinsky 1997; Elliott 1998; Gamoran et al. 2000). Expenditures need to be connected to opportunities to learn effectively (Gamoran et al. 2000), to having good teachers (Darling-Hammond 1995), to inquiry-based teaching methods (Elliott 1998), and to good equipment – especially in the case of science (Elliott 1998).


Schools with more low-income and racial-minority students are more likely to have teachers that are not certified or are teaching out of their area of certification (Ingersoll 2002), as well as teachers with lower achievement-test scores (Coleman et al. 1966). Teachers' test scores are related to students' test scores (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Black students are more likely than White students to have teachers with lower achievement-test scores (Coleman et al. 1966). Having a series of "high-achieving" teachers vastly increases the achievement of low-income and minority students. Sanders grouped teachers into quintiles based on their effectiveness in producing student learning gains. When low-achieving students had the least effective teachers, they gained an average of 14 percentile points during the school year, compared to low-achieving students with the most effective teachers who gained 53 percentile points on average (discussed in Haycock 1998: 3). Students who had three of the least effective teachers gained 29 percent compared to those with the most effective teachers who gained 83 percent over three years (p. 4). While people differ over whether certification measures teacher quality, a teacher's record of improving student learning does have cumulative effects on an individual student's learning.

Processes


Pedagogy. Researchers have tried to identify pedagogical conditions that facilitate learning by children of all races. In a study of four experimental classes using small, heterogeneous learning teams and six regular junior high classes, Slavin and Oickle (1981) found that the cooperative learning groups gained significantly more in academic achievement than did nonteam classes, largely because of the outstanding gains by Black students.

The amount of time children spend on class work correlates positively with their academic performance (Leone and Richards 1989). One study of 302 first-graders

Daily minutes of reading instruction



Number of words taught in a year

**Figure 13.8** Pedagogy: time and words taught.

Source: Dreeben and Gamoran 1986.

in 13 classes in the Chicago area found that Black students learned less than non-Black students because Black students were exposed to “restricted learning opportunities originating in district and school differences in the time spent in instruction and the coverage of curricular materials” (Dreeben and Gamoran 1986: 660) (Figure 13.8). The “annual number of words taught averaged 492 in the non-black schools and 260 in the black schools; children in the non-black schools received an average of 59 minutes of basal instruction daily, while those in black schools received an average of 37 minutes” (Dreeben and Gamoran 1986: 665). When what Dreeben and Gamoran call “the technology of instruction is taken into account, the initial racial differences . . . become trivial in magnitude” (Dreeben and Gamoran 1986: 667).

Discipline is another important school process. Black (or minority) students are more likely than Whites to “experience school settings that were either the most lenient or the strictest – settings often perceived as unfair and thus poorly designed for cognitive development” (27 percent of Blacks compared to 19 percent of Whites report being in such school settings) (Arum 2003: 180 and n. 64). In schools where students perceived the discipline as being both strict and fair, there were no racial gaps in test scores when a series of individual factors⁸ and school factors⁹ were controlled (Arum 2003: 180–1, nn. 47 and 49) (Figure 13.9). In contrast, in schools where students perceived discipline to be both “unfair and lenient, African-American students performed much worse than white students on their twelfth-grade test even after considering their prior tenth-grade performance and other environmental factors” (Arum 2003:181).




Figure 13.9 School processes: Discipline (African Americans' twelfth-grade test-score performance relative to that of Whites, by disciplinary perception).

Source: Arum 2003: 181.

There is an institutional setting in which some of the racial stratification of the larger society may be mitigated and where the socializing contexts (families, work, schools, and neighborhoods) are more similar among racial/ethnic groups, and that is in the US military. In schools attended by the children of US military personnel, especially in the overseas schools, the achievement test-score gap (NAEP writing and reading) between White, Black, and Hispanic students is lower than that in national samples (Smrekar et al. 2001: iv–v). Family, neighborhood, work, and school contexts all vary in the military setting. To join the military, a person needs to be at least a high school graduate, thus there are more high school graduates among Black and Hispanic military parents than in the population at large. Additionally, there are more two-parent families, more steady employment, comparable and integrated housing (based on rank), health care; and families are in a social context in which educational training and success is at least averred to be related equally to promotion opportunities independently of race. Some of the major differences in the schools include smaller school size than in most public schools, sufficient financial resources linked to instructionally relevant strategic goals, little curricular tracking, an academic focus, high expectations for all students, higher teacher salaries, preschool programs, and an expectation of parental involvement in the school (Smrekar et al. 2001). While the schools on military bases represent a strategic research site for exploring whether societal racial stratification is related to socializing contexts, interactions, responses, and student achievement, many components in our model were not included in the preliminary research done on these schools. While the Smrekar et al. study elaborates the school settings in which the children of military personnel are educated, unfortunately the research has not been linked with existing theoretical ideas nor is it a multivariate analysis aimed at assessing the relative importance of families, schools, and larger social contexts. The small

sample size precludes the possibility of conducting multivariate analysis. There are also no qualitative studies of education and life on the military bases that could explore whether racialized encounters occur and what meanings students, parents, and teachers are constructing. We believe that conducting such studies would help to advance our knowledge in productive ways, as we consider in our discussion of social interactions.

Interactions

Relational inequalities are enacted in daily interactions as well as in institutional forms. We examine briefly three sets of interactions, with an eye to how they vary by race and how various types of interactions are related to educational achievement and, then, consider how race may influence interactions more generally in school and beyond.

Parent-child. Various types of family/parent interactions are critical: general emotional warmth and supportiveness; timing and magnitude of independence training; general parental childrearing beliefs, values, and goals; general childrearing style in terms of authority structure, discipline techniques, and affective relations; personal efficacy and other indicators of general mental health; and the quality of managing household activities (see Eccles et al. 1997 for a review). Parents of different racial/ethnic groups have different expectations about what is the minimally acceptable grade a student can bring home, with Black parents having lower tolerances than Asian and White parents (Ferguson 2001).

Researchers have found that language styles (Bernstein 1977; Heath 1983; Delpit 1988; Mehan 1992), childrearing styles (Massey et al. 2003), and conceptions of childhood as concerted cultivation or natural growth (Lareau 2003) vary by class and/or race. Such differences have been observed to affect the congruence or disjunction between children's homes and schools and, hence, perhaps, their school adjustment and achievement.

Different interactional styles learned at home may be at odds with school expectations (Lewis 2003). Differences in styles of interaction may account for a considerable portion of the disproportionate disciplinary referrals of Black males (Lewis 2003: 173, also Ch. 3). A complex process may be operating in schools "in which particular, largely racially specific, cultural norms dominate the school context and lead to intolerance of the behavior of certain children who follow other cultural norms" (Lewis 2003: 173).

This is consistent with Ann Ferguson's finding (2000) that while both White and Black boys perform their masculinity by transgressing school rules, schools differ in how they respond to those transgressions, depending on the race of the boys (cited in O'Connor et al., forthcoming: 12), with Blacks being "punished through example and exclusion rather than through persuasion and edification, as is practiced with the young white males in the schools" (Ferguson 2000: 90).

Teacher-student. Disciplinary inequalities may have instructional consequences. "Ferguson (1998b) found that teachers hold lower expectations for African American students than for white students. These expectations were not based on race per se, but were a response to black students' histories of behavioral problems

and lower achievement. Nonetheless, differences in expectations help perpetuate differences in outcomes. . . . Cases of successful programs for disadvantaged minority students have demonstrated the validity of higher expectations" (Gamoran 2001: 139). Teachers' expectations and behaviors may contribute to the achievement gap between Black and White students, and teachers' expectations are more important for Black than for White students, while White students are more affected by their parents' expectations (Ferguson 1998a).

Work by several psychologists offers one explanation. Steele and Aronson's work (1998) on stereotype threat suggests that when stigmatized, minority college students are tested in situations that activate their fear of fulfilling negative stereotypes, those stereotypes may come into play, depressing their performance. Moreover, such effects are most pronounced for the students that care the most about performing well academically.

Their work raises the question of whether such stereotype threats affect younger children, an issue they are currently pursuing. Farkas et al. (1990) found that teachers' judgments of student work habits was the most important predictor of student grades, and teachers perceived the work habits of Asians and Whites much more favorably than those of Hispanics and Blacks.

Race also appears to have a dampening effect on the translation of cultural resources into school capital, notes Lewis (2003: 176). "Thus, many interactions among staff, between personnel and parents, between teachers and students, and among children involve the bringing together of people with differences in cultural styles, preferences, tastes, and strategies. Certain kinds of cultural styles are institutionalized and then become those that tend to pay off within schools, serving as cultural capital" (Lewis 2003: 176). Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell write, "It is unclear whether black students are rewarded in the same manner as their white counterparts. If cultural capital is predicated, in part, on the social position of its possessor and consequential micropolitical processes, the subordinate racial status of blacks may limit their ability to convert cultural capital and educational resources into academic success" (1999: 161). In a related vein, Farkas (1996) found that teachers – depending on their race, class, and gender attributes – evaluated students' skills and orientations differently. As Lewis concludes, "Thus not only do gaps exist in cultural capital, but groups are differently rewarded for the resources they have" (2003: 176). Surely we would hypothesize that such interactions could engender a sense of unfairness and alienation in children, if not outright anger.

Parent-teacher interactions. "Cultural capital . . . affects the success parents have in their interactions with schools," notes Lewis (2003: 175) and Lareau (1989, 2003) reports similar effects. The history of racism and discrimination may encourage distrust of institutions, such as schools, as Bryk and Schneider (2002) noted. It also makes it more difficult for even middle-class, Black parents to manage their children's academic careers in the same way that White parents can (Lareau and Horvat 1999). There is an "arena of ambiguity" for Black parents in relation to teachers. They are constantly wondering how much of what teachers are saying and doing is because of their child's race.

More generally, there is evidence from field research that race suffuses social interactions of all types. As Lewis notes:

Racial ascriptions are not solely about deciding what category an individual belongs to but also about the mapping of systems of meaning onto individuals. A person categorized as black, white, or Asian is being linked with a category already imbued with meanings. . . . The moment of identification is also a moment of inclusion or exclusion; an understanding is not merely formed but in many cases is subtly or explicitly acted on. . . . Everyday interactions, the moments in which the social category "race" takes shape and is given meaning in social interaction, are the means through which boundaries between groups are created, reproduced, and resisted. . . . Opportunities and resources are then distributed along racial lines as people are included in or excluded from a range of institutions, activities, or opportunities because of their categorization. (Lewis 2003: 152)

What is important about Lewis's observation is the way it emphasizes that interactions do not exist in a vacuum. Racial – as well as class and gender – inequalities shape the content, frequency, and consistency of some rather than other forms of social interactions. What proportion of children's time is filled with what types of social interactions is hypothesized to influence their responses to education and educational outcomes.

Responses

A number of researchers have noted that Black and White students and parents have different perceptions of the same situation (e.g., Bobo 2001: 286, Table 3; Lewis 2003; Ogbu 2003). A town that Whites see as fair and colorblind, "as an ideal community above or separate from an unfair world," is seen by Blacks as having schools "where racialized behavior was still very much in place" (Lewis 2003: 147). Ogbu (2003) reports that in Shaker Heights, Ohio, Whites prided themselves on having created a community with racial harmony. While Shaker Heights Blacks considered race relations to be better than those in surrounding suburban communities and elsewhere around the United States, nevertheless they saw this positive image as maintained in part by a "code of silence" about racial problems in the community (Ogbu 2003: 60). Such evidence suggests to social researchers that members of different racial groups experience the same situation very differently. Such differences are likely to affect their perceptions of social justice for members of their racial/ethnic group.

Differential perceptions of racial justice may affect behavioral responses. Numerous researchers have found that Black students value education as much if not more than Whites (Mickelson 1990; Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey 1998; Cook and Ludwig 1998; Blau 2003). Black students also value social goals and personal responsibility for achieving them more than White students do (Blau 2003: 69). Perhaps because of their distrust of standardized tests, Black students value such tests less than Whites and are less influenced by them in their plans for further education (Blau 2003). We were not able to find national data on students' perceptions of their teachers and schools. We think such perceptions need to be surveyed and we hypothesize that there are racial differences in them and that such perceptions may be related to reported behavioral differences.

Among the differences in behavioral responses, Black teens are less likely than Whites, but more likely than Asian or Latino students, to report that they have had




Figure 13.10 Homework by race.

Source: Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003: 94.

discipline problems (Blau 2003: 104). Blacks were more likely than Whites, Asians, or Latinos, however, to report being unprepared for class and cutting classes (p. 104), reports that are consistent with higher rates of absenteeism among Blacks in San Francisco high schools (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003: 141). Overall, Black students report doing fewer hours of homework per night and watching more TV or videos compared to other racial/ethnic groups (Figures 13.10 and 13.11). A panel analysis of a nationally representative sample of high school students found that extra time spent on math homework increased student test scores, while an extra hour of TV viewing negatively affected scores (Aksoy and Link 2000).

Some of these behavioral responses have been considered evidence for an “oppositional culture” among Black youths. A much-contested cultural explanation, the concept of oppositional culture emerged from a study of one all-Black, inner-city, high school in Washington, DC (Fordham and Ogbu 1986; Fordham 1988, 1993, 1996). Subsequent researchers have found some (Downey and Ainsworth-Darnell 2002; Farkas et al. 2002) or no empirical support (Kao et al. 1996; Cook and Ludwig 1998; Ferguson 2001) for the concept. Although Downey and Ainsworth-Darnell (2002: 158) found that oppositional culture (when measured by the variable, “My friends make fun of people who try to do well in school”) explained 11




Figure 13.11 TV viewing by race.

Source: Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003: 142.

to 15 percent of the Black–White gap in reading, civics, and writing test scores, this was only the case among fourth-graders. They see this as running counter to the theory, which expects oppositional culture to become increasingly important among older students. Our best assessment of oppositional culture is that it is not uniform among all Blacks, is class-linked, is most relevant for adolescents, and is stimulated contextually (Downey and Ainsworth-Darnell 2002; Farkas et al. 2002; Tyson forthcoming).

Very few studies have considered the relationships between racialized social contexts and student responses an essential link, if we are to understand how differential outcomes occur. In tracing the genesis of student behaviors, Tyson (2002, forthcoming) notes how early academic performance and evaluations affect students' self-perceptions, and "these perceptions subsequently influence the decisions students make with respect to effort expended on schoolwork, course choices, and post high school plans, as well as how attached they feel to school").

The greater valuation of school and education among Black students may help to explain why doing poorly may be even more demoralizing for them than for Whites and, thus, be more consequential for their subsequent behavior (such as school disengagement). It may also be one explanation for why school characteristics have more impact on Black achievement compared to that of Whites.

Payoff of education

One of the explanations Ogbu offered for oppositional culture theory is the concept of blocked opportunities or unequal payoff for educational achievement among different racial groups, which may affect differential achievement. The model proposed

here posits that even when minorities survive and overcome all the racialized social conditions discussed and achieve equal-educational outcomes, they will *not* reap equal benefits from their achievements. High educational achievement has not eliminated income inequalities among Asian Americans overall compared to Whites (Hirschman and Wong 1984; Tang 1993, 2000), although when being educated outside of the United States is controlled, the earnings gap disappears (Zeng and Xie 2004). Among Blacks who attended selective colleges, Bowen and Bok (1998) found that, even among the most highly educated males, racial differences in income remained – although no earnings differences existed among women.

Race differences in marital outcomes also exist. Among the highly educated African Americans studied by Bowen and Bok (1998) and Higginbotham (2001), Black women were less likely to be married than White women or Black men. Also, more highly educated Black women were working, compared to similarly educated White women, no doubt due to both marital and wealth differences.

There is additional evidence that education does not afford members of all racial groups the same payoff in housing, treatment by the police, legal system, merchants, or restaurants. Thus there are a number of indicators suggesting that educational achievement and attainment do not have the same “payoff” for Blacks and Whites, in material, symbolic, or social terms. As long as this is the case, we would expect that race might retain some independent effect on educational engagement and achievement. It is plausible that these corrosive effects might occur through the erosion of trust and could produce anger, demoralization, and, possibly, school disengagement in the next generation (as Ogbu 2003 suggests).

Conclusions

Racial differences in educational achievement – that have been averred by some to be due to genes or culture – are better understood by rooting them in historical and current racialized systems of inequality, which, in turn, affect the socializing contexts of neighborhoods, families, and schools, as well as the ensuing interactions, responses, and rewards. We believe that the model proposed here can explain Black–White differences and other racial/ethnic variations in educational achievement and attainment, both in the United States and in other countries. Existing research supports various portions of the model, affirming the importance of historical inequalities as reflected in grandparental and parental education, the impact of racial stratification in surrounding contexts, the effects of differential wealth, the importance of particular instructional and disciplinary contexts and experiences in schools, evidence for different TV-viewing behaviors, and the existence of differential payoffs for education among African Americans but not Asian Americans. We suggest that the unifying paradigm of a racialized system, albeit one in which some variations may exist, offers the best explanation for why racial differences in educational achievement occur.

Fathers’ occupations also are related to differences in the educational achievement of their children in 11 of 13 industrial countries (only in the Netherlands and Sweden were they not, according to Shavit and Blossfeld 1993) – although parental background is not strongly related to children’s educational achieve-

ment in developing and less-developed countries (Heyneman and Loxley 1983; Fuller and Heyneman 1989). When social class or racial differences are large, enduring, and institutionalized, they are consequential for the next generation and beyond, and they affect education outcomes in some of the ways we have delineated here.

If additional empirical data support the model rooted in racially structured inequalities we have proposed here, then there will be intellectual support for social policies that address those structural inequalities, assuming we have the political will to push for a racially just society. If we are committed to offering the chance for all children to achieve equally, regardless of their race/ethnicity or social class, we need to look both inside and beyond the walls of schools, to focus on structurally rooted inequalities in the larger society and the consequences of those inequalities for such important life outcomes as education, health, crime, life expectancy, and social justice.

As Shipler reflects, "To appraise a society, examine its ability to be self-correcting. When grievous wrongs are done or endemic suffering exposed, when injustice is discovered or opportunity denied, watch the institutions of government and business and charity. Their response is an index of a nation's health and of a people's strength" (2004: 298).

Notes

- 1 While we mostly use the word "Black," we use it interchangeably with "African American" (see Tatum 1999).
- 2 His equations contained many controls, including education, age, gender, South vs. other regions of the United States, marital status, number of children, union membership, sector, and a selection variable.
- 3 While the limitations of many databases make it impossible to consider differences in various types of capital across all racial/ethnic groups, we know that in this realm as well Latina/os and Native Americans closely resemble Blacks, and Asians resemble Whites.
- 4 Orr (2003) found standardized coefficients for wealth, parental education, and parental occupation of, respectively, 0.077, 0.057, and 0.058.
- 5 To measure the degree of racial inequality at the county level, Roscigno computed "racial ratios of poverty, mean income, and unemployment" (1999: 168). He did this by averaging the standardized values (*z* scores) for each of the three racial inequality ratios (p. 168).
- 6 For an exception see Wald and Losen (2003).
- 7 A considerable body of theory and research has considered the nature of curricular content, with the view that it often may seem irrelevant or alien to many minority students. We are not aware, however, of systematic research documenting how curricular content is related to student learning or other responses. It is a hypothesized relationship in need of systematic research.
- 8 These were: gender, two-parent family, tenth-grade test scores, academic track, siblings, socioeconomic status (SES), and non-English language home.
- 9 These were: rural/urban/suburban location, school size, student-teacher ratio, racial composition of students in school, percent of students in poverty, average SES scores of students in school, dropout rate, and racial composition of teachers.

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Part IV

Policy Responses to Inequalities

Chapter 14

Beyond Dependency: Welfare States and the Configuration of Social Inequality

LYNNE HANEY AND ROBIN ROGERS-DILLON

Since the early 1990s, feminist research on the welfare state has become one of the most innovative subfields of political sociology. Among other things, gender scholars have established that welfare states not only ameliorate social inequalities, but also act to produce and reinforce them. As many gender scholars have shown, the US welfare system from its inception followed a two-tiered logic. Through its policies and practices, the welfare state positioned some citizens as rights-bearing individuals and others as needy family members (Fraser 1989; Nelson 1990). These positionings, then, led systematically to different tracking whereby some recipients were channeled into an entitlement sphere – often called “social insurance” – and others were processed through a needs-based sphere – often called “social assistance.” Those in the former track received bureaucratically defined benefits to support their roles as wage earners, while those in the latter track received services to bolster their roles as caretakers. The gendered connotations of this two-tiered system were clear, with rights bearers cast in masculine terms and needy family members in feminine terms.

In order to understand how this divide bred and enforced social inequalities, gender scholars relied heavily on the construct of in/dependence. In their historical accounts, this construct seemed to make sense of welfare-state development (Gordon 1994; Goodwin 1997). From its origins, the US welfare state was geared toward managing dependency and separating those deemed to be “independent” from those thought to be “dependent.” Yet, as Fraser and Gordon (1994) revealed, dependence was not always construed in negative terms. In fact, not until the progressive era was it linked to certain categories of people, thus taking on negative connotations and becoming equated with social pathology. From this point on, it hooked into the social policy apparatus to shape historical inequities in state redistribution.

Jumping forward in time, the in/dependence dichotomy also has become the primary way to evaluate contemporary welfare reform. Since the enactment of the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996* (PRWORA), there has been a resurgence of work on in/dependence. The in/dependence frame has become a mainstay of research reports issued by nonprofit research

corporations, most of which use it for descriptive ends – as a seemingly neutral, scientific way to evaluate state programs for their “success” at reducing recipients’ reliance on state support. Then there are politically conservative scholars who deploy the construct in their indictments of welfare “as we knew it.” Here the usage of the dichotomy is more prescriptive – “welfare dependency” is a way to signify social pathology, and “independence” to connote normality (Tanner 1996; Mead 1997; Murray 2001). Even those critical of such politically charged prescriptions tend to rely on the in/dependence frame. Many feminist scholars appropriate the construct in their arguments about the deleterious effects of reform, claiming that reform will make women more dependent on market and/or familial relations (Mink 1998; Harrington 2000; Meyer and Storbakken 2000). Here the dichotomy is used as an analytical tool to critique the new forms of inequalities implied by welfare reform.

Given that so many welfare state scholars and researchers rely on the in/dependence dichotomy, it is surprising that few of them have reflected systematically on what it implies. With the exception of Fraser and Gordon’s (1994) genealogy of the term, most scholars deploy it without a clear statement of its causal linkages and associations. In this chapter, we provide just such a mapping of the uses and abuses of in/dependence. In doing so, we argue that the term simplifies the complex ways welfare states encode and shape social inequalities. In place of this dichotomy, we propose a conception of interdependence.¹ Our conception highlights the linkages among state, market, and familial institutions that can both protect and threaten women’s well-being. It suggests that these linkages are propelled by reciprocal resource flows through which women can harness and channel support among social institutions. Additionally, it recognizes the dynamic relationship between women’s networks of support and the concrete ways welfare states can constrain and enable these networks.

After conceptualizing interdependence and linking it to notions of in/dependence, we operationalize the term through an analysis of two welfare reform case studies. The first case study – drawn from 51 in-depth interviews conducted with low-income women in the Baltimore area in the post-AFDC (*Aid to Families with Dependent Children*) period – highlights how resources were transferred from state programs to enhance women’s labor-market positions and familial networks. Here we argue that rather than becoming less dependent on state assistance, the respondents appropriated state assistance to mediate familial and market relations; they mobilized state resources to commodify care-work and to gain leverage in domestic relations. The second case study – drawn from Haney’s (2002) research on welfare reform in Hungary – highlights the reverse: how the flow of resources from women’s family networks facilitated their utilization of state programs. Here we reveal how Hungarian women used their positions as mothers to stake claims to state and market support. In the end, we argue that analyses of interdependence offer a more nuanced understanding of state systems of inequality than analyses based on the in/dependence dichotomy.

The Uses and Abuses of In/Dependence

The storm of welfare reform in the 1990s not only restructured welfare systems; it also produced changes in the welfare state scholarship. In the United States, it led

to a sizable increase in the number of analyses of the welfare state. Suddenly, there were 51 welfare systems in the United States, all ripe for investigation. The differences among those working in this crowded field were significant – some approached reform for empirically descriptive ends, others for politically prescriptive ends, and others still for critical scholarly ends. Despite these substantive divergences, most welfare researchers converged to interpret reform through the in/dependence lens, a focus that often obscured the complex patterns of social inequality characteristic of poor women's lives. This lens also has been extended beyond US borders to re-envision the welfare state on a more global scale.

In/dependence as description and prescription

Of the many new actors involved in evaluating welfare policy, perhaps the most prolific and influential are researchers from nonprofit corporations and institutes. In the post-1996 United States, states were required to assess their reform efforts and, for a variety of reasons, many turned to agencies like the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) and the Urban Institute to conduct this work. These agencies, thus, were instrumental in setting the criteria for "success." Beyond the United States, transnational agencies like the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank took on this role. Quite early on, levels of "dependency" became a central way to evaluate welfare programs in all these contexts: the size of the "welfare rolls" became the acceptable way of gauging levels of dependency, while "dependency indexes" were constructed to trace shifts in the number of women moving onto and off of state programs (Broder 1997; Bashevkin 2002; Hamilton 2002; Miller 2002). These agencies also helped welfare departments create "scientific indicators" to predict dependency, whereby it became a disease for which recipients were in need of a vaccination (Peck 2001). In the process, they secured a particular definition of dependency, equating it with women's reliance on public assistance. Yet such equations rarely were spelled out explicitly. Instead, they used "dependency" as a neutral, scientific indicator of changes in the welfare system.

In the United States, policy researchers' conflation of dependency and state assistance ended up echoing the causal linkages advanced by many politically conservative scholars of welfare. Since the 1980s, these scholars blamed *Aid to Families with Dependent Children* (AFDC) for perpetuating a culture of long-term "dependency" and "dysfunction" in poor families (Tanner 1996). Some of them advocated a paternalist approach to welfare policy, arguing that "public dependence" could be used as leverage for the state to supervise the behavior of the poor (Mead 1986). Others, like Charles Murray, found such dependence wholly to be destructive and the source of several social pathologies. For Murray, dependence could only be addressed through policies that forced recipients to rely on the job market, families, or charitable services (Murray 1984: 228).

Although this discourse of dependence was most developed in the United States, it was in no way nationally bound; it has been deployed in the reform of other welfare states. In some cases, the links to US discourse were direct – as when former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher drew explicitly on Charles Murray's ideas when railing against the "dependent underclass" (Bashevkin 2002: 36); or when




Figure 14.1 Dependence: Reliance on the state.

British and Canadian reformers proposed to end welfare dependency by inculcating an “enterprise culture” of “self-sufficient individuals” into this underclass (Bashevkin 2002: 41). While such appeals surfaced in other parts of Europe, their policy effects were more limited (Wacquant 1999; Pierson 2001). One exception was East/Central Europe where there was a widespread adoption of “welfare-dependency” narratives. Spurred on by agencies like the IMF and World Bank, many East European policy makers and analysts joined the international chorus to lament welfare dependency – warning their populations of the social ills and weaknesses associated with it (Kornai 1995; Deacon 1997). Such appeals contributed to what Richard Sennett (2000) termed the “panic of dependency” – whereby dependency was defined as reliance on the state and as the source of a variety of social problems. Figure 14.1 illustrates this definition of dependence.

Whether deployed as a scientifically neutral descriptor or a politically charged signifier, this notion of dependency accomplished several things. First, it limited the definition of the problem. By focusing only on women’s use of state support, this definition obscured other issues, such as persistent inequalities in state redistribution and institutional tracking. This notion of dependency also limited the terms with which reform programs were assessed. Successful programs became those that reduced welfare rolls or cut spending – as opposed to those that undermined economic inequities or enhanced recipients’ well-being. Yet these are the precise areas where welfare reform has had questionable effects. In the United States, it remains unclear how many former recipients are making ends meet. Studies estimate that 20 percent of those who left AFDC and TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) from 1995 to 1997 had no identifiable income; 50 percent of them had wages hovering around \$6.00 per hour; and 30 percent of them had cycled back onto TANF within a year of leaving the program (Loprest 1999; Blank and Schmidt 2001). In East/Central Europe, the effects have been even more pronounced as poverty rates have shot up to record highs of over 30 percent since the early 1990s (Ornstein 1995; Standing 1996).

In addition to simplifying the nature of the problem, this definition of dependence led to limited solutions. If dependency was the culprit, then the goal of reform was the reverse: to make recipients “independent.” Just as they created indexes of




Figure 14.2 Independence: Labor-force participation.

dependency, policy researchers began tracking recipients' levels of independence. What did they mean by independence? Here there was a striking degree of consistency, even across national borders. Most often independence implied labor-force participation. As caseload decline became an indicator of dependence, employment rates became a central way to gauge independence. Researchers in different national contexts presented higher employment rates and longer work hours among low-income women as evidence of their new independence (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001; Bashevkin 2002; Hamilton 2002). Barriers to employment, such as lack of education, work experience, or support for care-work, then became interpreted as obstacles to independence – as did inequities in wages, training, and opportunity (Berlin 2002; Miller 2002; Knox et al. 2003). Rhetorically, welfare institutions mimicked this framing. In the United States, welfare departments metamorphosed into “Self-sufficiency Centers” and “Self-reliance Centers,” while caseworkers became “financial planners” and “self-sufficiency counselors.” Similar rhetorical moves characterized welfare agencies in Canada and Europe (Haney 2000; Peck 2001). Figure 14.2 offers a visual of this path to independence.

More controversially, another definition of independence began to surface among socially conservative analysts, particularly those in the United States. For them, independence connoted a reliance on private, family networks. Although it received little programmatic attention in 1996, one goal of US welfare reform was to increase marital rates by making single motherhood more difficult to sustain (Murray 2001). Here marriage became a way to steer low-income women from dependence to independence. Overall, policy researchers tended to make this link implicitly, proclaiming that recipients were moving toward “independent lives” as they left public assistance and entered “stable” relationships. Yet by the late 1990s, policy makers and politicians made this link explicitly as they proposed new programs to promote and enhance heterosexual marriage. By 2004, this definition of independence became embedded in the *Defense of Marriage Act* proposed by the Bush Administration. Among other things, the Act earmarked \$1.5 billion for premarital counseling, public campaigns on the benefits of marriage, and marital-enrichment classes. In their defense of the Act, supporters continually deployed notions of independence, equating it with heterosexual marriage and stability (Curran and Abrams




Figure 14.3 Independence: Reliance on private, family networks.

2000; Haney and March 2003). As Representative Nancy Johnson testified in Congress: “If we can restore marriage to its rightful place at all levels of our society, we will have accomplished more than could be achieved by any government program we might design” (quoted in Haney and March 2003). Figure 14.3 represents this path to independence.

As with conceptions of dependence, these definitions of independence met several ends. With independence defined as labor-force participation, policy makers and researchers could equate increased employment rates with the “success” of reform. If more poor women entered the labor market, reform must have done its job. Yet it is unclear whether this entrance was due to welfare reform or to the economic expansion experienced in many countries in the late 1990s (Baker and Tippin 1999; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000; Smith et al. 2000). It is also unclear just how “new” this entrance is – historically, poor women have always had high employment rates (Corcoran et al. 2000; Blank and Schmidt 2001; Riemer 2001). In addition, recipients of social assistance frequently engaged in wage labor, albeit often “off the books” (Edin and Lein 1997). Similarly, in the US context, there is little evidence that reform policies have encouraged marriage. Although marital rates did rise slightly among participants in welfare-waiver programs, the precursors to TANF, there is no evidence that TANF-work requirements, time limits, or family caps have increased marital rates (Fitzgerald and Ribar 2001). In fact, some analyses suggest that marriage-promotion programs may backfire since they are based on a notion of family that stands in sharp contrast to those adhered to by the communities they target (Haney and March 2003).

In this way, while policy researchers collected important and robust data on reform, their analyses were hindered by their unreflective use of the in/dependence frame – as well as their insistence on indexing it through caseload decline, employment rates, and marital rates (McCrate and Smith 1998; Danzinger et al. 2000; Zedlewski and Loprest 2001). To understand this insistence, it is useful to remember the constraints placed on these researchers. In the United States, nonprofit

research corporations conducted most of these studies, often in partnership with academic researchers. They had unusual access to reform programs through state contracts, but their access came with strings attached. Research corporations were dependent on evaluation contracts for their livelihood, which posed a conflict of interest: if they asked critical questions, they might lose future evaluation contracts (Rogers-Dillon 2001). So these researchers rarely scrutinized the assumptions underlying their terms and models. The same can be said of those working for transnational agencies, many of which also relied on research contracts for their own material security. This was particularly true in East/Central Europe, where other state and academic resources had evaporated rapidly in the 1990s (Deacon 1997; Haney 2000). Thus, as a result of their own "dependencies," researchers ended up using politically charged discourse and failed to interrogate whether the in/dependence dichotomy captured or reproduced the social inequalities of contemporary welfare systems.

In/dependence as critique

The focus on in/dependence is shared by other scholars who are far more reflective about its political connotations and far less sanguine about the effects of reform. Instead of using the dichotomy for descriptive or prescriptive ends, many gender researchers deploy it as a critical tool. Rather than proclaiming that welfare reform marks an end to recipients' dependency, these scholars interpret it as signifying a historical reversal in the *type* of dependency. They point out that the prevailing form of female dependency shifted over time: moving from a reliance on male breadwinners, often termed "private patriarchy," to a reliance on state programs, often referred to as "public patriarchy" (Boris and Bardaglio 1983; Abromovitz 1988; Brown 1992). Rather than ending female dependence, they argue that welfare reform harkens back to a period when women's private dependencies were more pronounced. Moreover, as women shift from a reliance on public programs to a reliance on private institutions, they project that gender equality will be threatened and inequities enhanced.

There are two main ways that the shift from public to private dependence is said to exacerbate gender inequalities, particularly in the US context. On the one hand, some scholars project that reform will make low-income women more reliant on the market: through time limits and mandatory work requirements, reform commodifies women's labor and subjects them to the vicissitudes of the market economy (Piven 1999; Orloff 2000; Moller 2002). In addition to negating the importance of women's childrearing, some scholars predict that heightened commodification will increase women's economic vulnerability, forcing them to work for wages that fail to bring their families above the poverty line. They also point out that recipients are subjected to new regulatory projects geared toward resocializing labor. Now, forced into deregulated labor markets, poor women will experience economic interventions through which incursions are made into their minds and bodies without respect for basic labor rights (Handler and Hasenfeld 1997; Little 1999; Schram 2000; Peck 2001). Far from making women less "dependent," reform policies are said to have shifted women's reliance on the state to the market. For these scholars, the rhetoric of dependency is thus a guise through which increasingly unequal labor practices are justified and obscured.

Other gender scholars make similar arguments about another type of private dependence – reliance on familial relations and networks. They also criticize the prevailing assumption that welfare reform undercuts women's dependency. Yet their concern is with how reform may end up re-encoding unequal familial relations. Some gender scholars claim that US reform does this directly: by penalizing one-parent households through family caps and illegitimacy sanctions and by campaigning to support heterosexual marriage, reform policies that undermine women's reproductive rights and marital freedom (Rose 1995; Mink 1998, 1999; Meyer and Storbakken 2000). Others emphasize the indirect effects of reform on familial relations: by forcing women to work for poverty-level wages, reform effectively pushes them into marriage and dependency on a male wage (Thomas 1995). This reliance then undercuts women's ability to wield power in their heterosexual relationships, leaving them more susceptible to domestic abuse and violence (Raphael 1996; Mink 1998; Roberts 1999; Harrington 2000; Scott et al. 2002). In effect, these scholars interpret the rhetoric of dependence as a guise through which increasingly unequal familial practices are justified and obscured.

Gender scholars not only use the in/dependence dichotomy to critique the gender politics of welfare reform, but also to provide a critical reevaluation of the connotations of the term. In doing so, they challenge the problem definition adhered to by many policy researchers and conservative scholars. Instead of viewing dependency as an objectionable social condition, they suggest that dependency is a normal and socially necessary state (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Neysmith 2000). They remind us that all social groups are dependent, be it on the labor market, the community, or family and friends (Kittay 1999). As these scholars attempt to rehabilitate dependency, they also defeminize it. By expanding its scope to encompass a variety of social relations, they draw out the universality of "nested dependencies" (Gordon 1994; Kittay 1999; Scott et al. 2002). Moreover, they note that only certain types of dependence become stigmatized or pathologized, which is a crucial form of welfare-state inequality and injustice (Pearce 1990; Fraser 1997).

These rethinkings of dependency's social connotations successfully expose the assumptions underlying descriptive and prescriptive uses of the term. Yet they have their own limitations. Conceptually, is it really viable to rehabilitate a construct that has been stigmatized and moralized so thoroughly? Also, is such rehabilitation even desirable? Might it lead to an acceptance of the unequal social relations and positions that underlay the welfare system from its inception? Or would the ideal be to move to the other side of the discursive divide by holding both men and women to the standards of "independence"? If so, would this lead to a similarly unequal welfare model that denies women's rights and needs as caregivers? In effect, by stifling the conceptual imagination, the in/dependence frame has pushed gender scholars back into dichotomous theorizing and gender sameness/difference debates. As a result, we are left without the analytical tools to envision how citizens can be recognized simultaneously as workers, caretakers, and community members.

Toward interdependence

At the end of their genealogy of dependency, Fraser and Gordon (1994) proposed an alternative to the in/dependence dichotomy through the concept of interdepend-

ence. Their conceptualization of interdependence included recognition of the ever-increasing division of labor among social institutions of support. It implied an awareness of how social institutions rest on the support of other institutions – how wage labor relies on unpaid labor in the home or how state support depends on the commodification of some in the labor market. In drawing out these linkages, their conception set forth a commitment to de-gender relations of mutual dependence and disentangle their gender connotations. A few years later, Kittay (1997: 200) went one step further to argue that interdependence is essential to all citizens' lives and forms the "foundation of all civic unions." Taken together, these conceptual shifts offer ways to transcend the in/dependence divide. Yet they do so in quite abstract terms, leaving unspecified precisely how to operationalize the concept in social research. What channels connect different social institutions of support? Through what means do the labor market, state, and family support one another?

Although not in explicit dialogue with these feminist theorists, some political sociologists have addressed these questions in what has come to be known as "welfare-regime analysis" (Esping Andersen 1990, 1999; Korpi 2000; Pierson 2001). Their work puts forth a typology of welfare regimes based on the particular combination of state, market, or familial support prevailing in a given welfare system. For instance, in Esping-Andersen's (1990) now classic formulation, "liberal" welfare regimes are characterized by social policies that commodify citizens and tie their well-being to market institutions – with secondary roles for the state and the family. This contrasts to "social democratic" welfare regimes, which position the state as the primary site of redistribution and the guarantor of universal citizenship. Finally, there are "corporatist" regimes, which rely much more on church, family, or personalistic networks. In effect, this regime typology exposes the structural interdependencies underlying different welfare systems. It also unearths the various ways that social provisioning connects state, labor market, and familial institutions.

While this regime typology has become enormously influential, it also has been subjected to considerable criticism, particularly from feminist scholars. On the one hand, some feminist theorists detect an androcentric bias, in which social institutions are centered in the model, and a corresponding dismissal of women's care-taking (Hobson 1994; Sainsbury 1994, 1996). Others fault the model for its failure to disentangle how the structural linkages formed by social policies shape gender relations, the sexual division of labor, and reproductive rights (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1996; Brush 2002). Still others reveal that this gendered patterning is not always coherent or consistent. Propelled by political institutions, practices, and rhetoric, policy interventions can and do vary within and across liberal regimes, as do their gender outcomes (O'Connor et al. 1999).

In both its mainstream and feminist variants, welfare-regime analysis provides a conception of interdependence that emphasizes the policy channels connecting the state, market, and family. In doing so, analysts resolve a number of the limitations of the in/dependence frame – rejecting its dichotomous character and highlighting the structural linkages among institutional realms. It also is arguable that their conception of interdependence is more "research-friendly" than that of other scholars. Yet the kind of research implied by their conception is a particular sort – broad, comparative/historical work that traces institutional patterns, policy constellations, and redistributive trends. When we move outside these more abstract arenas, key




Figure 14.4 Interdependence: Resource flows.

questions surface. What concrete mechanisms and actors facilitate the linkages among institutions? Do the resources flowing from these institutions move in a uni-directional way? What are the concrete ways that women can harness these resources? How does this harnessing breed and/or undermine social inequalities?

To address these questions, we propose a model of interdependence that shifts the unit of analysis from broad policy structures to low-income women's everyday lives. Figure 14.4 provides a representation of this model of interdependence. The first thing to notice about the model is that it makes the recipient central to the interconnections among institutions. Instead of assuming that these interconnections happen magically, from some abstract structural linking, we posit that recipients form a nexus through which state, market, and family support reinforce one another. We also suggest that these linkages are propelled by reciprocal resource flows through which women harness and channel assistance among social institutions. In this way, the arrows moving in and out of different social realms are the work of real recipients channeling real resources in their real lives.

Another key feature of the interdependence model is the direction of its arrows, which connote the movement of resources in a circular fashion. Unlike notions of in/dependence that presuppose a linear movement of assistance from one institution to another, interdependence has support moving into and out of different institutions – thus merging them in complex ways. For instance, the conception of dependence presented in Figure 14.1 assumes that welfare benefits flow out of the state and into recipients' pockets to support (or constrain) their families. Yet the interdependence model holds that resources also can emerge from the family to support (or constrain) state policies. Similarly, the representation of independence in Figure 14.2 posits that wages flow from the labor market into recipients' pockets to support families. But don't labor markets also rely on resources from the state and the family to reduce the costs of reproducing the labor force? The interdependence model allows for this possibility.

Finally, while all the examples we have given thus far involve the flow of material resources, our understanding of resource is broader. Since the ultimate goal of this model of interdependence is to analyze and assess how welfare states shape social inequalities, it would be unwise to limit ourselves to financial resources. Fol-

lowing the insights of Nancy Fraser (1997), we view welfare states as acting to secure patterns of redistribution and recognition. Clearly, welfare systems decide who gets what kind of material benefits, be they money, goods, or services. But they also inscribe patterns of representation, interpretation, and respect. These forms of injustice can be as detrimental as redistributive ones – forming the basis of recipients’ stigmatization and self-respect as well as public hostility toward them. Hence, the resources recipients mobilize from different support systems can be material *and* symbolic. The question then becomes how welfare state arrangements enable or block these networks of support. To explore this issue, we turn to the empirical world of welfare reform.

State Resources as Market and Familial Support: Welfare Reform in the USA

From policy researchers to socially conservative scholars to feminist theorists, the assumption has been that contemporary welfare reform in the United States would make women less “dependent” on state assistance – by making them more reliant either on wage labor or on heterosexual relationships. In 1999, we set out to explore this assumption through interviews with 51 low-income women in the Baltimore area.² Early on in the interviews, we discovered that the reform story was much more complex than those viewing it through the lens of in/dependence predicted. Far from receding in importance, state assistance remained central to our respondents’ survival strategies. But it did not work in stereotypical ways; instead of simply decommodifying them, state assistance was a resource for commodification and integration into the paid labor force. Similarly, instead of providing an alternative to relationships with men, state assistance became a way to manage and gain bargaining power in these relationships. In effect, our respondents outlined one form of interdependence – the movement of resources from the state arena to their work and family lives.

A few examples from our research provide windows into how this movement of resources operated. Perhaps the most illuminating of them was the way our respondents utilized state childcare programs and policies. As part of the push to get TANF recipients into the labor force, most states instituted provisions for childcare, usually in the form of childcare vouchers. The idea was to force women to “sell” their labor power for wages and to use the vouchers to “buy” childcare services in existing markets of care-work. What actually occurred was far more complicated. On the one hand, many of our respondents utilized these state policies to participate in markets of care-work. Rather than following the mandate of what kind of labor to “sell” and “buy,” they blurred the distinction by using state-funded retraining programs to gain childrearing expertise and certification. These women explained that they went this route because they already felt skilled in this area: they had honed their skills as caretakers under AFDC and, thus, thought it made sense to market them. So they tapped into state resources to enter this area of paid employment and become daycare providers.³

Importantly, these women’s ability to enter the childcare market was dependent on state support. In large part, this market relied on state assistance to sustain itself.

Our respondents who were licensed providers frequently explained that the influx of state-issued childcare vouchers made their work more lucrative and predictable. Because the vouchers provided a steady mode of payment, they created a more reliable and stable childcare market; there was less concern about receiving payment since most clients used childcare vouchers. Sounding almost like childcare entrepreneurs, these women described an emerging circle of care-work through which some women used state resources to become licensed providers and others used state resources to remunerate their services. For instance, one of our respondents, Mildred, who had recently become a licensed provider, estimated that close to all of her clients paid her with childcare vouchers. "I prefer the mothers with the vouchers," she explained. "With them, I know I will get paid. It's never a problem at the end of the month." After spending years on AFDC to care for her own children, Mildred received state funds to care for children of women transitioning off TANF.

Childcare vouchers also fueled the expansion of this childcare market. Sounding even more like childcare marketers, licensed providers like Mildred recounted how childcare vouchers enabled them to "expand" their pool of workers. They were not the classically "competitive" marketers, however, since they often employed women from their kin and community networks who were unable to find work or had been cut from other state programs. For instance, at the time of our interview, 53-year-old Jacqueline was sick with chronic fatigue syndrome and believed that her employment opportunities were limited. After losing her final appeal to have her disability benefits reinstated, she sank into a depression. Then she worked out an arrangement: Jacqueline's daughter found a childcare provider who would "pass through" her childcare voucher to pay Jacqueline to care for her grandchildren. By utilizing childcare vouchers, our respondents used state resources to remunerate and employ those who had few marketable skills, thus exemplifying the interconnections between state and market support and the ways the former enhanced the latter.

A second example of this form of interdependence was the way our respondents harnessed the resources that flowed from state support systems to sustain and enhance their familial relations – particularly those with men. Over and over again, our respondents expressed a strong desire not to be reliant on men. They worried about linking their well-being to men who might prove unreliable. They were concerned about relying on one man to father their children and to contribute financially, particularly given the discrimination they faced in the labor market.⁴ These concerns did not make them shy away from all relations with men. Instead, they developed strategies to lessen their sense of vulnerability. Our respondents argued that the more stable they felt in their lives, the more likely they were to form relationships with men. Moreover, they often used state programs to achieve this stability.

Those respondents who had been in long-term relationships frequently linked their longevity to their own ability to maintain stable incomes, affordable housing, medical benefits, reliable childcare – much of which they gained from state subsidies and benefits. This also was true of women who had gotten married recently or moved in with male partners; they had tapped into state programs that made them feel optimistic about their own futures. Many participated in state retraining and employment services to land steady jobs; others secured housing subsidies to move into their own apartments in safer communities. In describing the effects of these programs on their lives, a few women explicitly claimed that their access to

state resources and employment made them less “dependent” on men, which then enhanced their relationships.

Moreover, our respondents argued that their access to state resources gave them bargaining power in their heterosexual relationships. These women were reluctant to enter into relationships unless they had concrete resources to contribute. If the relationship was not reciprocal, they worried that they would be unable to wield decision-making power. One of our respondents, Darlene, provided an excellent account of how such worries shaped her relationship with her new husband, James. Darlene met James while shopping in a grocery store when, as she put it, “I was in a bad place.” Barely able to support her two children on TANF, she was living with her mother. James, on the other hand, had a secure, well-paid job as a prison guard and his own apartment. After only a few months of dating, he asked her to move in with him. Although Darlene was tempted, she declined his offer. “Imagine what it would have been like,” she recounted. “Me coming in with all my baggage, my kids and everything. That just wouldn’t have worked.”

Darlene and James continued to see each other while, according to Darlene, “I got my act together.” She attended several job retraining programs, eventually landing a position as a receptionist in a dental office where her mother worked. She worked out after-school care for her children through a combination of childcare subsidies and familial assistance. Once all of this was secured, Darlene agreed to marry James. Now in its second year, Darlene believed the marriage worked because of how she entered it:

“I waited til’ I had my life in order. You know, it wouldn’t have worked if I moved right in. He’s a great man, real understanding. But now I feel good about myself. Not dependent or nothing. Like I can stand up for myself . . . That’s real important to me.”

Rather than shifting from a reliance on the state to a reliance on men, Darlene utilized public resources to protect herself from private vulnerabilities. It is precisely this kind of connection that the in/dependence frame obscures. In fact, this frame would distort the actualities of these women’s lives under welfare reform. Women like Mildred and Jacqueline would be classified as “working” and thus moving from “dependence” to “independence,” a classification that misses the complex ways they channeled state assistance to support their work lives and merged public and private resources. Similarly, women like Darlene would be classified as “married,” bolstering assumptions either of their new “independence” or “dependence” on men. This classification misses how their views of and experiences with marriage were linked closely to public support and their sense of stability. The construct of interdependence illuminates these kinds of reciprocity. Additionally, it exposes how, in their everyday lives, women formed a nexus through which assistance circulated among social realms.

Familial Resources as State and Market Support: Welfare Reform in Hungary

Most research on contemporary welfare reform focuses on the restructuring underway in North America and Western Europe, but the welfare changes taking place

in East/Central Europe arguably are even more extensive. Since 1990, regional unemployment rates soared from less than 1 percent to over 13 percent; poverty rates shot up to over 30 percent; generous maternity-leave grants, family allowances, and childcare programs were cut or obliterated altogether; and state subsidies for basic necessities like housing, food, utilities, and transportation were eliminated and replaced by means-tested, poor-relief programs. Such a rapid and massive overhaul of state policies is simply unparalleled historically.

While serious social-scientific research on this overhaul is rare, the few existing accounts of it rely on familiar, conceptual models. In particular, the in/dependence frame has become a central way to interpret the East European reform story. On the one hand, it is used to describe what these countries transitioned from – a socialist welfare system, frequently portrayed as an enormous, dependency-generating machine (Kornai 1995; Szalai 2000). Plagued by universalism and massive entitlements, this system is said to have produced a dependency culture that “infantilized” the entire population and forced them into “tutelage, fearfulness, and passivity” (Gal and Kligman 2000: 87). Its effects are thought to be even more severe for women, as state socialism often is presented as the epitome of “public patriarchy” – a system that forced women to rely on the state for their every need and want (Verdery 1994; Kligman 1998).

The postsocialist welfare system, on the other hand, is depicted in opposite terms; relinquishing its former role and responsibilities, this state is said to push citizens to rely on private relations to fulfill their needs and wants. In Esping-Andersen’s (1990) terms, this is a shift from a social-democratic regime, which connected citizens’ well-being to the state, to a liberal or corporatist regime, which emphasizes the market or personal networks (Deacon 1997). Quite often this shift is read as a move from a “dependent past” to an “independent future,” thus reproducing the notion that states breed dependence while markets breed autonomy (Makkai 1994; Gal and Kligman 2000). Yet, as gender scholars have pointed out, state reform has not always led to increased choices or autonomy for East European women. Instead, many claim that reform and marketization privatized women’s domestic responsibilities and care-work, thus leaving them more vulnerable to market cycles and more reliant on heterosexual relationships (Einhorn 1993; Molyneux 1994; Rudd 2003). The concern was that the “state patriarchy” of the past would be replaced by “private patriarchy” – not unlike the concern voiced by gender scholars about US welfare reform.

Yet just as the in/dependence frame obscures many of the complexities of US welfare reform, it also simplifies East European shifts. For two years in the mid-1990s, Haney (2002) conducted archival and ethnographic research on how the Hungarian welfare state developed. Her findings complicated common notions of the shift from “state” to “private” patriarchy. Although she did find a sharp increase in social inequality and massive cuts in state assistance, the effects of these changes could not be captured through the in/dependence frame. Instead of moving from a reliance on the state to a reliance on private networks, Hungarian women strategized to connect public and private resources in new ways. They drew on familial positions to claim state support and labor-market integration. In doing so, these women provide examples of another form of interdependence – the transfer of resources from the family to the state and the labor market.

The previous discussion of interdependence in the United States centered on recipients' mobilizing material resources and the ways this altered patterns of redistribution. While recipients in postsocialist Hungary also utilized material resources, equally important was their use of symbolic resources; they waged battles over the representation and interpretation of their needs. Through these discursive battles, recipients frequently drew on their familial responsibilities and positions to stake claims to public support – arguing that their roles as mothers entitled them to comprehensive state and labor-market assistance.

To understand how this occurred, a bit of background information is needed. Prior to the late 1980s, the expansive nature of the Hungarian welfare state meant that it included women from different social strata. Its universal social policies extended assistance to all types of families; its institutions set out to intervene into a variety of familial problems, from childrearing difficulties to marital conflict to domestic violence to maternal depression (Haney 2002). It was this expansive reach that underlay imagery of the socialist state as a dependency-generating machine. Additionally, it was this imagery that motivated many of the postsocialist welfare reforms, with policy makers within and outside Hungary reforming the welfare system to target the poor. These reforms not only resulted in a massive scaling back of state policies and programs, but they also excluded those recipients no longer deemed “needy.” In effect, within only a decade, the Hungarian welfare system became the terrain of the materially deprived.

With these shifts, a new gap surfaced between those women excluded from the welfare state and those included in it. The prediction was that both groups would become more “independent” – with the former group turning to their families or the labor market for support and the latter group relying less and less on state assistance. Yet what actually occurred was far more complex. Instead of quietly reverting to their families and jobs, these women appropriated their familial positions as symbolic resources to expand their access to public support. Some did this by utilizing their domestic roles to claim financial assistance and advice from state actors. Others did this by drawing on their domestic identities to gain access to the labor market and/or to resolve problems at work. In both ways, Hungarian women maneuvered to transfer discursive resources among the family, the state, and the market in the hopes of improving their well-being.

Examples from Haney's (2002) fieldwork in Hungarian welfare offices provide a concrete sense of this discursive appropriation and maneuvering. The first example characterized women who had recently been excluded from state assistance programs due to their relative material security. They tended to be working-class women who had suffered material losses since the 1980s but remained just above the official poverty line. They came to welfare offices for help in resolving a variety of issues, from work to familial to emotional problems. In their initial interactions with caseworkers, they rarely received what they were looking for. Over and over again, these women were told they had become ineligible for all forms of state support and were instructed to look to their private networks for aid. “Well, I don't know what to tell you,” a caseworker once said to Mrs. Kovacs, a woman who was describing her husband's ongoing domestic abuse and violence. “If he really threw the television out the window, you could take up some overtime or borrow money to buy a new one.”

Instead of following such suggestions and turning to private networks, women like Mrs. Kovacs struggled to be reintegrated into state systems of support. They did so by mobilizing their domestic roles and identities; in particular, they constructed themselves as “good mothers” in order to stake claims to state support. They insisted on demonstrating their effectiveness as mothers to gain bargaining power in negotiations with caseworkers. These women did everything from informing caseworkers of their childrearing skills to bringing their children to welfare offices as demonstrations of their maternal success. They also linked their ability to mother properly to the existence of state assistance. “Do you know how much it costs to cook healthy food and how much time it takes to protect my children from all the disorderly influences out there?,” a mother of two once asked a caseworker. “How am I to do this alone now? Is there no longer respect for this?” In all these cases, the goal was clear: to extract symbolic resources from their family lives for reinclusion into the welfare arena.

Interestingly, a similar strategy was deployed by those women who remained welfare recipients after the postsocialist reforms. Having been deemed eligible for state assistance, these clients did not need to find a way to regain entry into the welfare sphere. Instead, they struggled to expand the kind of assistance they received (i.e., to force their caseworkers to go beyond the distribution of poor relief and provide more comprehensive help). Quite often, this implied becoming integrated into the paid labor force. For instance, female clients who were unemployed regularly asked caseworkers for help locating employment. They told stories of unsuccessful job searches; they discussed how they were laid off unexpectedly; and they described how their job skills had become obsolete in the new economy. Their pleas for help usually were accompanied by references to their domestic roles and lives. Some clients linked their search for work to their domestic responsibilities. They argued that they needed special assistance because their desire to remain “good mothers” limited the time they could devote to searching for employment. Others claimed that they needed help finding work because their roles as mothers left them without the necessary connections. After years of devoting themselves to full-time motherhood, they had fallen out of work-related and job-referral networks. “Since 1988, I have done the most difficult work of all and raised my children on GYES [maternity leave],” a mother of three once explained to her caseworker. “I have no colleagues and don’t even know where to go for a job anymore.”

Clients who were employed utilized similar strategies to argue for help in resolving a host of work-related problems. These clients often complained about how low their wages were – so low that they remained below the poverty line despite working full-time. They described terrible working conditions and schedules that had them working early in the morning to late at night. They recounted long commutes to get to and from work. And they discussed inflexible and unsympathetic supervisors. In voicing such concerns, clients attempted to involve state caseworkers in their work lives. Here, too, they justified this intervention through references to their familial roles. They claimed that their low wages would take a toll on their mothering practices; they argued that their long work hours and commutes would threaten their ability to be attentive mothers; and they maintained that unsupportive work environments would jeopardize their emotional well-being and, thus, their maternal competency. In expressing these concerns, clients clearly linked their labor-

market integration to the availability of social support. In addition, they mobilized their familial lives and maternal roles as resources to make claims to this social support.

Of course, claiming social support is not the same as receiving it. Herein lies a key difference between the forms of interdependence characteristic of low-income women in the United States and Hungary. When our Baltimore recipients utilized state programs as resources in their work and family lives, they had clear redistributive effects. These women established new markets of care-work, they created employment opportunities for other women in need, and they gained some bargaining power and a sense of security in their relations with men. Yet the redistributive outcomes of Hungarian women's strategizing were less clear. Newly excluded women rarely found their way back into state programs despite their maternal claims, while female clients rarely received the comprehensive social and economic support they sought. But this does not call into question the importance of the links these women forged among social institutions. Hungarian clients' rhetorical use of the familial may not have yielded monetary rewards, but it had symbolic import; it allowed some of them to argue against the exclusion processes pushing them out of the state arena. It allowed others to voice how their lives as mothers were connected intricately to state and labor-market institutions. Moreover, it allowed both groups to counter the public stigma attached to their lives, which is a key form of social inequality welfare states act to re/produce.

Beyond In/Dependence

This chapter has catalogued how notions of in/dependence have been used in social-scientific analyses of welfare state inequalities. From research on contemporary welfare reform in the United States to work on the overhaul of the East European welfare state, the tendency has been to assess inequality through the framework of in/dependence. Whether done with descriptive, prescriptive, or critical intentions, the objective has been to evaluate the extent to which state policies de/commodified women's labor and fostered a reliance on private or public networks of support. While it is revealing, we argued that the in/dependence dichotomy ended up obscuring more than it illuminated. The dichotomy has been moralized so thoroughly that it has lost analytical power; scholarly and political debates have been cast in such a way that it is no longer viable to argue for rehabilitating dependency. Nor is the solution to rank order types of dependencies by privileging market dependencies over state dependencies, familial dependencies over state dependencies, or nested dependencies over dangerous dependencies. Instead, we proposed to replace this dichotomy with a model of interdependence – a model that highlights the interconnections among institutions of support and the ways women form these institutional linkages to extract redistributive and symbolic resources for use in their everyday lives.

This shift in focus from women's in/dependence to their webs of interdependence has both empirical and conceptual payoffs. Empirically, it provides a new way to understand how resources circulate among family, labor market, and state institutions. To demonstrate this, we drew on examples from the United States and

Hungary and unpacked two emergent forms of interdependence. In the US case study, we exposed the concrete ways low-income women in Baltimore redirected state resources to support their work and family lives – using state programs to move into new markets of care-work, to expand these markets, and to manage their heterosexual relationships. We then drew on ethnographic work in the Hungarian welfare state to reveal how women struggled to convert familial positions into public resources – drawing on their identities as mothers to claim state support, to expand the scope of assistance, and to shield themselves from stigmatization. The lens of interdependence thus exposed how low-income women can form a nexus through which assistance is transferred among social realms. It also highlighted how women strategize to open up these channels, thereby augmenting the redistributive and symbolic resources available to them.

In this way, the model of interdependence opens up new possibilities for empirical investigation. By suggesting an alternative vision of state processes of inequality, it leads to new research questions. Rather than conceptualizing inequality in either/or terms (i.e., as stemming from women's reliance on the state, the family, or the market), this model defines it as the extent to which women can forge linkages among social-support institutions. From this conception, it then becomes important to explore how particular networks of support are enabled or blocked in particular welfare state arrangements and how they provide women with resources to protect their well-being. In this chapter, we analyzed two forms of institutional linkages in two different state contexts. Yet surely there are other types of linkages and other strategies women deploy to preserve them. For instance, in the US welfare state, it is possible that market-based resources have emerged to enhance women's state and family support. If they have emerged, did they exacerbate disparities among low-income women? Has differential access to kin and community support shaped women's ability to make reform work for them and to utilize possible market-based resources? Finally, how might all of this vary across different welfare state contexts and arrangements?

In addition to these empirical questions, the model of interdependence has important theoretical implications. Until now, scholars have tended to assess welfare reform according to the institutional resources it offers female recipients. What often gets lost in such assessments are what recipients offer social institutions and how their strategizing contributes to these institutions. The interdependence lens makes this reliance visible. It exposes how families, states, and labor markets mutually are constitutive and dependent on one another: Labor markets rely on state provisions to reduce costs and to reproduce the labor force. States rely on labor markets to cut expenditures and to take on some of the burdens of care-work. Both institutions rely on families to bolster themselves and to institute policies – just as family members rely on these policies to secure their own well-being. Additionally, all these institutions rely on women's channeling of resources. Through their channeling, women fill in institutional gaps and shift resources to areas where they are most needed. In doing so, they end up correcting for many of the shortcomings of these social institutions.

This conceptualization of poor women as active contributors to societal welfare may be the most important implication of the interdependence model. For far too long the in/dependence frame has bred distorted public images of poor women as

leeches on social institutions. These images reached female clients, in the United States and Hungary, who frequently referred to them when describing their own lives. In our interactions, women in both countries visibly were embarrassed as they spoke of their “dependence” on social support, particularly state assistance. Yet they were equally as hesitant to proclaim themselves to be “independent” – as if they realized that the actualities of their lives belied such a simple categorization. By revitalizing research on theories of welfare, the interdependence frame may offer new interpretive tools to combat this distortion, thus making the political discourses on welfare more responsive to and reflective of the complexities of poor women’s lives.

Notes

- 1 Our focus on interdependence is not without precedent. In the abstract, some welfare scholars have argued for a disruption of the in/dependence dichotomy (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Kittay 1999). They also have shown that welfare recipients enjoined public and private support to make ends meet (Edin and Lein 1997). Yet these deconstructions of dependency remain conceptually underdeveloped.
- 2 Our interview sample was drawn from the Baltimore Parenthood Study (BPS), one of the longest-running studies of disadvantaged families. On a variety of indicators, our sample looked very much like the population targeted by welfare reformers – disadvantaged, inner-city, African American, teenage mothers or the children of teenage mothers. The actual interviews were conducted from 1999 to 2001, most often in our respondents’ homes, and ran for two to four hours. For more on the BPS, see Furstenberg et al. (1987); for more on our interviews and sampling procedures, see Rogers-Dillon and Haney (forthcoming) and Haney and March (2003).
- 3 Interestingly, some of our respondents used the foster-care system in a similar way, becoming foster parents to be remunerated for care-work and to tap into state assistance programs. For more on this, see Rogers-Dillon and Haney (forthcoming).
- 4 Similar concerns and fears were discovered by Edin (2000) in her important study of poor women’s views of marriage.

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Chapter 15

Inequalities, Crime, and Citizenship

NIGEL SOUTH

As Hagan and Petersen observe, “Linkages between social inequality and crime have been subjects of speculation as well as some dispute since the early days of European . . . and American Criminology” (1995: 1). Such “speculation” and “dispute” persist, not only in criminology but also in adjacent academic fields. In part, this is because the problems of crime (commission and victimization) and of inequality are real-world problems attracting sustained attention from politicians and policy makers, commentators and media, interest groups across a wide spectrum (criminal justice agencies, victim support groups, prison reform advocacy organizations) and, of course, the general public.

This chapter examines the prevalence and persistence of inequalities, in relation to crime, with particular reference to social structure (socioeconomic and cultural factors) and to the idea of citizenship. Surprisingly, the latter is a relatively neglected category in crime discussion. Surprising, on the one hand, because the phenomenon of the poor committing crimes against others that are poor represents a cycle of diminution of the *ideal* of citizenship for both parties – offender and victim. On the other hand, the convicted and/or incarcerated prisoner is (dependent upon the jurisdiction) one of the major categories of *real* exclusion from full entitlement to civil and citizenship rights. This raises fairly obvious questions about tensions between the full realization of the punishment principle of “less eligibility” versus the (notionally) universally normative goal of rehabilitation of offenders and aim of releasing prisoners from jail as “good and useful citizens.” The sociological and political-science literatures on citizenship tend to focus on the progressive extension of citizenship rights and debates about this development, while the human-rights literature is attuned generally more closely to withdrawal or denial of citizenship and the abuse of human rights (Cohen 2001). In criminology, concerns with issues of inclusion versus social exclusion perhaps connect most clearly (Young 1999).

This chapter reviews theoretical perspectives, key studies, and data that have contributed to our understanding of the connections between crime and inequalities. The presentation of this material is organized into sections on: a review of param-

eters; a more focused summary of work related to factors such as unemployment, relative deprivation, the “underclass” debate, health and social support, and the politics of criminal justice (variables such as gender, ethnicity, and youth are referred to throughout). This is followed by a discussion of theoretical developments concerning inequality and crime and citizenship; then concludes with reflections.

Inequalities and Crime: Parameters and Definitions

The problems of poverty, crime, and associated concerns about criminal neighborhoods – as the cradle of criminal careers – are long standing (Trevelyan 1964; Elmsley 1996). Contemporary research has advanced our understanding of relationships between inequalities and crime and generally concurred that while these are complex, they are real and discernible. While modern Western societies have a record of success in sweeping away *absolute poverty*, very significant levels of serious poverty and gross inequalities remain. As discussed later, the resulting force of relative poverty or *relative deprivation* is associated with a range of psychological and behavioral responses, from depression and mental health difficulties, through feelings of humiliation and alienation, to expressions of antagonism, aggression, and transgression (James 1995; Young 2003). Politicians and public policy have made few inroads into eliminating the roots of these structural and associated problems. Despite substantial fiscal and administrative commitments to reducing poverty and improving education and housing, the reality remains that to varying explicit or hidden degrees, the bases of social-structural inequality are untouched. Systematically unfair taxation and welfare regimes leave the rich richer and the poor poorer; biased and punitive criminal justice policies leave the criminality of the powerful largely unfettered and the criminality of the poor ever-increasingly likely to result in imprisonment (Currie 1985; Taylor 1999; Lea 2002).

Over time, some consensus has arisen across the political spectrum (albeit with important and varying qualifications), suggesting that social and economic disadvantage will, all other things being equal, provide greater likelihood of patterns of socialization into values, skills, and/or attitudes favorable to taking advantage of opportunities for crime and/or association with criminal role models (Sutherland 1939; Miller 1958; Braithwaite 1979; Colvin and Pauly 1983; Greenberg 1985; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985). Perhaps the two most fundamental qualification statements in relation to any association between inequalities, deprivation, and crime are as follows. First, the majority of those in such circumstances do not become criminal or succumb to drug and alcohol dependency (the latter being associated by commentators and statistical analysis with propensity to commit property and violent crime). Second, there are many (principally males) at higher levels of the social pecking order for whom wealth and prestige should be the last source of concern yet who, nonetheless, still commit crime for profit and power. This second objection to the inequalities/crime link frequently is explained in terms of social psychological, sociological, and common-sense propositions regarding: the drive of internalized forces of relative deprivation that affect the rich as much as the poor (Lea and Young 1984); and a combination of competitive masculinity, greed, and ambition (Messerschmidt 1997). Hereafter, this latter issue must be set aside, for

the relative inequalities among the already well-off are not the concern here. However, the first point must be recognized and should take account of choice and responsibility, but also the particular personal circumstances and social conditions in which these are exercised.

In relation to the likelihood of criminal victimization, it has been argued that it is increased by conditions of general inequality and social deprivation (Kershaw et al. 2000: 47–9; Hope 2001). Hagan and Petersen (1995: 5) note that criminological theories of “Opportunity, routine activity, and lifestyle . . . emphasize that subordinate populations are inadequately equipped to defend themselves against crime” (Hindelang et al. 1978; Garafalo 1987; Felson 1994; Felson and Clarke 1998). These particular theories stress the importance of the choices made from a point of view focusing upon the individual within a limited sphere of everyday action. Critical criminologists would argue for a more social approach with more explicit recognition that “subordinate” populations (ethnic minorities, women, and youths) find themselves ill equipped to defend themselves because of the sheer weight of the structural bias against them. This means that not only is society racist, patriarchal, and homophobic (Messerschmidt 1997), but also that key institutions discriminate against or fail the powerless (Cox 2002). Hence the police harbor “institutionalized racism” (Miller 1996; Lea 2002); domestic violence remains a largely invisible and “unpopular” problem (Dobash and Dobash 1992); and, though youths may be the most likely offenders, also, frequently they are overlooked as victims of assault and theft – from the schoolyard to the city center. Furthermore, as we now know, children and young people have not been well protected from a massive amount of hidden sexual abuse and cruelty in families and in caring institutions (from the Church to social-care homes). Individual “choices” become somewhat limited in the circumstances of these individuals.

Individual situations and social statuses are related to crime and victimization patterns in quite broad ways. Young women may be deflected from crime and victimization because of family expectations of them (Hagan et al. 1979), but the restrictions that families can impose are changing and young women today expect greater freedom. Ethnicity and youth are variables strongly associated with crime and, in the United Kingdom, most statistically recordable crime would seem to be committed by a minority of young men and boys below 25 years of age, “disproportionately drawn from the urban, under-educated, under-employed working class” (Downes 1998: 2). Yet one of the most significant points about this profile is that it describes a population group that is also at high risk of crime victimization.

The Rich Get Richer . . .

Perhaps one of the neatest criminological maxims in the current literature is Reiman’s (2001) title for his well-known text, “the rich get richer and the poor get prison.” Encapsulated and implied here are a number of important questions. Why does the criminal justice system focus downward and rarely upward (Sutherland 1949) leaving the “crimes of the powerful” (Pearce 1976) remaining excessively privileged? Why do the poor go to prison when, for offences of more serious pro-

portions in terms of their economic, moral, or physical-harm implications, the white-collar or corporate wrongdoer is fined, warned, dealt with in civil rather than criminal courts, or simply ignored (Braithwaite 1979; Wells 1988; Gobert and Punch 2003; Mitchell and Sikka 2004)? Who “does” the defining and labeling that differentiate the deviant and the dominant (Becker 1964)? Who makes the actuarial judgments (Stenson and Sullivan 2001) that so clearly mark out what is literally a world of difference between the crimes and punishments of the poor and the powerful? To pursue such questions, a sense of the wider picture is necessary.

An Unequal Economy: The Work Poor and the Work Rich

As Pahl remarked of the United Kingdom at the millennium,

hopes for a more equal society have been disappointed, since the rich are getting richer more rapidly than the poor. In 1961, Britain's top 10% of wage earners took home three times as much as the bottom 10%. By 1990 they earned more than four times as much. Between 1979 and 1994/1995, the lowest earners saw an increase of about 14% in their real incomes . . . [while] the highest earners saw their real incomes rise by well over 50% during the same period. (1999: 1)

With the collapse of traditional, skilled, manual trades – and the industries that sustained them – and corresponding damage to the communities that drew economic lifeblood from these industries (Taylor 1999), a form of “occupational and income polarisation” (Pahl 1999: 1) is occurring. Here, those that are well placed in the labor market “are most able to boost their earning opportunities through training and further education and can provide better education for their children. They are healthier, live in safer communities and are able to accumulate capital from a variety of sources” (*ibid.*; for discussion of similar themes in relation to the United States, see Duster 1987; Wilson 1987, 1996; Currie 1985). Those that are weak in relation to labor-market opportunities also face (directly and indirectly) associated disadvantages; for example, patterns of work based on unsocial hours for poor pay make it difficult to invest in family life or in further educational achievement. In both the United Kingdom and the United States, these people most likely “reside and work in more dangerous communities, must rely upon higher risk forms of public transportation, and have insufficient resources to otherwise structure safe environments and lifestyles” (Hagan and Petersen 1995: 5; see also Taylor et al. 1996). Those that “are clustered in the poorer parts of town regularly work across the tracks to keep the well-off families functioning. The work poor keep the work rich going; indeed, it is only the availability of such cheap ‘help’ that enables the dual career families to continue” (Young 2003: 396). In some cases, the changing economic fortunes of cities has meant that communities that once were proudly reliant on traditional industries have seen their replacement by informal economies of crime (Taylor 1999; Lea 2002) and, in particular, the new market of global dominance – illegal drugs supply (Hobbs 1995; Ruggiero and South 1995; Foster 2000). In terms of overarching trends in income differentiation, two variables seem of particular interest in theories and studies of links between inequality and crime: first, unemployment and, second, relative deprivation.

Unemployment and crime

Economic models of crime assume rational behavior under generally predictable market conditions (although, of course, jurisprudence and various criminological theories must accommodate nonrational action). Conservative commentators and politicians have tended to emphasize “rational choice” and deny links between social-structural factors and crime, interpreting the “causes” of crime in terms of increased “opportunities” and the failure of the moral will required to avoid “choosing” crime (Anderson 1993; Downes 1998: 3). Thus, one particularly influential writer, J. Q. Wilson (1975), has argued that the increase in crime in the 1960s could not be attributed to problems of poverty, as this was a decade of significant increases in living standards and provision of welfare and education. Ten years later, Wilson and Cook took the position that “[e]ven the strongest evidence of a crime-economy link does not explain more than a very small portion of the year-to-year changes in crime rates, and so it is unlikely that even very successful economic policies will have more than a modest effect on crime rates (and then only on the rates of some crimes)” (1985: 8).

Nonetheless, it is difficult for Conservatives to retain faith in the power of market forces – for example, free competition or interest rates – yet simultaneously deny a more significant link between crime and the influence of movements in the economy than Wilson and Cook would allow. Hence, it has become somewhat less controversial that correlations between trends in markets and crime can be identified: most obviously, supporting the proposition that a rise in unemployment and fall in wage levels will have a relationship with an increase in criminal activity (Freeman 1996; Reilly and Witt 1996). Of course, this is not to say that such a view might be expected to form any major policy from Conservative quarters. Nor is it likely that politicians of any party in the West will cease trying to put the best possible “spin” on official data about the performance of the economy. This feature of presentational politics involves manipulating the unemployment figures and, in both the United Kingdom and the United States, it is as true of these statistics as of those reporting crime rates that they have been seriously massaged in some way or another (Walker 2002). The fact that imprisonment removes from the unemployment figures many individuals with poor employment prospects is widely recognized.

UK data from the early 1970s to the early 1990s indicate that nonqualified males experienced an unemployment rate that increased from 4 percent to 16.9 percent (Nickell and Bell 1995). Over the same period, the wage rates of unskilled male workers relative to others in the labor market fell considerably (*ibid.*; for the United States, see Duster 1987). The parallel, third trend of significance is that alongside these developments there was a substantial increase in recorded crime in England and Wales (Witt et al. 1998: 265).

Unemployment and the informal economy

Numerous studies show how informal economic activity becomes important in areas where legitimate economic activity and opportunities have been hollowed out (Davis 1990; Wilson 1996). Replacement by insecure enterprises and businesses on the edge

between licit and illicit markets can be vital in providing alternative work and possible bases for future revitalization (White 1989). In some countries (for example, Italy) such edge enterprises can be a common lubricant of the market, attractive to both legitimate and criminal participants (Ruggiero and South 1995). Nevertheless, this is not a desirable economic state to be in. First, rather similarly to the common sense at the heart of Wilson and Kelling's (1982) "broken windows" hypothesis (subsequently taken too far and too worryingly), the signs of economic deterioration in a community deserve remedial action before they take hold. Urban regeneration schemes are not without their problems or critics but are preferable to urban degeneration. Second, as Young (2003) has pointed out, the idea of the informal economy as a generator of alternative work can carry a rather romantic message belied by the realities of inadequate income and/or the violence of people's lives. Perhaps because he focuses on the drug economy, Young overstates this case but is probably correct that "the 'crime as work' metaphor is one that is," by now, "hopelessly overburdened" (2003: 409). Nonetheless, while exploitative, the opportunities provided by the informal economy and "work off the books" are important to many who are not valued by the mainstream labor market.

In the United States, African Americans and Latinos associated with drugs gangs may be dealing drugs but this is a precarious existence for most and rarely the route to earning fortunes (Fagan 1991; Hamid 1992; Hagedorn 1994), yet attitudes to legitimate work may be ambivalent and for good reason. Young (2003: 409) notes that the crack dealers in East Harlem studied by Bourgois (1995) "are far from unaware of the world of legitimate work. They are ridden with self-doubt about their exclusion, had fantasies about being a 'normal working nigga,' had been in work and had been humiliated by the world of work. Simultaneously wanting to be legitimate and despising it but far from being oblivious of it [sic]" (on the similar experience of UK Asian youth and legal work versus drug dealing, see Akhtar and South 2000). Despite lack of skills and education, and experience of prejudice and rejection in the labor market, given encouragement and assistance some of these marginalized males (and this is a dominantly male culture; Maher 1997) are attracted by the availability of ways to convert their lifestyle to one of a more conventional form (Duster 1987). This may be most likely to occur as young adulthood develops, other responsibilities begin to accumulate, and involvement in crime begins to decline (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). As Hagedorn observes, "Many homeboys believed that using skills learned in selling drugs to set up a small business would give them a better chance at a decent life than trying to succeed as an employee" (1994: 210). Such ambition has been recognized in some imaginative social programs, though great potential for the "turnaround" of illicit into legal entrepreneurialism is probably still being missed. In relation to addicted drug users requiring treatment and counseling programs, some have benefited from incorporation into these of education, work and skills elements, building upon the "moment" when users decide to change, with encouraging results (South et al. 2001). Elsewhere, initiatives such as the Delancey Street Project in San Francisco have worked with "over 11,000 former convicts, addicts, prostitutes, and alcoholics" unsupported by official sources yet generating a commercially successful Foundation creating real work and education opportunities for former offenders (www.giraffe.org/giraffe_heroes/mimi_silbert.html).

Relative Deprivation, Income, and Crime

The idea of relative deprivation (Runciman 1966) has been discussed extensively in relation to crime (Lea and Young 1984; Stack 1984), as a reflection of institutionalized inequalities that are perceived as unjust and give rise to expressions of varying degrees of resentment. Witt et al. explored the hypotheses “that an individual’s chance of engaging in criminal activity in part depends on his relative earnings. . . . The underlying assumption is that growing wage inequality between comparative reference groups can give rise to feelings of envy and injustice. This implies that as the earnings gap widens, relative deprivation increases, which in turn leads to increases in crime” (1998: 265–6). UK data on wage inequality, unemployment, and recorded crime covering 1979 to 1993 were examined by these authors, who found a strong positive correlation, adding that their results “suggest that continued falls in the relative wages of unskilled men and increases in male unemployment in England and Wales act as incentives to engage in criminal activity” (1998: 265–6).

The work of Field (1999) has also pointed to strong correlations between trends in the economic cycle and patterns of recorded crime. These reveal increases in crime related to the growth of consumption, so the greater the stock of consumer goods in society the more likely a rise in acquisitive offenses. Field’s (1990) earlier work on these trends has been described by Downes as illustrating “*anomie in action* . . . when times are good, people buy from department stores; when they are bad, from car boot sales and backs of lorries. For a growing number, times are always bad” (1998: 3).

Inequality, violent crime, and relative deprivation

Hagan and Petersen note that in a considerable body of work, economic and class-focused structural explanations of links between inequality and crimes of violence are replaced or supplemented by consideration of cultural, “racial/ethnic, and regional” elements that generate subcultural theories of violence (1995: 4; see also Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967; Banfield 1968; Blau and Blau 1982; Messner 1989). Such theories are diverse in detail but can be summarized in general terms. Relative economic deprivation is still a central idea but finds its “delinquent solution” (Downes 1966; Lea and Young 1984) in the use of violence as a response to the “offensive” behavior of: rivals (e.g., trespassing on “turf” where they don’t belong; Moore 1978); minorities and “others not like us” (e.g., the rise of hate crimes of violence; Iganski 2002); or “usurpers” of “our” jobs, “our” women, “our” culture (in the United States this latter response is greatly entangled with the vigilante tradition, itself intimately tied to support for the death penalty, Zimring 2003; in Europe it has been associated with the rekindling of neo-Nazi groups and violence against migrant workers, Sack 1998). Such approaches may have affinities with *anomie* theory as well as the subcultural/cultural studies explanations applied from the 1970s on, to the responses of principally white, low-achieving, young men facing the decline of their communities and traditional work destinations (Hall and Jefferson 1976). Structural causes of the dissolution of community and loss or

relocation of work, then and now, can be too difficult to comprehend and too remote to target in any direct expression of frustration or anger. Instead, historically, it has been the “newcomers” (immigrants and others), providing cheaper labor or willing to pay rent on poor housing, who are blamed for changing the labor market or the neighborhood and who may become targets for violence and harassment. Yet, of course, the new exploited are not the problem; the problem is the cycle of exploitation itself.

In the United Kingdom, some have interpreted violence as an expression of sub-cultural attempts to resurrect idealized forms of “tough” working-class masculinity (Rock 2002: 74) and “magically” resolve the dislocation caused by wider social changes. Today, such analysis seems less convincing and violence is increasingly expressed by use of firepower. For the United States, studies have shown that poverty, income inequality, and relative deprivation are powerful predictors of gun-related homicide and violent crime (Krahn et al. 1986; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Kennedy et al. 1998). In the United Kingdom, gun control is extremely restrictive but remains a serious concern. Gang culture crime of recent years has seen a drug-related rise in firearms offences, homicides, and the fear that the American experience is about to be mirrored in the British inner city (Taylor 1999). Principally linked to Black gangs (so-called “Yardies” and “Posses,” although few have authentic connections with the original Jamaican Yardie gangs), shootings have been carried out to protect turf, to signal retribution, or just because someone has not shown enough “respect” (*The Week*, 2003). Around 500 homicides and 5,000 attacks involving guns are estimated to have occurred since the early 1990s (2003). To interpret this new style as “resistance” or as simply paralleling the power dynamics of the legal economy is probably both patronizing and missing the point – the attraction of profitable criminal enterprise is certainly motivating but so too is the risk and “seduction” of “doing crime” and all “the life” that comes with this (Katz 1988; Young 2003). This is one of the most fraught areas for sensible discussion in the United Kingdom and so far the US experience has not provided a blueprint for action that would find wide appeal.

... And the Poor Get Prison

Offenders are largely seen as “unequal” by mainstream society. While this may occasionally be seen as requiring reform, the tendency is toward a negative evaluation of their worth and contribution (or lack of it) to society, and of their low social status (“deserved and with only themselves to blame”). They are a “them,” different to “us” in terms of inner values and external behaviors. This powerful way of seeing offenders and crime has implications for notions of citizenship and rights and has contributed to the populist criminal justice politics that have moved the criminal justice system away from a process concerned with treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare to a law-and-order machine concerned with risk-managing the rational offender and incarcerating the dangerous (Garland 2001). Of course, citizenship entitlements and obligations are to be properly valued. It would not be helpful to deny that crimes such as burglary, assault, rape, and murder grievously offend against the rights, inviolability, and lives of others. However, the aim should be to

use citizenship and rights in a more inclusive way and to extend access to social capital.

By contrast, corporate offenders enjoy the economic and social benefits of their position with little challenge from either legal or populist quarters; they profit from activities that damage the quality of life of others and from economic crimes that pass losses onto consumers via higher prices, workers losing pensions or jobs, and compromised health and safety programs leading to accidents and manslaughter deaths of employees (Alvesalo and Tombs 2002). Health harms also follow from cost cutting – affecting production processes and transportation, creating pollution, waste disposal problems, and road deaths. Such problems usually affect environmental victims who are already the least powerful and unequally resourced (Bullard 1990; South 1998).

Recent Theoretical and Empirical Directions

The “underclass” and responsibility for crime

There are various definitions of the term “underclass” (Murray 1990; Wilson 1996) although in a strict sociological sense the implication of a “class” base is misleading. The term refers to a varied population that is “done to” rather than having the potential to “act as” a genuine “class,” or even to find common voice or the resources to mobilize as a social or protest movement. Lockwood (1996) provides some examples of the structural and systemic impediments to the development of “underclass”-based coalitions and common cause which instead promote disengagement. Patterns of nonvoting behavior among the poor and minorities in the United Kingdom and United States are one indicator of this.

Perhaps the question . . . is, not why minorities protest against . . . discrimination but why protest does not take on a more widespread political form. One reason is that ethnic groups vary in the extent to which they have become integrated in the host society, at least as measured by educational and occupational achievement. Whatever the reason for this, it has the effect of reinforcing invidious comparisons between minorities and thereby preventing their coalescence as a united bloc. A more fundamental reason, however, is that in so far as minorities have “full” citizenship, they are necessarily caught up in rules of the civic game which present a choice between legitimate remedial action, such as achieving supplementary rights, and action outside the rules, which provides grounds for increased prejudice and further discrimination. (Lockwood 1996: 544)

In practice, the idea of an “underclass” has been popularized less as an analytic tool and more as a politicized label employed by commentators on both the right and the left. The influential argument advanced by Murray (1984), and rapidly taken up by conservative governments and think tanks, was that welfare is disabling not enabling; that it is not a safety net for the needy but a featherbed for the feckless, encouraging the breakdown of families; further, it does not help prevent crime but actually creates it by producing a shiftless underclass, born into welfare dependency and expecting the state and others to provide. Thus Young notes the popular image of “the underclass” as living:

in idleness and crime. Their areas are the abode of single mothers and feckless fathers, their economics that of drugs, prostitution and trafficking in stolen goods. They are the social impurities of the late modern world. (1999: 20)

The moral position of the new right has argued that the traditional virtues and values of the family have been diminished (Mooney 2003) and that this is a more powerful cause of delinquent and criminal activity than structural conditions such as unemployment (Downes 1998: 4). However, Currie (1985), among others, points to the obvious limitations of too narrow a focus on such particular variables since, as Downes summarizes:

to pitch unemployment against family background as the cause of crime is singularly unhelpful, since economic and social inequalities can aggravate both as well as leading to community decline. Secondly, unemployment is not simply to be contrasted with employment, as if both were standard units of experience. Insecure under-employment is no better than unemployment as a source of livelihood sufficient to support a family and experience an active sense of citizenship. (1998: 4)

Crime, health, and social support

The point at which inequality and crime intersect is, of course, just one among a clustering of inequality-related vulnerabilities and particular conditions for the least advantaged. Lack of social capital, influence, and networks may also be important, as will the material conditions and daily experience of life in relation to accommodation and health. In relation to such life experiences, the British Crime Survey reports that those who considered themselves to be in poor health or who had a limiting illness or disability had heightened levels of concern about crime (Kershaw et al. 2000: 47–9, Table A7.9). Or, to connect health, violence, and gender inequalities, studies of victims appearing at hospital Accident and Emergency services have revealed a far higher incidence of domestic violence casualties than were reported to the police (Shepherd and Lisle 1998). This is unsurprising given the point made earlier about the persisting invisibility of violence within the home (generally, though not always, committed by men against women). These authors suggest the need for health services and local domestic violence initiatives to liaise more effectively, with the former providing improved referral to victim support organizations, although others (Keithley and Robinson 2000) urge caution about such developments on the grounds that this would increase the surveillance and intrusion of agencies of risk management into the lives of the predominantly poor and disempowered, who already receive a great deal of social inspection. This point anticipates discussion (below) about the changing character of models and practices in social control and the need to shift toward greater provision of social support.

Following the election of the UK Labour Government in 1997, “crime and community” became the focus of considerable attention in “social inclusion” interventions (Matthews and Pitts 2001). Of relevance here is research published by the Public Health Alliance, finding that:

The effects of the fear of crime, rather than crime itself, on the health of individuals and communities has been largely underestimated. In particular, the impact of “inci-

vilities” on well being is not well recognised. . . . [B]oth victims of crime and non-victims identified a deterioration in their quality of life and adopted a range of coping mechanisms likely to be detrimental to health, in particular increased use of alcohol, smoking and use of both licit and illicit drugs. . . . There was . . . a strong correlation between crime, fear of crime and gender and race. Women and black communities . . . identified stress, depression and sleeping difficulties at twice the rate of the sample as a whole. (McCabe and Raine 1997, iii)

Focusing on youth in the community, a report from the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO 2001: 15) suggested that “background research into the relationship between health and youth crime is far from extensive” but “That which exists . . . suggests a high correlation between substance misuse, adverse mental health and a range of other health-related problems on the one hand, and offending by children and young people on the other.”

Wilkinson (1996) has argued that, “the range of inequality in a society is directly related to levels of health (and well-being) in that society, relative to other societies” (Pahl 2003: 2). Although Wilkinson is primarily concerned with “Unhealthy Societies,” the general ideas also have clear relevance in relation to the occurrence and prevalence of crime in communities. Wilkinson argues that “the social environment becomes less supportive where income differentials are greatest . . . [and] that when people feel inferior or are put down they are more likely to feel shame and anxiety” (1996: 3) – feelings likely to confirm and compound identities of failure and relative deprivation and find expression in various harms to self (e.g., drug misuse, self-mutilation) and to others (e.g., interpersonal violence, theft).

The needy in society are frequently multiply victimized and, as Cullen (1994: 530–4) observes, while they suffer no shortage of social control, they lack sufficient social support. It should therefore be evident that the more “joined-up” social support that society can offer the better:

a social support perspective leads us to reconsider the connection to crimes of inequality. . . . As stated by Currie (1985), . . . “economic inequality can generate crime not only by exposing people to relative deprivation but also by eviscerating and inhibiting the development of social support networks.” (Cullen 1994: 534)

Recent sociological and political science studies draw attention to the notion of social capital as a source of such relevant community resources and strengths (Hall 1999: 418). However, in communities facing various forms of deprivation related to health, housing, social exclusion, and institutional racism, such social capital may be hard to identify, while lack of confidence in the political system and public services can be palpable (Akhtar and South 2000). Combinations of crime and control can drive away social support, social capital, and social and economic services and amenities.

From welfare and justice to control and populism

The UK Government’s Social Exclusion Unit (2002: 1) has acknowledged that prisons don’t work – “prison sentences are not succeeding in turning the majority of offenders away from crime” – yet United Kingdom and US politicians ignore the

evidence and encourage the increasing use of imprisonment. This contradiction reflects the popular appeal of punishment (or at least political perceptions of this) and results in the unnecessary imprisonment of large numbers (particularly women) disproportionately drawn from the populations of the poor and minorities. In this respect, one significant feature of the popular call for tougher measures is the evidence that “public support for aggressive enforcement is the strongest among persons *most likely* to be the target of that enforcement, namely African Americans, Hispanics, low income residents, renters, and persons of limited education” (Rosenbaum 1993: 76; emphasis added). Proponents of intensive police operations are able to point to survey results which suggest that, whilst ethnic minorities are strongly opposed to police use of excessive force (more so than Whites), the same groups of the most disadvantaged residents may call upon the police “to do whatever it takes” to remove the local drug and related crime problems (ibid.; Lee and South 2003). In practice, police crackdowns and the War on Drugs have resulted in remarkable rates of incarceration in juvenile institutions and prisons, impacting disproportionately on young Black men and minority communities (Miller 1996; Mauer 2000) and this is true of both the United States and the United Kingdom.

The question here is how to protect the poor from persistent re-offenders. This is a question of some sensitivity with regard to balancing social justice for all versus individual rights and liberties. In 2003, the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, announced an objective of transforming the criminal justice system into what he referred to as a “victim justice system” (Home Office 2002). The importance of advocacy and support for victims is important and incontestable, especially given that the victims of crime stand a high chance of also being victims of other social inequalities. However, this is problematic if the proposed remedial strategy means that new potential sources of injustice and inequity are introduced. For example, as proposed for England and Wales, an increase in civil penalties for antisocial-behavior offenders sounds welcome as a way of avoiding unnecessary criminalization – except that this is something of a sleight of hand. Caution is called for when reviewing such measures, for as Cohen (1985) described, what in fact is occurring is a “widening” of “the net” and new powers and penalties are simply being “added-on” via their introduction into the foreground of control on a frequent basis. The increasing accumulation of antisocial-behavior powers received its political endorsement on the back of the controversial “success” of “zero tolerance” in New York City, a policy disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable and already socially excluded (Carrabine et al. 2000). The transatlantic policy-transfer process means that such developments are now familiar in both the United Kingdom and the United States.

Garland (2001) discussed a general shift from liberal to punitive responses to crime in late modernity and identified “two criminologies.” The first is concerned with “normal,” “rational” offenders and the second with “threatening outcasts” and “fearsome strangers” (p. 137), the latter being very much the problem population associated by the moral right with the idea of the underclass and also central to the Bush/Blair transatlantic discourse about terrorism. As Garland (2001: 137) amplifies, the first category “is invoked to routinize crime, to allay disproportionate fears and to promote preventative action. The other functions to demonize the criminal, to act out popular fears and resentment, and to promote support for state

punishment.” In the first view, we are all rational decision makers, granted “equality” of choice about whether or not to commit crime, and to take or not take preventative measures against victimization. This has been an enormously influential philosophy in the development of crime prevention, target-hardening, and community-policing initiatives. In practice, this perspective and resulting programs have not been so naïve as to deny differences between socioeconomic circumstances and locations of the poor versus the middle class and rich but the neoclassical principle of rational choice remains paramount and inequalities are, at best, secondary considerations. Yet, as Downes remarks, while

the individual *is* responsible . . . choice and responsibility are not exercised in a vacuum. Certain circumstances encourage people to make criminal choices rather than resist them. Also, people do not simply leap from conformity to crime overnight: a lengthy process of drift, indecision, backtracking and networking is commonly involved, at any stage of which the individual may desist. . . . It is the job of governments to foster social arrangements that make the drift into delinquency less rather than more likely. (1998: 3)

In the second view, by contrast, it is the very status of being “less than equal” that draws attention. This may be because of a “choice” of lifestyle or because of a state-defined principle of “exceptionality” based on an assumption of “threat” (e.g., the rationale for incarceration at Guantánamo Bay or for the inclusion of crimes such as the serial homicides in Baltimore in 2003 within new domestic antiterrorism legislation in the United States).

Politics, promises, and crime control

Problems of inequality, crime, delinquency, and incivilities are obvious sources of anxiety for any society. In part, this unease reflects the mismatch between ideals and aspirations and the realities of individualism and relative deprivation. In relation to crime and control issues, discontent and frustration find expression in the projection of our fears onto “external” threats, to be blamed for our ills, and the phenomenon of a never-ending supply of “fearsome others,” “suitable enemies,” and the cyclical repetition of panic attacks about them (Pearson 1983; Christie 1986), all ensuring a constant source of political ammunition for the cause of more social control. In recent decades, in both the United Kingdom and the United States, successive political parties, Prime Ministers, and Presidents, have attempted to woo voters with comforting promises of a return to less troubled times. However, this is an invocation of images of the past, now so reconstructed by memory and media that they have become edited versions of history, repackaged by a thriving nostalgia industry. In turn, the impossibility of delivering on such promises is eventually acknowledged; governments then start to make different promises about “more policing, more law, more punishment” instead; inevitably, it is those living in society’s worst conditions that are unequally policed and imprisoned. This policy prescription for crime control represents one of the clearest areas in which political convergence between right and left has occurred in United Kingdom and US politics since the early 1980s. It also reflects transatlantic policy-transfer agreement at the highest levels of political alliance (seemingly untouched by the declared politi-

cal beliefs of incumbent chiefs of state) about the “best way” to forge effective crime control – and now, antiterrorism – responses. “Inclusionism” is jettisoned except in the sense of building the metaphorical and literal fortresses that defend “us” against “them” (literal examples include residential “gated communities” and “supermax” prisons). A reality of social exclusion is legitimated. This occurs despite the genuine nature of many efforts and programs aimed at the reduction of disadvantage.

Inequality, Crime, and Citizenship

Roche notes that, “In the mainstream theory and practice, citizenship is pictured as a multidimensional complex consisting at least of the three familiar dimensions of civil, political and social citizenship, together with their related institutions” (2002: 71). Citizenship implies equality in terms of social rights but such achievement in (undeniably) unequal social structures is a problematic aspiration. In the “classic,” Mertonian, “American Dream” world of the 1930s to the 1950s, legitimate success was to be achieved via pursuit of a “Protestant work ethic,” but some argue that in contemporary culture this is being replaced by a “consumption ethic” that creates a new identity for the citizen of our times:

The primary image offered to the modern citizen is not that of the producer but of the consumer. Through consumption we are urged to shape our lives by the use of our purchasing power. We are obliged to make our lives meaningful by selecting our personal lifestyle from those offered to us in advertising, soap operas, and films, to make sense of our existence by exercising our freedom to choose in a market in which one simultaneously purchases products and services, and assembles, manages and markets oneself. The image of the citizen as a choosing self entails a new image of the productive subject. (Rose 1990: 102–3)

But, of course, Rose describes a world of “equal” access to a lifestyle sold via media and marketing. As Meyrowitz (1985: 132) argues, for the children of the poor, only the television in the corner of the room offers an immediately accessible window into Rose’s world of consumption and only here are the excluded free to see but not obtain “what they are deprived of in every program and commercial.” This is a world of images remote from the everyday reality of the life of the poor and only stresses (literally so) their position of inequality, fueling feelings of relative deprivation. For many, the choice of what type of “productive subject” to become is to choose to be one that can first acquire the money to *then* become the citizen who can choose an identity as consuming citizen.

It is obvious that problems of crime persistence and crime victimization fit rather uncomfortably with idealist views of citizenship. Varieties of impatience, intolerance, vilification, and punitive sanctions can be directed at both criminals *and* victims – most particularly where they are seen as the “undeserving poor” who commit crimes or are “deserving victims” whose lifestyle and social situation “contribute” to their own victimization. This kind of observation is not new. As de Tocqueville remarked, “nothing is so difficult to distinguish as the nuances which separate unmerited misfortune from an adversity produced by vice” (1969 [1835/1840]). The politicization of crime as an electoral issue, media-fueled fear of

crime, and the spread of middle-class demands for protection have produced and legitimated trends in control that emphasize that it is better to err on the side of caution and clamp down on those believed to be in adversity of their own making rather than face the risks that might follow from overly charitable assumptions about “unmerited misfortune.” Modern individualism is based on numerous narratives of justification for the position that “no one is looking out for me and mine so why should I look out for others?” This is the middle-class version of the techniques of neutralization employed by teenage delinquents. This leads to the need for discussion of how individuals and societies “neutralize” and excuse their declining capacity to care (Cohen 2001), and then to the vexed issue of whether offenders and prisoners “deserve” to be viewed as equal citizens, or – having offended against the rights of others – have forfeited a measure or all of their own citizenship rights.

The decline of care and concern?

Although the call to enhance social support and social capital is appealing and should be central to the agenda for assisting revitalization of deprived communities, no one doubts the difficulty of mobilizing altruism and cooperation in contexts of disenchantment and discontent. Distrust of “do-gooder” promises and reliance on “number one” shapes the nature of care and concern in a particular way. Homer Simpson, for all his ineptitude, is a “Mr. Average” in this respect. Young argues that it is not relative deprivation alone that is damaging but its “lethal combination” with individualism. In the urban (or indeed global) Hobbesian jungle, justifications of the need to not do some things and to do others are born of the “rational choice” to protect self- (or national) interests in preference to extending ourselves in other, less necessary, directions (1999: 341). As Cohen (2001) shows, we ignore the plight of victims of crime visible before our eyes and within our hearing (the best-known example being the Kitty Genovese case; Rosenthal 1999); we live in states that justify inhuman treatment and torture (and in the United States, capital punishment); and we declare compassion fatigue in the face of numerous media and postal calls for charitable donations and volunteer action for various causes. Thus, a social condition of individualism becomes not a contradiction but a real lived politics for those who are not in a position of need. One of the most famous articulations of such an ideological view was that of Margaret Thatcher who, as British Prime Minister, declared that “there is no such thing as society, only individuals and families.” Of course, the rich and the middle class remain the mainstays of charitable giving and volunteer work but this reflects their resources and capacity to fulfill such roles. Poor communities have well-documented traditions of provision of mutual self-help. All of this social support is important but of modest impact and the suspicion deserving of future research is that care and concern diminishes greatly when crime and offenders are mentioned.

Offenders, prisoners, and citizenship

As Janoski and Gran note, “[W]hile many speak of the rights of . . . citizens, few speak of their obligations,” and here is a key problem for the relationship between

rights of offenders and inequality (2002: 36). The reduction of inequality as related to causes of crime might well receive support in the name of both social justice and crime prevention but the principles of Classicist thinkers in criminology and of arguments of “less-eligibility” also have powerful attractions when asking “why those who harm and offend against the rights of others should be entitled to equal citizenship rights?” Traditional approaches to legal judgment and punishment address precisely this and strip away some entitlements, at least for those who are receiving a sentence of imprisonment, or even, in some jurisdictions, for those who have *ever* been convicted of a criminal offense. However, there are arguments that this is a self-defeating approach.

In the United States:

Voting rights are left up to the states, so the laws vary. . . . Most states take the right away from those in prison also those on parole or probation. While most states also return the right to vote once the terms of a sentence have been completed, thirteen states, five of them in the South, take voting rights away for life – a punishment extremely rare in the rest of the Western world. As a result there are now more ex-prisoners than prisoners in the United States who can’t vote. (Perl 2003: 1)

Rights in the American system of justice reflect persisting discrimination (Reiman 2001) and this is reflected not merely in the fact that Blacks are more likely to be executed than Whites since reinstatement of capital punishment, but even in the fact that although roughly equal numbers of Blacks and Whites are victims of murder, 80 percent of executions have followed murders of *White* victims (Amnesty International 2003); while “across the country, one in eight African-American men is barred from voting” (Perl 2003) as a result of engagement with the criminal justice system.

In the United Kingdom Vaughan argues that:

currently punishment is being deployed to shore up citizenship through the exclusion of marginalized members and immigrants. If we look at the use of custody in England and Wales in 1997, there was an increase of 19 per cent for female prisoners, 16 per cent for young male offenders. Furthermore, 85 per cent of non-criminal prisoners were held under the 1971 Immigration Act. . . .

Punishment is now being used not upon those who are thought to be conditional citizens with a view to reintegration but against those who are thought to be non-citizens to disable or exclude them. Punishment in the modern era has always been ambivalent but it is losing whatever sense of inclusiveness it has as the exclusiveness of citizenship becomes more evident. (2000: 36)

Yet, as Farrant and Levenson have shown, it is both possible and valuable to reintegrate offenders into positive citizenship and this can start within the prison to give prisoners responsibility: “The process of imprisonment strips prisoners of their citizenship and their membership of society in a variety of ways. Loss of liberty is the most visible part of that process. Nonetheless, it is increasingly argued that being an active citizen is of great benefit to individuals, communities and society as a whole” (2002: 1).

Conclusions

In both the United States and the United Kingdom, social divisions and income inequality widened between the rich and poor through the latter decades of the twentieth century. This trend can be seen to connect, albeit in rather complex ways, to criminal offending, likelihood of victimization, and experience of social control: “groups that are economically deprived – particularly young, disadvantaged minority males – are also heavily involved in serious criminal offences, especially violent street crime . . . these and surrounding citizen populations also experience high rates of street crime victimization. And, have-nots disproportionately constitute the population of persons who are in contact with, and/or under the supervision of, the criminal justice system” (Hagan and Petersen 1995: 3).

It has been an insight central to the development of a sociological criminology since the era of the Chicago School that deprivation and inequality are related to crime, whether their importance is viewed as their persisting characterization of certain neighborhoods or the life circumstances of individuals and families. Indeed, within the famous concentric zone model of the city of Chicago in the early decades of the twentieth century, the movement of new groups of migrants and marginal groups into and then out of the “zone of transition” represented a process of populations seeking to act out aspirations, take advantage of opportunities, and address the sense of relative deprivation promoted by the “cheek by jowl” contiguity of downtown affluence existing alongside slum housing. As Davis (1990) illustrates in his remarkable anatomy of Los Angeles, by the end of the twentieth century, the visible proximity of threatening poverty alongside the spectacular growth of corporate and private wealth was being addressed via the creation of two cities – one for the “haves” and one for the “have-nots.”

In 1992, in the wake of the acquittal of LAPD (Los Angeles Police Department) police officers charged with the brutal beating of Rodney King, Los Angeles exploded in a riot of pent-up anger. In England in the early 1980s and again in summer 2000, several communities with high ethnic populations saw outbreaks of public disorder and riot related to conflicts with the police and between different groups including Whites. Following the latter, the Cante Report (2001) found, unsurprisingly, that inequalities in housing, education, and employment were key causes of local concern but also that initiatives designed to “tackle problems and disadvantage seem to institutionalize the problems rather than solving them, and area-based regeneration initiatives simply reinforced the separation of communities” (O’Neill and Spybey 2003: 11). And all of this occurred, as the reference to “regeneration initiatives” indicates, in a wider socioeconomic context of the past and present degeneration of the communities of the poor alongside the globalized redistribution of industry and relocation of new forms of service-sector work (e.g., call centers) to countries where labor is cheaper but wage rates in these jobs are relatively higher than in other work.

Connections between crime, inequalities, and diminished citizenship are complex (whether with regard to victims or offenders). There is no clear *causality* here and it would be a grave mistake to replace the pathological determinism of conservative explanations of crime (assuming biological and/or innate moral deficiencies of

the poor) with some kind of alternative social-structural determinism. Nonetheless, empirical correlations between poverty, inequalities, and criminal victimization and offending are well described and widely accepted. A sociological approach allows us to see how “private troubles” reflect “public issues” (Mills 1963). The problem is not a lack of evidence concerning the “troubles” and “issues” that need to be addressed, it is the lack of political will and prospects for socioeconomic reform.

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Chapter 16

Disability and Social Inequalities

MARK PRIESTLEY

Given the widespread concern that currently exists amongst scholars and policy makers to address the social disadvantage experienced by disabled people in contemporary societies, the inclusion of a chapter on disability in a major volume on social inequalities may seem relatively unproblematic. Yet, until quite recently, such a contribution would have been surprising to many readers and contested by some. The way in which our understanding of disability in a social world has changed over recent decades is indicative of theorizing in social inequalities more generally, and sheds light on the way in which human differences, traditionally defined in individual and biological terms, have been redefined as issues of social justice and collective concern. In many ways, contemporary thinking and praxis in the area of disability equality exemplifies these processes. The main aims of this chapter are to explain the theoretical developments that have brought disability studies into the arena of social inequalities and social justice, and to examine how these shape our understanding of current disability debates in an international context.

The first part of the chapter examines some of the major schools of thought that have influenced our understanding of disability, illustrating how the social construction of a problem shapes our social and institutional responses to its resolution. For example, where “disability” has been constructed as personal tragedy or biological deficit, social responses to disabled people have tended to focus on the traditional remedies of care, cure, or prevention. By contrast, where “disability” is constructed as discrimination, exclusion, or injustice, social responses are more likely to focus on human rights and the removal of barriers to inclusion. In particular, the discussion draws out the distinction between individual and social models of disability, emphasizing the significance of the latter as a form of praxis emanating from activism and resistance within the disabled people’s movement.

The discussion then moves to consider the more complex interaction between disability and other axes of difference and social inequality. The key themes here are concerned with issues of commonality and difference, for example, in relation to gender, ethnicity, generation, class, sexuality, and impairment. Debates about

difference have become increasingly prominent within the field of disability studies, prompting poststructuralist critiques of social model thinking. These debates illustrate the need to think about social inequalities in multidimensional ways, for example, in terms of “double-discrimination,” “simultaneous oppression,” and situated identities.

The final part of the chapter draws on some current disability debates in order to show how competing explanations are played out in substantive areas of contemporary concern. The discussion illustrates the dynamics of social inequality and resistance using examples identified as priorities within the international disabled people’s movement, with particular reference to eugenics and contemporary bioethics, education, and employment. These examples illustrate how the cultural devaluing of disabled lives must also be viewed in terms of structural explanations of disability and human capital.

Theorizing Disability and Inequality

The emergence of disability studies as an academic discipline has been both rapid and expansive but has its roots in the activism and experiences of disabled people. It is therefore no coincidence that developments in disability theory have taken place alongside the emergence of an international disabled people’s movement, campaigning for equality and full participation in all spheres of social life and human rights. Indeed, the kinds of models and thinking that have allowed academics and researchers to engage in a new and radical reappraisal of disability and inequalities spring directly from ideas developed within disability activism (Driedger 1989; Campbell and Oliver 1996; Fleischer and Zames 2001).

The most significant achievements (both academic and political) have arisen from the development of a social interpretation, or “social model,” of disability that highlights the shortcomings of more traditional and individualistic approaches. Thus, social scientists have increasingly come to view disability as the product of complex social structures and processes, rather than as the inevitable result of individual difference or biology. This historic shift of emphasis, from the individual to the social, has allowed both activists and academics to promote a fundamental and far-reaching critique of the way societies disable people with perceived impairments, and to envisage the possibility of more enabling social alternatives. Grasping the underlying distinction between individual and social models of disability is therefore key to understanding disability as social inequality.

One way to understand this distinction is to think about the life experiences of disabled people. There is now a great deal of evidence showing how people with perceived impairments are often excluded or disadvantaged in important areas of social life, such as education, employment, family life, political participation, cultural representation; or in access to goods and services, like transport, housing, information, and so on (e.g. Barnes 1991). One of the big challenges for researchers and theorists is to explain how and why this happens. The traditional view within social science and medicine was to assume that someone with an impairment would inevitably find it difficult to perform various “normal” activities and, as a consequence, would also have difficulty in fulfilling normal social roles (e.g., Parsons

1951). In this sense, the kind of social inequality associated with disability in modern societies was viewed largely as *an individual problem caused by impairment*. From this perspective, the most appropriate social response was either to correct the impairment or to help the person “come to terms” with it, by negotiating different (less valued) social roles (e.g., Nirje 1969).

By contrast, a social interpretation of disability turns this idea on its head, questioning the assumption that there is any necessary causal relationship between having an impairment and becoming disabled. For example, it is clear that the experience of disability varies for different people, in different cultures, and in different periods of history (e.g., Ingstad and Reynolds Whyte 1995). Thus, people with apparently similar biological characteristics might become more or less disabled depending on social circumstance. This implies that such inequality might be a social rather than an individual phenomenon, something that is not so much biologically determined as produced by particular social environments and processes. Crucially, this view suggests that it is not physical, cognitive, or sensory impairments that cause disability but rather the way in which societies fail to accommodate natural aspects of difference between people (e.g., Zola 1989). Consequently, a social interpretation of disability tends to relocate the “problem” of inequality from the individual to society. Disability can then be viewed as *a social problem caused by social processes*.

These contrasting ways of thinking about disability have been developed more formally in the literature as two competing models – commonly known as the “individual model” and the “social model.” Traditionally, individual approaches dominated academic understandings of disability, especially in the medical and therapeutic literature. However, it is now social interpretations that largely define the boundaries of contemporary “disability studies” (Davis 1997; Linton 1998; Albrecht et al. 2001). This distinction between individual and social models was first articulated in an academic context by Oliver (1983) and has been developed at length since then. However, the original impetus came from ideas developed within the disabled people’s movement. In particular, Oliver drew directly on a distinction made in the 1970s by activists within a British organization called the Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS). In an exchange of ideas with other, more mainstream, lobby groups UPIAS argued that:

Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed group in society. (UPIAS/Disability Alliance 1976: 3)

This social interpretation of disability influenced not only disabled academics like Oliver, but also the definitions adopted by the international disabled people’s movement in the 1980s and, through this activism, the formulation of a radical policy agenda for full participation and equality in the twenty-first century. From this definition flows much of what we now understand as the social model of disability. Looking at the wording in more detail, there are four important points. First, the interpretation acknowledges that some people have impairments but points out that disability is something different, “imposed on top.” Second, it suggests that disability is about exclusion from full participation in society. Third, and most

important, this exclusion is neither necessary nor inevitable (by implication, we could imagine a society in which people with impairments were not disabled). Fourth, it makes sense to think of disabled people as an oppressed social group, and not simply as the victims of individual and tragic circumstance:

Hence disability, according to the social model, is all the things that impose restrictions on disabled people; ranging from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination, from inaccessible buildings to unusable transport systems, from segregated education to excluding work arrangements, and so on. Further, the consequences of this failure do not simply and randomly fall on individuals but systematically upon disabled people as a group who experience this failure as discrimination institutionalized throughout society. (Oliver 1996: 33)

To summarize, the key theoretical and political developments have arisen from the emergence of a social interpretation, or “social model,” of disability. The social model approach is significant because it allows us to reexamine the inequalities experienced by disabled people in contemporary societies as social problems resulting from social causes, rather than individual problems originating within the person. In sociological terms, C. Wright Mills’s (1959) distinction between “personal trouble” and “public issue” may be helpful here. Traditional approaches have been premised upon the assumption that the disadvantage experienced by disabled people can be reliably constructed as a personal trouble while social model approaches construct inequalities as a public issue of social structure. Although of critical importance, this binary distinction between individual and social models simplifies a complex set of relationships. In order to understand the complexity of disability and social inequalities it is necessary to move from basic modeling to explanation and theory.

Individual model explanations

Within the individual model approach we can identify two main themes of enquiry: one focused on the measurable characteristics of the body and its physical or cognitive functioning (a biomedical model of disability), and one focused on the negotiated aspects of individual identity and adjustment (a psychological model of disability). Individual approaches offer a nominalist view of social inequalities because they assume that disability has no “real” existence as a social phenomenon beyond the individual (other than an aggregation of individual experience). Such an approach to the social world is reminiscent of Descartes’s assertion that generalities have no basis in objective reality, and the Cartesian analogy is underlined in the way that individual model explanations tend to locate the causes of disability either within the physical body (inequality as a consequence of biology) or within the mind (inequality as a consequence of perception and negotiated intersubjectivity).

The first of these approaches (emphasizing biological causes) is perhaps more familiar in the disability literature as the “medical model of disability.” From a biomedical perspective, the social inequalities experienced by disabled people may be regarded as biologically determined and therefore attributed to the physical condition of the body. Impairments are likely to be seen as intrinsic “abnormalities” or “deficits” that prevent an individual from performing everyday tasks, which in turn

prevents them from fulfilling valued social roles in society. By implication, the ultimate problem of social inequality is reducible to biological causes. In terms of biomedical research on disability, the unit of analysis is the impaired body and the predominant method of analysis is variate empiricism. In response, the social model critique is that biomedical explanations of disability fall short of explaining the causes of social inequality because they rely on the inappropriate application of biomedical paradigms to problems that are essentially social.

Thus, within a biomedical model, it is the individual that has the problem and thus the resolution of inequality will depend ultimately on changing or treating the individual – through the cure or prevention of impairment. The responsibility and authority for such treatment rests with medicine and its allied professions, including biomedical research and physical therapy. The origins of a biomedical model are evident in the rise of European scientific rationalism and in the subsequent lexicalization of everyday life (Zola 1977). For example, we might look to Francis Galton's (Charles Darwin's cousin) pioneering of statistical measurement of human functioning or Foucault's (1977) "scaling of bodies," and to the eugenic applications of bio-psychology (Spearman 1932; Eysenck and Eysenck 1969). The influence of biological determinism was also evident in the revival of sociobiology and social Darwinism (Ardrey 1970; Tiger and Fox 1972) and continues in the wealth of disability research that is concerned with physical rehabilitation, drug development, and surgical intervention. More recently, the continuing influence of biomedical explanation is evident in the bioethical debates arising from the Human Genome Project (Fitzgerald 1998).

The second influential strand of theory within the individual model paradigm draws primarily on psychological rather than biomedical explanation. Although maintaining the assumption of a causal connection between social inequalities and the individual, psychological explanations offer an alternative to biological determinism. In this sense, social inequality may not be viewed as a necessary consequence of biological difference or impairment but rather as the consequence of an individual's failure to manage or successfully negotiate the stigma of a "spoiled identity" (Goffman 1963). The emphasis here is on cognitive or symbolic interaction between disabled and nondisabled individuals and their affective experiences. From this position, social inequality may be constructed as a problem of individual psychology arising from the negotiation of loss and damaged social roles. The units of analysis are identity and experience, while the predominant methods of analysis are grounded in subjective idealism, phenomenology, interpretative psychology, symbolic interactionism, and so on.

We can see this approach at work in the wealth of interpretative psychological work that deals with disabled people's "adjustment" to impairment and nondisabled people's attitudes toward people with perceived impairments. It is evident, for example, in Carroll's (1961) work on blindness or Goffman's (1963) analysis of stigma. Since the problem of disability is constructed as one of damaged individual psychology, the strategies for resolution point toward the need for processes of coping, adjustment, and adaptation. In common with Parson's (1951) analysis of the "sick role," there is a social responsibility on the disabled person to seek rehabilitation into normal social roles and to comply with "technically competent" professionals in so doing (for example, through counseling, psychological rehabili-

tation, or psychotherapy). Thus, although psychological models of disability do not necessarily reduce explanations of social inequality to biological causes, they remain largely within the individualist paradigm. In common with biomedical explanations, the assumption is that social inequalities arise from deficits within the individual, and that the authority and legitimacy to address these problems lies in the intervention of more powerful (predominantly nondisabled) professionals.

The preceding analysis outlines two strands of thought that dominated traditional approaches to social inequality for disabled people prior to the development of social model thinking. Although biomedical approaches have had a particularly dominant influence on the definition and treatment of disabled people in modern societies, it is the individualism of these approaches rather than the role of biomedicine that is significant. Within an individual model, the problem of social inequality remains a problem of the individual disabled person. As Oliver concludes:

The individual model for me encompassed a whole range of issues and was underpinned by what I called the personal tragedy theory of disability. But it also included psychological and medical aspects of disability. . . . In short, for me, there is no such thing as the medical model of disability; there is, instead, an individual model of disability of which lexicalization is one significant component. (1996: 31)

Social model explanations

In contrast, social model approaches focus not on presumed deficiencies within the individual but on explaining the social processes that cause people with perceived impairments to experience inequalities, as a minority group in society. Disability ceases to be a property of the individual and becomes instead a social property (Thomas 1999). As with individual model explanations, there have been different approaches to this task, and social model accounts tend to cluster around two types of explanation: one focused on the role of cultural values and representations (a cultural model of disability) and one focused on political economy and disabling environments (a structural model of disability).

The application of social constructionist and cultural approaches to disability breaks with the individualist traditions of bio-psycho-medical models by acknowledging that the causes of social inequalities operate beyond the level of the individual. Rather than accepting that biological differences necessarily lead to social disadvantage, cultural approaches emphasize the significance of the social construction and cultural representation of such differences. In this sense, it is society's negative response to people with *perceived* or *accredited* impairments that creates social inequalities (rather than any intrinsic deficit within the individual). Historically, we might associate such an approach with the idealist sociological traditions of Durkheim and the study of culture, or with the kind of labeling theory advanced by Lemert (1951), Becker (1963), or Goffman (1963).

From this perspective, numerous writers have emphasized the role of culture and ideas in shaping disability labels and social roles (e.g., Shakespeare 1994; Ingstad and Reynolds Whyte 1995). Such approaches often emphasize traditional beliefs and folklore or the continuing reproduction of disabling images in the mass media. This characterization of disability, as a cultural construction, is premised (implicitly or explicitly) upon the notion of cultural relativism. That is to say, it assumes that

the construction of disability is a product of specific cultural beliefs, practices, and conditions. While people of difference have existed in all societies, the way they are labeled, and therefore the degree to which they experience social inequalities, will vary according to dominant cultural perceptions of that difference. Thus:

Physical handicaps tend to be transcultural in the sense that they are found all over the world. However, the extent to which handicaps physically limit the playing of social roles is culturally variable. (Lemert 1951: 29)

Disabling values can contribute to social inequality in a number of ways. On an individual level the expression of disablist attitudes and beliefs may impact directly on disabled people's experience and identity but such values may also be shared by groups of actors who have power over disabled people's lives (such as professionals or policy makers). Within welfare institutions, disabling values may become highly codified as professional discourses of surveillance and discipline. On a macro level, disabling values may operate as culture or ideology.

Collective social values may be revealed in many ways – through cultural representations, through the form and content of legislation, through administrative and institutional arrangements for welfare production. Fraser (1987) argues that dominant cultural products reflect the values of dominant social groups and that these values then define the needs of subordinate groups (in Fraser's case, women), while Lugones and Spelman (1983) theorize the role of values in oppression as "cultural imperialism." For Iris Young (1990), cultural imperialism involves the "universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm." Where this occurs, the normalcy of the dominant group's perspective leads alternative perspectives to be judged as deviant, as "other."

If social inequalities for disabled people can be explained in terms of oppressive cultural values and representations then this suggests that strategies for change should be targeted at society rather than the individual. In particular, cultural approaches are likely to highlight the significance of public education, cultural change, positive media representations, and the building of a disability counter-culture that challenges the hegemony of disabling values. The recognition of disabled people as an oppressed cultural minority, or outsider group, has been particularly significant in the move from tragedy-based to rights-based campaigning on disability equality issues.

Social constructionist approaches to disability have been enormously useful in detailing how particular aspects of human difference become devalued as "abnormal," and how the labeling of particular groups as "other" impacts on their level of social inclusion within different societies and cultures. Such approaches move our thinking on from individual models of disability by offering a social interpretation of the inequalities experienced by disabled people. However, there are some limits to the explanatory power of cultural theory. In particular, social constructionist and labeling approaches, based on cultural relativism, often fall short of explaining *why* particular values and constructions of difference become dominant or oppressive in particular social and historical contexts.

Within the social model paradigm there is, then, a second and influential strand of explanation, which seeks to move beyond the relative autonomy of cultural theory and to explain disability in terms of structural causes. From a structural per-

spective disability has been defined in terms of the material barriers and relations of power that stand in the way of full participation and equality for disabled people. Within critical disability studies, the development of the “social model” of disability owes much to this approach and to application of a materialist or Marxist analysis of history. This is the philosophical basis for a strand of disability theory that has been central to the mobilization of the disabled people’s movement, and is particularly evident in the groundbreaking work of British disabled activists and academics such as UPIAS (1976), Finkelstein (1980), and Oliver (1990). Such writers have argued for a political economy of disability that explains the social inequalities experienced by disabled people as a product of industrial capitalism (Finkelstein 1980). Here, the emphasis has been to identify structural forces and material relationships of power arising from the division of labor and the waged economy that excluded many people from participation in paid labor – an argument developed more formally by Oliver (1990) and Gleeson (1999).

Marxist writers have tended to argue that the development of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism, urbanization, and Fordist production methods required a set of social relations that excluded many people with impairments from equal participation in a competitive wage-labor market. This, it is suggested, led to the growth of new institutional welfare arrangements to accommodate the newly created “care” needs of an excluded social group. Where scientific rationalism and medicine created new categories of people according to biological characteristics (blind, deaf, crippled, and so on), industrial and welfare capitalism created a broader category of disabled people whose labor could not be exploited for profit in a competitive market. From a structural Marxist perspective, disability may then be viewed as an administrative category of labor force exemption, arising in response to the needs of state and capital to control labor supply and legitimize the regulation of welfare (Stone 1984; Finkelstein 1991; Priestley 1997). In more general terms, this argument is also reminiscent of Habermas’s (1987) contention that welfare capitalism creates specifically new forms of domination and subordination as the “life world” becomes increasingly “colonized” under the control of rationalized bureaucracies.

Cultural values continue to play a significant role in this approach but explanations of causality move to a more structural level. In this way, Oliver argues that it is the mode of production that influences cultural values and representations rather than the converse. It is the social relations of production and reproduction within a capitalist political economy that define who is labeled as “disabled” and create the imperative for their social exclusion. The assumption is that disabling cultural values and the personal tragedy theory of disability maintain and legitimize the social relations required by a dominant mode of production. From this perspective, the notion of cultural imperialism may be better understood as ideology. As Iris Young suggests:

Ideas function ideologically . . . when they represent the institutional context in which they arise as natural or necessary. They thereby forestall criticism of relations of domination and oppression, and obscure possible emancipatory social arrangements. (1990: 74)

Thus, disabling cultural values would function ideologically where they could be shown to uphold existing relations of domination and subordination in a real and

material way (through capital accumulation, state legitimation, private or public patriarchy, imperialism, and so on). They would function ideologically where they could be shown to perpetuate existing relationships of power within the production of welfare (for example, in the power of the professions allied to medicine). They would function ideologically where they could be shown to mask or preclude the possibility of social inclusion through alternative social relations (for example, a more equitable reorganization of work, family, welfare, or citizenship).

To summarize, the development of social model approaches has allowed both political activists and scholars to promote a redefinition of disability, from one based on the assumed biological deficits of individuals to one based on institutional discrimination and oppression within modern societies. The development of social model definitions and theory should also be considered as a significant form of praxis, since it both stems from and feeds into the liberation struggles of disabled people for full participation and equality. There have been different approaches to this task, emphasizing both cultural and structural causes in the creation of disabling social relations and inequalities. The difference between these approaches tends to be a matter of emphasis, however, and most social model writers accept that both structural and cultural forces play a part in creating the collective experience of social inequality for disabled people.

Commonality and Difference

The strength of social model approaches is that they allow us to reconstruct social inequality for disabled people as a collective experience of discrimination and injustice, rather than as a personal tragedy affecting only individuals. Moreover, the recognition of disability as a broad social category, and of disabled people as an oppressed minority group, opens up alternative strategies for addressing social inequalities through collective political action and identity politics. Consequently, rights-based approaches, based on the collective experience of oppression and a social model of disability, have been at the heart of a new disability politics and the mobilization of an international disabled people's movement. Where individual model approaches, particularly biomedical approaches, individualized needs and divided people according to medical labels (based on perceived impairment), social model approaches tend to collectivize the needs of people with different kinds of impairment labels as a common interest group. This collectivization of the disability experience challenges the personal tragedy theory of disability, provides intellectual resources for the construction of shared disability identities, and lends weight to a common liberation struggle. However, the strength of this new commonality has also been viewed as a weakness by some authors, particularly when considering the intersection between disability and other dimensions of social inequality.

For example, disabled feminists have consistently asserted the significance of a gendered analysis of disability, emphasizing how the social inequalities experienced by disabled women differ from those experienced by men in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Such differences are apparent in a number of important life domains. Disabled women are less likely to be in employment or to progress in education, and are more likely to live in poverty or to be subject to a denial of

reproductive and parenting rights (these issues are discussed in more detail later in the chapter). Consequently, concerns have been expressed that the assumed homogeneity of oppression inherent in the disability label may mask the fact that disabled women experience a kind of “double discrimination” when gender inequalities are also taken into account (e.g., Hanna and Rogovsky 1991).

Others have drawn attention to the way in which disabled women within the disability rights movement have focused attention on different aspects of social inequality from their male counterparts. Such arguments often draw directly on the feminist assertion that personal can also be political. In particular, it has been suggested that disabled women have drawn attention to aspects of inequality within the private domain, such as personal relationships and the psycho-emotional impact of disability, while male writers have tended to focus on inequalities within the domain of public policy and institutions, such as employment and education (see Lonsdale 1990; Thomas 1999). While this is perhaps an oversimplification, there is some truth in the fact that those (male) writers who pioneered social model theory from a political economy perspective also marginalized aspects of difference and oppression in the personal or domestic sphere.

Similarly, there has been an increasing concern amongst Black and minority ethnic writers to assert the additional levels and kinds of social inequality experienced by disabled people from those groups. Within national contexts, such arguments tend to focus on the intersection of disability and racism in White societies and the simultaneous oppression that results for disabled people from Black and minority ethnic communities in those contexts. Moreover, personal and institutional racism may prevent many minority ethnic disabled people from participating in collective disability politics and organizations, while disablism may exclude them from full participation in their own ethnic communities (e.g., Stuart 1992).

There has also been a concerted attempt by activists and some writers to assert the differential exclusion experienced by disabled lesbians and gay men. There are some parallels here with arguments on race and ethnicity, in the concern that sexual minorities may be excluded from full participation in a homogenous disability identity politics whilst also experiencing barriers to full participation within gay and lesbian politics and communities. On the one hand, this marginalization reflects the way in which disabled people have often been constructed as asexual, resulting in the marginalization of sexuality within discussions of disability (until recently, at least). On the other hand, where questions of sexuality and sexual rights are asserted as issues of disability politics, there are concerns about the tendency to construct such debates in terms of an assumed heterosexuality (Shakespeare et al. 1996; Tremain 2000).

Perhaps less frequently argued, yet highly significant, are dimensions of difference associated with age and generation. Just as gender theorists have shown what may be gained by distinguishing between disabled women and disabled men, so a life-course approach suggests that the different experiences of “disabled children,” “disabled adults,” or “disabled elders” might also be significant. For example, within the personal tragedy paradigm, childhood impairment may be seen as particularly tragic while impairment in older age is likely to be constructed as less aberrant, or even as something of a social norm (Priestley 2002). The likelihood of impairment increases with age and, in Western industrialized societies, the

majority of disabled people are over retirement age. Yet, older people are rarely considered as “disabled” in quite the same way that younger adults and children often are (even within more radical debates on disability rights). There is, then, some concern that the assumed commonality of disability identity politics privileges “adult” interests and may mask the way in which generational conflict compounds the lack of representation for those from “non-adult” groups (Priestley 2003).

Thinking about social inequalities and disability politics in terms of commonality becomes increasingly problematic when we consider the experiences of disabled people in a global context. Two themes are important here. The cultural relativist approach to social model explanations emphasizes the variability of social exclusion in different national and cultural contexts. There is thus a significant and expanding anthropological literature detailing how cultural beliefs and practices affect the construction, representation, and treatment of impairment and disability in different countries and subcultures (e.g., Ingstad and Reynolds Whyte 1995). For example, attention may be drawn to evidence of the social inclusion of people with certain impairment characteristics who might be expected to be more excluded in another cultural tradition or locale (e.g., Groce 1985; Nicolaisen 1995).

By contrast, there has been much less written from a structural perspective about the differential impact of disability in a global context. In particular, structural explanations of social inequality that draw on the traditions of political economy have been dominated by influential accounts of developing industrial capitalism in Western economies (notably the United Kingdom and North America). Uneven economic and political developments create different disabling conditions in different societies. There is, then, a sense in which the structural commonality thesis on disability has privileged Western accounts and obscured the differential impact of global capitalism on disabled people in the majority world (Coleridge 1993; Charlton 1998; Stone 1999). This also impacts on identity politics, since disabled people in poorer countries are often campaigning on different priority issues from those in richer, more powerful countries. For example, where economic and physical survival are critical to disabled poor people in many parts of the majority world, preoccupation with other debates may be viewed as a highly privileged Western perspective. Given that the social inequalities experienced by disabled people are inextricably linked to poverty, there is, then, a pressing need to extend the application of the political economy argument to a more global analysis. As Majiet argues:

If one looks at the [disability] agenda, we can ask who sets the agenda globally for human rights. My impression and humble opinion is that this agenda is very much set by the North and that we need to take issue with that. (1998: 1)

Finally, a key debate in the literature questions how a broad-based disability theory can represent the needs and experiences of people with different kinds of impairment. As discussed earlier, social model analyses have resourced a new and powerful identity politics based on the commonality of a minority group experiencing social inequalities (thus breaking with a biomedical tradition of “divide and rule,” based on the power of professions to ascribe different labels to people with different impairment characteristics). However, there have been concerns within the movement, and within critical disability theory, that the commonality approach

favors some well-represented impairment groups (such as wheelchair users) and compounds the marginalization of others. In this context, specific concerns have been expressed about the underrepresentation of people labeled as having learning difficulties, deaf people, those with unseen impairments, and mental health system survivors (Corker 1998; Goodley 2000).

Underlying some of these discussions is a concern that social models of disability may lead us to overlook, or indeed reject, the unique embodied experiences of people with different kinds of impairments. The political significance of social model approaches has been an almost complete disengagement from constructions of disability as individually and biologically determined. Consequently, some writers argue that social model theorists have moved too far toward a view of disability that is effectively disembodied (Hughes and Paterson 1997). Indeed, even some strong advocates of social model politics question its social constructionism, asserting that different impairments do present tangible, biophysical, and embodied realities that place individuals at a residual disadvantage irrespective of the removal of disabling barriers and practices (e.g., French 1993; Crow 1996). Thus, Thomas (1999) argues that we should acknowledge both “impairment effects” and “disability effects” in thinking about the social inequalities experienced by disabled people.

To summarize, discussions of difference are not necessarily incompatible with a commonality thesis on social inequalities or with social models of disability. While there is clearly much diversity of interest and identity between disabled people (in terms of impairment, gender, ethnicity, age, class, or sexuality, for example) the minority-group approach affirms commonality in the collective experience of discrimination and oppression. Yet, it is important to question any attribution of disability as a “master status,” or any implied hierarchy of oppression between different dimensions of inequality. Although there is commonality in the social inequalities experienced by disabled people, different groups are affected in different ways. Moreover, once we construct disability as a social product rather than a property of the individual then “disability” becomes contextual rather than intrinsic to the person. Where the experience of disability is seen as a product of particular disabling practices and environments then disability identity becomes highly contextual. Consequently, there are many situations in which being a woman, being gay, being Black, being old, or being poor may be much more significant to experiences of social inequality than being disabled. In theorizing disability as social inequality it is therefore important to retain an understanding of collective oppression whilst maintaining an active engagement with debates about “double discrimination,” “multiple oppression,” and “situated identities” (Vernon 1999; Vernon and Swain 2002).

From Theory to Practice

The final part of the chapter moves on from theoretical constructions, using examples from current debates about disability and social inequalities to show how competing discourses and ideologies are played out in practice. The discussion draws on two substantive areas of concern, identified as priorities within the international

disabled people's movement, which illustrate the dynamics of social inequalities in both cultural and structural terms.

Bioethical debates and the right to life

There is a sense in which all debates about social inequalities are underpinned by assumptions about the social, moral, and economic value attributed to different human lives. Thus, the valuing of certain lives over others (men over women, White European over Black, straight over gay, nondisabled over disabled, young over old, and so forth) has been used consistently to legitimize social inequalities and relationships of domination and subordination. For example, historical attributions of superiority and inferiority were clearly evident in the unequal dispensation of citizenship and property rights between women and men, in justifications of the African slave trade, the European persecution of Jews, the maintenance of apartheid, and so on. There is perhaps no starker test of such values than in decisions about who should live and die in a society. It is therefore unsurprising that disability rights campaigners have become increasingly concerned about the eugenic potential of contemporary bioethical debates on the "prevention of disability."

The term eugenics refers to philosophies for selecting the characteristics of people in a population, and to practices for "improving" the genome of that population (specifically, deciding who should be born, who should die, and who should reproduce). Eugenic thinking has a long history and can be seen in many societies throughout the world. However, developments in scientific method, technologies of surveillance, and the apparatus of the state allowed eugenics to find a more concrete expression in the modernist economies of the early twentieth century. Indeed, eugenic policies exemplified what social theorists might see as the key features of the modernist nation-state (Bauman 1987). Twentieth-century eugenics was based on categorizing different population groups using rational scientific methods. They reflected concerns with the strength and racial "purity" of nations. Eugenic concerns also reflected the imperatives for productivity, social order, and social conformity inherent in the social relations of industrial capitalism.

Disability figured prominently in this history, and public programs to prevent the birth of disabled children were widespread, along with programs to forcibly sterilize disabled adults (primarily women of childbearing age). Policies to prevent the birth of disabled children were often justified on economic grounds. For example, the American Eugenics Society were keen to compare the apparently low cost of sterilizing or segregating people with learning difficulties with the high cost to society of supporting future generations of "defectives" (see Larson 1995). Such arguments were persuasive to the policy makers of the time, appealing to concerns with productivity and welfare expenditure.

More recent analyses have emphasized the increasing significance of "personal" eugenic decisions, involving consumer choices and individual risk negotiations. Selective prenatal implantation and abortion to prevent the birth of children with impairment characteristics are perhaps the most obvious examples and might suggest that we are witnessing a move away from traditional "societal cultural eugenics" toward a new kind of "personal eugenics" (Wolbring 2001). The rapid development of reproductive technologies expands the potential for intervention in

the governance of birth choices, and the combination of increased technological knowledge and declining birth rates in modern societies has been taken by many to suggest that reflexive choices are now a more significant factor in deciding to have a child than, say, economic necessity, social pressure, or chance. From a sociological perspective, it is tempting to view these developments as a function of reflexive modernization (presenting increased consumer choices in the management of life course risks). However, the distinction between personal and public remains contested since economic imperatives, cultural values, and the power of the medical profession continue to be significant factors in shaping individual reproductive decision making.

Determining which human characteristics are socially desirable or undesirable, and where we “draw the line” between them, is central to decision making about who should or should not be born. In this context, impairment characteristics are generally seen as undesirable and practices such as genetic counseling, prenatal screening, and selective abortion are widely offered as a means to reduce the number of disabled children born. This in turn reinforces the low social and economic value attributed to the lives of those who do survive. Birth choices are embedded within cultural discourses of personhood and citizenship that devalue disabled lives, and there is increasing pressure on mothers to produce “normal babies” (Ettorre 2000). Knowing more about the biological characteristics of children prior to birth increases the scope for eugenic decision making and places additional pressure on parents and professionals to reject children at risk of impairment. Consequently, there has been considerable concern about the bioethical implications of birth choices arising from genetic research and the Human Genome Project.

Access to new genetic information raises particular concerns for minority genetic groups, including groups of disabled people, about confidentiality and the potential for new forms of “genetic discrimination.” More broadly, there is concern that new genetic knowledge will impact not simply on individuals but on identifiable social and ethnic groups, whose genetic capital is viewed as undesirable or at the very least devalued. If the new genetics does pose a threat to global human diversity then it is important to ask which characteristics are most likely to be targeted in eugenic birth decisions. Medical ethicists have consistently sought to justify selections made on the basis of impairment and disability, while opposing selection based on other characteristics such as sex.

At the heart of these debates is an argument about whether it is right, or even acceptable, for a person to begin life with impairment when such a life could be prevented. Thus, to confront birth choices at the beginning of the life course is also to confront the criteria we use to value different lives in society. Disabled people's lives have been widely devalued on many levels – as biologically inferior, as psychologically damaged, as culturally “other,” and as presenting an economic “burden” to welfare capitalism. Consequently, it is perhaps unsurprising that contemporary birth choices continue to be framed within a pervasive view of disabled lives as “wrongful lives.” Yet those who argue that we should prevent the birth of children with impairments wherever possible – and many do – are making a significant assumption about the relationship between impairment and disability (outlined in the first part of this chapter). The assumption is that people born with certain *biological* characteristics, defined by medicine as impairments, will inevitably

lead disadvantaged *social* lives (and that this will also disadvantage their families and society as a whole). Social models of disability challenge this reasoning, suggesting that social inequalities result primarily from *social* rather than *biological* causes. To recap on earlier arguments, it is not biological difference that causes “disability” but our inability to accommodate human difference in society. Consequently, it is not biological differences that should be removed from the world but disabling barriers; it is not disabled lives that are “wrongful” but disabling societies.

Similar tensions are apparent in debates over end-of-life decisions for disabled people. There is a clear disparity between disabled people’s life chances and those of nondisabled people, and eugenic arguments about the relative value of disabled and nondisabled lives also frame social interventions to prevent or hasten death. The construction of death and dying in contemporary societies reveals a cultural attachment to longevity and notions of the “good” or “timely” death. Yet, in this context, the deaths of disabled people are often viewed as less tragic or more “merciful” than those of nondisabled people – reflecting the low social and economic value attributed to disabled lives as human capital.

It is true that life expectancy for different population groups may be biologically determined, but it is also culturally constructed and socially produced (for example, as a result of access to nutrition and health care). There is considerable evidence that people with certain impairments are more likely to die at a younger age than the average within populations, and this may sometimes be attributed to the biological impact of impairment on the body’s capacity for survival. However, it is also evident that differential access to medical treatment, health care, healthy environments, and welfare resources affect the survival chances of disabled people throughout the world. Clearly, these are issues of social inequality rather than biological difference.

Turning to more active interventions, the most graphic example of the wholesale killing of disabled people occurred in Nazi-occupied territories before and during World War II. Although the remembrance of those who died during this period has emphasized the particular catastrophic experience of European Jews, it is less often acknowledged that the genocide programs began with the killing of disabled people (and that the numbers who died were substantial). This apparent oversight reflects both an absence of reliable data and a failure to recognize people with different impairments as part of a common disability group. However, there is also a danger of collusion with the underlying eugenic assumption that the killing of disabled people might be regarded as somehow less outrageous, in its historical and medical context (e.g., Friedlander 1995; Disability Rights Advocates 2001). As with the state-sponsored murder of Jews and others, the legitimacy of killing disabled people relied upon their dehumanization and on propaganda that characterized them as lacking the potential to live a worthwhile life.

As mentioned earlier, the mass eugenic programs of the early twentieth century reflected the key characteristics of modernist nation-states. However, technological and social changes in late modern information societies suggest that death decisions have become increasingly focused on purposeful negotiations between individual consumers, health professionals, and the courts. Such negotiations have attracted

much recent attention and debate, highlighting the increasing practice of legalized euthanasia and “physician-assisted suicide.” Although physician-assisted death for disabled people is by no means a new phenomenon, it appears to be on the increase, and recent high-profile cases (such as that of Dr. Jack Kevorkian in the United States) have fueled intense debate about the rationale for intervening to end lives.

Advocates of assisted death for disabled people have often based calls for “death with dignity” on assumptions about the inevitability of poor quality of life with impairment. Yet, such arguments deny the struggles and advances of disabled people within the movement for independent living, who have shown that such dignity can be achieved through choice and control in the self-direction of community-based support services. The real barriers to dignity and quality of life are therefore less connected with impairment than with disabling barriers, such as the way resources are allocated to provide support. To advocate the killing of disabled people as an appropriate response to economic and social inequalities is therefore highly problematic.

In response to the issues raised by contemporary bioethics and eugenics, disability groups have become active in campaigning on right-to-life issues, and in protesting eugenic abuses in cases of child killing, euthanasia, and assisted death. Public debates on death and dying are dominated by disabling discourses that maintain the tragedy-laden association between impairment and negative quality of life. By contrast, disability activism and disability cultures have reclaimed more positive representations of disabled life projects. These cultural counter-claims highlight the significance of social model theory, illustrating how social inequalities arise primarily from disabling relationships of power rather than embodied experiences of impairment. Prominent within this disability counter-culture is a celebration of human diversity and an active resistance to the traditional devaluing of disabled lives. Thus, when representatives of disabled people’s organizations from 27 countries met in 2000, the outcome was a statement entitled *The Right to Live and Be Different*, including the central claim that:

We are full human beings. We believe that a society without disabled people would be a lesser society. Our unique individual and collective experiences are an important contribution to a rich, human society. We demand an end to the bio-medical elimination of diversity, to gene selection based on market forces and to the setting of norms and standards by non-disabled people. (Disabled People’s International Europe 2000)

Education, employment, and the value of disabled lives

The preceding discussion of eugenics, bioethics, and diversity illustrated how social inequalities for disabled people have become life-and-death issues for modern societies. It is not possible, or necessary, in this chapter to provide a comprehensive review of the full range of contemporary issues in disability and social inequalities (see Albrecht et al. 2001). However, it is useful to broaden the illustration of themes by considering some further substantive areas of inequality. With reference to the opening discussion on models and theories, it is important to understand that the devaluing of disabled lives may be explained both in cultural and structural terms.

The following section uses the examples of education and employment to examine social inequalities in terms of investments in disabled and nondisabled lives.

Education (and particularly schooling for disabled children) has been a prominent area of concern in disability equality debates at the international level. This is perhaps unsurprising. As global markets and technologies develop in new ways, access to education and lifelong learning become ever more important to social inclusion and economic survival. Yet, many disabled people have been denied opportunities to acquire the knowledge and skills required in a changing world. Many millions have been excluded from formal education altogether, and where access has been granted, the legacy of "special" education steers them to institutions and educational programs that separate those with accredited impairments from their nondisabled peers.

Different explanations of disability generate different approaches to education. For example, where essentialist biological explanations suggest a child-deficit approach to education, based on the allocation of children to impairment categories in schools, social constructionist explanations suggest that administrative segregation reinforces artificial boundaries and negative stereotypes (Riddell 1996). Materialist models of disability offer an additional perspective by explaining the structural and economic forces that shape particular patterns of school provision in different societies (see also Corbett 1998; Clough and Barton 1999; Clough and Corbett 2000).

From a functional or structural perspective, the role of schooling may be viewed as investing in children as future human capital and in socializing them into accepted and valued adult roles. Thus, educational institutions may be regarded both as agents of capital accumulation and social control. Within Western education systems in particular, preparation for autonomous adult labor in a market economy appears to be a significant educational goal (Cuypers 1991; Morgan 1996) and values such as conformity, competition, and selection are prominent in the curricula and management of schools. Clearly, this raises some questions about the extent to which investments in "special" education for disabled children have been geared toward these same ends. Indeed, there is much evidence that traditional investments in special education have tended to reinforce the future care and dependency of disabled people rather than their future inclusion or autonomy (see Oliver 1989). However, the promotion of a more inclusive educational agenda in recent years has challenged such assumptions.

Within a philosophy of inclusion, education is, then, constructed as an issue of redistributive justice, rather than one of social control or market forces (e.g., Barton and Slee 1999). Moreover, the well-documented educational inequalities for disabled women and poorer disabled people throughout the world reinforce how multiple disadvantage and simultaneous oppression cut across a more generalized account of disability. Booth (2000) notes that disabled learners continue to be the most excluded from education, raising particular concern in poorer countries where limited resources add to the barriers, and where policies of universal compulsory schooling have been less established. It is perhaps significant then that the movement for inclusive education for disabled children is increasingly interacting with movements for the inclusion of other marginalized groups (in terms of gender, poverty, or ethnicity, for example). Thus, not simply in terms of disability,

Regular schools with this inclusive orientation are the most effective means of combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities, building an inclusive society and achieving education for all; moreover, they provide an effective education to the majority of children and improve the efficiency and ultimately the cost-effectiveness of the entire education system. (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization and Ministry of Education and Science 1994: 2)

Although there is a widespread rhetorical commitment to the principles of educational inclusion by states throughout the world, achievements in practice remain extremely patchy and practice often falls far short of aspirations. Even within countries that have similar populations of disabled children and similar levels of economic or political development, there are clear national differences in the way that education is organized. This may reflect economic and demographic considerations, the constraints of physical and social geography, and differing political or welfare regimes. Culture, values, and attitudes toward disabled people may also play a part in shaping educational expectations and the quality of provision. However, in order to understand why disabled learners continue to be so disadvantaged as attitudes change, it is again necessary to consider the structural challenge presented by inclusion. In particular, a more structural analysis of disability would suggest a potential conflict between the celebrations of diversity and equality in education, on the one hand, and the economic demands of competitive global labor markets, on the other.

It is perhaps unsurprising then that the development of social model approaches to social inequality for disabled people began with an overt focus on the centrality of employment. For example, in developing their groundbreaking discussion on the *Fundamental Principles of Disability* (discussed in the first part of this chapter), UPIAS emphasized that, although no one aspect of disability discrimination should be treated in isolation, inequality in employment was critical:

the struggle to achieve integration into ordinary employment is the most vital part of the struggle to change the organisation of society so that physically impaired people are no longer impoverished through exclusion from full participation. . . . All the other situations from which physically impaired people are excluded are linked, in the final analysis, with the basic exclusion from employment. (UPIAS/Disability Alliance 1976: 15–16)

Following this lead, early social model theorists argued that changes in the structure of adult labor markets were instrumental in the production of disability as a new social category in capitalist economies. Indeed, Stone (1984) showed how administrative definitions of who is “disabled” arose directly from state efforts to control adult labor supply in industrial market economies (see also Priestley 1997). Since the exact definition of who is exempt from work obligations changes, in response to economic demands and technological change, policy definitions of disability are shown to be “elastic” (Gruber 2000). Thus, people classed as disabled because they are “unable to work” at times of low labor demand (e.g., during economic recession) may be brought into the labor market at times of high demand (e.g., during wars or periods of economic growth).

This kind of analysis suggests that structural changes in future markets may offer new opportunities for disabled adults to participate in economically productive

labor. For example, much hope has been placed on the potential impact of technology and flexible working in post-Fordist modes of production (see Roulstone 1998). However, technologies are not isolated from the prevailing relations of production, and technology alone can be no guarantor of employment. As Michailakis (2001) notes, "technological optimism" often overlooks the embeddedness of technologies within economic, social, and cultural contexts.

This emphasis on productive paid work, coupled with imperatives for economic survival in countries without established welfare provision, has generated a preoccupation with employment in disability research and policy. The assumption that entry into employment will address social inequalities for disabled people is widespread. For states, too, there are economic benefits in exploiting the labor of untapped sections of the population, particularly in times of high demand or where there is pressure on limited welfare resources. Thus, actions to increase employment opportunities for disabled adults increasingly have been promoted by policy makers and disability activists alike, on both economic and social grounds.

There is little doubt that participation in work and employment are key cultural signifiers of citizenship and status in modern societies (particularly in the historical construction of male adulthoods). Yet disabled people, and disabled women in particular, continue to be disproportionately unemployed, underemployed, and underpaid (along with young people and nondisabled women), resulting in conditions of extreme poverty for many millions of their families. The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate that some 386 million people of working age are disabled (a majority of the world's disabled population), yet many, up to 80 percent in some countries, remain unemployed due to the disabling attitudes of employers, unequal access to education and training, an absence of appropriate support, and disabling barriers in the workplace. Access to economic resources for those who are unemployed is often very limited, and in many developing countries threatens physical survival (Turmusani 2001). Consequently, access to adult paid employment is sometimes seen as the only available mechanism for breaking the link between disability and poverty.

Differential access to the benefits of paid employment and education means that world poverty is a key issue for disabled people. In a global context, poor people are more likely to be affected by impairment and disability, and disabled people are more likely to live in poverty. The causes of such disadvantage are not simply to do with disabling attitudes or prejudice. They are deeply rooted in structural inequalities and conflicts arising from uneven economic, technological, and political development. Disabled women are particularly disadvantaged in this way.

In order to develop a more inclusive model of employment, it is necessary to ask whether the notion of work can be reformulated on an alternative set of principles, such as social obligation and interdependency (e.g., Gleeson 1999). Despite the considerable developments in modes and means of production within post-Fordist economies and information societies, participation in socially valued work remains largely unchallenged as the central marker of adult citizenship. Yet, an analysis based on inclusion in competitive wage labor deals with only one side of the work equation; masking the fact that the work of consumption is an increasingly significant marker of social inequalities in contemporary societies (Campbell 1987; Castells 1996).

If structural explanations are important in explaining the historical production of disability then it is equally important to review these developments in the light of continuing social transformations in contemporary societies. In particular, structural analyses of disability have been premised on a particular view of the social relations of production in industrializing capitalist economies (or more accurately, modernity). Consequently, the social transformations associated with late modernity and postmodern analyses present new challenges to understanding and explaining the social inequalities experienced by disabled people.

Social Inequalities and Human Capital

The debates and examples introduced in this chapter illustrate both the cultural and structural inequalities experienced by disabled people in contemporary societies. A repeating theme in the discussion suggests that disabled lives have been commonly devalued, in terms of personhood and human capital (Stone 2001). Moreover, the lowered human value often attributed to disabled lives is closely related to real inequalities of social and economic investment in the life chances and physical survival of disabled people. This cultural devaluation is reflected in constructions of disability as personal tragedy, as biologically determined, and as a state of otherness. Clearly, such constructions also lend weight to dominant modes of welfare, which respond to issues of disability inequality through prevention, medical cure, care, dependency, and segregation. As long as the devalued worth of disabled lives is viewed simply as personal tragedy or biomedical fact there is unlikely to be much change in this situation. By contrast, viewing disability as a consequence of social forces and political economy opens up the possibility to address social inequality in terms of inclusion and human rights.

It may be useful to think about the social inequalities experienced by disabled people in terms of access to different kinds of resources, or capital, that people draw upon during their lives. For example, in Bourdieu's (1979) terms, disabled people are commonly excluded not only from the benefits of economic capital but also from social and cultural capital. In a global context, disabled people remain considerably marginalized from access to economic capital and the benefits of its exploitation. Indeed, access to even a subsistence or survival level of income is by no means guaranteed for disabled people in much of the world. Poverty and access to a source of income (predominantly through work or welfare) are therefore priority issues, especially in societies without established systems of cash benefits for those excluded from paid employment. As a consequence, disabled people are more likely to be amongst the poorest of the poor throughout the world (and disabled women, children, and elders in particular). Social capital is important, too, since differential access to social networks of information and support can be a critical factor in shaping inequalities and life chances. Histories of social exclusion and institutionalization have removed generations of disabled people from direct engagement with networks of social capital, and the benefits that these bring in social and economic terms. In addition, disabled people's access to cultural or symbolic capital is also restricted through the negative cultural construction of disability and impairment. In this sense, it is significant that the aesthetics, or *habitus*, of

impairment continues to convey considerable signifiers of low social status in modern societies.

In challenging social inequalities, the disabled people's movement has made considerable gains in some of these areas, for example in resourcing and promoting more positive disability identities and cultures, which in turn provide access to new forms of social and cultural capital. There have been gains too in the greater acceptance of disabled people as valued community members, and as the holders of more valued social roles (as workers, students, or parents, for example). Political campaigning and identity politics have also begun to challenge the economic exclusion of disabled adults from paid labor. However, it is important to underline that the kind of systemic poverty and economic marginalization experienced by disabled people on a global scale remains largely impervious to a purely cultural or identity-based approach – ultimately, structural problems require structural solutions. If we concede that the social construction of disabled lives as devalued human capital is largely a product of global economic forces, then the social inequalities experienced by disabled people are unlikely to be radically transformed without a greater understanding and transformation of global capitalism.

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Chapter 17

The Culture of Medicine and Racial, Ethnic, and Class Disparities in Healthcare

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Racial disparities in medical treatments and in health status have been documented in numerous studies over the past two decades. In an editorial in the *New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM)*, Epstein and Ayanian noted, “there is little evidence that racial disparities in medical care or in measures of health have substantially diminished” (2001). Gary King (1996), in an insightful theoretical analysis of this research, argues that explanations of racial differences in medical care and of participation rates in medical research are grounded in institutional racism and in the professional ideologies of medicine and healthcare systems that lead to power imbalances between minorities and medicine’s elite professionals. King identifies three phases of research in this field, all of which have relevance to our project: (1) initial “exploratory research,” which documented differences between Blacks and Whites in medical care, utilizing quantitative data; (2) “contemporary” research, which focuses on coronary artery disease and other specific diseases, using rigorous methods to investigate causes of disparities in treatment; and (3), most recently, “an incisive period in which researchers attempt to combine theory, methods and policy considerations.” King argues that to understand documented differences, one must come to understand covert as well as overt racism and the multifaceted dimensions of institutional racism in medical and health institutions. His work and that of numerous other researchers who have documented disparities in health and treatment for ethnic and linguistic minorities, in addition to examining Black–White differences, raises questions about how we might best understand the mechanisms – attitudinal, structural, institutional, and ideological – that produce disparities in medical care and in health status.

Our initial study questions for the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Group on Racial and Ethnic Disparities focused on the culture of medicine. How do the culture of

medicine, the training of medical students and residents, and the organization and delivery of healthcare affect patient treatment in such a way as to produce obvious and documented disparities in therapeutic action? Whether it is treatment for cardiac disease, asthma, kidney disorders, or mental illnesses, some Americans receive less than optimal or even standard best medical therapies. Two decades of research have documented that, whether bounded by ethnic or racial identities, immigrant status, English-language fluency, educational attainment, poverty, low socioeconomic status (SES), or urban/rural residence, minorities and the poor receive less care and poorer quality care than their middle-class and educated compatriots. The committee invited our group to address the question, "how could well-meaning people (healthcare providers) provide inequitable care to minority and nonminority patients?"

This question and the committee's initial larger query about the culture of medicine and its contribution to patterning disparities in medical care and treatment have proved daunting to address. Empirical studies on medical training and racism appear scant in our literature searches. Our own research (Good 1994; Good 1995; Good and Good 2000) on the socialization of medical students and on the culture of medicine, while suggestive, has not directly addressed disparities in care granted patients. However, in our studies over several decades, we found that "the medical gaze" soon becomes the dominant knowledge frame through medical school, that time and efficiency are highly prized, and that students and their attending physicians are most caring of patients who are willing to become part of the medical story they wish to tell and the therapeutic activities they hope to pursue.

Nevertheless, we identified no clear relationship among the medical hierarchy, culture of training, or professional ideologies that would readily explain patterned disparities in care by race, SES, and ethnicity (such as the study group's suggestion of a modeled preference for private rather than public patients although clearly such preferences may exist at many institutions). We contend that such relationships are multidimensional and subtle, and that to identify the production of disparities in care requires considerable additional critical observation of our institutions of training and care. For example, differences in value of public and private patients may be conveyed not only in direct but in indirect and subtle process. In our own academic community, such distinctions may be demonstrated through a common but not hegemonic hierarchy of value. For example, many physicians regard practicing at a community clinic as less prestigious than practicing at an academic medical center, where private as well as public patients receive care. The diversity of medical professional communities also allows for "the saint" or hero physician, who is devoted to the care of the underprivileged or the poor. Professional careers are made in community-oriented medical service and in teaching "cultural competence" to one's medical students and residents.

Nevertheless, both the charismatic hero physicians, who are leaders in social medicine (see Farmer 1999), and the less publicly known academic and community physicians, who are to be commended for their commitment to improving the quality of care provided to the underserved or to ethnic minorities, work within a biomedical knowledge frame. Although tempered with a social medicine perspective and interpretative sensibility, these physicians also employ the medical gaze in their daily clinical work and practice. Thus, we do not wish to underestimate the

power of the medical gaze and the biomedical sciences that inform it to shape patterns of care and thus differences in care as well. In such a hierarchy of valued knowledge, psychological and social data are often regarded as inadmissible evidence by students who are learning to hone their case reports and presentations to focus on the essence of “what medicine cares about” (Good 1998). The social data may produce patterns of care not otherwise critically examined, even for more practiced and socially concerned clinicians.

This simple picture of “valued knowledge,” while the dominant model and underlying ideology in early medical training, hardly captures the complexities of contemporary medical education. In contrast to a singular biomedical model of training, which gives scant attention and value to the social aspects of medicine, many American medical schools over the past quarter-century have increasingly incorporated curriculum materials on diverse patient cultures. In addition, students have often been encouraged to engage in activities oriented to caring for underserved, poor, and minority patients. Our observations of and engagement with medical education since 1976 have exposed us to social medicine-sensitive curricula even as we have contributed to it (Good and Good 1980, 1981). Examples include the University of California at Davis, which in the late 1970s and early 1980s developed cultural courses that addressed “the health needs, beliefs, and practices” of California’s various ethnic populations and immigrants (Asian, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, Vietnamese immigrants, and other refugees from Indochina – with a notable lesser emphasis on African Americans). Harvard Medical School’s commitment has flourished in the past two decades, increasing curricula in medical anthropology and social medicine, although the school has had a long tradition through the informal curriculum of encouraging students to participate in international as well as local community programs providing healthcare for the poor or marginally served ethnic groups. A third program, and among the most impressive, was begun when the University of New Mexico established its medical school in 1968. The highly committed, state-sanctioned, and legislated programs of the University of New Mexico School of Medicine teach students about the state’s diverse populations and the healthcare needs of rural as well as urban ethnic communities. The school mandates practice training in underserved areas to provide care to the American Indian (Hopi, Navajo, Zuni, and others) and Hispanic rural populations. Many schools have produced formal and informal curricula, which on paper appear to be promoting cultural competence. Rarely, however, does medical training focus on the culture of medicine itself; rarely do students have the time or the formal sanction to critically analyze the profession and institutions of care to examine how treatment choices, quality of care, and research practices are shaped; or how medical culture may produce processes that evolve into institutional racism or aversive racism in clinical practice (King 1996; Whaley 1998). Theories about how professional elites and the imbalance of power produce institutional racism, such as Kings’s, call for empirical documentation.

Why do racial and ethnic disparities continue to exist despite the two decades of documented research, of educational efforts to teach medical and health professionals “cultural competence” and social medicine, of programmatic efforts to attend to health needs of underserved communities, and most recently of NIH/NCMHD (National Institutes of Health/National Center on Minority Health and Health Disparities) and previous governmental efforts to redress the inequities

in medical care and health status? Are educational and research programs ineffective in changing clinician behavior and institutional and professional culture? Does the culture of medicine – as exemplified in the medical gaze and its underlying ideologies and political economy of what constitutes legitimate medical knowledge, bioscience, and appropriate medical decision making – too readily exclude patients whom clinicians assess as likely to pose “problems” and compromise the efficacy and efficiency prized by the medical world? Do professionals’ concerns about patient compliance and community and patient trust at times serve as justifications for their employing different approaches to treating minority patients, and thereby (and perhaps naïvely) to their providing a lesser quality of care? Or are disparities in care ingrained in the social and economic inequalities that are rife in our larger society, feeding inequalities of treatment in America’s healthcare system? Clearly, differences in insurance coverage influence the kinds and quality of care patients receive. Do patients contribute to these disparities in care and, if so, how? We contend that multidimensional processes are at the root of different types of ethnic and racial disparities in health status and medical treatment. These processes are structural, economic, environmental, and political and attitudinal. Individual behavior as well as institutional culture and practices are implicated.

In the remainder of this essay, selected findings from studies documenting disparities are presented. In addition, exploratory qualitative data from recent interviews with physicians-in-training and with faculty attending physicians are introduced to suggest possible directions for a critical analysis of the culture of medicine and the political economy upon which it is based and from which it is produced. A cultural analysis of bias in mental healthcare is presented as one model suggestive for future research in other domains of medicine. In this case, differences in diagnosis and treatment by race and gender in psychiatry are examined, demonstrating how cultural and social analyses contribute to an explanation of racial and ethnic disparities in care and treatment. The conclusion draws on these materials and the wider literature documenting disparities in healthcare, with the aim that future research findings and interpretations may contribute to formulating policies that will redress disparities in the quality of care.

The Culture of Medicine: Insights from Physicians in Academic Teaching Hospitals

Clearly, the financing of healthcare coverage, type of health insurance or accessibility to government programs, as well as lack of coverage, are relevant to understanding what happens within healthcare institutions and in the intimate exchanges that we characterize as clinical interactions, and how these interactions result in decisions that produce racial and ethnic disparities in treatment. The Harvard Medical Practice Study analyzed over 32,000 records from New York State hospitals located in metropolitan/urban town/suburban/rural areas. The project found that patients who had no health insurance and who lived in poor urban areas were more likely, regardless of race or ethnicity, to experience an adverse event (Weiler et al. 1993).

Where one receives healthcare, including how one enters a healthcare institution (via an Emergency Room or via a controlled appointment process), influences the

type and scope of care provided. It may also influence how healthcare providers, from nurses and physicians to medical students and technologists, interpret who their patients are, what life experiences they carry with them, and what problems they may cause for those who will be delivering care. These processes – whether stereotyping, prototyping, or profiling – clearly have consequences for treatment choices and medical decisions. Disparities in care and differences in therapeutic actions, regardless of provider race in certain cases (Chen et al. 2001), rest in part on these larger social processes within our complex medical institutions. The following discussion examines findings from our pilot interviews and seeks to raise what we believe are some reasons disparities persist.

Our past research on medical education and the socialization of medical students was carried out at Harvard Medical School in 1986–91, and addressed how medical students and physicians-in-training learn to see, present, and write up patient cases (Good 1994; Good 1998; Good and Good 2000). Students come to embody the medical gaze as they learn to see what is relevant data and to speak the language of medicine. Early in training, they enter the molecular worlds of disease and therapeutic interventions and the world of medical practice and medical culture. They also learn socially acceptable behaviors – when to speak, how to listen, and what is relevant to the clinical task. Students struggle to learn “what medicine cares about.” Students are also socialized to attend to social and economic issues in healthcare; some embrace the “social medicine” perspective even as they come to speak and be in the molecular medical world. Those who do so incorporate into their studies projects in international health, urban health, and volunteer work providing basic healthcare for poor or immigrant or minority populations. These social medicine projects become less central in students’ education as they move into clinical clerkships and become responsible for the clinical care of patients and for decisions of therapeutic consequence. Other research on medical education, from the classic work of Robert K. Merton et al.’s *Student Physician* (1957) to Becker et al.’s *Boys in White* (1961) to more contemporary projects such as Fred Hafferty’s *Into the Valley: Death and the Socialization of Medical Students* (1991), document similar experiences, suggesting historical depth and continuity in the culture of medical education. This continuity of medical educational culture persists despite a sea change in the gender and, to a lesser extent, the racial and ethnic profile of medical students. In addition, extraordinary developments in medical technology, biomedical science, and the political economy and financing of medicine and delivery of healthcare appear to be subsumed into this culture and way of learning medicine.

Scholars interested in narrative analysis such as that provided by Katherine Hunter (1991), as well as many physicians interested in medical narratives, have all explored ways physicians present and speak about patients. Narrative forms of the culture of medicine are ingrained; they have historical depth and substance and make for continuity of professionalism despite changes in practice environments. They are reinforced by the modeling that occurs through the hierarchy of medicine, through interactions between students and interns, interns and residents, and residents and attending physicians. What is important in medicine is learned through daily interactions with peers and with the hierarchy, and students are rewarded as they come to behave as competent, reliable, and responsible clinicians who have learned appropriate professional behavior. How does this professional socialization

affect physician behavior so as to have an impact on the treatments offered to patients of different social groups?

First, the culture of medicine emphasizes the dismantling of patient life narratives and the reconstitution of patient concerns and experiences of illness and associated social context into medically meaningful narratives that allow physicians to determine a diagnosis and formulate plans for therapeutic actions and procedures. In our research, students and attending physicians often regarded patient life issues as “inadmissible evidence”; senior clinicians modeled for juniors how to streamline medical narratives and to edit out data irrelevant to the clinical decision or task currently at hand. Patients are not ignored. However, as students and residents mature as clinicians they learn to create clinical narratives for patients; these clinical narratives are biomedical stories through which physicians explain to patients about their disease diagnoses and processes, therapeutic options, and treatment courses and goals. Good doctors engage patients in these clinical stories, teaching and guiding and helping patients own what is happening. Some clinicians describe this very simply as empowering patients, while others reflect little but work hard at fitting patients into the medical world of treatment, helping patients understand and accept what may be difficult treatments for frightening and life-threatening diseases. These narratives smooth the working of what one of our junior colleagues calls “the medical machine.”

Disruptions in the Medical Machine

Recent interviews with attending physicians, residents, and medical students in the Boston area suggest several ways the medical gaze may lead to disparities in health-care. Interviews were carried out with physicians who were both men and women and were from Euro-American, Asian, and African American backgrounds. A second-year medicine resident at a major teaching hospital, having recently completed a PhD in medical anthropology, made the following observations as we explored what might lie behind the reasons for disparities in healthcare for minorities, immigrants, and lower-class patients. She had been thinking about these issues, in large measure due to publication of recent research on health disparities and to the publicity of NIH minority research activities:

“People who don’t fit into the medical machine” are ones who may not get offered the latest therapeutic interventions. Here at [x hospital] is a medical machine – we are all cogs in it, not just the docs, but the patients too. And the more we fit into our role, the smoother the machine runs. In internship – it is relearning to listen to patients without listening to them. It is painful, because it is the opposite of anthropology. You learn to do a better job by not listening to your patients. . . . We become different types of subjects, disciplined (after Foucault), to fit into the machine. Or Fordist. The machine model breaks down when patients don’t get referred into high tech medical therapies, the most cutting edge of medicine. When physicians experience difficulties in interacting with patients, it befuddles the doctor, and derails them. In ER shifts, there is the discipline of time, and when a patient derails you, it is glaringly obvious. In the ER, you have an immediate problem – what do I do with this person – the faster you make a decision the better you are as an ED doctor; it is a different yardstick to figure out what is troubling them.

Patients derail physicians when they present with what an attending physician described as “socially complex problems.” The notions of the medical machine, of derailment and befuddlement, are relevant to explaining why disparities exist. The comments of a cardiac specialist, who has practiced in community clinics as well as in a major teaching hospital, highlight similar issues. He remarked: “One needs to attend to the more mundane aspects of doctoring.” In today’s practice environment, “we need cooperative patients because of the tightness of time.”

Another attending physician noted how language problems and family issues can disrupt practice flow and influence choice of therapeutic options. Her work with patients at a community mental health clinic became most difficult when she found that many of her patients of color had social situations that were “so dismal that it far outweighed the clinical problems” she was expected to address. She remarked that her work over the four years at this clinic led her to reevaluate:

why I became a clinician . . . when patients would ask for disability papers when I thought they should have a job and structure; when I had to turn in many patients for abusing their children. I felt I was in an adversarial role that I did not want to be – court papers, reports, and people needed social interventions and no one was offering it. In the past, clinicians had the luxury of time to teach and do paper work, now they are scheduling brief therapeutic sessions instead of 50-minute sessions to allow time for insurance paperwork.

A fourth-year medical student had experienced similar pressures of time that the attending physician and resident discussed. He explained:

a measure of success (as a student) is extracting a history of illness and developing a treatment regimen that allows you to discharge the patient with some improvement. Things that interfere with the above make physicians uncomfortable. If you have a minority patient who allows you to do the history and treatment plan (in a timely fashion) then the interaction is not problematic for the most part. I am of course speaking for myself.

When we discussed if he detected any bias in the curriculum or in modeled behavior by attending physicians or residents that might have an impact on how minority patients were treated, he reflected:

One modeled message currently about hospital care is rapid assessment, efficiency, and treatment. One thing about minority, indigent, low-income patients, is that their social situations are complex in negative terms and not fixable by any intervention that can happen in the hospital. As a result, one becomes almost discouraged to begin to explore these things. With some people you work with a translator and even when not, there is a reluctance rather than an inclination to get a good social history and explore the social roots of the illness.

When I asked whether he observed any differences by racial or ethnic groups in terms of their trust in the medical system, he remarked that he had not interacted with that many African Americans but his impression was that:

Absolutely. African American patients do not come into the hospital expecting to be treated well. White lower-class patients, for example at the MGH, expect to be and they have been treated well. Asians – so many different kinds, new immigrants versus academics.

This very thoughtful student and I discussed how readily one distinguished different groups of Asians, some difficult to care for because of language barriers and social situations, others more similar in educational status and class to the medical community and easy to communicate with, but that it was easy to slip into grouping African American patients into one category.

A resident also noted the stereotype of African American patients as being “dreadfully sick and their social life is so disorganized that they are ‘non-compliant’ and living in a state of chaos, with a disorganized household, or that they are socially isolated and incredibly sick and incredibly difficult to manage.” In these cases “it is really hard to make progress and take care of patients,” if, for example, diabetes is out of control and vague symptoms are difficult to manage. The resident concluded, however, that she did not have experiences that fit the stereotype she had just elaborated; her experiences were more varied. When asked if she had stereotypes for Asian patients, she noted that she did not have any, although she thought of East African patients (Somalians) as different from African Americans and Asians. This resident reported that she and her colleagues have a profile for young Hispanic women with total body pain – “they hurt everywhere” and “you simply cannot interview them. You take it on their terms or abdicate helping them. Some people work with them, I use the notion of *nervios* with patients, and it speaks to the political and domestic violence in their lives, if I think it makes sense; a sense of culture bound category. Everybody calls them crazy including Hispanic doctors.” In this case, the resident’s advanced degrees in medical anthropology have added to her ability to bridge cultural gaps between this population of patients and the medical world.

Race and ethnicity continue to define responses of clinicians. Assumptions are often made that may have inadvertent influence on how treatment interventions are offered to patients and how disease etiology is explored. One mode of profiling racial groups is through case formulations – the way certain diseases are discussed in relationship to certain minorities. Examples include African American patients who are associated with hypertension and diabetes; Asian patients with hepatitis; poor Hispanics, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans or Central Americans with diabetes and obesity; or working-class Irish with alcoholism. Case examples may follow an epidemiological pattern – diseases more prevalent in certain groups will be described in terms of patient demographics associated with those groups. Thus, though in a subtle way, race, ethnicity, and class become part of the world of the medical gaze and the standard patient formulation. Does this lead to explicit racism or bias in what is offered to patients in terms of medical interventions? An African American attending psychiatrist noted that in his consultations on psychotropic medications he often finds that primary-care physicians prescribe less current drugs for their Black patients. When he asks them why, they are baffled and unaware. Current antipsychotics and psychoactive drugs are not only an improvement over older medications in treating mental disorders, but also are better tolerated than older drugs.

The Bias of Efficacy

All physicians we spoke with expressed concern about how effective their interventions will be when patients may be “train wrecks” – the student’s term for victims

of complex social problems – a term also used by residents and attending physicians. The following example recounted by a resident suggests how complex responses by clinicians may be and how clinicians may take actions to offset the perceived bias:

Last night I had an elderly African-American woman [in the ER], “the classic invisible cardiac patient who does not get referred to cath.” I was trying to make a strong case that she needed to get cathed, to see if blockages [were the cause of] her intermittent episodes of shortness of breath. Her story was fuzzy in the way it came out. We push people to answer questions in a format we phrase for them. We guide and teach them how to answer the questions. If we try to coach them and they don’t respond to it or submit, it throws us off. Her job was to put her words into mine.

The attempt was successful. The resident commented on a second patient, with whom she was having less success. She had grown familiar with her through the patient’s many visits to the ER.

I was thinking about how to help these patients and figure out what was wrong with them. I had another African-American lady; a huge part of her problem is chaos in her life, with teenagers living in her house who use drugs. She does not have keys to her own apartment, the kids stole the keys, she has to be let in. I got the social workers to impose their external presence to intimidate the kids, and get them out of the house. She [the patient] comes less often into the ER. I also gave her a tranquilizer. I feel bad about dosing a social problem. If chaos is in their life, patients such as this woman don’t get referred to high tech care, to cath, because they have a “difficult social situation.” There is a danger of quickly moving to that interpretation and physicians are biased in looking at the patient and saying “oh, difficult social situation” and sure black physicians do this, too. Some people do this and some don’t – it needs to be documented.

Political Correctness, the Medical Machine, and the Meaning of Bias

In the clinical contexts we discussed, political correctness appears to be the normative order in public discussion. Medical students with whom we spoke note they never hear overtly negative racist comments in the hospital or among classmates. This sensitivity is new to the late twentieth-century generation of medical students and faculty in our study area. However, when race is not a category of response, certain groups of patients are fair game for jokes and occasional expressions of dismay and amazement about discrepancies in expectations, behavior, and their treatment of physicians. Patients from the former Soviet Bloc – Russians and others – are in particular maddening for physicians. Because “race” is not part of the package, physicians feel freer to comment on what they regard as strange behavior inappropriate in our society’s wider medical culture.

Examples that are perceived as disrespectful behavior toward physicians and the healthcare system include not showing up for appointments and not notifying the clinics, calling in the middle of the night for minor problems, choosing to go on vacation instead of keeping surgical schedules, and demanding particular treatments when paying, without regard for physician recommendations and expertise. “No-

shows” are calculated into the time schedules for many community clinics and ambulatory care units; surgical units and surgeons are aware they may have problems with such patients as well. These problems are encountered with other new immigrants also and many of them do not speak English. The community clinics with large immigrant non-English-speaking populations appear to be scheduled differently than are units at the teaching hospitals.

The gap between the culture of medicine and the social and cultural resources, contexts, and frames of reference of certain social groups clearly is related to how healthcare is delivered and how therapeutic options are offered and chosen by clinicians. The boundaries are fluid. They are sometimes associated with race, sometimes with class, sometimes with immigrant status, sometimes with disease state and age (the “train wrecks” – the old heroin addict for whom little can be done that is effective and efficient.)

Anne Fadiman’s *The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down* (1997) is an account of misunderstandings and mistakes by the medical system, by well-meaning physicians, and by the state in the care of a young Hmong girl suffering from epilepsy. The story Fadiman tells is not only dense, but it has some facile answers to “the problem” also: get translators, increase understanding, and listen to patients and their families. However, as we review the larger picture of disparities in healthcare, the issues are more resistant to analysis, and rest not only in relationships between physicians and patients but also in larger organizational practices, cultures, and the financing of healthcare systems.

The labor force in American medical institutions today, at least in the Northeast and in California, is remarkable for its ethnic diversity. In the metropolitan area where the authors work, the hospitals’ staffs include many new immigrants, some of whom speak English as a second language and with limited fluency. The impression of our interviewees as well as of the authors is that the majority of the medical teams in the local teaching hospitals, including the nurses and doctors, are of European background and considered “White.” However, the medical staff is a minority of the hospital labor force.

The majority of the hospital labor force are of mixed race and ethnicity and reflective of community surrounds. Interestingly, a major shift has also occurred in the race and ethnic composition of attending physicians and residents in these hospitals, a sea change that has occurred in the past decade. When interviewees identified the residents with whom they worked by race and ethnicity, the picture was of great diversity. And even greater diversity is evident in the local medical schools. For example, one fourth-year medical student in recent rotations worked with several Jamaican residents, with African Americans from New York and Alabama, with Asian Indians, Chinese Americans, Chinese, Korean Americans, Hispanics, and Mexican Americans. Reflecting on his response to this question, he noted that he may have had more “minority” residents than not in his rotations. As a White male, he found himself in the minority. A woman resident in medicine noted that her colleagues were African American and Hispanic as well as Asian American and South Asian Indians. Whites included many Jewish physicians, and nearly half of the residents with whom she worked were women.

This change in resident color, gender, and ethnicity is the future face of medicine in the United States. However, color, race, and gender do not make medical culture.

The profession of medicine is powerful in the reproduction of culture and practice, expectations and “gazes,” and in defining what is important and significant in medicine. The financial and organizational shifts are also important, and recent changes in the financing and organization of medical care have had great impact. Universalism in patient care becomes more difficult to achieve when pressures of time and money shape clinical interactions and treatment choices. Thus, attitudes of clinicians are but a limited part of the culture of medicine and the reasons for discrepancies in care. Institutional practices that favor the privately insured patient over the publicly insured patient, that favor patients with greater social and personal resources, education, money, and social position and respond more readily to patient demands are likely to neglect or give less attention to patients who are poorer and who may be less socially and psychologically integrated.

This diversion of ethnicity and race in the healthcare labor force and in the medical profession suggests that regardless of what caused disparities in the past, ongoing disparities in care cannot simply be explained by racial differences between providers and patients. A recent *NEJM* article by Chen et al. (2001) documents that racial difference in cardiac catheterization after an MI was not related to physician race; the study was carried out with a population of White and Black physicians and patients. The importance of a change in the ethnic and racial diversity of American physicians may be measured in part by closer examination of disparities in care and by addressing these issues in government-sponsored NIH research. The training of healthcare professionals is also of high priority in reducing disparities in care. The following section addresses ways that health professionals have been trained thus far and the limits of current approaches.

Addressing Healthcare Disparities through the Training of Healthcare Professionals

The literature on health disparities among ethnic minority populations includes discussion of sources of inequality based on institutional, clinician-centered, and patient-centered factors. A substantial literature on cultural sensitivity and cultural competence – particularly in relation to clinician training – has thus evolved. In the recent past, the vast majority of the scientific publications on cultural competence has been in the nursing literature. Most of these publications focus on compelling reasons to train “culturally competent” clinicians, including the pronounced ethnic and racial disparities in healthcare access and outcomes, the burgeoning ethnic minority population within the United States, and the well-documented underrepresentation of ethnic minority practitioners in healthcare professions (Nickens 1992; Gonzalez et al. 2000; Stoddard et al. 2000). Curricula or principles supporting the development of cultural sensitivity or cultural competence in healthcare professionals are outlined in these articles. Notwithstanding the indisputable face validity to developing such curricula and principles, there has been an unfortunate relative dearth of studies that systematically investigate either: (1) effective strategies for training clinicians; or (2) how such training improves patient and clinician satisfaction and healthcare access and outcomes (Brach and Fraser 2000). This literature on cultural competence is no doubt invaluable in mobilizing interest in

promoting cultural sensitivity through moral rhetoric (e.g., Richardson 1999), but also underscores the shortage of evidence-based data in addressing and resolving healthcare disparities.

The developing interest in cultural competence in clinician training is both a pragmatic response to the increasing proportion of ethnic minority individuals in the United States population and the failure of a strictly biomedical model in achieving uniform outcomes in this diverse population and a moral response to the inequities of healthcare among ethnically diverse populations. Although legitimated by epidemiologic studies of disparities in healthcare access and outcomes, the specific features of cultural competence have drawn substantially from the tradition of cultural relativism (initially promoted by social anthropologists, e.g., Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict) and have been developed and applied within the more recent anthropologic subdiscipline of medical anthropology. The seminal work, *Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture* (Kleinman 1980), introduced and popularized the concept of “explanatory models” of illness. The frequent divergence of explanatory models between clinician and patient and the clinician’s failure to appreciate and negotiate this were arguably a primary source of nonadherence to treatment recommendations as well as clinician and patient dissatisfaction with the clinical encounter (Good and Good 1980, 1981). Subsequent concepts developed within the field of medical anthropology, such as “semantic networks of illness meanings” (Good 1977), “idioms of distress” (Nichter 1981), the distinctions between disease and illness (Kleinman 1988a), and the social course of illness (Ware and Kleinman 1992) provided the theoretical underpinnings of an informed approach to cultural diversity in the clinical encounter, allowing both culturally sensitive and strategic healthcare delivery to ethnically diverse populations. Eventually, the impact of this theoretical body of knowledge was manifested in clinical materials; for example, in an appendix outlining a means of formulating relevant cultural details to enhance understanding of psychiatric illness presentation among diverse populations in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (4th edition, American Psychiatric Association 1994), used by most practicing psychiatrists.

Educators have identified several tensions in addressing cultural sensitivity in clinician training. For instance, Good (1994) has described being encouraged to edit out so-called extraneous details (often the very details that illuminate relevant socio-cultural background that may have an impact on communication and adherence in the clinical encounter) in the preparation of oral presentations. In this case, the growing pressures to be efficient in the evaluation, triage, and disposition of patients reduce a patient to his or her physiologic condition and encourage exclusion of social context in negotiating clinical care. Despite this prevailing tendency in traditional medical education, data from a recent study on physician communication patterns (Roter et al. 1997) support that patient satisfaction is significantly higher in clinical encounters during which the physician practices a “psychosocial” communication pattern (i.e., in which physician talk is almost evenly divided between psychosocial and biomedical issues). This study also found that the frequency of this communication style was relatively low (<10 percent), possibly because physicians felt that such an approach is more time-consuming; however, the study documented that psychosocially oriented clinical interactions did not, in fact, significantly increase the length of the patient visit. Failure to attend to social context

may not only have adverse consequences in case formulation and treatment decision making, but may also contribute to the disenfranchisement of ethnic minority populations relative to their healthcare. That is, exclusion of psychosocial context may contribute to diminished opportunities for collaboration in the clinical encounter, especially between ethnically dissimilar clinicians and patients. For example, a recent study demonstrated that ethnic minority individuals report less positive perceptions of their physicians than Whites (Doescher et al. 2000) and another found that race-concordance in the physician–patient encounter was associated with higher participatory decision making (Cooper-Patrick et al. 1999).

Another dilemma in training clinicians, identified by two psychiatrists teaching psychiatry residents about cultural competence in a Boston teaching hospital, is in negotiating the tension that occurs when clinicians are exposed to the diversity of cultural traditions while resisting the tendency to stereotype or racially profile patients. Whereas it is useful to teach clinicians about the diversity of and patterns in culturally based help-seeking practices and traditional remedies – particularly with immigrant populations with whom they will have contact – it is important to maintain a perspective that fits this information into heterogeneous personal and social contexts. A failure to do so risks clinical reductionism that resembles prejudice, and more importantly, misses the opportunity to grasp the complexity of cultural, social, and personal variables that come to bear on the health problem at issue. These two psychiatrists agreed that case studies provide an excellent avenue for residents to explore “the multiple layers” and “complexity of clinical decision-making.”

Another paramount concern identified in the education of clinicians on cultural sensitivity and competence is in helping clinicians-in-training to move beyond a mastery of the catalogue of diverse healthcare-related practices to an examination of their own preconceived notions and feelings in clinical encounters with patients from ethnically diverse backgrounds. A recent paper on nursing education (Tullmann 1992) illustrated the distinction between a certain competence with respect to ethnically diverse patient practices and the unfortunate and persistent racism still manifest in various clinical interactions. The paper’s author concludes that a frank examination of racism needs to accompany exposure to cultural diversity. Similarly, the two above-mentioned psychiatrists have observed that because of a concern among residents “about being politically correct” in their seminar and, specifically, because “no one wants to be on record with peers or with you about certain [racially sensitive] things,” creating a safe environment in which to explore and discuss counter-transferential feelings generated in racially and ethnically diverse clinical encounters remains “a training challenge.” They report that “although we are not living in an era in which there is complete closure to this subject [of cultural sensitivity],” they have noted an increasing sophistication among residents with respect to awareness of cultural diversity, in part due to greater exposure to experiences working in other countries. However, increasing opportunities for exposure to other cultures can also preclude people from looking at their own deeply held attitudes about the Other. These psychiatrists thus frame their seminar as “not about knowing what to say or even what to think” but rather, as a process of deepening the process of self-examination vis-à-vis one’s attitudes toward diverse peoples. Without such self-examination, Laszloffy and Hardy (2000) point out that, within the context of therapy, “It is possible for acts of racism to occur ‘innocently’,”

routinely, and with little detection or accountability.” Finally, based on a case study of a medical school course addressing race issues in medicine, Fischbach and Hunt (1999) suggest the need for “proactive” and ongoing programs to address racial and cultural sensitivity in medical education. The concern about creating space to tackle the problem of racism in clinical encounters is consistent with a recent policy statement issued by the American Public Health Association (2001) calling for government funding to research the impact of racism on racial and ethnically based healthcare disparities in the United States.

Increasing time constraints on clinicians arguably place pressure on them to seek “shortcuts” in managing complex clinical problems. In a recent review of biases in clinical judgment, Lopez (1989) writes that clinician error may occur in the absence of clinician prejudice as a result of selective information processing. That is, the time-pressed clinician uses available information and past experience about patient characteristics such as race and social class to arrive at a clinical hypothesis. Unfortunately, this practice may lead to systematic over- or under-diagnosis of certain illnesses among certain populations. Lopez argues that this conceptual framework for understanding clinician bias suggests specific strategies for training clinicians that contrast with more traditional emphasis on examining and changing prejudicial attitudes. Specifically, he suggests that education will need to focus on how clinicians process information to avoid such errors.

Notwithstanding strong impressions based on anecdotal and epidemiologic data, limited research has investigated whether there are systematic deficits in the education of clinicians with respect to cultural competence. Two studies have assessed the prevalence of formal instruction on cultural sensitivity and cultural competence in medical schools and found that such courses are present in only a minority of institutions. Lum and Korenman (1994) surveyed American medical schools in 1991–92 and identified only 13 schools offering cultural sensitivity training; similarly, Loudon and colleagues (1999) identified 13 programs with such training in North America, less than half of which were compulsory. A study assessing the prevalence of cross-cultural content within psychiatry residency training programs showed a much higher prevalence of cultural content integrated into training materials, with 92 percent of programs surveyed reporting inclusion of such content (Baker et al. 1997).

The health professional education literature contains relatively few studies on whether inclusion of cultural sensitivity or cultural competence material enhances skills of trainees. Robins and colleagues (2001) developed two standardized patient cases and assessment instruments to explore how medical students responded to cultural data in a clinical encounter. Their study demonstrated differences in cultural sensitivity based on the ethnic background of the student; based on their results, the authors advocate curricular intervention, but did not use their intervention to test outcome in acquisition of cultural competence skills. One study was able to document an increase in language skills and cultural knowledge among medical student participants in a didactic and experientially based program (including an educational trip to learn first-hand about health practices in Mexico) as compared with controls. Another study found higher levels of cultural competence (as measured by knowledge of, tolerance of, and comfort with diverse populations) among preclinical medical student participants in a “global multiculturalism track” as

compared with nonparticipants (Baker et al. 1997). Two outcome studies on cultural competency training in nursing school showed somewhat contradictory results. One study examining the impact of specific instruction on culturally appropriate care to nursing students found that students who received the instruction actually felt less prepared to provide culturally sensitive care (Alpers and Zoucha 1996), and another showed that both recipients and nonrecipients of a cultural sensitivity intervention improved self-reported cultural competency skills (Napholz 1999). Further research will be necessary to determine whether increased cultural sensitivity can be achieved among healthcare professionals with various curricular programs and, if so, which types of programs are most effective.

In the following case analysis, the use of cultural analysis to explain clinician bias is discussed. Examples of research, such as the work on mental health services, may suggest ways to pursue analyses of reasons for disparities in medical treatment in the nonpsychiatric domains of medicine.

A Case Analysis of Disparities in Mental Health Services

Evidence for the role of clinician “bias” and the culture of mental health institutions

Just as we were completing this review of the role of health professionals and the culture of institutions in reproducing health disparities, Surgeon General David Satcher announced the release of his office’s report on disparities in mental healthcare in America. Entitled *Mental Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity. A Supplement to Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General* (Surgeon General 2001), the report sets out to assess evidence for disparities in mental healthcare and the burden of mental illness for racial and ethnic minorities in America. After providing a wide-ranging review of current data, the report provides the stark conclusion that “ethnic minorities collectively experience a greater disability burden from mental illness than do Whites. The higher level of burden stems from minorities receiving less care and poorer quality of care, rather than from their illnesses being more severe or more prevalent in the community.”

The report argues that minorities have less access to mental health services and are less likely to receive needed services; that minorities in treatment often receive a poorer quality of mental healthcare; and that minorities are underrepresented in mental health research. It argues that while all Americans face fragmented and inadequate levels of mental health services, as well as societal stigma toward mental healthcare, racial and ethnic minorities experience a particular constellation of barriers that deters them from reaching services, including mistrust and fear of treatment, racism and discrimination, and cultural and language barriers. The report argues that mental health disparities are grounded in historical and present-day struggles with racism and discrimination, and that minorities are overrepresented among vulnerable, high-need subgroups such as persons who are homeless, incarcerated, or institutionalized. But its strongest conclusions focus on disparities in access to and use of services and the quality of care that members of minority groups may expect to receive.

In a section of the Executive Summary entitled “Main Message,” the report sets out one of its primary claims: “The main message of this supplement is that ‘culture counts.’” Culture, it argues, is the “common heritage or set of beliefs, norms, and values” of members of a group. Language and culture are particularly significant for mental healthcare. Since mental disorders affect thoughts, moods, and integrative aspects of behavior, the report notes, the diagnosis and treatment of such disorders greatly depend on verbal communication and trust between patient and clinician. At the same time, the report notes explicitly that mental health professionals also constitute a culture, and makes the provocative claim that “the culture of the clinician and the larger healthcare system govern the societal response to a patient with mental illness.” Given the stark indictment of the mental health system, this claim would suggest that racism and discrimination may well be a part of “the culture of the clinician and the larger healthcare system,” responsible for a significant proportion of the disparities identified, even though broader social experiences of violence, poverty, and discrimination increase minorities’ vulnerability to mental illness.

What is meant by suggesting that racism and discrimination are a part of the culture of the mental health profession and the healthcare system – given that community mental health professionals often are among the leading advocates for the poor and minorities suffering from mental illnesses? We focus here on two very specific debates – the over-diagnosis of schizophrenia among African Americans, and the elevated rates of involuntary commitment of African Americans. We hope that these may provide a model for thinking more generally about how the “culture” of clinicians and health institutions may contribute to reproducing disparities in health services and outcomes. In particular, review of these issues will make clear the importance of close attention to the particularities of the medical conditions and health services being examined.

African Americans and the “Over-diagnosis” of Schizophrenia

Adebimpe, an African American psychiatrist, reviewed studies of psychiatric treatments of Black patients and reported that “a modest body of circumstantial evidence” suggested that members of minority subcultures are at particularly high risk for error in psychiatric diagnosis and assessment (1981). Although it is not easy to carry out empirical studies, evidence continues to mount that specific patterns of misdiagnosis may put members of minority communities at special risk for poor medical care. In particular, research dating back to the 1960s provides strong evidence that African Americans in mental health settings are diagnosed with schizophrenia at much greater rates than White Americans and that Whites are diagnosed with affective disorders at much higher rates than African Americans, with data suggesting a similar – though less severe – pattern among Hispanics. A review of health services literature by Snowden et al. (1990) found that Black Americans in in-patient psychiatric services are diagnosed with schizophrenia at almost twice the rate of White Americans, and that Hispanics are diagnosed with schizophrenia at one and a half times the rate of non-Hispanic Whites. Most researchers believe these statistics reflect over-diagnosis of schizophrenia and under-diagnosis of affective disor-

ders, rather than differences in prevalence or care seeking (for reviews of this literature, see Neighbors et al. 1989; Good 1992b; Good 1997). Since a diagnosis of schizophrenia carries powerful implications for treatment with antipsychotic medications, assignment to mental health services designed for the chronically mental ill, and social stigmatization, and since failure to diagnose bipolar disorder may lead to the failure to use effective medications, these findings are particularly troubling.

Researchers over the past decade have continued to investigate this phenomenon. The most recent data continue to show great discrepancies in the diagnoses of Black and White patients. For example, Strakowski et al. (1993) found that 79 percent of African Americans in a public-sector hospital were diagnosed with schizophrenia, compared with 43 percent of Whites. In another study, Strakowski et al. (1995) found that 28 percent of African Americans in a university hospital emergency room were given such a diagnosis, compared with 20 percent of Whites.

Furthermore, treatment patterns seem to reflect these judgments concerning the severity of illness. Strakowski et al. (1995) found that Black patients seen in an emergency room were significantly more likely to be hospitalized, and Segal et al. (1996) found that African American patients seen in an emergency room received 50 percent higher doses of antipsychotic medications than patients of other ethnic groups, while their doctors devoted less time to assessing them and scored significantly lower on an Art of Care Scale. Although these studies do not prove that Black patients are misdiagnosed, they are consistent with a conviction among many researchers that African Americans are at serious risk for receiving a misdiagnosis of schizophrenia, for being provided inappropriate – and inappropriately high levels of – antipsychotic medications, and for receiving poorer care than White patients in the same settings.

Research has pursued several lines of explanation for this apparent phenomenon.

Culture and the Expression of Mental Illness

One leading hypothesis about the source of the high level of apparent misdiagnosis in minority and immigrant populations is that it may result from cultural differences in the experience and expression of symptoms between such patients and “typical” majority patients. Since the current diagnostic manual is based explicitly on symptom criteria, the experience of culturally distinctive symptoms, such as “nervios” and “ataques” among Mexican American patients, hearing voices of the dead among bereaved Indians, and hallucinations not associated with psychosis among Puerto Ricans or African Americans, may lead clinicians to misunderstand patients whose culture is different from majority culture norms.

This can result in mistaken diagnoses. Current diagnostic categories are derived largely from research among majority populations, particularly those found in hospitals or specialty psychiatric clinics, and thus tend to lend support for the impression that such expressions of illness are universal (Mezzich et al. 1996). Cross-cultural research seriously challenges the validity and universality of some diagnostic criteria and diagnostic categories derived from such research, indicating a series of hypotheses that have important implications for medical care for immigrant populations or minority communities (Kleinman 1988b). Thus, one hypoth-

esis, consistent with the message that “culture counts” in the Surgeon General’s report, is that cultural differences between majority norms and normative ways of experiencing and communication symptoms among minority persons, including African Americans, may lead to mistaken diagnoses. Although there is now a large literature on cultural shaping of psychiatric symptoms, few studies have systematically examined explicitly whether these differences lead to increased levels of misdiagnosis for cultural or ethnic minority patients, such as difficulties in assessing and diagnosing African American patients who suffer psychoses, depression, or anxiety disorders.

“Clinician Bias,” “Aversive Racism,” and Misdiagnosis

A second set of hypotheses suggests that systematic patterns of misdiagnosis may result from clinician bias, and that the social and cultural context of diagnosis and diagnostic judgments should be submitted to sustained research. Using experimental techniques to investigate how both clinician and patient variables influence assessment, psychological investigations were begun in the 1960s that focused on patterns of “over-pathologizing bias,” which occurs when clinicians treat women, the elderly, members of racial and ethnic minority groups, the poor, and the mentally retarded.

Lopez argues that research on social class shows the most consistent findings of bias, and that “bias is also consistently revealed in diagnostic judgments of Black and White patients” (1989: 191). He finds little evidence to date for bias toward Hispanic patients. Lopez concludes from his review that “systematic errors in judgment based on patient variables may pertain to all clinicians and not just to those clinicians with prejudicial attitudes,” and that “investigators should give careful consideration to the symptoms or disorders used as their clinical stimuli” (1989: 194).

Support for these conclusions comes from an interesting study, conducted by Loring and Powell (1988). They mailed questionnaires to psychiatrists, stratified by gender and race, asking them to participate in a study of the reliability of *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (3rd edition; DSM-III) by making diagnoses of two case vignettes. Two hundred and ninety psychiatrists responded. The case narratives, written in the style of the DSM-III Casebook, included clear-cut diagnostic criteria to support diagnoses of undifferentiated schizophrenic disorder (an Axis I diagnosis) and dependent personality disorder (an Axis II diagnosis). Descriptors identifying the gender and race of the case, or excluding such characteristics, were randomized, allowing the researchers to analyze how diagnosis is influenced by race and gender of both psychiatrist and patient.

Findings are suggestive. First, “correct” diagnoses were given for only 38 percent and 45 percent of the two cases, respectively. Correct diagnoses were most often given when no identifying characteristics of the client were provided. Second, a highly complex pattern of interaction between race and gender of psychiatrist and race and gender of the case emerged. For example, White female psychiatrists diagnosed the first case as brief reactive psychosis 50 percent of the time when the client was identified as a White female, and paranoid schizophrenic disorder 53 percent of the time when the client was identified as a Black male. No single interpretation

of the overall response pattern can be given. However, Black patients were given significantly more severe diagnoses, and Black psychiatrists shared in this pattern of rating. However, one clear pattern emerged. Black male clients were diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenic disorder in 43 percent of the first cases (compared with 6 percent, 10 percent, and 12 percent for White males, White females, and Black females, respectively), and with paranoid personality disorder in 50 percent of the second cases (compared with 26 percent for the total sample). As the authors conclude, "clinicians appear to ascribe violence, suspiciousness, and dangerousness to black clients even though the case studies are the same as the case studies for the white clients" (1989: 18).

Whaley (1998) provides an insightful, complementary perspective on sources of racism in mental health services. Providing a comprehensive view of social-cognitive models of racism, Whaley elaborates a theory of "aversive racism," which may be relevant. Drawing on the work of Gaertner and Dovidio (1986), he ascribes aversive racism to "low prejudice" White subjects who hold negative stereotypes of Black people. He argues that "whites who identify with a liberal political agenda (e.g., endorse public policies that promote racial equality and combat racism, view themselves as nonprejudiced and nondiscriminatory, and sympathize with blacks' history of victimization) but who harbor negative perceptions of black people" will experience "prejudice-related conflict" rather than hostility or hate, expressing "discomfort, disgust, uneasiness, or fear" indirectly or in situations that do not threaten their liberal self-image (Whaley 1998: 49). He cites evidence that liberal Whites are as likely as conservative Whites to discriminate against Blacks in situations that do not implicate racial prejudice as the basis for their actions, and then goes on to examine how such "aversive racism" might function in mental health settings.

Whaley focuses particular attention on research that identifies, "bias in mental health professionals' judgments associated with the racial stereotype of blacks as violent" (1998: 51). He reviews evidence that African Americans are likely to be sent to local correctional facilities, while White patients with similar levels of psychopathology and violent behavior are more likely to be referred to a mental health hospital. He interprets the Loring and Powell (1988) study cited above as evidence that Black patients are more likely to be given a more severe diagnosis "because they are stereotyped as more dangerous." And he links this specifically to the literature on over-diagnosis of schizophrenia for Black patients. However, since violence is not among the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, he is forced to make an indirect argument, saying that, "The racial stereotype of violence may set off a chain reaction in the mental health evaluation and treatment process for black persons seeking help" (1998: 52).

He cites evidence that a diagnosis of psychotic disorder "is associated with fewer sessions with a primary therapist, greater likelihood of being treated with medication, less likelihood of being in outpatient treatment, and a lower chance of being in treatment with a professional therapist" (Flaskerud and Hu 1992), arguing that "severe diagnoses and restrictive interventions," both forms of "therapeutic social control," are linked to the view that mentally ill persons are dangerous. "Thus, the stereotype of violence is the common denominator in perceptions of black individuals and the diagnosis of schizophrenic disorders," accounting for both the over-diagnosis of schizophrenia for African Americans and a "chain reaction in the

mental health evaluation and treatment process for black persons seeking care" (Whaley 1998: 52).

Race, Perceptions of Violence, Involuntary Commitment, and Diagnosis of Schizophrenia

Lower socioeconomic classes and minority persons, and in particular African Americans, are overrepresented in public mental health institutions. Perhaps even more troubling, however, is a consistent finding that African Americans are overrepresented among those who are committed involuntarily. After an extensive review, Lindsey and Paul (1989: 172) conclude that after individuals "have reached the public system for admission, Blacks have been and continue to be even more overrepresented in comparison with Whites among those who are involuntarily committed. Such overrepresentation appears across all periods of data collection and all areas of the country, without regional differences" (e.g., North vs. South). Recent accounts by patients and patient advocates provide reminders that involuntary commitment is still often associated with abusive treatment and abrogation of human rights (Nordhoff and Bates 1989), and those experiences of coercion influence inclination to participate in treatment (Lidz et al. 1995). (There is a large literature on elevated rates of schizophrenia among Afro-Caribbeans in Britain, as well as higher rates of involuntary confinement; see Coid et al. 2000 for a recent example.)

Involuntary commitment is linked in part to assessment of severity of a person's illness and to diagnosis, suggesting an added reason for concern about misdiagnosis and its overrepresentation in minority communities. However, involuntary commitment is also linked to assessment of "dangerousness," formally defined as the likelihood that an individual will use violence against self or others. The study of actual rates of violence among persons identified as suffering mental illness has recently been the focus of research and sharp debate. Analysis of data from the NIMH Epidemiological Catchment Area studies found that the claim that the mentally ill are no more likely to be violent than those who are not ill is untrue (Swanson et al. 1990; Link et al. 1992; Monahan 1992).

However, research also indicates that "excess risk for violence among mental patients is modest compared to the effects of other factors," in particular when compared with the effects of alcohol and drug abuse, and "only patients with current psychotic symptoms have elevated rates of violent behavior and it may be that inappropriate reactions by others to psychotic symptoms are involved in producing the violent/illegal behavior" (Link et al. 1992: 290). The sources and types of risk of violence among persons suffering mental illness and those who engage in substance abuse, as well as the implications for mental health services and involuntary commitment, are significant issues in ongoing research (Link and Stueve 1995; Junginger 1996).

Although Lindsey and Paul conclude that "empirical data to date provide no direct assistance in narrowing the range of explanations proposed for the overrepresentation of Blacks" among those who are involuntarily committed (1989: 179), the data are consistent with Whaley's theory of aversive racism discussed pre-

viously. Both epidemiologic and ethnographic research are needed to understand how this explanation fits with other social and institutional factors and to extend the analysis to other minority groups. Detailed ethnographic and clinical research will be required to identify how assessment and commitment processes function in particular settings and with particular populations – for example, rural Indians jailed for drinking, African Americans apprehended by the police, or persons assessed in psychiatric emergency rooms of general hospitals or state institutions. Findings from such research would have important implications for improving mental health services in community settings, correctional institutions, and psychiatric institutions, and for eliminating racial and ethnic bias in assessment and treatment.

For the purposes of this review, the linking of perceptions of violence, psychiatric diagnosis, and involuntary confinement may provide a model for understanding how clinical judgments and treatment decisions that have discriminatory impact, resulting in disparities in health services, may be made by persons who are not overtly racist and by persons who are strong advocates for minority communities and patients. The linkages in this case are highly specific, rather than a result of generalized attitudes or tendencies to discriminate. Indeed, because good care requires assessment of levels of dangerousness to self and others, the role of stereotyping those who are to be considered “violent” may well “slip under the radar” of efforts to provide training to support “cultural sensitivity” or culturally competent care. To be useful, this model needs to be verified in research and extended to other types of ethnic stereotyping. And, rather than hypothesizing attitudes such as “aversive racism,” research should be directed at measuring them.

Cautions: Health Systems Issues, and the Complexities of Mental Health Phenomena

It is important to temper the hopes that a single line of reasoning, such as that outlined above, is adequate to fully explain disparities in mental health services. We have not yet mentioned disparities in access to health insurance, or the tendency for persons who belong to ethnic and racial minorities to be overrepresented among those who are poor and homeless and to grow up in settings where violence is a part of the routine social environment. No mention has been made as to how managed care, or “managed behavioral health services,” is affecting the relationships formed between patients and clinicians. Yet we know that health insurance is closely linked to access to mental healthcare.

McAlpine and Mechanic (2000) recently demonstrated that for a sample of persons with severe mental illness, who are disproportionately African American, unmarried, male, less educated, and low income, almost three-fifths received no specialty mental healthcare in a 12-month period, one in five were uninsured, and only 37 percent were insured by Medicare or Medicaid. Because “persons covered by these public programs are over six times more likely to have access to specialty care than the uninsured,” any explanations that ignore formal mechanisms for access to care are likely to be extremely partial. Furthermore, privatization of mental health services has led to disbanding of clinics devoted to the care of high-risk children, youth, and families. Therefore, psychiatrists have far fewer visits to develop rela-

tionships with patients that allow them to move beyond initial stereotypes – on the part of both the clinician and the patient – and to develop truly therapeutic and understanding relationships than is true under other forms of mental health services. Thus, great care should be taken in developing explanations that focus on decision-making processes of individual clinicians.

Finally, in the specific case discussed here – the apparent “over-diagnosis of schizophrenia” among African Americans – the robustness of the phenomenon remains in question. Because there is no gold standard or biological marker for diagnosing schizophrenia, one line of research attempting to determine reasons for higher rates of schizophrenia among hospitalized African Americans has compared diagnoses using standardized diagnostic interviews with recorded hospital or emergency room diagnoses. The best such study, carried out by Neighbors et al. (1999), found that use of a standardized diagnostic interview reduced the percentage of Black patients diagnosed with schizophrenia in a Michigan hospital from 58 percent to 39 percent.

However, the study found that White patients diagnosed with schizophrenia were reduced from 49 percent to 31 percent and that levels of “misdiagnosis” for White patients (assuming the research diagnoses were correct) were somewhat higher for Whites than for Blacks. Misdiagnosis in this study was shown to be as high for Whites as Blacks, and even the most carefully designed study continued to find higher rates of schizophrenia among hospitalized African Americans than among hospitalized White Americans. Thus, although mental healthcare provides an important model for how to approach the issues to be addressed in this review, it remains a particularly difficult domain to make claims with great certainty.

Concluding Questions

The multidimensionality of reasons for disparities in healthcare and medical treatment for racial and ethnic minorities, along with the lack of data focused explicitly on the role of the culture of professionals and health institutions in producing these disparities, makes it difficult to fully respond to the charge given to these authors by the IOM Committee. “Culture counts,” as Satcher’s report notes. Until recently, when cultural analyses were proposed, the focus was largely on patient culture. Burdens of difference were on patient communities, and medicine and health professionals were expected to learn to be culturally competent in attending to the diverse populations that make up American society.

When we are challenged to examine the culture of medicine and of our healthcare institutions, we are also challenged to bring a critical perspective that has largely been ignored by most research to date or that has circumscribed cultural inquiry to the differences between patients’ and physicians’ “beliefs.” Disparities in medical treatment are not simply matters of differences in “beliefs.” Clearly, political and economic factors that shape our medical commons and our larger society are implicated in the production of these disparities. Physicians interviewed as well as research reviewed indicate that societal racism and persistent inequalities may be responsible for many of the differences, now so widely documented.

In a recent study sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Hargraves et al. (2001) found that minority physicians, who were more likely to be in solo

practice, were also less likely to obtain referrals to specialists and had greater difficulty admitting patients to the hospital. Given that minority physicians care for a greater proportion of minority patients, differences in high-technology care may be related to environmental practice factors. As Hargraves et al. (2001) note, "Minority physicians' inability to arrange important medical services for their patients may be positively associated with problems minority patients have with access to care." Minority physicians in this study included Hispanic and African American physicians (see also Komaromy et al. 1996; Gray and Stoddard 1997).

Minority physicians also feel there is discrimination in peer review, hospital promotions, Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement, malpractice suits, and private insurance oversight (Byrd et al. 1994). Bias appears in the awarding of managed care contracts as well, with disparities between White and minority, in particular Asian, physicians documented in a national survey (Mackenzie et al. 1999). These complexities of bias and practice environment clearly indicate that differences are found not simply in cultural diversity or in practice "beliefs."

In sum, we recommend the following approaches to further understanding of reasons for disparities:

- 1 Attend to a critical analysis of the culture of medicine in its broadest meaning and in different practice and training environments and geographical regions. The dimensions of time, efficiency and efficacy, and the medical gaze may be useful starting points, but analyses should examine behavioral modeling and hierarchical relationships that may influence patterns of care and choice of treatments as well.
- 2 Examine the political economy of cultural practices in medicine, from the arrangement of healthcare delivery systems to the financing of biomedical innovations and practices, to the justification for choice of treatment and care.
- 3 Examine the practice arrangements of minority physicians by ethnicity, age, and region (urban/rural and state).
- 4 Explore how the sea change in the ethnicity and race of medical students, physicians, nurses, and healthcare staff affects provision of care to ethnic and racial minorities, new immigrants, and the poor.
- 5 Identify interventions and programs that have been successful in medical and nursing education and have influenced the way care is provided to ethnic and racial minority patients.
- 6 Assess the success of programs directed to redress imbalances in care such as minority outreach programs and clinics; what are positive lessons, negative if unintended consequences, and avoidable difficulties?

These are elementary suggestions, and the questions with which we began this chapter are but partially addressed. Unfortunately, we have not been able to conclude with a clear set of findings. Clearly, more work focused explicitly on these questions is required, and such research will have to include in-depth, qualitative work – observations; in-depth confidential interviews with health practitioners, including those in training; and similar in-depth interviews with patients from diverse minority groups about their experiences in healthcare. In terms of policy responses to eliminate racial and ethnic health disparities, these will not only have to come from innovative

research and programs in the medical commons and the healthcare arena, but, as David Williams suggests, from larger societal changes (Williams and Rucker 2000). And such responses will have to use new and innovative understandings of culture, ethnicity, and racism to develop multidimensional results.

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Chapter 18

The Nervous Gaze: Backpacking in Africa

CLAUDIA BELL

Most of the discussions around tourism as a development strategy in African countries look to possibilities for economic expansion. For other tourism writers, Africa is a case study of analyses of impacts of globalization. This author interrogates two case studies of tourism in Africa: guests at a backpackers' hostel in Pretoria, South Africa; and a group traveling by overland truck from Cape Town to Victoria. Both cases show how Africa, the subject of the gaze, is heavily edited for visual consumption. In both cases, the tourist subjects responded to mediated visions of Africa as a dangerous place for travelers. In poor African countries, the "Other" is constructed as a potentially dangerous subaltern in and through tourism. Simultaneously, the construction of the "Other" is pivotal to travel capitalism. Without the "Other" at African visitor sites, there is no exotic upon which to gaze, no service class to facilitate the visit. The locals are required as a safe part of the consumable experience, which reiterates the inequality of the host servant class.

It is a fundamental irony that tourists are people wealthy enough to go to remote places and look at poor people. The urge to taste the exotic often involves a trip to such poorer nations – for instance, those African locations of the case studies that follow (Pretoria and Botswana). Chard noted that in travel writing of the eighteenth century the boundary between the foreign and the familiar was obscured by another symbolic boundary: the separation between the traveler as spectator, and the spectacle of the foreign. The traveler is not attracted to the foreign by any personal need or desire, but to be able to pronounce authoritatively on the spectacle of exoticness and compare it with the familiar – while at a distance from both domains (Chard 1996: 127). The recent Qantas airline advertising campaign is tellingly apt: "[T]he world is your playground." Present-day tourism as a commodity has forgotten old-fashioned ideas about travel broadening the mind, and instead locates it in the midst of capitalist consumption: travel is entertainment and exotic cultures serve as theme parks and picturesque sites for consumption (MacCannell 1992; Urry 2002).

The case studies in this chapter show that sometimes this quest to see the exotic is a fraught one. The construction of the "Other" is pivotal in travel capitalism:

without the “Other” at African visitor sites, there is no exotic upon which to gaze, a fundamental requirement of tourists seeking difference (Urry 2002: 1); and no service class to facilitate the visit. However, the racist assumptions embedded in White Westerners as they grow up are aggravated as they visit African countries, where tourists are constantly warned to beware of the potential danger of this “Other.” In tourism, where the “Other” is the compliant subject of the gaze, equality cannot be present. Additionally, so long as one group perceives another as a source of possible risk, an equal relationship cannot be forged.

Tourism Research

Tourism studies is a growing area in academia, well represented by highly reputable journals such as *Tourist Studies*, *Tourism Research*, *Journeys*, and *Annals of Tourism Research*. However, the text material that sociologists examine on tourists is generally quite different from tourists’ everyday discussions about travel. Examples include: the recolonization of indigenous peoples, and their employment in subservient roles to please the needs of tourists (e.g., MacCannell 1992; Hollinshead 1996); the exacerbation of the concept of “Other” as object of the tourist gaze (Aitchison 2001; Urry 2002); the relationship of tourism to environmental issues (Brennan and Allen 2001; Bell and Lyall 2002); distorted development through tourism expansion in Third World countries (Ritzer 2001; MacCannell 2002); the advancement of eco- and adventure tourism as a form of niche marketing (Bell and Lyall 2002); the power of global corporations to commodify otherwise untouched, small places (MacCannell 2002); national identity assertion through tourism (Ateljevic and Doorne 2002; Bell and Lyall 2002); the visitors’ own “self-as-project” agendas and personal impacts (Johnson 2001; Bell and Lyall 2002); and the dependent role that tourists fall into, in alien cultures (Dann 1996; Johnson 2001).

All of these topics are the bases for lively academic investigation. Yet, these topics still appear to be largely the domain of the tourism researcher, not part of commonplace tourist discourse. The popular-press travel pages or television travel shows do not carry out any such analyses. Their agendas are to drive tourism and to encourage consumer participation in travel capitalism. Often airlines, resorts, and tourism bureaux sponsored the items; in short, they are advertising.

Marketing and management provide models for some approaches in tourism scholarship. When it comes to considering tourism as a development strategy in African countries, most commentators consider that the African continent has unreached potential. Writers focusing on economic advancement, such as Dieke (2001), describe Africa as still some distance from a “finished-tourism product.” He claimed an urgent need to mobilize human resources to develop and support a tourism industry, so that African countries can compete more effectively in the international tourism marketplace (Dieke 2001: 73–4). Tisdell and Roy (1998: 4) point out that many activities of the state influence the development of tourism, including public infrastructure, transport and communication regulations, rules concerning foreign exchange, issues around law and order, and so on. They draw attention to the range of impacts of tourism when it is used as a development strategy, but do not explore these effects in any detail. Louw and Smart, in their summary of

social aspects of tourism and development in South Africa, concluded that tourism as an option for promoting development will produce both benefits and costs; but they barely expand on these (1998: 83). Sindiga observed that tourism development in African countries “could provide substantial resources to kick-start and/or maintain the development process” (Sindiga 1999: xiv). However, Sindiga also conceded that achieving the potential of tourism would require large investments in physical and human capital both in developing infrastructure and training suitable tourism personnel. For all of these authors tourism is a promising route for African countries to participate in global capitalism. Their accounts present attempts to foster tourism as a strategy for dissolving economic inequities in Africa as highly ambitious. Such processes have uneven outcomes.

The previous authors conceptualize “development” as growth of gross national product, technological advance, industrialization, and social modernization. Being a cultural theorist who examines tourism as a consumable commodity, I suggest in this chapter that the “development” perspective overlooks a bigger picture. Tourism development scenarios require a parallel (usually unstated) increase in the service class – an expansion of local subservience to accommodate affluent tourism consumers. Typically, tourism development is not about achieving equality, but about accommodating wealthy visitors. Some economic advantage perhaps may accrue, if the profits stay in Africa, but foreign-owned airlines and hotel chains usually reinvest their money elsewhere. The work of tourism advocates contrasts vividly with that of Amartya Sen (1969), whose broader account of development describes not just a route to economic self-determinism, but humanitarian achievements as well. Sen favors forms of development in which the principal ends include liberty, political participation, basic education, and health care.

The analysis of how global inequities are (re)produced, via tourism, has a strong voice in the literature of contemporary tourism sociology. The sociological imagination shifts the focus from economic forces and local employment-problem solving, to social and political change, and then examines the interplay between global and local processes (Eade 2002). There is a central contradiction that tourism as a strategy for economic development in poor nations inherently erodes the traditional culture that attracts those very tourists (MacCannell 1992; Hollinshead 1996; Urry 2002). That other countries have become “theme parks” for affluent visitors, endlessly seeking their own self-actualization as global consumers, is an issue addressed in detail by various authors (e.g., MacCannell 1992; Bell and Lyall 2002). Moreover, the construction of place as “spectacle” (Rojek 1997; MacDonald 2002), and local people and places as “performers and performances” (Desmond 1999; Tucker 2002), has also secured a place in the scholarly tourism literature. These investigators describe the continuing exploitation of marginalized people through tourist practices. All would agree with Harrison, who states, “[T]ourism is inexorably increasing, feeding on increased globalization and, in turn, contributing to it” (Harrison 2001: 18).

Africa in Western media

A key point is missing from the commentaries of the writers previously cited who support tourism as a development tactic entailing various programs to train per-

sonnel and to encourage development (Dieke 1998; Sindiga 1999). *The* fundamental obstacle to tourism in Africa is the image of the continent. Africa has a particular and special form of inequality due to media depictions and racism. Appadurai (1997) refers to the concept “mediascape”: the place in which public concepts are constituted and transformed. “Mediascapes” are both the global distributive capacity to produce and disseminate information, and the “global” images of the world presented through the increasing range and forms of media. The large, complex images and narratives presented to the world blur the lines between fiction and reality. As legends that may be true, they are taken up very quickly before “factual” counter-narratives can surface. The results maintain their hold on the public because they fill in the evocative content at the interstices of local and world events (Worth 2002: 67).

Du Bois identifies race as the primacy-theoretical framework for perceiving and being perceived in the world (Dates and Barlow 1993: 1). In their analysis of images of Black people on popular media, Dates and Barlow remind us of the power of succeeding generations of White image makers to dominate the reading of “minority” populations.

Well-established stereotypes of Black people, especially those living in very poor nations, have continued because those groups lack the power to resist the continuing construction and promulgation of those very images. There is continued media production of a world in “black and white,” as Dennis and Pease put it (2000). Therefore, tales that provoke fear of Africa have currency because of the combination of old beliefs and xenophobia, plus generations of negative imagery of people in those nations, as well as because of the current factual material – such as (for example) the murder rate in Pretoria. Africa is home to some of the world’s poorest countries, with attendant features of unemployment, poor housing, limited sanitation, erratic water supplies, haphazard public transport systems, and disease. Alongside grinding poverty, the unstable political past and present of some African countries informs impressions of Africa as a whole. Africa is still portrayed globally as a place of unpredictability and danger – something of a “dark continent.”

The mystique of Africa

Few people today read two publications that, in their day, fired public imagination about Africa: Galton’s *Art of Travel* (1855), an account of African folklore and advice for travelers, and Livingstone’s *Missionary Travels* (1857). These texts resolutely established the mystery, danger, and challenge of travel in Africa. Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1995, originally published in 1902) is part of the same mythological tradition about Africa that Westerners have inherited, along with Hollywood constructs and reconstructs – most recently in *Lara Croft Tomb Raider: The Cradle of Life*.

Although the continent had been known for at least 5,000 years before the European discovery of the New World, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the African interior was almost a complete mystery to Europeans. The technological revolution that enabled Europeans to conquer the Americas was insufficient for the conquest of Africa (Bell and Lyall 2002). Unnavigable rivers, poor land, heat, rainfall, humidity, tsetse flies (which prevented raising European breeds of domes-

tic animals), and dangerous wild animals effectively impeded infiltration into the interior of that vast continent. A second technological revolution – associated with industrialism, urbanism, and the growth of science – was needed before Africa could be penetrated (McLynn 1993: 1). Today, roads and public transport crisscross and connect African countries, but the mythic visions of impenetrable and dangerous terrain persist. Additionally, they are reinforced by limited, myopic, and Eurocentric news coverage of events anywhere in Africa. Inadequate journalism leaves fertile ground for such low-intellect “reality television” programs as *Survivor: Africa* to compound Western ignorance. It is as if Africa exists simply as a trope to perpetuate traditional-colonialist ideas of “Other” – to provide a large space on the globe that reiterates the relative progress and affluence of Western nations, and the comparative hopelessness of the more recently “civilized.”

Political explanations for conditions in impoverished, war-torn, or disease-prone sectors of Africa are oversimplified grossly in the Western media. What is received, instead, are tales ridden with despair and horror – pathetic calls for urgent help with aid programs, revulsion at the world’s ugliest diseases, disgust at the cruelty of wars, and genocide in small nations. Against this backdrop, the eager African would-be tourism entrepreneur has an uphill struggle to woo affluent visitors from offshore. This chapter describes two case studies in Southern African countries in 2001. These two cases illustrate the impact of received messages about Africa as a place that is dangerous for travelers. Both cases are sites of the “nervous gaze,” as visitors respond to rumors and media stories of potential dangers outside safe visitor environments.

Researcher as Tourist

It is important to acknowledge that the tourism researcher who carries out fieldwork is also a tourist. In this case, the only practicable way to undertake this study was via participant observation: to live the life alongside those being studied. Participation observation has long had a reputable place in social research. It provides access and insights where any other approach might distort the data. It allows social actors – the subjects – to be themselves, without disruption and adjustment to the research process. This approach facilitated identifying the previously undocumented categories of tourists discussed in this chapter: those occupying a backpackers’ hostel as a [benign] prison and a group of overland trucker passengers traversing African countries in a “mobile safe house.” Only participant observation could provide these new insights: tourism driven by escape, and by the quest for *safe* adventure, tempered by fear. The tourists openly talked to the researcher about their travels, providing spontaneous comments less likely in a formal interview.

Every tourist’s own culture – the “accidents” of any journey (date, routes, encounters), discourses both popular and hypothetical – these all mediate the tourist’s experiences. Any tourist’s particular understanding of their new environment comes about episodically; and, so too, the tourism researcher also is immersed in a peripatetic, episodic journey. The serendipitous nature of this kind of fieldwork is sometimes challenged for its lack of scientificity; but cannot be bettered for its access to real experiences by social actors in real situations. The experiences of both

researcher and subjects (tourists) have overlap, congruence, and empathy. The fragments that the researcher gathers – the tourists’ autobiographic analyses, their uncertainty and ennui, their expressions of *fear* – provide another model of their world that sits alongside the familiar happy, seamless “we-had-a-good-time” narrative.

Case Study 1: The Backpackers’ Hostel

The backpackers’ hostel that is the location of this case-study group is in Pretoria, South Africa. It has high fences topped by tangled barbed wire surrounding it and is protected by a security gate. The hostel is a large, old family home with bunkrooms, a television common room, and a basic kitchen. There are a series of one- and two-roomed cottages in the large garden. People may also pitch tents on the lawn. Many travelers stay overnight, connecting in the morning with the airport shuttle or the Baz bus (a dedicated backpackers’ bus going only from one hostel to others). However, some stay for several weeks or months. Visitor security is clearly paramount. Even long-term guests are not given keys to this property; they have to ring the bell for admission or to exit. Uniformed security officers commonly patrol all tourist accommodations, even backpackers’ hotels, in African countries.

During a one-week stay there in 2001, the researcher was surprised that the hostel was not used solely as a brief stopover convenience, but also served as a temporary home reminiscent of hippie communes in the 1960s and 1970s. Residents escaping employment or other demands at home lived off their savings and acted out a rudimentary domestic life. Most were German, but others were French, Belgian, and Swiss. Their days were spent in leisurely fashion – cooking, eating, emailing, chatting over coffee, and, occasionally in pairs or small groups (never alone), venturing out to the local shops to buy provisions. “Africa” was perceived nervously and was experienced largely through anecdotes and rumors from incoming backpackers.

In *Escape Attempts*, Cohen and Taylor wrote:

[T]he life plan maps our existence. Ahead of us run the career lines of our jobs, our marriage, our leisure interests, our children, and our economic fortunes. But sometimes when we scan these maps, traverse these routes, follow the signs, we become strangely disturbed by the predictability of the journey, the accuracy of the map, the knowledge that today’s route will be much like yesterday’s . . . for some people such feelings may be so intense that they are led to search for alternative realities. (1976: 26)

These authors appear to assume the inevitability of all these things: career, marriage, leisure pursuits, children, and an economic future. For White male academics in the 1970s, this was not a surprising set of values – nor was it surprising that they assumed it applied universally to others. Still, when this was written, there were individuals in their own culture who did not accept those values. The numbers seeking, or cast by economic conditions into, alternative ways of life have increased since the 1970s, as suggested by data on job mobility, international travel, single-ness, childlessness, and criminality.

What happens today to those who simply do not fit the “unreflective accommodation” of Cohen and Taylor’s life values? With the easier availability of international travel, well, a few go to Africa. They appear to be despondent, isolated from

outside influences, and without purpose (Maffesoli 1996). The inhabitants of the backpackers' hostel were single, from their thirties to late forties, weary of their jobs back home (in teaching, Internet technologies, or self-employment in small businesses recently abandoned with or without profit). Their "despondency" was apparent. What next? Novel consumption seems to counter long-term ennui or an uncertain future (Bell and Lyall 2002).

"So, when are you going back to Germany?" the researcher asked one 39-year-old woman who had been at the hostel for ten weeks.

Shrug. "Who knows? What is there for me in Germany?"

Early nineteenth-century writings defined African travel, frequently and explicitly, as referring to traversals of geographical, behavioral, and symbolic limits. Leaving home opened opportunities to push boundaries of convention. The traveler could move well beyond ordinary pleasures, crossing the symbolic line between faithfulness to the familiar and craving escape from the dullness of ordinary life. The travelers the researcher spoke with had escaped the dullness at home, but had difficulties crossing the line to the unfamiliar in unpredictable Africa. They seemed encumbered with the old dullness at their new location. When asked about their stay, most said they saw Africa as affordable but boring. They'd actually prefer to visit a White country, but Africa was far less expensive. Early in their visit, they had been to a game park and done some sightseeing. Now they seemed to be merely filling the weeks until returning home. Unlike places they might stay in Europe, the pleasures of exploring a city, or even going for long walks, were not perceived as options for these travelers. One of the men, 34, explained:

It is far too dangerous here. We hear all the time of people getting mugged and car-jacked. The Afrikaans are leaving. If it is not safe for them, it is not safe for us. It is just as dangerous for men as for women. In any country a woman might worry about being raped. Here, whoever you are, you could easily be murdered.

Another explained that the hostel was like "a prison in reverse. The bad people are outside and we are locked inside to be safe from them." By avoiding contact with local black Africans, these backpackers are avoiding the visual "duel" described by Sartre: that duel [conflict] encountered when two subjectivities encounter one another, and one has to lose. But how did they identify the "bad people"? One guest said that "[T]he problem with black people is that you can't tell just by looking at them if they are good or bad."

A spokesman for the Ministry of the Environment and Tourism in Pretoria echoed her comments. He explained that when Western countries get news coverage of a major problem in any Africa country, tourism drops off in all African countries. The idea of "Africa" is generalized across all African nations, or perhaps it is regionalized to all Eastern or Southern nations while, for example, Zimbabwe has problems; and across West Africa because of events in Gambia and Liberia. His perceptions affirm that the inability of White Westerners to distinguish between African countries runs parallel with perceptions that all Black people looked alike.

Over several days of conversations with four women and three men (all single), a particular category of traveler emerged: the person that resists some of the values of their own culture and seeks respite elsewhere. The Pretoria backpackers had

found themselves, at this stage of their lives, either bored or marginalized (because of their single, childless status) by contemporary society. All had education or training beyond high school level, and enough money for a few months in a budget-accommodation establishment in Africa. At the same time, though, dominant values from home persisted: the attitudes that they as Whites were “good people” compared with potentially bad Black people outside the hostel fences. While in this situation, they were frustrated that their fear of Black Africans confined them to their hostel. Their indignation at this did not include any political analysis or concern for local people in post-apartheid South Africa; rather, their irritation was at the curtailment of their own freedom. The irony of this situation seemed to go unnoticed.

Daily life at the hostel was modest. The travelers engaged in few activities: the agenda seems to be to relax and forget about Germany, Switzerland – and Africa. The hostel was by no means a luxury resort, but it offered companionship, peace, safety, and time to chat or email. The turnover of visitors provided variety. This small subculture of tourists was sheltered from contact with the greater culture of Africa. They were aware of the contradiction between their own daily activities and mythologies of travel adventure. One commented on how her journey was perceived by those at home. “At home [Switzerland] they think this is so exotic. It’s like we’re on a big adventure. But really we are just hanging out at this place.”

At the hostel, deterring stories about travel in Africa were replayed over and over; warnings and rumors of outside danger were daily conversation. The backpackers often repeated: “Pretoria is the most dangerous city in the world”; “Pretoria is the city with the highest murder rate in the world.” The risks were believed to be so well known that misfortune was seen as the victim’s fault. Thus, when a young Australian couple arrived without any possessions, because they had just been mugged on a train from Johannesburg, consensus at the hostel was that one should never take trains from Johannesburg. A couple of months earlier, a woman at the hostel had been raped walking alone from her safari camp. The consensus was that she should not have walked alone. Dangers clamored from all sides: AIDS, rape, mugging, carjacking, and shooting. In their fear fantasies, the perpetrator was always Black. One said, “I didn’t realize Africa was so black. I thought there would be more white people.” Another replied, “There probably are. But they live in white areas and only go to white shopping malls.”

Case Study 2: Nomad Adventure Tourists

Nomad is a commercial trucking company that takes travelers on journeys across Southern African countries for anything from 10 days to 13 weeks. The tours are advertised as “Adventure Tours” and *Nomad Adventure Tours* is written on the side of their trucks. This is just one of several adventure tourism businesses transporting tourists across Africa. The trucks have been adapted with bus seats and roll-down, see-through screens in place of fixed windows for the passengers. The rear of the truck contains a lock-up kitchen; the sides have locked storage for camping gear. Travelers are allowed one small bag each; it must fit on the mesh roof rack inside the truck. The compactness of stowage deters tourists from accumulating possessions as they travel. Furthermore, the truck does not stop at places selling tourist

artifacts, as is standard practice on day tours at places all over the world, where stops at craft shops or papyrus/silver/jewelry factories may be longer than visits to official attractions.

The researcher joined a truck to travel and camp across Namibia and Botswana to Victoria Falls. Group bonding was almost mandatory: the truck motto was "FIFO," which stood for "Fit in or f . . . off." The trip included three nights at Okavanga Delta to see the wildlife. The itinerary loosely fitted the tourism market niches (Morgan and Pritchard 1998) of both "eco-tourism" (see wildlife, camp in nature) and "adventure tourism" (camping and the chance to bungee-jump, kayak, and ride a hot air balloon at the end of the trip at Victoria Falls).

The group

Passengers, 14 travelers from 11 countries, ranged in age from 20 to 53 and all, including the guides, were White. Most of the tourists were professionals, including four doctors, one property developer, an IT worker, two welfare managers, an academic, one soldier, two students, and two teachers. These travelers were punctuating successful careers with this adventure and all certainly saw this tour as adventure. As the days unfolded, it became known that most of them had never camped before (with the exceptions of the soldier and the Australian). This, in itself, made the journey an "adventure." Several confided that they would prefer more comfortable accommodations. Dedicated campsites were used throughout the journey. These usually had "acceptable" (flush) toilet and shower facilities, and a bar. The driver led the tour and his partner served as guide and cook. They had been doing this work for four years and did not have a permanent home anywhere. Perhaps they were the nomads?

The journey

Namibia and Botswana are not small areas to traverse. Most mornings required a five or six a.m. start to break camp, eat breakfast (prepared by the camp cook and a roster of volunteers), and then hit the road again. At the other end of the day, often the tents were assembled as darkness fell, then the meal was eaten around a campfire. For information about what one could see out of the truck windows, those sufficiently interested relied on their own *Rough Guides* or *Lonely Planets*. Many read novels or slept their way across the broad flat Botswanian landscape. The big events each day were (a) seeing wild animals, (b) setting camp at a site with a bar, and (c) hot showers. Every few days there was a grocery stop. The travelers leapt from the bus like excited children to buy treats not supplied by Nomad (e.g., sweets, chips, and cigarettes). No one bought local newspapers. Everyday camping routines afforded relaxation, security, and a sense of belonging in an otherwise alien environment. The environment was seen as truly alien: too dangerous to venture into without the guidance of the group leader.

The Nomad travelers' observations were through the truck windows. The truck itself delineated the boundary between the local people outside and the travelers. The travelers at this boundary contrasted markedly with the local people: through Whiteness, affluence, itinerancy, internationalism, consumerism, and as gazers. What they saw outside the bus windows was "Other": the subject of their nervous

gazes. Not one would have considered traveling across these countries without a group and an experienced guide. The truck provided security; it was effectively a mobile “safe house” to shelter the travelers from having to negotiate the unknown world of the “Other,” outside.

Meeting local people at Okavanga Delta

At the Okavanga Delta, having the local (Black) people make the food, pole the makoras (dugout canoes), and take care of the camp charmed the visitors. In this case, the tourists (at the Okavanga Delta) could see how the “Other is constructed as subaltern in and through tourism, . . . [and the] host destination and populations are ‘Othered’ by the tourist industry and tourists” (Aitchison 2001: 135). The most often articulated reaction was at how very expensive this experience was (US\$160 for three days). Sociopolitical analysis was absent and clearly not an agenda item. At the same time, “the construction of the Other is pivotal to . . . global capitalism linked to tourism” (Aitchison 2001: 140). Without the “Other” at Okavanga, for instance, there is only landscape and animals, and no service class to facilitate the visit (makora polers, camp maintenance staff, bush guides, village hosts). While nature tourism was a primary agenda of the Nomad trip, the travelers welcomed contact with the Okavanga people, posing with them for photographs, and singing and dancing together in the evening (but not cooking or eating together). In this context, the locals were a colorful and safe part of the consumable experience. Their job was to “perform” such local cultural practices as were required for the tourists’ pleasure. No evidence showed that the tourists had any consciousness of the subjectivity of the local people, of their view of the tourists as objects of the local gaze. As Margolis notes, “[W]e want to be in control, we want others to exist for us” (2002, <http://sjmc.cla.umn.edu/faculty/schwartz/ivsa/BlindSpots/final.htm>). In the case of tourism, that is what is paid for; these are key desirable features of travel capitalism and such sentiments imply inherent inequality.

Tribes of tourists

Tourism is a category of consumption. As Stivers explained, “[O]ne belongs to a consumption community without having to establish a personal relationship with fellow consumers” (Stivers 1994: 125). The peer group, as “tutor in consumption,” sets fleeting standards about who and what to consume. Temporary communities are constructed by the act of consuming together. Hence subcultures of various consumer types ebb and flow through consumer-lands. Such was witnessed in both tourist groups – the backpackers and the truckers – in Africa. The idea of the tribe, individuals united by consumption, was also discussed by Maffesoli (1996). In both groups observed, members had decided to consume certain parts of Africa and joined consumption tribes based on recognition of style and consumer goals. The comparatively modest levels of daily consumption at each site indicated that each group had made decisions about the type of tourism they would consume. This was reiterated on a daily basis by the “style” of consumption of each group.

The Nomad tour leaders dictated the activities, every day, with no options. The tourists had paid for this leadership; it was assumed that the guide would know best what to show them. Cities were avoided. Activities such as visiting museums,

galleries, or craft enterprises were not included, and time was not made available for those who might want to do this. Focus was maintained on “nature” as an environment upon which to gaze; and on the protection and containment of the gazers. The tourists never had to deal with local people, local currency, or passport control. The breezy open truck was a form of insulation against local cultures. In this group, there was a strong sense of orderly rituals around camping, around the division of minor domestic chores, around evening meals, and campfire games. Retreating to one’s tent to read was to violate the norm of participation, and it was not encouraged. The leader strongly urged group involvement.

The travelers were an identifiable group traversing the landscape. There was a strong sense of “us” compared with “them” – the objects of the tourists’ gaze. Developing a sense of belonging and self-identity become mutual processes. Indeed, in occasional stops in towns to buy groceries – when the visitors might be allowed to wander about for an hour or so – the group members always looked out for one another, monitoring safety. (At a one-hour stop at Maun, Botswana, the Nomad tourists were instructed to travel in pairs and were warned to conceal cameras and wallets.) The young women travelers, in their cropped tops and tiny shorts, were conspicuous in villages where the local women wore flowing body-covering garments. This difference in attire reiterated the “we” and “us” and locals gazed at the tourists (but did not take photographs). At sites such as Maun market, Botswana – where poverty is evident – the wealth of the tourists was extremely conspicuous. Their power as wealthy visitors is acted out from the moment they arrive in the truck; as they walk into unfamiliar local spaces with their smart daypacks, wallets, and wearing Western leisure clothing; as they haggle over goods for sale; and as they photograph local people. These entitlements set the visitors apart.

Observations provide poignant images for the term “tribes of tourists.” These tribes are fluid; they ebb and flow across international space; they gather then disperse, then gather again in different configurations and at various venues. The tourist’s membership in this tribe is dynamic, changing, ephemeral, and uncommitted: an “occasional” membership. The tourist tribe exists entirely by decisions made and money spent. Consuming together, they become a community of travelers, or a traveler subculture. Together for a few weeks (in many tour situations just for a few hours), tourists enjoy particular rituals, behaviors, transient friendships, and bondedness. They are together because they have an interest in common, however temporarily – not because of family, occupation, or national links. They are not concerned now with being individuals with jobs and social positions, but with the self-written roles they assume so that they feel they are part of the ensemble (Maffesoli 1996). In their search for experiences of (affordable) exotica, these tourist tribes require tame local people upon which to gaze. Once again, they display their “need” for the reiteration of global inequities.

Nomads: The Prescriptive Gaze

In *Hearts of Darkness*, McLynn wrote of the psychology of the early explorers in Africa. He noted the distinction between traveler and explorer, the traveler taking refuge from the mundane, appealing to those with a low-boredom threshold, “deter-

mined to hold at bay *noia*, *angst*, and *ennui*" (1993: 340). McLynn suggested that the explorer, in contrast to the traveler, has a case of "action neurosis." This malaise was once identified in an analysis of African explorer Stanley. He suggested: "[I]n the explorer such restlessness is raised to a new power of monomania. The corollary of this is a feeling of profound gloom and anticlimax when the exploit draws to a close" (McLynn 1993: 251).

Experiences of the Nomad travelers can be contrasted with this. What their gaze rested upon was prescribed heavily. The schedule was paramount and the itinerary sticky-taped to the inside of the truck door. There was no possibility to negotiate options or vary the length of stay at any point. There was no need to have any contact with local people. Constant reminders were issued about personal safety and about securing possessions. This form of travel contrasts dramatically with both "traveler and explorer," who might stop and gaze wherever and whenever they wish. By the end of the trip, the Nomad travelers took a strongly "been-there-done-that" attitude: this trip had been fun, it was now over, and they must return home. Some already had their next trips planned and booked. Indeed, the one American on board said he had been traveling for two years, and actually took a trip home for Christmas: "I took a holiday from my holiday!" The sense of anticlimax that McLynn described did not seem to apply to those for whom travel adventure is a commodity, available for regular purchase.

"Home," for the nineteenth-century African explorers, was Industrial Revolution Britain and its alienating impact on human beings. McLynn quoted A. J. Swann:

The silence of the forest is a welcome change from the noisy city and one's manhood seems to assert itself much more when entirely cut off from European associations. Perhaps the sense of individuality is the main attraction. In the constant whirl of civilisation the personal element is somewhat lost in the mass. Out in the forests of Africa you are the man amongst your surroundings. (McLynn 1993: 346)

The Nomad group did not replicate this experience. The need for peace and silence did not seem paramount to this group. The quiet landscape was obliterated by music played loudly and constantly on the truck stereo system. Evenings were spent in the bar, when there was one, or in lively conversation and games around the campfire. Any chance of being "a man (or woman) alone in your surroundings" was vigorously avoided; myriads of threats lurked everywhere. In this environment, "assertion of manhood" was far too dangerous.

The Nervous Gaze

From the very start of European contact with Africans, there was an already established tradition of "Blackness" as evil; the devil was commonly represented as Black. "A stereotype of the black man as barbaric, libidinous, un-Christian and associated with evil . . . predated African trade and colonial expansion, and was available from Medieval tradition even in Elizabethan times" (Hartmann and Husband 1974). In colonialist expansion from the sixteenth century the non-White was typically in a subordinate role. In the seventeenth century, the myth of the "noble savage" con-

tributed another stereotype; Black men were paternalistically portrayed as naïve children of nature.

Hartmann and Husband (1974) explain that during, and since, the beginning of European colonialism, domination of non-Whites by Whites has taken place via military conquest, enslavement, and economic and political control. The idea of White superiority persists and exacerbates inequities within Western societies. Despite historic social movements in support for Black races, including antislavery and philanthropic movements, political democracy and universal suffrage, humanitarian and liberal impulses are not strongly entrenched in some parts of Western culture or in some individuals. Negative stereotypes have persisted and they are acted out in even such apparently politically “innocent” sites as present-day tourism.

For the White middle class, their own position in society generally provides power over the non-White sectors of the population. However, this superior position cannot always be acted out when one travels in a country with a Black population. The traveler is vastly outnumbered; for instance, the population of Botswana is overwhelmingly Black, as is the population of the city of Pretoria. The prejudice tourists have learned early in their lives makes them anxious in Africa. At the same time, the tourists’ relative wealth in this new context (compared with their financial status at home) widens, and makes even more apparent, the economic gap between themselves and the local people. They are strongly sensitized to the potential for predation of themselves as wealthy outsiders.

The research on these two backpacker groups that set out to employ the tourist gaze in Africa shows that behind the gaze is the insecurity of the outsider. The subjects of this study experience anxiety about possible hostility that might be expressed with violence by the oppressed group, by the poor against the wealthy, and violence toward the stranger by locals. In countries “known” for high rates of violence, including occasional incidents of violence against tourists, the tourist’s gaze is a nervous one. The usual level tourist gaze has become uneasy. That “nervous gaze” is not an individual quality, but part of a general perceptual field conditioned by European history and prejudice.

Anxiety was suspended at the Okavanga Delta. At that site, the travelers were taken along the swamp rivers by dugout canoes, their luggage carried by local people. Okavanga people acted as guides to help spot wildlife; they were the cooks and maintained the campsite; they provided the evening entertainment. Their roles were as both “exotic other” upon which to gaze, and as poorly paid servants to underpin the physical comfort of the travelers. On the second day at Okavanga, the tourists were invited to visit the Okavangans’ village, Movutsa, a one-hour walk from camp. There the tourists peered inside huts, strolled around the village, and greeted residents. Gradually local adults gathered around, and began to sing. The singing and dancing grew more vigorous, and the tourists were invited to join in. This was a “safe place” in which to mingle with the “Other.” The tourists had paid for this optional extra as part of the fees paid to camp at Okavanga (at Okavanga, visiting fees are paid directly to the local people, not to an outside travel agent). Each tourist had a camera and took numerous photographs of the local people. None of the local people took photographs: a glance into some of their homes indicate that items such as cameras would be well down the list of requirements in a village that did not have tap water for each dwelling, or electricity, and that

depended on donated used garments for clothing. While the village visit was part of the package, tourists nevertheless had a sense of privileged access. However, because few of the Botswanans spoke any English, and none spoke fluent English, cross-cultural conversation was limited. The lack of language in common did not impede a sense of mutual goodwill, but there was no discourse to challenge the power imbalance between the wealthy tourists and the poor Botswanans. The tourists warmly welcomed this rare chance to see a real village. Nevertheless, they were maintained in the tourist-as-colonizer position. While at this site, some of the “fear of Africa” was suspended; once back on the truck, the typical distinction continued between the tourists and the culture outside.

Tourism and Inequality

The global tourist industry depends on a lowly paid servant class to provide for every need and whim of visitors. In a hotel lobby or on a tour to a “minority ethnic village,” for example, inequality is inherent in transactions. Amongst other purchases, the tourist is paying for confirmation of his or her privilege.

The Nomad travelers almost never made any observation about anything other than that which the guide indicated. Indeed, when the researcher carefully broached a comment on the impacts the tourists might be making on local people, there was general amazement. “I would never in a million years have thought about it!” one said. “I guess I just think of them all as Africans, who maybe earn a few dollars because we pass through this way.”

The group member who made this comment appeared comfortably accepting of global inequalities. His sense of self as a “global citizen” – a familiar term amongst those tourists, who prefer to call themselves “travelers” – draws from a highly selective version of democracy as assertion of individual rights, without social responsibility. The traveler wants the right to see, unimpeded by the work required to know or understand (Bell 2001: 18). Those rights include the right to consume other nations, as tourists that pay their own way; but with little sense of the implications for local people. This is a “democracy” that often provides travelers (because of their sense of entitlement) with greater rights than the people in the countries they visit. For instance, their financial resources open access to wherever they want to go, and to whatever services they wish for; their travel insurance gives them enormous emergency and health-care entitlements. That the delivery of such services reiterates inequalities in the host culture is not a focal concern to those emancipated by their dollars to explore and consume other cultures, for amusement. Their right to service and satisfaction might mean replication of such local inequities as gender dominance and subservience, or exploitation of child, family, or local labor. Third World child prostitutes serving Western tourists are perhaps the most chilling example of this. It is important to note that while tourists spend record amounts of money on travel each successive year, at the same time the incidence of global poverty increases annually.

At the time of this research, there had recently been death, by ambush, of the children of a French family driving in Northern Namibia, and numerous carjackings in Pretoria. On the Nomad truck, the tourists sought, and paid for, reassur-

ance. The guide had authority because he was South African, spoke several local languages, and was believed to know the safe routes and safe places to stop (actually there are often no alternative routes and stops were at the only dedicated tourist campsites). His knowledge ensured trust. The Pretoria backpackers took the advice of their proprietor, and fellow residents, and exercised extreme caution: a disenfranchising caution that actually prevented them from seeing much of the city and country they were visiting. In both cases, there was never an attempt to underplay danger. For both the truck company and the hostel, fear assured business. At a national level this is ironic, because this comes at a time when efforts to encourage international tourism are thwarted by the perception of African countries as dangerous.

Conclusion

The familiar “we-had-a-good-time” narrative, populist-tourist discourse is something of a PR job on a personal level: on tourists themselves, and on their journey. Successful travel means one *must* have had a good time! Once at home, the fact that one spent so much time hiding in a backpackers’ hostel in Pretoria might be omitted from a narrative about traveling in Africa. In the wish to appear a very confident traveler, the stories might be reformulated. Yet, while at the backpackers’ hostel, the scary stories are items to exchange – a form of currency, a way of participating. In each case – away or at home – political-cultural analysis remains absent from the agenda.

Tourism’s massive popularity at this time in history is because it is a readily purchasable commodity. There are no particular credentials, skills, nor talents required to buy travel; nor money – a lot of travel is obtained through credit. It is accessible to anyone who can pay or borrow, and who qualifies for a visa. In Africa, many development projects have provided infrastructure to support tourism, from which local inhabitants benefit as well (e.g., improved roads and transport systems). New tourism enterprises have been introduced as sources of income in impoverished places (e.g., nature experiences; accommodation; adventure-tourism activities). While these may indeed boost local family incomes and community economies, each enterprise also expands the local servant class and the subservient relationships to the tourist consumers. Those servant roles are expected, and taken for granted, by Western tourists, whose own comforts supersede any thought about how alternative forms of development might upskill the local population more effectively.

The dominant conclusion drawn from this study is, perhaps, alarming. These case studies reveal that some tourism entrepreneurs actually profit from the anxiety that some tourists feel when traveling in Africa. It is, therefore, in their interests to continue to promote those anxieties. Where those anxieties center on racial prejudice and fear of the Other, then the entrepreneurs are complicit in exacerbating or exaggerating the apprehensions that tourists carry with them. Although tourism is being developed as a means for Africa to participate in global capitalism, one of the costs is that, as a process, tourism implicitly recapitulates both global and local inequalities.

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Chapter 19

Origins and Contours of the Population Debate: Inequality, Population Politics, and NGOs

TULSI PATEL AND NAVTEJ PUREWAL

Origins and Contours of the Population Debate

In order to understand population politics and the emergence of the population inequality debate, it is essential to trace its social-historical context. Since the period of the Greek city-states and Confucius, most commentaries on statecraft, in different societies, have considered population as one of the important sources of revenue and defense. In the modern era, population has a history of debate between the academic circles and public policy makers alike, long before the twentieth century. Malthus's debate with Godwin and Condorcet regarding the well-being of human populations goes back to the eighteenth century.

The Poor Laws debate, the neo-Malthusian League, and the latter's regional wings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are examples of the importance given to the size of population and its effect on, and relationship with, inequality and well-being in most countries in the world. Indeed, during the past 500 years population has been the center of keen interest and debate by national governments and international organizations, especially since World War II, when international aid and assistance agencies started to intervene and influence the population policies of newly developed Third World countries. Here, we will explore the context in which the population inequality question arose.

The Poor Laws, Malthus, and Marx: Ideological Underpinnings of the Population Inequality Debate

When monasteries were abolished, during the reign of Henry VIII in the early sixteenth century, one of the results was a great increase in vagrancy and crime among the poor in the countryside in England. The only possible measure to mitigate this problem was relief and work for the poor people. The Poor Laws, first introduced in England in 1536 (subsequently revised several times until 1948), were to address

this problem of poverty. Compulsory taxes were levied to support the poor. Consequently, Elizabethan England faced rising economic problems as the poor became poorer even though the Poor Laws were intended to bring aid to the poverty stricken. By the end of the seventeenth century, there was a substantial rise in the amount of money spent for welfare. By 1795, parliament had confirmed the minimum income guarantee, exponentially increasing the cost of relief. Widespread disapproval of poor relief was articulated. The landed and the rich became critical of the Poor Laws and turned it into a moral question (Ross 1998).

Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834), an economist, sympathized and participated in the debate with his famous work entitled, *Essay on the Principle of Population* in 1798. He wrote extensively about population growth and what he saw as a threat to the balance between nature and economic well-being. He postulated that passion between the sexes is strong and was going to remain so, leading the human race to reproduce at a geometric progression rate, thereby outstripping the capacity of the earth for food production, which increased at an arithmetic progression rate. The availability of food per head would decline at this pace and misery and poverty would follow. Malthus argued that the only means of checking population growth were the very repercussions of population growth, such as poverty, famine, war, and so on – termed “positive checks.” Voluntary restraint on population growth through abstinence and celibacy he called “preventive checks,” but cautioned against their potential to lead to vice and immorality, until he changed his mind in the 1803 revised edition of his essay.

Thus, Malthus’s theses on population growth (Malthusianism) came to represent a position in which the size of population was the cause of instability. He was horrified to see poverty and was concerned about the ever-increasing prohibitive costs of poor relief. In fact, he considered welfare provision as an impediment to necessary checks on the population of the poor. In his view, the Poor Laws encouraged population growth without increasing provisions to support that growth. The economist in him gave a supply–demand analysis of poverty, distress, and misery in terms of population size (Ross 1998).

In analyzing social inequality, poverty, and welfare, he brought population to the center stage of debate. Poverty and scarcity have since been closely tied to population matters. The debate around Poor Laws was conducted on both ethical and economic lines. Taking a Utilitarian position, Malthus held the view that a government that represses inequality of fortune through welfare mechanisms would be destructive of human liberty itself. Utilitarianism upholds the superior claim of equality of liberty in the face of which it justifies economic or income inequality. Accordingly, a society’s goal should be maximizing the sum total of utilities enjoyed by the people to achieve a state of goodness. If more equitable distribution of income leads to lower aggregate income (and hence lower aggregate utility) then equality is not consistent with that goal.

The Utilitarian principle does not make a fundamental moral claim for equality of income. Malthus’s criticism of the poor relief measures, which were to be the genesis of welfarism, was based on the conviction that poverty would remain. To Malthus, the onus lay on the poor to rid themselves of their poverty through hard work, thrift, celibacy, and abstinence. His views had no place for poverty caused by structural inequalities between the landed classes and the peasantry or subordi-

nate classes. Malthus had many supporters and admirers among the propertied and the bourgeoisie, and is credited with bringing the subject of population under serious social science purview (Ross 1998).

The major critique of Malthus's ideas came from the scattered comments on population by the German intellectual and scholar, Karl Marx (1818–83). Marx, along with his close associate, Friedrich Engels, developed an understanding of the transformation of agrarian societies to industrial, capitalist ones. Marx and Engels analyzed the emergence of new and exploitative economic relationships in the capitalist industrial society: the proletarianization of the workforce (where workers not having access to the means of production are forced to “sell” their only possession, labor, to the capitalists) was the focus of their concern. Thus, Marx and Engels concentrated on structural reasons for social inequality – in contrast to the Utilitarian view, which considered the individual as solely responsible for his or her poverty and misery (Meek 1953). Marxists favored the distribution viewpoint that focuses upon inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power within a society. This viewpoint argues that the poor distribution of resources, and poverty and inequality, are the causes, not consequences, of population growth and resource depletion (Newbold 2002).

On the population question, thus, Marx and Engels were less concerned about growth of population as a cause of poverty or social instability, but rather as an effect of it. To them, too many people or too little food was not the central problem of society. Marxist analysis, while pointing to the structural inequalities in society, argues that population growth will take care of itself once the structural inequalities that exist between classes – in terms of their access to the means of production and the unequal social relations in capitalist societies – are removed. Marx thus turned population into a dependent variable, and stood Malthusianism on its head.

Both Malthus and Marx address the issue of the greatest good of the greatest number of human beings. Human welfare was of concern to both of them; both were concerned with social inequality. However, their views about society were at variance with each other. While Malthus considered inequality and poverty as inevitable features of society, which could only be curtailed by reducing the numbers of people, Marx was of the view that inequality itself could be removed. While Malthus assigned the responsibility of mitigating the evil of poverty to the individual, Marx assigned it to the oppressed class as a whole to overthrow private capital and bring about the socialist mode of production. The debate has since become wider and has incorporated many other dimensions of inequality and population. Economic inequality has not been the sole point of debate in population politics; several other dimensions of social inequality are subsumed in the debate.

Inequalities of Race, Genes, and Gender: “Othering” in Population Politics

Social inequality is closely related to, and often derived from, economic inequality. One kind of inequality feeds and multiplies the other. Income differentials have noneconomic repercussions. The poor are thus likely to have lower social status as well, which is not just economic in character. For example, the definition of poverty

in a country in relative terms, say 10 percent of the population, hides the differential nature of inequality. Poverty does not affect everyone equally. Thus, it is found that more women, Blacks, Hispanics, and ethnic minorities in most parts of the world, including the United States, are poorer. Several disadvantages follow from relative economic inequality. The poor in all countries are known to have less education, employment, prestige, and power in relation to the rich. They are poorer in terms of social and cultural capital (understood as the advantages and economic opportunities that accrue from normative social networks). This condition leads to a vicious circle of lowered capacities, lowered social status, and lowered economic opportunities.

This process is intricately related to another perpetual process of “othering,” which occurs in all societies at all times. Humans give meaning to differences. Differences of race, genes, or sex are turned into concrete categories and practices that influence every aspect of social life. The dominant groups and structures in society, through various means, such as education, science, symbols, culture, politics, and outright coercion and violence, define and demarcate the “other” as the different and the unequal, the inferior, the dependent, the to-be-guided and controlled.

Rousseau, in the mid-eighteenth century, said that all humans are born naturally equal. This idea does not sustain itself in the conditions of the real world. The accident of birth routinely determines the possibilities to achieve wealth, power, and prestige. This is especially so when gender and race inequalities are taken in account. Gender, caste, generation, and race have had different meanings in different societies and across societies in different times. Next we discuss the “biological” differences of gender and race with two historical cases: the *eugenics movement* and the *birth control movement*, the latter led by women in the early twentieth century. Both of these are examples of biological differences and their “created” social meanings having fueled population politics. Economic inequality gets superimposed on biological difference in informing population politics (Ross 1998).

The Birth Control and Eugenics Movements: Population Policy as Controlling of the “Other”

Women took up the issue of birth control from around the 1840s as part of the women’s rights movement. Their perspective was different from population control as such, that is, the relation of population growth with economic development; for women it was more of a closely experienced issue of daily life. They emphasized the fact that reproduction is both biological and social. Schulamith Firestone, in her book *The Dialectic of Sex* (1970), which was caricatured for its radical feminist perspective, considered the issue of biological reproduction as the very cause of women’s oppression. Women wished to be free like men in the social, economic, and political spheres; technology could relieve them from having to bear babies. Freedom from biological slavery for women was considered a possibility for real freedom, an escape from one pregnancy after another. Margaret Sanger is known for advocating this movement and founding the first feminist journal, *The Woman Rebel*, in 1914. She was arrested for her act and remained in exile in England. The

charge against her was violation of *The Comstock Law* of 1873, which declared distribution of contraceptives and information about them as obscene. The Birth Control League was formed by Sanger, exiled in England, and Mary Wave Dennett in America. By 1939 the Birth Control Federation was formed to advocate women's autonomy in matters of reproduction. Sanger, in the initial phase of her struggle for the right to abortion and contraception, is known for having supported birth control to overcome biological slavery (Shapiro 1985: 8).

The historical politico-economic context of the birth control movement is worth discussing here. In American economic history, the mid-nineteenth century was the period of transition from slavery to freedom. After the 1880s, coinciding with America's transition to a commercial and industrial power and a more urban society, there was a sharp and steady rise of immigrants from all over Europe. The racial quality of the population became a dominant/popular issue in America. Joseph de Gobineau (1816–82) had put forward a theory about the inherent inequality among human races, which placed the Teutonic (or German) race at the apex and others following according to whiteness of skin. Even before Gobineau's *Inequality of Human Races* was translated into English in 1915, Americans cited him in defense of slavery (reported in Shapiro 1985). Eugenics offered a robust view of society and blamed the victims for the social problems associated with industrial society.

While the birth control movement stood for a common contraception policy across race and class differences, the population control policy to a great extent incorporated the logic of eugenics (eugenics is a branch of study of human heredity, applying genetics principles to the improvement of the human race). Eugenic laws were passed in many states in America soon after 1907, Indiana being the first. This remained so until the Nazi sterilization experience of Hitler's Germany brought eugenics a bad name. Either class or eugenics slipped into population control policy to prevent a unified platform for a common contraception policy for women. Petchesky (1984) discusses the limited utility that birth control had for population controllers due to the patriarchal values inherent in the system. The population control establishment had a hegemonic hold on the American elite. The long struggle for the right to abortion, which could give direct control over reproductive practices for women of all classes and groups, and the use of sterilization as easily the most respectable mainstay of contraception policy, are indicative of the influence of the Church and patriarchy (husband, doctor, and priest). Women were not equal to men, but some women were more equal than other women. The superior among women did not want to waste themselves in continuous reproduction of babies, while the lesser ones were forcibly sterilized as if religious strictures did not apply to them.

Though the birth control movement and eugenics movement had major differences, which mirror class and gender differences even today, they did briefly work together. For instance, Clarence Gamble, a wealthy population control advocate, worked with Margaret Sanger in the 1930s and formed the Birth Control Federation of America in 1939, and in 1942 the International Planned Parenthood Federation. He differed from her on the question of women's autonomy. The women's rights struggle did not agree with the insistence by the population controllers that

educated, White women, have a large number of babies, while poor women of color should be sterilized. The possibility of choice was limited both for the rich and the poor women. Discriminatory sterilization was a serious dilemma for women's rights and birth control groups as the population control program was double edged. It provided women with contraception, which they desired, but denied abortion until the economic recession in 1969. (See Ross 1998, Ch. 3 for more on the Malthusian transformations over time.) Sanger's position did not remain constant. Up until World War I, Sanger was advocating for the knowledge and use of contraception to be popularized, a position associated with the socialist movement. The birth control movement quickly moved toward the establishment, trying to distance itself from its socialist allies, in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution witch-hunt against the left (Hartman 1987: 95–6). Shapiro (1985) describes how the positions like those of Sanger and Gamble (birth control and population control respectively) coincided on many occasions for certain periods of time, especially when both shared the same platform. This earned Sanger the praise of population controllers, to the dislike of women fighting for birth control. Sanger became a controversial figure in this respect. She was even viewed as a racist for her enthusiasm for making common cause with population controllers.

In stark contrast to the spirit of the birth control movement, state-orchestrated massacre of “undesirable” people through the idea of racial hygiene (Proctor 1988) occurred in Germany around the same period. Gobineau's theory of inherent inequality among the races was handy for Alfred Ploetz, the founder of German Racial Hygiene (1905). Notions of German citizenship, blood protection, and genetic health dominated during the Nationalist Socialist regime, as did Nazi medicine, euthanasia, and coercive sterilization. During Adolf Hitler's time, fear was created about the decline of the German birth rate and it was felt that it was about time something was done to maintain the race of the Nordics. Psychology and medicine provided studies supporting differences in race and grounds for the “othering” of the lesser races. Roma (gypsies, shown as originating from India and of Aryan race but having “degenerated” blood through mixing with others), Soviet prisoners of war, mentally and physically handicapped, and the Jews were all deemed inferior. After 1936, the Roma became subject to the Nuremberg Laws for prevention against Hereditary Diseased Progeny and the Law against Dangerous Habitual Criminals, which required them to be sterilized. Around 30,000 of them were forcibly sterilized and over 70,000 suffered euthanasia deaths by 1938, to improve the German genetic stock. The Jewish Holocaust is well known.

The Malthusian-oriented population control found a place for itself after the infamy attached to the Nazi sterilization program dampened popular enthusiasm for the eugenics movement. The troubled times during the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s were inspiring for Malthusian views. Restrictive migration control and eugenic sterilization became more palatable and even sensible to broad segments of the American population. Race fear gave way to arguments for social development, economic growth, and international political instability as justifications for sterilization of the poor and socially handicapped. Preventing “welfare babies” made sense. Population control differed from birth control as it was not voluntary and was race and class oriented. Women's struggle for contraception was partly achieved through population control but the official approval for

sterilization and disapproval of abortion remained a contentious issue between birth controllers and population controllers.

It is worth recalling that by the latter half of the eighteenth century, the popularity of Malthusian ideas in the industrializing world had turned population into a contentious issue. Beside the eugenicist and women's rights movement intermittent distancing and aligning on the population question, it has remained, in different incarnations, at the center of socioeconomic inequality. The resurgence and present dominance of neo-Malthusian notions of population control is linked to developmental debates. In fact, the politics of development is a significant dimension of the population-inequality debate. The definitions of development, the means and goals, are intricately connected to population policy in developing countries. Here, we will discuss some of these issues.

Population and Development: Inconclusive Debates between Alarmists and Revisionists

Population is seen as a great hurdle for economic development by Malthusianists. Also, the utilitarian argument suggests that the relationship between economic growth and equality of income is a conflicting one. Equality of income comes into conflict with economic growth, which is popularly known as "growth-equity trade-off." Following this logic would mean that pursuit of economic equality might even turn out to be impoverishing for all.

Perhaps the simplest way of thinking about development is an increase in prosperity due to a continued increase in the size of an economy. At the national level, the most used measures of economic well-being are GNP (Gross National Product) and GNP per capita. The former uses market valuations to measure national income, while the latter is an indication of the average material living standard of a nation's people. The latter measure has limitations, especially when poverty is figured, as it fails to show the actual range of income distribution. For economic growth, a proportion of the total output must be set aside from consumption as savings for channeling into investment. High rate of growth is possible through high rate of savings or borrowings. It means that economic growth must not only keep pace with population growth but also generate sufficient savings to guarantee growth. Labor productivity through efficient use of technology for a more and varied range of goods and services signifies economic development. Labor productivity is measured by the quantity of goods and services one can produce with a given expenditure of effort, averaged out in terms of time spent in working or labor time. The number of people in a country is critical in enhancing labor productivity, economic growth, and development. Demographic processes of fertility, mortality, and migration can be important causes of upward or downward trends of growth. Population thus enters into and complicates the neat growth versus equity trade-off equation. For a country to continue to mark economic growth and development, its population needs to balance so that savings after consumption may be set aside to be ploughed back as investment, besides resources for increasing the capacity of people to enhance labor productivity. This population resources balance is conveyed in economics and demography through the concept of optimum population.

Overpopulation, to recall Malthus's warning, is bound to lead to scarcity, misery, and vice. In other words, overpopulation leads to an increase in mortality and morbidity, poverty, hunger, unemployment, and illiteracy, and stunts labor productivity. Paul Ehrlich's book, *The Population Bomb* (1968), sent danger signals that overpopulation would result in inadequate resources to sustain the human population. The correlation between overpopulation and resources points to population increases globally, particularly the uneven rates of population growth in the context of the earth's resources, which are argued to be finite. The global think tank, the Club of Rome, has reiterated the danger signs since the early 1970s. The Club of Rome broadened its base from economic resources to all natural resources, including environment, thereby looking at the world as the common pool of irreplaceable resources. The narratives of population and development have been diverging for some time. The 1970s saw a gradual separation of the agenda of population control from the goal of development; Furedi (1997) provides a lucid account of the distinct stages in the history of the encounter between population and development as well as a wide variety of views on the population and development debate. Contemporary environmentalism is one of the views and it synthesizes with traditional Malthusian concern about limited natural resources.

Since the 1950s, particularly since the end of World War II, volumes have been written on the impact of population growth on the economy. Demographic processes have had close interaction with economists and their theories and approaches. The conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between equality and growth is modeled with the help of the Kuznets curve – after the Nobel Laureate, Simon Kuznets (1955). On the basis of the pattern of income distribution in the developed countries in the West, he noted that as a country is developing from a low level of income its inequality initially rises. Only after it reaches a certain level of affluence does inequality begin to decline. Thus, inequality is a necessary concomitant of growth. This takes us back to question the argument that more savings owing to fewer people can be reinvested for economic growth.

The theory of demographic transition (Thompson 1929; Notestein 1945) put forward a similar argument, though in demographic terms. The theory of demographic transition is based on the idea of social inequality. Countries of the world with lower industrial growth are less socially developed and thus have higher fertility even after high mortality has been curtailed. The emerging bulge in population of those countries is a cause for concern. The world is divided into two unequal parts on the basis of fertility and mortality balance. Osmani (2001) has detailed the empirical inadequacy of the view linking capital accumulation with growth. Several studies show that theses such as “growth is dependent on capital accumulation” and “saving patterns of the rich and poor are similar” are unsustainable. Some of the world's most populous countries with high fertility have experienced high rates of growth in per capita income in recent decades. These countries are India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, Korea (with the exception of some sub-Saharan African countries). Cassen (1994) clearly points out the inconclusive, if not entirely negative, evidence of several studies questioning the inverse relationship between population growth and economic development, especially the challenge posed by the “revisionist” approach demonstrated by Simon's (1981) book, *The Ultimate*

Resource. Julian Simon is an economic optimist who argues that the world population growth is good. He sees few limits to population growth and prosperity, provided the economic system and market mechanisms work correctly. Simon (1981) criticized Malthus for lack of evidence for his postulates and for not foreseeing the quantitative leaps in agricultural production. The revisionists point to improvements in human health, life expectancy, and increased food production to support their position. However, Simon upholds democracy and argues that if progress is to be achieved it must occur in a democratic-capitalistic system. Economic liberalism, liberal international relations, and diffusion and adoption of technology have put the population debate on a sounder footing. The alarmists and the revisionists might find common grounds in policies that keep in mind the complexities of the demographic-economic relationship. Like overpopulation, optimum and underpopulation are also relative conditions and do not depend on numbers or density alone in a given area. The debate splintered, generating two lines of arguments, with one focusing on population-resources links and the other considering the population-economic growth connections. Further, contemporary population controversy has moved beyond the classical Malthus-Marx debate. There are shades of alarmists and revisionists in this debate. We have discussed the environmentalist position. Other revisionist shades range from women and human rights to the religious, pronatalist perspectives (see Furedi 1997 for details).

We have seen that the neo-Malthusian population policies, based upon the idea that a smaller population necessarily leads to capital accumulation and growth, and popular with international developmental organizations and national governments, are contested and cannot be seen as universally valid. In fact, the connections between reproductive behavior, equity, and development must also be understood in terms of micro-level realities apart from the macro picture.

Equity and Growth: Other Macro and Micro Interlinkages

Distribution of resources and human capabilities are other considerations in the issue of growth and equity trade-off. Examples from Taiwan and Korea, where radically large-scale redistribution of land took place, have shown that equality helped these countries achieve high rates of economic growth and overall prosperity that earned them the status of East Asian miracle economies (Osmani 2001). Sri Lanka among the South Asian countries and Kerala in India, demographically analyzed by Dyson and Moore (1981), are examples of societies with a fair degree of gender and social egalitarianism in the past. Both the cases support the thesis that there exists a link between traditional autonomy of women, distribution of public services provision, and growth through human capital development and enhancement of people's decision-making capacities. Politics and gender egalitarian social orders have provided a base for remarkable achievement of high levels of nutritional and educational standards despite low income levels, made possible through the conscious intervention of the state in food, health care, and education (Dreze and Sen 1989). They further argue that with appropriate policies it is possible to achieve remarkable equality in the distribution of basic capabilities even if the distribution

of income is not very equal, nor the level of income particularly high. China and Costa Rica are other examples where the demand for basic capabilities has a very positive policy implication. Such an equitable distribution of resources is likely to affect the imbricated schooling and fertility decisions, which are believed to promote economic growth: aspirations for training and educating children – and the entailed costs – influence decisions to regulate fertility. They are as economic as much as they are social, cultural, historical, political, and emotional, when considered at the micro as well as the macro levels.

Let us take the case study of a village in the northwestern state of Rajasthan in India, conducted by Patel (1994). On the basis of in-depth interviews and fieldwork conducted in the village, she reports incipient signs of demographic transition likely to happen. In this rural area, marriage is universal, the value of children is high. A woman's status is accrued through marriage and children. Birth of a son is critical for a couple and more so for a woman, who may be divorced or forced to live in constant fear of a possible second wife if she does not give birth to a son for the family. The plight of childlessness, which is invariably involuntary, is described in detail, emphasizing that it is motherhood which gives meaning, besides honor, to a woman's life. The village is only 22 kilometers from the city center and since 1954 has had three government-funded schools. Nevertheless, schooling was far from universal even for men. Among the teenager cohorts, at least one son was sent to school by almost all the couples. Others assisted their parents in the family occupations of farming, animal husbandry, traditional craft, or wage labor. Only two girls had completed high school, primarily because their father was a schoolteacher and posted out of the village in towns and cities in the region. His family accompanied him wherever he lived, resulting in better education for all his four children, compared with their cohorts in the village. Girls in the village had only just started to attend school. One girl who had completed middle school was illustrative of the likely trend. Though educating girls is still thought of as a wasteful and avoidable expense, at least some girls are visible in schools; and more officially registered after persuading their parents in the name of free and compulsory education by teachers and other government workers. The cost of training children does increase in the process of the overall change that is occurring in rural India, not leaving the village unaffected.

From the 713 married women ranging from 14 to over 80 years, Patel's cross-sectional data shows fertility differentials by age and generation. A great deal of this may be attributed to the public provision of services and improved life expectancy, which for all India hovered around an average age of 23 years in 1921 and had reached 68 by 1991. In this Rajasthan village, of the 3,011 children born to all the living ever-married women (or reported by the 20 widowers), 707 had died. The mortality rate was very high and it would be inappropriate to think about curtailing fertility in the light of this lurking fear in parents' minds. However, there is an age differential in this mortality trend. Infant and child mortality was on the decline in the village, as in the rest of India. Patel describes people's experiences of the modern fertility control program pushed by the official family planning program, which has been in existence since 1951 and constitutes an overarching presence in the public health-care provision. Of the 64 sterilization cases (9 percent) of the ever-married husband-wife units, 45 were women, and 19 men. Most of the steriliza-




Figure 19.1 Fertility differentials: Births per woman (richest fifth to poorest fifth of population, by region).

Source: UNFPA, *State of the World's Population* (2002).

tion cases happened in the mid-1980s, when the study was being conducted. Remember that even if India's family planning program has had its vicissitudes and failures, it has made its presence felt in the nooks and corners of the country. Village-level health workers and auxiliary nurse midwives, and all forms of mass media, have spread the message of fertility control far and wide. (See Figures 19.1 and 19.2.)

The younger generation seems more open to listening to the message. The majority of the sterilized persons in the village were young. Younger women exercised their agency in the negotiations with their spouses and in-laws. They were able to garner support and manage to arrest further childbirth. This may be indicative of the likely transition occurring in terms of the desired number of children. The social optimum of two sons and a daughter remains intact and may change in the future. However, the risk calculations that parents make are interesting. The risk of child mortality is certainly lower for the younger parents than that perceived by their parental and grandparental generations. Even though these decisions were made and sterilization resorted to, it was done only after couples had achieved the social optimum number and sex composition of children. Patel elaborates the manner in which younger couples circumvent the hurdles in resorting to sterilization though




Figure 19.2 Infant mortality differentials: Average deaths (per thousand live births, richest fifth to poorest fifth of population by region).

Source: UNFPA, *State of the World's Population* (2002)

not without keeping in mind the security of having at least one son to look after them in old age and to live with them. Most of the sterilized cases are not outstanding in attributes of educational achievement, land holding, or personal income. This poses a question about the tenacity of factors known to bring about fertility decline. Patel does not agree with the simplistic assumption that modern medicine enables parents to determine how many children to have with reference to the standard desired number. She discusses the various nuances of sociocultural and politico-economic dimensions seen through the life cycle and fertility career of couples, which situate fertility behavior in the village.

What has changed for certain is the overall decline in child mortality and the increased possibility, through improved transport and communication, of accessing the health services of the state (though they are shunned for child delivery, which is always conducted at home). Technological change from tubectomy to laparoscopy (provided free in the village or its vicinity in addition to financial incentives) has added to the perceptibly reduced postsurgical health risk to sterilized women. The reduced mortality risk enables them to risk deciding to adopt the terminal method of fertility control (the most popular one in India). This is done often in the face of some criticism from the senior generation, whose perception of the risk of child mortality is greater than that of the younger cohort of parents.

This perception of social transformation and its consequences in terms of reduced fertility decisions by younger parents in this village takes us back to Dreze and Sen's (1989) thesis about the provision of public services influencing the standards of living and enhancing human capacity potentials. Jeffery and Jeffery (1997) have analyzed the relationship of macro political influences and economic conditions on fertility differentials in another rural area in North India. Similar studies suggest that we should not remain restricted within the equity-growth trade-off correlation but should also consider historical and macro-level service provision and policy.

Malthus's legacy has maintained the heat in the population and development debate, which in actual terms divides the world into "developed" (lesser population) and "developing" (large population). While highlighting the adverse consequences of population growth can be seen as Malthusian, efforts to curb population growth can be identified as being neo-Malthusian. As the Marxist perspective suggests, population control views seem to have a strong element of imperialism and neo-colonialism when one looks at the power dynamics between the "developed" and "developing" in historical and contemporary contexts. Thus, in the Marxist view, international development aid is considered to enhance the North-South divide in the world. We have seen that there is mixed evidence and no unanimity on the correlation between population and development. Moral and ethical problems have continued to pose a serious challenge to this debate since the Poor Laws period. Furedi (1997) shows that an important shift has taken place, and the more specialist studies, especially those based on empirical research, are far more circumspect. "Today, professionals attached to the delivery of population programs are far more likely to justify their action on the grounds that it will improve women's health or protect the environment, than because it contributes to economic development" (Furedi 1997: 2).

Thus, population control policies, whether we are talking of the infamous discriminatory sterilization, and eugenics, racial hygiene, or blood purity, or the Malthusian notions of population control for development and social stability, have more often than not been an exercise in domination of the "other." Furedi (1997) discusses the clear shift toward new rationales for population policies. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that the consciousness of demography may be symptomatic of other anxieties. As we will see in the later sections of the chapter, developmental paradigms of globalization, liberalization, and privatization promoted and pushed in Third World countries by international organizations also carry a clear stamp of the dominant notions of population control. International developmental aid and assistance, a major feature of the liberalization/Structural Adjustment Programs, are tied up with neo-Malthusian population control policies, emerging as dominating policies from "above." The population establishment (that is, the international network of developmental organizations/institutions active in the area of population control) promotes the dominant modernization-developmental paradigm. The interweaving of different agendas on the population debate makes it difficult to understand the different perspectives on the subject. Besides state intervention, the system works with the participation of so-called civil society institutions, or NGOs, which professedly promote people's participation in developmental policies. How various institutions have contributed to this process of domination is addressed in the next section of this chapter.

The Population Establishment

The neo-Malthusian view has been influential in shaping population policy, particularly in the post-World War II period when population control programs became an important part of development assistance and aid. The period after World War II saw the end of direct colonial domination in many parts of the so-called developing world, and it is at this point that aid and assistance by way of large international organizations began. During this period the transition from the “civilizing mission” of European colonizing powers such as France and Britain to the new modernization paradigm, with the United States at the forefront, has been greatly facilitated by the international development establishment, which has acted as a continuing enforcement of power of so-called “developed” countries over “developing” countries. The population field has been a key area in which these power dynamics have been played out, through the introduction of population control or birth control programs in many newly independent developing countries.

The “population establishment,” comprised of a number of international level organizations specifically focusing on population issues (such as the United Nations Fund for Population Activities [UNFPA] and the Population Council), took a central role in furthering the neo-Malthusian approach by emphasizing demographic statistics to indicate an ever-increasing world population. The population establishment, consisting of a wide range of organizations, stands at the apex of international population activity but is by no means uniform or monolith. In fact, it consists of a disparate body of organizations following different sets of aims. For instance, the US Agency for International Development (USAid) provides assistance to both country programs and NGOs, research units, universities, and nonprofit organizations. USAid reflects the approach of the US government in its adherence to population control objectives. However, the controversial issue of abortion has been the reason for USAid’s relinquishment of its patronage to agencies and groups providing abortion services. In the early 1980s, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, and again more recently in 2000 under the George W. Bush administration, USAid withdrew its considerable funding from International Planned Parenthood (IPPF), UNFPA, and other organizations for this reason. The UNFPA, on the other hand, is the largest multilateral organization working in the area of population. It supports a vast array of population activities, though it focuses mainly on family planning. The UNFPA operates under the ethos of the United Nations and the Human Rights Charter, thus on the surface encouraging a noncoercive, voluntary environment for population activity, though in actuality the extent of this has been questionable (Hartman 1995). Despite the dominance of organizations like USAid, UNFPA, IPPF, and others, the United States government has been the largest donor to population activities globally. Its utilization of the population establishment for channeling population assistance and for ensuring the neo-Malthusian agenda has come to shape the nature of population directives within the population establishment.

Adherence to the modernization paradigm (that growth would result in more equitable terms of development) has shaped the types of activities undertaken by development agencies in “developing” countries. This has meant that not only have

economic growth and increased productivity been made the essential goals for development, but so has a transition to fertility patterns, such as those of the so-called developed world, relying on the theory of demographic transition. Population establishment aims to slim the population bulge and fertility rates through their assistance and programs.

The post-World War II period has thus been most clearly marked by a neo-Malthusian approach to population, with the US government and other Western donor states connecting economic objectives with social/welfare ones. One organization, the World Bank, has been a particularly influential voice in furthering this agenda, with population reduction built in to many of its Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), directly tying development aid with a country's willingness to achieve targets. As much as 1 percent of the 7 percent of development assistance is given for population, and even this proportion was changed with liberalization through SAPs, as we will see below (Hartman 1995: 113).

The World Bank was a central force in espousing target-driven population reduction programs through Structural Adjustment Programs introduced in the 1980s. While spreading free-market principles through economic liberalization in developing countries, SAPs also contained an implicit understanding that increasing population growth rates had negative economic impacts. Thus, conditions were applied to World Bank loans which stipulated that structural adjustment loans would be contingent upon a country adopting population reduction policies, though overall spending on health and social welfare was dramatically cut. Hence, the neo-liberal agenda of decentralization and free-market economics saw the World Bank simultaneously cutting back on social welfare and enforcing population control, while encouraging economic growth through closer integration with the "global" economy.

One consequence of this was that social services, mostly concerned with reproduction, were cut back in expenditure terms and reorganized. Instead of the state being the sole or principal agent for the provision of such services, regardless of whether they were externally or domestically financed, private "nonprofit" non-governmental organizations were charged with many of these functions. NGOs had already been receiving widespread attention for their comparative advantage in being in touch at the grassroots level. This shift occurred simultaneously with a review of policies implemented for several decades through governments that showed lower results than expected. In developing countries like India, which introduced family planning policies in 1951, soon after its political independence, the central state-led planning tradition would soon come under attack by the economic reforms of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the early 1990s. Despite being an early experiment in terms of its national family planning policy, India was not successful in curbing its population growth, and this was further exacerbated by its failure of mortality control. The inability of countries such as India to achieve targets has been a critical point from which the state's role in population policy has been critiqued by the population establishment.

The World Bank has not, however, acted alone. In fact, population control programs have been sponsored and executed by a range of organizations in the population establishment, such as the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the US Agency

for International Development (USAid), and the Population Council, which have each in their own way contributed to the formulation of an accepted understanding of population policy as population reduction through fertility control. Betsy Hartman notes how it was “overpopulation” and not concern for women’s well-being that had been the inspiration behind Western policy makers’ family planning ventures. Naming some of the emergent organizations, she charts a number of steps by which the population establishment has ascended to such influence (1985: 59–60):

- Support for fledgling local family planning organizations, often staffed by Western-trained nationals, with population-control values, by private population agencies such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).
- Larger involvement of institutions such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Population Council in the establishment of population research institutions.
- Flow of funds and personnel from the US government’s Agency for International Development (USAid) as an integral part of foreign aid.
- Entry of multilateral institutions, such as the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) or the World Bank.

Thus, a complex network of organizations and agencies operating at the international and supranational levels was established during the 1960s, at a time when neo-Malthusian explanations of poverty and social inequality had economic and political backing. It is from here that family planning services were launched internationally, with the focus in developing countries upon information, education, and communication (IEC) campaigns and service delivery of contraceptives. However, the top-down structure of policy making was reflected in the programs being implemented. The policy directives came from above, with targets often having coercive effects, and generic policies not taking into account traditional or local birth control practices. However, it is worth noting that it was largely the national governments, and not the population establishment, which received the most criticism.

Neo-Malthusian Population Policies and Inequality

The extent to which there is, in fact a population “problem,” can best be addressed through an examination of some of the themes in population policy. While in the eighteenth century Malthus had postulated a causal relationship between population growth and poverty, his neo-Malthusian contemporaries have furthered this with the argument that particular policy interventions, such as birth control and sterilization, can favorably alter population growth rates.

During the mid-1950s to mid-1970s, population policy was based on the modernization model. Thus, population control became the prerequisite for development. The shift from high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality can largely be explained by improvements in health and sanitation during and after the Industrial Revolution, which saw a drop in death rates and eventually also saw the

Table 19.1 Population size and growth

(a) Population size by region (in millions of people)

<i>Date</i>	<i>World</i>	<i>High-income countries</i>	<i>Low-income countries</i>
1950	2,515	832	1,683
1970	3,698	1,049	2,649
1998	5,930	1,182	4,748
2025 projection	8,039	1,220	6,819

(b) Average annual population growth (%)

<i>Date</i>	<i>World</i>	<i>High-income countries</i>	<i>Low-income countries</i>
1950–1955	1.8	1.3	2.1
1970–1975	2.0	0.9	2.4
1995–2000	1.4	0.3	1.7

Source: United Nations: *World Population Prospects 1988* (1989) and UNFPA *The State of the World Population 1998* (1998), cited in Hewitt and Smyth (2000).

birth rate decline. Population statistics reflect not only population growth or fertility, but also mortality or death rates. While mortality rates have declined dramatically in most parts of the world, fertility rates show a slower rate of descent in developing countries, with 3.1 children to every woman, compared to 1.6 children to every woman in more developed countries (UNFPA 2000). However, despite declining rates of population growth, the overall rates of fertility still show that the greatest proportion of the world population resides in the Third World (Table 19.1).

The rate of population growth globally climaxed at around 2 percent in the early 1960s. Since then, the rate of world population growth has slowed down to less than 1.4 percent. However, it is also important to note that the population base is continually added to year by year, meaning that the number of people each year increases, despite a declining rate of growth. Presently, this annual population “addition” is about 77 million people a year, compared with about 53 million in the 1960s (UNFPA 1999).

The link between fertility and mortality, however, is important to note when explaining the persistence of large populations in developing countries and the concerted attention given to addressing the issue. Widely acknowledged as a reason for high fertility in developing countries is the social security dimension – that more children provide for poor families. Without a state apparatus to support people in old age in developing countries, there is indeed an incentive for couples to have more children as a means of ensuring that they will be looked after in old age, as well as to have contributing hands to the family economy. Additionally, low survival rates of infants and young children affirm this incentive. Despite certain improvements in health, seen in mortality rate decline, many diseases are still affecting young children, particularly in countries where health provisions have been undermined by political and economic reform, resulting in continued high rates of infant mortality. Thus, the assumption by Malthus and his neo-Malthusian contemporaries that the poor reproduce out of ignorance has been largely discredited by studies showing the rationality of decision making around reproduction

(Mamdani 1972). There are also apparent differentials between the fertility patterns of the rich and the poor in different parts of the developing world, revealing inequalities among and within developing countries.

Population statistics indicate that there are simultaneously both increasing and declining rates of population growth. While population growth has been slow and gradually increasing through most of human history, recent data have shown marked trends. For instance, the world's population more than doubled in the second half of the twentieth century, reaching six billion in 2000 (UNFPA 2002), with some regions experiencing high levels of population density and others experiencing underpopulation (Hartman 1987; Dasgupta 1995). It can also be the case that geographic regions with high density of population may sometimes be categorized as underpopulated (such as the United Kingdom) while those with very low density are denoted as overpopulated (sub-Saharan Africa). The two examples given here reflect the contradictions that are sometimes present within local or regional contexts. The UK is one of the most densely populated countries, with 90 percent of the population living on 10 percent of the land and a fertility rate less than replacement level. Sub-Saharan Africa has high fertility levels accompanied by patterns of labor migration that result in severe labor shortages in areas of origin. Why then, one might ask, is sub-Saharan Africa a major recipient of population aid and assistance and the UK not?

Another example of the contradictions often apparent in population contexts is the fact that South Africa's population density is not high, but despite this its population development program has since the 1970s been geared toward reducing the fertility rate of the Black population (Chimere-Dan 1993). Within such national contexts, the term "overpopulation" is often evoked when referring to inequality, poverty, or urbanization, furthering the argument that population growth, not the organization of economic production and resource allocation, is at the heart of social inequality. Hence, the characterization of the "population problem" within this line of thought attributes declines in social development to the effects of overpopulation rather than to the system of production and management of resources within this system (Purewal 2001: 97). This, again, reverts to the debate between Marxist and Malthusian ideas on the population question. Nonetheless, the causes of population variation can often be manifold and not so easily attributable to any one set of factors. As Hewitt and Smyth explain, "the unevenness in the distribution of population ranges from ecological endowments, colonial history, and forms of production, to national and international migration and resettlements (or any combination of these)" (2000: 129). Thus, mere snapshots of population statistics do not offer an in-depth contextual understanding of the population dynamics at the heart of the population question. They merely point to and indicate the connections that population has to other societal processes.

The policy contexts of population indicators also are revealing of how the implementation of population policy is riddled with dynamics of power, control, and inequality. The application of neo-Malthusian policies in national developing country contexts shows how population control has maintained dominance even after the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994. The use of incentive schemes to reduce population has been one policy outcome of this. For example, a government scheme in Bangladesh during the mid-

1980s used financial incentives and was praised as a success story of fertility decline by the World Bank. Emergency measures were enacted through government and high-ranking army officials to increase sterilization incentives (Hartman 1995: 225). Poor men and women were given several months' wages in return for undergoing the sterilization operation. Wider poverty and development indicators in Bangladesh during this period deteriorated rather than improved, showing how such policies have avoided addressing the social and economic factors surrounding population and reproductive choice. Disincentives, such as penalties, and encouragement of long-acting contraceptive drugs have also been applied as methods of curbing population growth. The pharmaceutical industry has been a formidable force in pushing its products upon developing countries through collaboration with national governments desperate to reach targets set by the international population and development community. Invasive contraceptive drugs such as Depo-Provera, Norplant 6, and anti-pregnancy vaccines have been introduced often without medical support or appropriate follow-up information or care (Hardon 1994; Shrivastava 1994). The Indian government relaxed its drug regulations in 2000 in order to encourage the adoption of such long-acting drugs to help meet its population targets under the direction of the World Bank, exposing its adherence to the targets approach to population reduction. Policies enacted by governments of developing countries have thus not merely reflected the respective national population policy directives, but have also been greatly influenced by the international scene and the trends of international discourses as they have evolved and emerged through the strength of organizations and institutions.

NGOs in Population Politics

The organizational structure of population activities evolved in the 1970s and 1980s under the auspices of the population establishment during a time when the neoliberal agenda (structural adjustment, market liberalization, and decentralization) was ascending to dominance. Since that time, on an escalating scale, the implementation on the ground of most population programs has been done by local-level organizations and NGOs. They, through funding directives, have put into practice the imperatives set at the supranational level and then passed on to the national and local levels. Thus, by 1994, at the time of ICPD discussions, the structures and systems were already in place for the new era of population activity, with the NGO sector acting as a driving force for change.

One of the most critical changes to the contemporary context of the population debate has been the intensification of globalization processes, with enhanced concerns about ownership and management of resources as well as the accountability and sovereignty of the state. The state had once had a publicly owned resource base within which it could mobilize for population programs. This, as pointed out earlier, is no longer the case in most Third World countries, which have undergone structural adjustment and liberalization. In the new era, NGOs have been identified as representatives of "civil society" or "community" on the one hand, but on the other have been inadvertently tied to supranational interests and agendas because of the availability and organization of funding at the international level.

The ICPD that took place in Cairo in 1994 is an illustration of these processes. It is important to note the influence that criticisms of past population programs by the NGO sector, health advocates, social activists, and feminists had upon the conference proceedings. During the three years of preparatory meetings before ICPD, state-led and target approaches were criticized by these groups, who for the first time were given a platform to voice their positions. The overall message that came through from these preparatory meetings and the actual conference was the need to view population policy within a broader, integrated perspective. Previously, population policy had primarily been concerned with population reduction and population control (i.e., neo-Malthusian), rather than on reproductive and sexual health, rights, gender, and access to services. Hence, since ICPD we have seen a period in which participation by local communities, people, and particularly women, is being explicitly focused upon as a primary aim for ensuring a move toward target-free policies, which work within a framework of reproductive rights and choice. This shift is what is commonly referred to as the “new consensus.”

The collective pressure placed upon the ICPD agenda by community, health, and women’s organizations was the catalyst for inducing the shift toward formally acknowledging the social base of reproductive health (Smyth 1998). The resulting Program of Action on Population and Development, which emerged from ICPD, made a number of recommendations. Firstly, agendas of previous UN conferences, such as those on sustainable development and human rights, were adopted in terms of the inclusion of issues such as economic sustainability, the importance of economic growth in tackling poverty, and the notion of “rights.” Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, were the explicit changes made to the previous neo-Malthusian approach by the inclusion of a social perspective. Crucially, this placed women at the center of the program of action without making them mere vehicles to achieving population reduction, as many argued was the case before. Thus, the term “reproductive health” was replaced with “family planning,” and women were viewed as having agency and rights to make their own choices (Hewitt and Smyth 2000).

While the ICPD Program of Action in itself reflects a marked shift away from targets and toward a broader reproductive health and rights perspective, the enactment of the new recommendations required another change. Governments had previously been the primary implementers of population programs, with financial support from international agencies; these earlier programs had specific goals for meeting population reduction targets and had largely been occupied with delivering birth control and family planning services. In accordance with the new recommendations, however, NGOs were identified as the most appropriate actors in the population field:

[N]on-governmental organizations have made and are increasingly making important contributions to both population and development activities at all levels. In many areas of population and development activities, non-governmental groups are already rightly recognized for their comparative advantage in relation to government agencies, because of innovative, flexible and responsive programme design and implementation, including grass-roots participation, and because quite often they are rooted in and interact with constituencies that are poorly served and hard to reach through government channels. (ICPD Program of Action 1994)

The reference to the “comparative advantage” of NGOs in the Program of Action identifies the potential for decentralized, participatory population policy implementation led by the NGO sector. To construct the NGO sector as the savior of more empowered development, however, would be misleading. NGOs themselves are subject to multiple constraints within civil society as well as in dealing with governmental- and supranational-level mandates. Firstly, that all NGOs are positioned close to the communities is not necessarily the case, with many NGOs having offices in urban centers but a vast majority of their activities occurring in rural areas, for example. Another problem with “jumping on the bandwagon” of the new consensus in celebrating the role of NGOs is that financial arrangements for population activity at local levels are, even more than prior to the ICPD, tied to the population consensus at the international level. Thus, it is questionable to what extent NGOs working in the area of population in the post-ICPD period have been able to act upon aims not immediately derivative of the Program of Action. The nature and rhetorical aspects of participatory processes, however, have much to do with the financial arrangements under which projects are undertaken by NGOs. In many cases, it is NGOs that are *undertaken* by donors as projects in themselves, which certainly raises questions about the level at which projects can possibly be participatory or decentralized when funding is tied to such a highly hierarchical administrative structure.

An example of this type of administrative structure is the International Planned Parenthood Fund (IPPF). IPPF is one of the largest voluntary organizations working in the area of family planning and constitutes an international umbrella for national autonomous Family Planning Associations (FPAs) in approximately 200 countries in a federation of voluntary FPAs. The IPPF maintains that local volunteers and staff, who implement their programs within their own legal and cultural contexts, run these FPAs. The extent to which such a large-scale international organization has been successful in encouraging locally appropriate activities has been questioned by critics who view its guiding principle still to be population reduction, albeit in cooperation with voluntary organizations.

There are, of course, many local-level activities which have been initiated, planned, funded, and managed by locally based nongovernmental organizations. Action India is one such NGO, based in Delhi, which addresses the health needs of pregnant women and young children. However, the organization has its roots in a social action campaign against dowry, following the rise in reported dowry deaths in the mid-1970s. Following this, activists came to the realization that people could not sustain themselves with awareness alone but needed material support as well. Hence, Action India has adopted a philosophy incorporating feminism, self-help, and the promotion of herbal and alternative remedies. Its strategy has been a preventative approach to poor health that has simultaneously addressed the social factors that affect women’s health such as alcohol, income stress, violence, poor sanitation, to name but a few.

The funding disparities among different kinds of NGOs influence their activities. Also, the coordination between funding and community preferences and priorities may not always match. NGOs try to sustain their activities by arriving at a very delicate balance between the felt needs of the target community and the priorities of the funding organizations. For example, Woman and Child Upliftment Programme

(WACUP), an NGO based in a squatter settlement in north Delhi's Wazirabad area, is given funding for its population activities under the reproductive and child health (RCH) program of the government of India. The funds for this program come from another NGO, named Society for the Support of Voluntary Agencies (SOSVA), providing reproductive health services to several grassroots NGOs. WACUP works in the predominantly Muslim locality where it is based. It finds it very difficult to convince women to have smaller families when fear of their husband's second marriage or divorce looms large for most of the young women, who have very little education and whose husband is the sole economic and social support. WACUP manages to take pregnant women to hospitals for childbirth in cases of difficult delivery. It also organizes a weekly clinic, its most popular activity. The visiting doctor provides a wide range of services to residents of all ages, both male and female, through which a few cases of pregnant women and infants from the constituency are apparently given suggestions to curtail their family size. The doctor and the NGO staff have to be very careful in offering suggestions as the Muslim community here, as has been the case with other communities in India, is suspicious if not disapproving of the family planning program of the Indian state. (Observations are from fieldwork done as part of a British Council sponsored-project, "Gender, Population and Sustainable Development" by Tulsi Patel and Navtej Purewal.)

How the discourses of population and development feed down from the macro level (donors) to the micro levels (NGOs and communities) is of particular concern when understanding the role of NGOs in the "new consensus," as there are often conflicts of interest that coexist between these dislocated groups and organizations. While the World Bank has referred to this as a process of democratizing development, others, such as John Harris (2002), have cast a more critical eye upon the ideological implications of this shift as "depoliticizing development." The streamlining of activities through the emerging "new consensus" on population has meant that NGOs seeking funding or sponsorship, either from their governments or from donor agencies, must, as well as keeping to the reproductive rights and choice agenda, show their relevance to achieving the aims of economic growth and population reduction. Hence, counter to Marx's argument that structural inequalities are at the root of the population question, the "new consensus" does not fundamentally question the structural foundations of economic, social, and political organization but rather has positioned NGOs as the missing link between civil society, market forces, and the state. While this argument may have some validity in the experience of many NGOs and communities, the appropriation of local-level activities by international- and national-level agendas may influence the degree to which inequalities – and the structural elements to inequalities – between men and women, developing and developed countries, class and racialized communities, are heard or addressed. Thus, NGOs should not be viewed as panaceas to the inequalities that exist in societies, but rather as catalysts to the new era of development action and policy. Otherwise, NGOs, in asserting local and regional viewpoints in their engagements with governments and international institutions and processes, would risk exposing themselves to the "appropriating appetite of development" (Escobar 1995).

Having traced the history of the common association, in the public mind, between population growth and resources as the major cause of problems to do with development, we have seen the contradictory theoretical and ideological views that led

this relationship being a controversial one. Scholarship on the subject has traditionally distinguished between the pessimistic Malthusian view and the optimistic Marxian one. The clash of these classic views continues to influence the debates on the impact of population growth on poverty, inequality, and development. The discussion on population today does not fit into the classical ideological pattern owing to shifts in priorities and a serious questioning of the modernization–development paradigm, especially during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The question of population is not just about numbers but also about “othering.” At the micro level, considerations regarding fertility, mortality, and survival of children vary from those at the macro theoretical or policy levels. Inequalities and differences continue to haunt world agendas and programs. Participation of NGOs as civil society organizations is not without limitations. In this chapter, we have seen the concern of the population establishment in the historical backdrop of the population debate and empirical research.

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Part V

Media, Technology, and Inequalities

Chapter 20

Selling Images of Inequality: Hollywood Cinema and the Reproduction of Racial and Gender Stereotypes

NORMAN K. DENZIN

My abhorrence of neoliberalism helps to explain my legitimate anger when I speak of the injustices to which the ragpickers among humanity are condemned. It also explains my total lack of interest in any pretension of impartiality, I am not impartial, or objective . . . [this] does not prevent me from holding always a rigorously ethical position.

P. Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*: 22

Classic Hollywood cinema was never kind to ethnic or minority groups . . . be they Indian, black, Hispanic, or Jewish, Hollywood represented ethnics and minorities as stereotypes. . . . Classic Hollywood film [is] ethnographic discourse. . . . Hollywood does not represent ethnics and minorities; it creates them and provides an audience with an experience of them.

A. M. Lopez, "Are all Latins from Manhattan?"
in *Unspeakable Images*, pp. 404–5

Classic Hollywood cinema has never been kind to women. Irrespective of their class, but not their ethnicity, women have been treated as desired objects of the male gaze, cast in stereotyped parts, good and bad women, good and bad mothers, sinners or saints. Cinema does not represent women – it creates them. These creations provide audiences with gendered experiences of a racialized, gendered social order built on inequality, masculinity, and violence.

We live in neoliberal times where a contempt for a progressive identity politics organized around sexuality, gender, race, and class has become commonplace (Giroux 2000a: 160). Hollywood's history of selling images of race, class, and inequality is embedded in these neoliberal spaces.

Here I offer one version of this cinematic history – a story about how Hollywood sells and has sold images of inequality. This is a genealogy, a critical, performative pedagogy (Denzin 1997) that crosscuts gender, class, geography, and social science writings on race and ethnicity (McKee 1993). This is a structural history. It

emphasizes key historical moments and structural processes that have shaped the representations of minority group members and inequality in American cinema during the twentieth century. It is important to note that these processes operated differently for each racial and ethnic group. Every historical moment, with its specific cinematic formulations, articulates a version of a class-based American racial system.

The ideological effects of these cinematic representations never disappear; they are present constantly in popular culture. Hollywood films continuously circulate in the national imaginary, including on videotapes, DVDs, TV reruns, and in satellite broadcast. In these formats, films do the ideological work of constructing and locating racial, gender, and class inequities within American social life. A politics of representation structures this process. Films do not mirror the real world; they create their versions of it (Hall 1996a,b).

This chapter's argument unfolds thus: it begins with a discussion of current scholarship and scholarly debates, addressing inequality in cultural studies and critical pedagogy (see Giroux 2000a,b; Darder et al. 2003; McLaren 2003). Next, it locates the analysis within the current literature on race and American cinema (Watkins 1998; Denzin 2002) and discusses how this critical-cultural studies' approach differs from sociological approaches to the study of cinema and its construction and reproduction of race and inequality (Hall 1996b). It turns then to a critical reading of America's cinematic racial order, concluding with arguments for a politically progressive cinema of resistance and social difference.

Inequality and Political Economy in Cultural Studies

We live in dark and bitter times. Democratic public life is under siege. A culture of fear has spread around the world. In the United States, reactionaries and neo-liberals have all but overtaken the languages and politics of daily life, locating Americans in a permanent, open-ended war against faceless, nameless, dark-skinned terrorists. Patriotism has become the national watchword.

The economy is slumping and unemployment is at a record high. Crony capitalism reigns. Affirmative action is under assault. Conservative politicians tied to global capitalism advocate free markets defined by the languages of commercialism and commodified social relations (Giroux 2003: 2). Neoliberals contend that what is good for the economy is good for democracy. The gap between rich and poor widens. Social injustices extending from "class oppression to racial violence to the ongoing destruction of public life and the environment" (p. 2) have become commonplace. The ideological relationship between capitalism and neoliberal democracy has never been stronger.

These bitter times call for the practical, progressive politics of performative-cultural studies. Such an emancipatory discourse connects critical pedagogy with new ways of reading, writing, and performing race, class, and postmodern culture. A critical cultural pedagogy shapes these performances. Critical pedagogy focuses on the ways in which films, and other forms of cultural production, function as forms of ideological education, hegemonically shaping values and constructing identities, particular ways of being raced, classed, and gendered in the social world

(Kincheloe and McLaren 2000: 284). Critical pedagogy, in the form of critical readings and performances, attempts to disrupt these cultural practices performatively, in the name of a “more just, democratic, and egalitarian society” (p. 285).

Leftist criticisms

In contrast to the classic, leftist political economy position, which privileges the economy as the cause of inequality, cultural studies models refuse to give primacy to class, labor, or economic inequality (Giroux 2000a: 160; McLaren 2003: 161). Instead, an interactive, performative, identity-based model is emphasized. In response, leftists argue that social movements organized around sexuality, gender, race, and identity give politics a bad name. They argue that by refusing to make class primary, cultural studies scholars contribute to a “splintering of the left into identity sects” (Giroux 2000a: 161). Contemporary cultural struggles organized around difference are read as poor substitutes for real-world politics.

Cultural studies critics, like Giroux (2000b), contend that class-based critiques presume a unified, pre-given, stable, subject position based on class. This view, it is argued, essentializes class, and does not understand that class and subject identity are located in a “shifting, negotiated space marked by historical, symbolic, and social mediations, including the complex negotiations of race and gender” (2000b: 137). The leftist critique comes close to blaming minorities for the White backlash associated with neoliberalism, curiously aligning itself with the right’s White supremacist racialized attacks on minorities. This critique also makes it difficult to understand how class is actually lived through the “modalities of race and gender” (p. 137).

The economic model of politics is based on a “resurgent economism rooted in a totalizing concept of class in which it is argued that ‘we can do class or culture, but not both’” (Giroux 2000b: 138–9). It refuses to take up the ways in which race, gender, age, sexual orientation, and class are intertwined. Nor does it examine culture and the media as ideological sites that pedagogically inscribe, construct, and represent identities and desires. In so doing, it trivializes a critical cultural studies, reducing culture and politics to the study of the popular. It does not interrogate how culture as “a terrain of struggle” mediates our relationship to the material world, and shapes our sense of political agency (p. 139).

The invisibility of class

With McLaren, I believe that class, “race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation constitute an interconnected ensemble of social practices” (2003: 163). Yet, as McLaren argues (p. 163), quoting Ortner:

class exists in America but cannot be talked about . . . it is “hidden” . . . there is no language for it . . . it is “displaced” or “spoken through” other languages of social difference – race, ethnicity, and gender. (1998: 8–9)

Clearly, at the levels of discourse, experience, and representation, gender, “class, race, and ethnicity are so deeply mutually implicated in American culture that it makes little sense to pull them apart” (Ortner 1998: 9; McLaren 2003: 163–4).

Class position and identity in America are racialized and gendered already. Race, gender, and ethnicity are always class categories (McLaren 2003: 164). The global cultural logics of neoliberalism and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), which rest on the “uncontested reproduction of global relations of exploitation” (p. 164), fuel this mixing of race and class and gender.

Thus are the discourses of race, class, and gender hidden and made visible in the pedagogical spaces of neoliberalism.

Reading Race Cinematically

This analysis turns now to strategies for reading race, gender, and inequality and their presence in classic Hollywood cinema. Like Watkins (1998), this analysis stresses a historical politics of representation. Race films are ideological texts. Unlike traditional sociological students of the media, this approach does not stand outside the texts interpreted. Individual readings of these texts are personal and political; they should be interrupted to challenge their pedagogies. Additionally, no presumption is made that films objectively mirror reality.

The argument presented is organized using a multiple-part thesis. First, the twentieth century’s history of cinematic race relations has been shaped by what Myrdal (1944) called the American dilemma. This dilemma reflects a deep-seated conflict between a national creed that endorses the fundamental equality of all persons, and the segregationist and discriminatory realities surrounding the actual treatment of America’s racial and ethnic minorities (1944: 24; see also McKee 1993: 227; Lyman 1990, 1998). Historically, this conflict has produced a two-sided race relations agenda, one played out both in real life and on screen. Myrdal’s analysis pathologized the African American community, finding dysfunction in a reactive, defeatist, overly emotional, and violent culture, including unstable family structures, inadequate schools, high crime rates, superstition, political provincialism, and unwholesome recreational activities (Myrdal 1944: 928–9). The “white man’s burden” obliges Whites to lead non-Whites into full assimilation.

The social science history of America’s race relations has attempted to explain why full integration and assimilation have not occurred. Hollywood, like the rest of society, has not been immune to this social science utopian discourse, and the politics of representation that shape it.

Second, the race and movies of the 1990s are stitched into a contemporary version of the American dilemma. These films enact a post-civil rights racial politics. This politics shapes a cinema of racial violence. It contributes to the production of a new racial discourse, which connects race and class to a culture of violence.

Third, a majority of Americans know and understand the American racial order through the mass media. Accordingly, those who control the media, including cinema and television, shape and define a society’s discourses about race, and race relations. As Hall argues, there is “no escaping the politics of [racial] representation” (1996b: 473). Gray elaborates, contending that in the 1980s the new right, under the leadership of Presidents Reagan and Bush, constructed notions “of whiteness that . . . [made] appeals to . . . black male gang members, black male criminality, crumbling black families, black welfare cheats, black female crack users, and black teen pregnancy” (1995: 14).

Fourth, the new right “had to take away from blacks (and other persons of color) the moral authority and claims to political entitlements won in the civil rights movements of the 1960s” (Gray 1995: 17–18). Negative images of “blackness,” and “brownness” (dark skin) were constructed, and cinematically arrayed “along a continuum ranging from menace on the one end to immorality on the other, with irresponsibility located somewhere in the middle” (p. 17).

Persons of color commingled in this complex, multidimensional, space. But in White popular, middle-class culture this was not a rainbow coalition; it represented, instead, a menacing blur of dark-skinned, non-English-speaking others, including African and Asian Americans, Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, and other Spanish or non-English-speaking subaltern persons (e.g., Indian).

Fifth, of course, nothing is pure, solely White, Black, or Hispanic, or Chicano or Asian. Instead, hybrid cultural forms interact in the gendered, racial, and ethnic spaces of popular culture: Chicano and Black rap,¹ the violent gang and gansta rap, Chicano and Black gangs, all-woman gangs (on this process, see Hall 1996b: 471). These cinematic and televisual representations of race, ethnicity, and gender constitute, at the national popular level, America’s system of race relations. Seemingly out-of-control classrooms are nonetheless managed by White women who are ex-marines (*Dangerous Minds*, 1995); and by the skin of his teeth, and with the help of a good Black man (*Grand Canyon*), a White man escapes from the violent racial ghetto streets of Los Angeles, a frightening place presented as if it were a bombed-out foreign city.

Sixth, this cinematic version of the racial order situates race in the “hood,” the barrio, and in Chinatown. In these foreign sites, the viewer confronts dark-skinned youth, baseball hats on backwards, driving low-riding cars. Threatening, cacophonous sounds reverberate from boom boxes – Chicano and Black rap. Complex mixes of black and brown faces confront the White viewer: Blacks, Asians, and Puerto Ricans, the subaltern threatening, youthful other is in our faces.

Seventh, the hood, barrio, and gang films of the 1980s and the 1990s answered to and attempted to salvage this political situation. Through the complex act of cinematic representation, these films defined this new (but old) racial order. African American, Chicano, Asian American, and White filmmakers produced a conservative cinema of racial violence; a cinema and cinematic gaze focused on the violent, destructive features of ghetto life, the very features stressed by the new right – drugs, the cocaine wars, gangs, gansta rap, drive-bys, and gang warfare (Reeves and Campbell 1994; Sanders 1994).² This gaze made the sexuality and violence of the Black body the object of a system of spectacular display. This racial gaze was aligned with the laws of patriarchy and the state. It made a spectacle of law and order. It made transgressive, Black male bodies the subjects and objects of a White panoptic system of social control and surveillance. In this manner, the cinematic gaze recreated a visual racial order of repression and control.

America’s Cinematic Racial Order

To begin the reading of America’s gendered, racialized, and classed cinematic racial order, an interrogation is done on a scene from Spike Lee’s highly controversial 1989 film, *Do the Right Thing* (Guerrero 1993: 148–54; Bogle 1994: 319–20).

Table 20.1 The gendered cinematic racial order and American theories of race relations, 1900–2000 (representative films)

	<i>African American</i>	<i>Asian American</i>	<i>Hispanic</i>	<i>Native American</i>
Race theories: Eugenics, nativism				
1900–1920	<i>Birth of a Nation</i>	<i>Broken Blossoms</i>	<i>Martyrs of the Alamo</i>	<i>Squaw Man</i>
Race theories: Race relations cycle, White man's burden, riots				
1921–30	<i>Our Gang</i>	<i>Mystery of Dr. Fu Manchu</i>	<i>Davey Crockett at the Fall of the Alamo</i>	<i>The Scarlet West</i>
Race theories: Melting pot, assimilation, cultural inferiors				
1931–40	<i>Gone with the Wind</i> <i>The Littlest Rebel</i>	<i>Charlie Chan's Chance</i>	<i>Flying Down to Rio</i> <i>Song of the Gringo</i>	<i>Last of the Mohicans</i>
Race theories: Black metropolis, melting pot, riots, American Dilemma				
1941–50	<i>Miracle in Harlem</i> <i>Pinky</i>	<i>Bataan</i> <i>Charlie Chan in Rio</i>	<i>Below the Border</i> <i>Border Buckaroos</i>	<i>Red River</i> <i>Duel in the Sun</i>
Race theories: Authoritarian personality, desegregation, melting pot, personal prejudice				
1951–60	<i>Porgy and Bess</i> <i>Defiant Ones</i>	<i>Yank in Korea</i> <i>Teahouse of the August Moon</i>	<i>Left-handed Gun</i> <i>Touch of Evil</i>	<i>Big Sky</i> <i>Apache</i> <i>Lone Ranger</i>
Race theories: Civil rights race riots, black power, miscegenation outlawed				
1961–70	<i>Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?</i>	<i>My Geisha</i> <i>Green Berets</i> <i>M*A*S*H</i>	<i>A Few Dollars More</i> <i>West Side Story</i>	<i>Comancheros</i> <i>Geronimo</i>
Race theories: Separatism, school integration, internal colonial models, Miami riots				
1971–80	<i>Shaft</i> <i>Cotton Comes to Harlem</i> <i>Coffey</i>	<i>Tora! Tora! Tora!</i> <i>McCabe and Mrs. Miller</i>	<i>French Connection</i> <i>Dirty Harry</i> <i>Badge 373</i>	<i>Outlaw Josey Wales</i> <i>Billy Jack</i>
Race theories: Multiculturalism, gangs, cocaine wars, Miami riots				
1981–90	<i>48 Hour</i> <i>Clara's Heart</i> <i>Lethal Weapon</i>	<i>Chan Is Missing</i> <i>Year of the Dragon</i>	<i>Zoot Suit</i> <i>Colors</i> <i>La Bamba</i>	<i>Dances with Wolves</i>
Race theories: Pluralism, diaspora, multiculturalism, affirmative action, riots				
1991–present	<i>Rage in Harlem</i> <i>Malcolm X</i>	<i>Joy Luck Club</i>	<i>American Me</i> <i>Mi Familia</i>	<i>Thunderheart</i> <i>Geronimo</i>

Sources: Bataille and Silete (1985); Richard Jr. (1992); Guerrero (1993); McKee (1993); Bogle (1994); Keller (1994); Boyd (1997).

The analysis will move backward and forward from this scene, offering a truncated genealogical and gendered history of America's race, ethnicity, and inequality cinema (Friedman 1991b). These films (see Table 20.1) can be read as modernist, realist, ethnographic texts³ – stories and narrative histories that privilege maleness and Whiteness, an assimilation-acculturation approach to social-class and race-relations problems in America (Lopez 1991: 405; Chow 1995: 176; Denzin 1997: 75–8).⁴

These films are tangled up in social science theories of inequality, race, ethnicity, and the American racial order, including arguments about eugenics, nativism, race relations cycles, melting pots, authoritarian personalities, labor markets, internal colonial models, multiculturalism, and theories of Diaspora and pluralism. As realist ethnographies, as texts which perform situated versions of the racialized class order, these films have created and perpetuated historically specific, racist, and gendered images of the dark-skinned ethnic other (Wang 1978). This racist imagery extends, like a continuous thread from *Birth of a Nation* through *Boyz 'N the Hood*. The topic, therefore, is how these films have done this and what the consequences are for race and class relations today. First, however, the discussion deals with Lee's movie.

Do the right thing

In a pivotal moment (near the film's climax), as the heat rises on the street, Lee has male members of each racial group in the neighborhood hurl vicious racial slurs at one another:

Mookie to Sal (and his Italian sons – Vito and Pino): “Dago, Wop, guinea, garlic breath, pizza slingin’ spaghetti bender, Vic Damone, Perry Como, Pavarotti.”

Pino to Mookie (and the Blacks): “Gold chain wearin’ fried chicken and biscuit eatin’ monkey, ape, baboon, fast runnin’, high jumpin’, spear chuckin’, basketball dunkin’ ditso spade, take you fuckin’ pizza and go back to Africa.”

A Puerto Rican man to the Korean grocer: “Little slanty eyed, me-no speakie American, own every fruit and vegetable stand in New York, Bull Shit, Reverend Sun Young Moon, Summer 88 Olympic kick-ass boxer, sonofabitch.”

White policeman: “You goya bean eatin’ 15 in the car, 30 in the apartment, pointy red shoes wearin’ Puerto Ricans, cocksuckers.”

Korean grocer: “I got good price for you, how am I doing? Chocolate, egg cream drinking, bagel lochs, Jew ass-hole.”

Sweet Dick Willie to the Korean grocer: “Korean motherfucker . . . you didn’t do a goddamn thing except sit on your monkey ass here on this corner and do nothin’.” (Denzin 1991: 129–30)

Race and ethnic relations in Lee's world

Lee's male speakers are trapped within the walls and streets of a multiracial ghetto (Bed-Stey). Their voices reproduce current (and traditional) cultural, social class, racial, and sexual stereotypes about Blacks (spade, monkey), Koreans (slanty-eyed), Puerto Ricans (pointy red shoes, cock-suckers), Jews (bagel lochs), and Italians (Dago, wop). The effects of these “in-your-face insults” are exaggerated through

wide-angled, close-up shots. The speaker's face literally fills the screen as the racial and class slurs are heard. These Black and White, Korean, Puerto Rican, and Hispanic men, women, and children exist in a racially divided urban world, a violent melting pot. In this violent world, little evidence of assimilation to the norms of White society appears, nor is there any evidence of the Black middle class in this film. Complex racial and political ideologies (violence versus nonviolence) are layered through subtle levels and layers of sexuality, intimacy, friendship, hate, love, and a lingering nostalgia for the way things were – or might have been – in days past.

Prejudice crosses color and class lines, but racial intolerance is connected to the psychology of the speaker (e.g., son Vito). It is “rendered as the *how* of personal bigotry” (Guerrero 1993: 154; emphasis in original). The economic and political features of institutional racism are not taken up; that is, in Lee's film “the *why* of racism is left unexplored” (p. 154; emphasis in original).

Still, even as racial insults are exchanged, Lee's text undoes the notion of an essential Black, White, Korean, Puerto Rican, or Hispanic subject. Each speaker's gendered self is deeply marked by the traces of religion, nationality, race, gender, and class. Blacks and Koreans inhabit an uneasy but shared space where, in the moment of the riot, the Korean grocer can claim to be Black, not Korean. Lee's world is a cosmos of the racial underclass in American today. This is a world where persons of color are all thrown together, a world where words – like assimilation, acculturation, pluralism, and integration – have little, if any, deep meaning. Lee's people have been excluded from the social, economic, and political structures of the outside White society.

In this little neighborhood's version of the hood, differences are ridiculed and mocked. Separatism is not valued, although intergroup differences are preserved, through speech, music, dress, and public demeanor. Indeed, like ethnic voyeurs, or middle-class tourists, the members of each ethnic group stare at one another and comment on how the racially and ethnically different other goes about doing business and daily life. These separate racial and ethnic groups are not merging into a single, ethnic entity.

Only in a later film (*Clockers*, 1995) will Lee take up the “insidious, socially fragmented violence” (Guerrero 1993: 159) of the hood films of Singleton, Van Peebles, and the Hughes brothers. Cheap guns, crack cocaine, gang and drug warfare are not present here. However, a seething racial rage is a rage that is deeper than skin color, deeper than social class, even. This is a rage, even when muted, that attacks White racism, and urges new forms of Black, Korean, Puerto Rican, Hispanic, and Latino nationalism.

Thus is evidenced a reverse form of ethnic nativism;⁵ disadvantaged racial group members stereotyping and asserting their superiority over the ethnically different other. Victims of racial hatred, they reproduce that hatred in their interactions with members of different racial and ethnic groups. The benefits of the backlash politics of the Reagan and Bush years are now evident (Guerrero 1993: 161). Fifteen years of playing the race card, 15 years of neoconservative, racial, nativist, national politics come home to roost. The nation's racist, crumbling, violent, inner-city ethnic enclaves have become “violent *apartheid* environments” (p. 159; emphasis in original).

Consequently, Lee's film – as realist-ethnographic text – marks one ending for one history of the gendered, social class and race relations story in America today. It is an ending that has race riots and racial minorities attacking one another.⁶ This ending demonstrates the paucity and tragedy of nativist and liberal assimilationist (and pluralist), desegregation models of race and ethnic relations (McKee 1993: 360–7). It is as if the clock had been turned back to 1914 and everyone was watching D. W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation*; White men in Klan hoods attacking coons who are sexually threatening the sexuality and lives of White women (see Singleton's 1997 film, *Rosewood*). Thus, it is the birth of a new racist nation,⁷ but how to start over?

In the Beginning: Creating a Cinema of Racial Difference

There is no fixed place to start the conjunctural history of America's cinematic racial order. Even before Griffith's *Birth of a Nation* (1915), earlier silent films – including *Chinese Laundry Scene* (1894), *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1903), and *A Gypsy Duel* (1904) – were presenting racist views of American race relations (Guerrero 1993: 9; Keller 1994: 10–11). Nonetheless, by the mid-1920s Hollywood had firmly put in place a system of visual and narrative racism (Wang 1978: 2, 73–5) that privileged Whiteness.⁸ This system solidified what would be a near-century's long version of racial and ethnic stereotypes. These stereotypes would be fitted to the cinematic representation of African, Hispanic, Native, and Asian Americans. "Rarely protagonists, ethnics merely provided local color, comic relief, or easily recognizable villains and dramatic foils" (Lopez 1991: 404). The effect of this marginalization produces the standard assessment. Hollywood's ethnic representations were (and are) "damaging, insulting and negative" (p. 404).

Following Lopez, this chapter argues the possibility to "pinpoint a golden or near-golden, moment when Hollywood, for complex conjunctural reasons, sees the light and becomes temporarily more sensitive to an ethnic or minority group" (1991: 406). These moments vary for each minority group: after World War II, for Jews and Latin Americans; after the civil rights movement of the 1960s for Hispanic, Asian, African, and Native Americans (p. 406). In these moments, gendered history is rewritten. Previous stereotypical representations are rejected and new understandings and stereotypes are constructed (p. 406).

As with Lopez (1991: 405), these films are read with their historical moments as situated, modernist, naturalistic ethnographies (see Denzin 1997: 75–6). These cultural texts factually, authentically, realistically, objectively, and dramatically present the lived realities of gender, class, race, and ethnicity. These films perform race, class, and ethnicity (Lee's Pino talking to Mookie), and do so in ways that mask the filmmaker's presence. This supports the belief that objective reality has been captured. These texts bring gendered racial and ethnic differences into play through a focus on the talk of ordinary men, women, and children and their personal experiences.

These are ethnographies of cultural difference, performance texts that carry the authority of cinematic mimesis. They "realistically" reinscribe familiar (and new) cultural stereotypes, for example, young gang members embodying hip-hop, rap

culture.⁹ These representations simultaneously contain and visually define the ethnic other. This is a mimesis which rests on the conditions of its own creation: White stereotypes of dark-skinned people.

These texts are cultural translations; they exoticize strange and different racial worlds, often revealing the “dirty secrets” (Chow 1995: 202) that operate in these exotic worlds. Borrowing from Chow (p. 202), who borrows from Taussig (1993), contemporary race and ethnic films constitute a “novel anthropology.” The object of these texts is not the exotic world itself, but “the West itself mirrored in the eyes and handiwork of others” (Chow 1995: 202). As translations, these films bring positive and negative attention to the ethnic culture in question (p. 202). In so doing, they risk betraying the very world they valorize, for its meanings have now been filtered through the lens of the filmmaker as ethnographer.

Structural Commonalities

Hollywood’s treatment and representation of the ethnic other has been shaped by the following factors and processes: (1) nineteenth- and twentieth-century racist ideologies; (2) a preexisting racist popular culture; (3) an early, racist silent cinema; (4) the advent of sound film (*The Jazz Singer*, 1927); (5) a widely understood racist performance vocabulary; (6) gender-specific, cinematic, racial stereotypes connected to (7) a series of film types and genres; (8) a segregated society which reproduced these cinematic stereotypes; (9) a preexisting star system contained within a vertically integrated studio production system¹⁰ (Keller 1994: 112), which used a racist film-production code; (10) the production of literary and dramatic works with racial themes that could be made into movies, including those in the post-World War II, realistic social consciousness, social problems tradition (1947–62; Cook 1981: 401; Keller 1994: 127); (11) minority directors, actors, and actresses seeking cinematic work, expanding minority theater audiences, and the appearance of theaters in racial ghettos (Bogle 1994: 105); (12) America’s military history; (13) the civil rights and women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s.

A brief discussion of each of these dimensions is required; and then this chapter argues that men and women in each minority group have a different history with these structural processes. Ruptures and interruptions, as well as the absence of continuity, mark these disjointed histories.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century racist ideologies – which affirmed the White man’s burden in the race relations arena, the celebrated Anglo-Saxon nativism¹¹ – emphasized the uncivilized nature of dark-skinned persons and their threat to White society (including women); favored a “melting pot” assimilationist philosophy of racial difference (Musser 1991: 39; Keller 1994: 5); set immigration quotas; endorsed laws against miscegenation and integration; and sustained a commitment to racial conflict and genocide, when necessary.

A preexisting oral (storytelling), print (comic books, dime novels), performative and visual (vaudeville, minstrel shows) popular culture of racial differences shaped and supplemented the cinematic representation of America’s racial order (Keller 1994: 5). These cultural texts drew upon the above beliefs and provided early cinema with a repertoire of racist cultural images.¹²

Early silent cinema (1900–26; see Mast 1976: 221) – using racial stereotypes, racial slurs, and racist cosmetology (blackface) – told comedies and other stories about the racially inferior (and threatening) ethnic other (on the ethnic and racial comedies, see Musser 1991). Silent cinema used White actors and actresses in blackface (Bogle 1994: 26). This ended with the release of *The Jazz Singer* in 1927. This film signaled the need for “real Negroes in Negro roles” (p. 26)¹³ and marked the popularity of film musicals, an idiom connected with Black cultural life (p. 26).¹⁴ This opened the door for an indigenous American Black cinema, which flourished from the 1920s to the 1940s (p. 105).¹⁵

These films helped shape an ethnically specific visual, racist performance vocabulary. This vocabulary has precise terms and looks for Blacks (toms, mammies; see Bogle 1994: 4); Asians (chinks, gooks; see Wang 1978); Native Americans (redskins and good Indians; see Bataille and Silet 1985); Hispanics (greasers and half-breeds; Keller 1994: 13); and members of other ethnic groups (Jewish, Irish, Italian, and so forth).

Visual (and vocal) excess were central to this performance vocabulary, which was historically specific (see later discussion). Visual excess focused on costume, performance style, sexuality, and musicality.¹⁶ Visual repertoires implemented racial and ethnic stereotypes. These included, for Blacks, stoop-shouldered, banjo playing, shuffling males in blackface, wearing work clothes; for one version of the Black women, jolly, smiling, happy aunt Jemimas; for Asians, opium dens, slant-eyed, self-deprecating, small-boned males with Fu Manchu moustaches; and for Asian women, reed-slender, kimono-garbed Madame Butterflies; for Native Americans, teepees, dogs, horses, mountains, brown-skinned men (and women) with painted faces, bows and arrows, and braided hair; for Hispanics, gay caballeros, zoot suits, greasy hair, guitars, sombreros, flowing, colorful skirts, and guitar music.

Vocal excess emphasized the inability of the ethnic other to speak ordinary English. Garbled, slurred speech and racially coded phrases connected to each minority group were developed, including Blacks: “Yo,” “git,” “jest,” “Bro”; Hispanics: thick, impenetrable accents, using Spanish phrases – i.e., “I keel ze man sis morning” (Keller 1994: 65); and Asians: using pidgin English. Wang offers this example from *Chinatown* (1974). In responding to Jack Nicholson, a Japanese gardener observes, “Salt water velly [very] bad for glass [grass]” (1978: 215).

The speech of Carmen Miranda, the best-known Latin American actress of the 1940s, was constantly characterized by the presence of “cultural impurities . . . disturbing syncretisms . . . accents . . . shifting registers of tone and pitch . . . and linguistic malapropisms” (Lopez 1991: 416). As Valdivia observes for Latinos, “the endurance of the accent in the stereotypes stems from the mistaken characterization of all Latinos as recent, and quite often illegal, immigrants” (1996: 131). Broken speech places the ethnic other outside the American mainstream.

This visual and verbal vocabulary often interpreted the minority-group member in sexual, not racial or ethnic, terms (Lopez 1991: 410), thereby maintaining the theme of miscegenation while preserving barriers between Whites and non-Whites. Thus, the bodies and sexual demeanor of classic Latin actresses (Delores Del Rio, Lupe Velez) were presented as exuding smoldering, irresistible sensuality, and sexuality (pp. 410, 412). Called “hot-blooded Latin temptresses” (pp. 410, 412), these women were represented as being attractive to (and attracted to) Anglo men. On-screen miscegenation was not allowed (Lopez 1991: 412; see note 16).¹⁷

This performance vocabulary was fused with stereotypical gender-specific identities fitted to each minority group. These identities were connected to the appearance of major and minor parts in American movies for Blacks, Asians, Hispanics, Native Americans, and representatives from other racial and ethnic groups.

According to Keller (1994: 37–69), 11 identities – three for women (cantina girl, faithful self-sacrificing *senorita*, vamp), and eight for men (greaser, bandit, bad Mexican, gay caballero [i.e., Zero, Cisco Kid, good Mexican, good bad man, Hispanic avenger, and Latin lover]) – were developed for Hispanics. As previously noted, Bogle lists five basic (and classic) Black characters: tom, coon (pickaninny, Uncle Remus), tragic mulatto, mammy, brutal-black buck (1994: 3–4).¹⁸ Asian characters divide between Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan types, conniving businessmen, gang members, brutal military officers, laborers, cooks, dragon ladies, and geisha girls (see Wang 1978; Marchetti 1991, 1993).¹⁹

These character types were stitched into film genres and film types. For Hispanics there were Latin musicals (and Latin lovers), Western, border, bullfighting, Mexican revolution, barrio and gangs, prison, drug, Acapulco, family, and immigration films (Keller 1994). Asian character types were primarily fitted to adventure, crime and mystery, war and westerns (Wang 1978: 197); and Native Americans to westerns. Blacks, like Asians, have been cast in any film requiring a servant. While Blacks have not been confined to a specific genre, Black actors, and actresses, until recently, have not been cast as major characters in mainstream Hollywood cinema. The Black musical is an exception to this conclusion. From the 1920s to the present, Blacks have been cast in “old south” plantation stories, spirituals, musicals, family melodramas, ghetto adventures (blaxploitation), buddy, and action films.

A racially and ethnically segregated society (education, leisure, work, religion, residence) helped to define, embody, and reproduce the cinematic racial order and its pervasive stereotypes. These stereotypes were perpetuated by a segregated and class-stratified film industry. Central to the industry’s racial self-consciousness was the development of a production code (1922–34, 1968, 1972) that prohibited miscegenation and sexual relations between and across racial and class boundaries (Cook 1981: 214–15, 266–7, 442–4).²⁰

Hollywood needed stories to tell. There were ample literary works and dramatic plays telling stories about race and ethnic relations that could be adapted to the screen (*Gone with the Wind*, *Charlie Chan’s Courage*, *West Side Story*, *The Last of the Mohicans*, *Dances with Wolves*) and to one or more film genres (comedy, family melodrama, western, women’s film).

Throughout the twentieth century there was (especially for Blacks) a pool of minority production companies (Reol, Gate City Film), theaters, directors (Micheaux), actors (Robinson, Gilpin, Moreland), and actresses (Horne, McKinney), who could direct or be cast in these films (Bogle 1994: 105). This group would, after the 1960s, become more active in the cinematic representation of African Americans (see Wang 1978; Guerrero 1993; Marchetti 1993; Reid 1993; Bogle 1994; Keller 1994).²¹

America’s cinema of racial representation is intimately connected to wars and the military. Virtually every major American war (Revolution, Civil, Native American, Alamo, Spanish American, World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and so on) has occasioned attempts to align minority males with the American war effort, while

often identifying the enemy as the self-same foreign, ethnic other. Thus, there have been good and bad Asian (*M*A*S*H*),²² Native American (*Thunderheart*), Hispanic (*The Alamo*), and Black soldiers (*Glory*, *Soldier's Story*). The high death count of the ethnic other cannot be minimized. Wang notes that the film industry has emphasized the Asian death theme, "by way of kill ratios and filmic body counts. The assumed cheapness of Asian life is an integral part of America's cultural perception of Asia" (1978: 239). (This theme has recently been extended to the hood movies, where the body count of dark-skinned youth is always very high.)

The civil rights and women's movements of the 1960s and 1970s helped create the conditions that challenged long-standing racist and sexist representations of America's major minority groups.²³ Thus the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s were associated with politically self-conscious Black, Asian American, and Hispanic cinemas.²⁴

Reading the Cinematic Racial Order

On the surface, Hollywood's version of the gendered racial order appears to be seamless and continuous, a constant history of undifferentiated derogation, and racist (and ethnic) stereotyping that applies across each racial and ethnic group (but see Lopez 1991: 404). This image is sustained, in part, because a series of common structural factors shaped Hollywood's representations of the ethnic other, including those discussed above: the sound, star, genre, and studio production system, the larger system of racism (and miscegenation) in American culture, the major foreign wars of the twentieth century, and so on. That is, each minority group was confronted with a racist system of cinematic representation.

However, a minority group's place in the cinematic racial order was (and is) shaped by how and when it entered this system of structural commonalities. In turn, each group's history is marked, as Lopez (1991: 406) notes, by multiple moments of revisionist, racial enlightenment, by new forms of representation and interpretation that are aligned with current perceptions.

This suggests that America's cinematic racial order is a fractured, discontinuous system of representation, a system that is constantly being revised in light of new understandings. These revisions move in two directions at the same time. In some instances, they return to the beginning, to reinscriptions of those moments when the minority group is defined as entering American society.²⁵ In other forms, the revision attempts to correct, or alter, ongoing representations of the group – for example, contemporary challenges to the violence in the hood movies (Weinraub 1997), or claims that these films treat women in negative ways (hooks 1990: 180). In both instances, the revision and its meanings are connected to other representations and anchored in specific historical contexts (see Hall 1996c: 435).

Thus, under the White, Eurocentric model, African Americans entered the system as slaves, products of a plantation system and an internal, civil war. Native Americans were treated as enemies of the state, to be placed on reservations, their native cultures destroyed. Asian Americans represented a threatening barbarian, foreign presence in American culture (Wang 1978: ii); they needed to be destroyed, assimilated, or otherwise put in the service of the state. Hispanics were a diverse

group (Keller 1994): Mexicans who wanted to control the Alamo, lawless, Mexican revolutionaries, greasers, half-breeds, Spanish and Latin aristocrats, Latin American politicians.

This historical relationship with the state shaped Hollywood's representations of each ethnic group. That is, this relationship defined how the group originally entered into the system of cinematic representation (slave, bandit, half-breed, barbarian, etc.). Each group, in turn, fitted this relationship to its own structural history with the state and with Hollywood's cinematic apparatus.

African American cinema

The cinematic representation of Blacks, decade by decade (from 1900 to the present), alternates between four basic race relations models: pure segregation (plantation) stories (1930–45 – *Gone with the Wind*); mid-century (1947–62) social consciousness, assimilation films examining the negative consequences of segregation (e.g., the Negro Cycle films of 1949); post-1970 movies examining the positive benefits of assimilation (the *Lethal Weapon* series); and post-1970 films repudiating assimilation and stressing, instead, Black separatism and life in the hood (the blaxploitation films of the 1970s and the hood films of the 1990s; see Table 20.1).

Bogle and Guerrero both note that by the early 1920s Blacks had their own star and film production system, and were creating films that challenged racist images contained in Griffith's *Birth of a Nation*, and the earlier *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The 1920s featured the comic Negro, the jester, the blackface tradition, and cute little Black children.²⁶ The sound system in the 1930s created an important place for Black (*Porgy and Bess*) and Latin (*Flying Down to Rio*) musicals.

Two significant features defined the Black 1940s. The first was the continued presence of Black entertainers, including the sophisticated use of jazz performers (Louis Armstrong) and Black singers (Lena Horne). These films contained extended musical scenes, unrelated to the narrative, which could be cut if audiences objected to seeing a Negro on the screen (Bogle 1994: 121).

The second feature involved the emerging "New Negro" film cycle connected, in part, to the social-consciousness film movement that extended from 1947 to 1962. A new group of Black actors and actresses²⁷ presented a "New Negro," who emerged as a sympathetic human being, a strong woman, a feeling man, a doctor . . . minister.²⁸ The "New Negro" films represent a significant revisionist moment in Hollywood's treatment of African Americans. The "Negro Cycle" films of 1949 (Cook 1981: 401), examined previously taboo topics: passing, tragic mulattoes, and racial intolerance. These films opened the spaces for the major (and minor) Black stars of the 1950s.²⁹

The 1950s are the Eisenhower decade, the age of black-and-white television, the Korean War, the Supreme Court desegregation decision of 1954, bus boycotts, Jackie Robinson, Martin Luther King, federal troops marching in Arkansas, forced integration in America's schools, but continued residential and workplace segregation (Bogle 1994: 160). Dorothy Dandridge, Sidney Poitier, and Ethel Waters emerged as Black stars that could carry films to a mass White audience (p. 161).

The flaws in the national doctrine of integration would be exposed in the 1960s, transition years when the civil rights movement would reveal racism to "be . . . a national sickness" (Bogle 1994: 193). More deeply, the institutional roots of racism

would be uncovered, and the limits of a personal, psychological approach to racism made apparent.

During the 1960s, however, mainstream Hollywood primarily was silent on civil rights (and Vietnam).³⁰ Four Black art films at the beginning of the decade (*Shadows*, 1961; *The Cool World*, 1963; *One Potato, Two Potato*, 1964; *Nothing But a Man*, 1964), and four new-style Black films released in 1969 (*Uptight*, *Slaves*, *The Learning Tree*, *The Lost Man*, *Putney Swope*) marked the beginning of the Black separatist movement (Bogle 1994: 194).

The 1970s is called the decade of "The New Black Hollywood" (Bogle 1994: 257). "The studios produced black-oriented films pitched directly at pleasing blacks" (p. 232). The industry focused on the following types of films: blaxploitation (*Sweet Sweetback's Baadasssss Song*); action films with the pimp/outlaw/rebel as folk hero (p. 236); black-community comedies (*Cotton Comes to Harlem*); action and war films starring black athletes (O. J. Simpson, Jim Brown); black-family films (*Sounder*); women's films (including action, *Coffey*, and tragic romances, *Lady Sings the Blues*); Richard Pryor's Black-White male bonding comedies (*Silver Streak*); and Black musicals (*The Wiz*).³¹

The blaxploitation and black comedies of the 1970s celebrated life in the Black, urban community, and films laughed at and with the old Black characters (congenial coons, toms, painted ladies; Bogle 1994: 234). They flaunted Black power, crossed previously taboo class and sexual boundaries, challenged racism, and stressed a militant form of Black separatism (p. 236).

The 1980s, the "tan decade" (Bogle 1994: 268), can be read as a return to the 1960s, "black performers in supporting roles in big-budgeted, general white releases" (pp. 268–9): Carl Weathers (*Rocky*), Morgan Freeman (*Driving Miss Daisy*). With few exceptions (*Do the Right Thing*, 1989), the Black activism of the 1970s was absent. Assimilationist stories predominated (*Trading Places*, *Beverly Hills Cop*). The concept of a corrupt racist system was not part of Hollywood's discourse under the Reagan and Bush administrations (p. 267; also Page 1997: 107)

Five films at the end of the decade took up Blackness from a White, revisionist perspective: *Cry Freedom* (1987), *Mississippi Burning* (1988), *Bird* (1988), *Glory* (1989), and *Driving Miss Daisy* (1989). Charles Burnett, Julie Dash, Spike Lee, and Robert Townsend emerged as important, new, independent filmmakers who were examining Blackness for a Black audience. The decade ends with Lee's *Do the Right Thing*, a return, with new multicultural themes, to the militant, Black separatist films of the 1970s.

Thus do Lee's texts segue into the hood movies of the 1990s: *New Jack City*, *Boyz n the Hood*, *Menace II Society*, rap, hip hop, and repetitions of old stereotypes toward women. New and previously established Black filmmakers, actors, and actresses gained power and recognition.³²

Hispanic cinema

On the surface, Hollywood's treatment of Hispanics parallels its treatment of Blacks: namely, the reproduction of stereotypes (greasers, half-breeds, red-hot lovers) stitched into a discontinuous film history moving between segregation, assimilation, and separatist narratives. However, the situations of the two groups cannot easily

be fitted into a single historical model. Hispanics have a complicated relationship to Anglo cinema culture, a relationship that is confused by several factors.

The word Hispanic – like the words Latino, Chicano, Mestizo, Mexican, and Spanish American – contains multiple meanings. These include those connected to such identity markers as race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and politics (Noriega and Lopez 1996: x).³³ These meanings blur with other factors involving language group (see Anzaldúa 1987: viii), intermarriage, nationality, region and city (e.g., Southwest, Miami, Los Angeles, etc.).

Thus, various accounts of “Hispanic” cinema (Hadley-Garcia 1990; but see Noriega 1992a, 1992b, 1996; Fregoso 1993; also Rodriguez 1997: 9) write this history through the word Hispanic, and through the various “Hispanic” themes that have been present in American cinema since the silent era. This produces a series of discontinuous, decade-by-decade, regional, genre-driven, discrete histories that often crosscut the above categories (see Keller 1994: 3): the Broncho Billy cycles, the Latin Musical, the cowboy western.³⁴

The only constant in this process are the stereotypes that spill over from one genre to another. These stereotypes cluster around a small set of negative meanings, including barbaric, greaser, lustful, treacherous, untrustworthy, lawless, and violent. In turn, these meanings circulate around those shifting points of reference marked by non-Whiteness (dark and brown skin), impenetrable accents, and the words “Hispanic,” “spic,” “Mexican,” and “half-breed.”³⁵

Noriega and Lopez clarify this complex structure of meanings and factors, arguing that all Latino films:

be approached through the matrix of differential histories . . . the ethnic or, subnational (Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban American); the interethnic and interminority;³⁶ the panethnic or national . . . (Latino, Hispanic); the mainstream, or national (American); and the hemispheric or, international (Latin American). (1996: xii–xiii)³⁷

So there is no single “Hispanic” cinema. There are multiple “Hispanic” cinemas, which only work back and forth against one another (and the White mainstream) in every decade and period since the silent era.

As early as 1913 there were protests against the film industry and its negative representations of Hispanics (Keller 1994: 116). These protests continued into the 1930s, when the Good Neighbor Policy (1933–47) of the Roosevelt administration called for friendly, less racist pictures of Hispanics (Lopez 1991: 407).³⁸

The social consciousness, social problems films of the 1947–62 period produced sympathetic images of Hispanics, including youth gang films (e.g., *Blackboard Jungle*), and courtroom (*The Lawless*, 1950) dramas (Keller 1994: 129). These were assimilation narratives that positioned border-crossing Mexicans as threats to mainstream culture (see Berg 1992: 39).

There was no mid-century “Hispanic film” cycle, as there had been for Blacks. However, four events in the 1960s significantly shaped Hispanic film: the civil rights movement (see Noriega 1992b: 141);³⁹ the repeal of miscegenation laws; the development (in Italy) of the “spaghetti western” directed by Sergio Leone and starring Clint Eastwood (e.g., *A Fistful of Dollars*); and the training of a group of Hispanic film professionals who would come of age in the 1980s (see Noriega 1992b: 142; 1996: 7–8).⁴⁰

In the 1960s, Hollywood, as it had been for Blacks, was silent on civil rights for Hispanics. The Italian westerns reproduced old stereotypes, and a cycle of urban gang films (*West Side Story*, 1961; *Young Savages*, 1961; *The Pawnbroker*, 1965; *Wild Angels*, 1966; *Change of Habit*, 1969) perpetuated negative images about bad, lazy Mexicans, and Latins (Keller 1994: 153).

In the 1970s, the Hispanic community did not generate its version of the blaxploitation films, although the Hispanic and Chicano civil rights movement helped put the Frito Bandito, Chiquita Banana, and Jose Jimenez to rest (Keller 1994: 162). Hispanic gang films, as if in anticipation of the Black hood movies of the 1990s, gathered force in the late 1970s (*Boulevard Nights*, 1979),⁴¹ and continued through the 1980s (*Zoot Suit*, 1981; *Stand Alone*, 1985; *The Principal*, 1987; *Colors*, 1988).

These films perpetuated the public myth that “one of the major ways Chicanos become visible in public discourse is as ‘social problems . . . as greasers . . . bandidos . . . [as members of] gangs’” (Fregoso 1993: 29; see also Jankowski 1991; Reeves and Campbell 1994; Sanders 1994).

Between the “summer of 1987 and the spring of 1988” (Keller 1994: 163) “Hispanic Hollywood” arrived with the release of four films: *La Bamba*, *Born in East L. A.*, *The Milagro Beanfield War*, *Stand and Deliver* (p. 163).⁴² Like the “the New Black Hollywood” of the 1970s, the “new” Hispanic Hollywood films of the late 1980s were produced by Hispanic filmmakers,⁴³ for a Hispanic audience and starred Hispanics.⁴⁴ These films actively engaged and criticized earlier genres which denied, repressed, or distorted Chicano/a history (Fregoso 1993: 30).

They were successful financially, and were “eminently Chicano” (Keller 1994: 164). Each used intensive bilingualism, focused on Chicano characters, positively evoked the Chicano lifestyle, and made positive connections between Mexico and US Hispanic border culture.⁴⁵

The Chicano/a cinema movement extends into the 1990s with a continuation of films made by Chicanos (and Chicanas) for and about the Chicano community, including the Hispanic hood: *Hangin’ with the Homeboys* (1991), *American Me* (1992), *Bound by Honor: Blood In, Blood Out* (1993), *My Family/Mi Familia* (1995), and *My Crazy Life/Mi Vida Loco* (1995). This new cinema employs the economic practices of mainstream Hollywood to produce films which create a critical, historical race consciousness, a history that attempts to reclaim a forgotten past (see Noriega 1992b: 149–53; Goldman 1996: 84 – e.g., *Zoot Suit*).

A specific set of film practices are associated with this project, including the use of *mise-en-scène*, montage, testimonials, folk ballads (corridos), off-screen narration, and voice-overs (see Noriega 1992b: 152–9; Fregoso 1993: 70–6).⁴⁶ These narrative and cinematic techniques celebrate and mark key elements in Chicano culture, especially the themes of resistance, maintenance, affirmation, and neo-indigenism, or *mestizaje* (Noriega 1992b: 150), that is, the person who crosses borders. This “border cinema” contests assimilation and melting-pot narratives.⁴⁷

The Los Angeles Schools of Chicano/a and Black Filmmakers

By 1990 there were two new groups of filmmakers, the Black and brown Los Angeles Schools (see Masilela 1993; Noriega 1992b: 142, 1996: 7–8; Fregoso 1993:

31, 129). The barrio-hood (and Hispanic prison) films of the 1980s (*Zoot Suit*) and 1990s (*American Me*) connect Hispanic gangs and community life to a unique regional and ethnic border culture, what some argue is the new dominant form of American culture (Noriega 1992b: 151). Nonassimilation is a key element in these films.⁴⁸

The Los Angeles Schools of Chicano/a and Black filmmakers share several characteristics (see Diawara 1993: 9, 22–5; Massood 1996): a concentration on the present; an opposition, at one level, to Hollywood studio practices; a telling of family stories; the use of native cultural musical forms; challenges to simplistic assimilation narratives; a focus on the negative features of gang life; an examination of life in the hood and the barrio, including constant police surveillance; telling masculine, heterosexual coming-of-age stories.

The two schools implement a critical approach to cultural identity (Noriega 1992b: 151, 1996: 6; Masilela 1993: 108).⁴⁹ The classic, cinematic approach to ethnic identity assumed a core self with a fixed origin, an authentic, ethnic essence located in a unified subject: a greaser, a coon, a mammy, a tragic mulatto (see Hall 1989: 69; Fregoso 1993: 31). The new filmmakers reject this essentializing approach, calling, instead, for a transformational model which sees identity in gendered, processional terms (Hall 1989: 70). This multisided identity is constituted “within not outside [the system] of representation” (p. 68), including television and cinema (Hall 1989: 80; Fregoso 1993: 32).

This processional view creates the space for the reexamination of new and old forms of Chicano/a and Black cultural identity. Yet, as Fregoso notes, even as this critical reappraisal occurs, a public myth is perpetuated (1993: 29). The “official race-relations narrative” (p. 29) in America today converges on a single point – the threats posed by Black and Hispanic male youth to White society. This myth privileges the ideology of assimilation. This story has “dominated media portrayals, and the social-science literature since the 1960s” (Fregoso 1993: 29).

Asian American cinema

The Asian American cinematic story is at least as long as a century: the construction of the mysterious Orient as a site of desire, violence, and intrigue, the Orient as a threat to the West (Browne 1989: 29; Marchetti 1993: 27). This is a history with variations on a single, but complex, motif: distorted, racist representations of Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Filipinos, Vietnamese, and Asian Indians (Wang 1978: i). This theme is contained, and repeated, within three basic film genres: adventure films, crime, mystery and spy stories, and war narratives (p. 195). Assimilation narratives are the norm for this so-called “model minority group” (Healey 1995: 404). Unlike Hispanic and Black cinema, there is no extended positive revisionist period for the Asian American community, no golden moment when Hollywood seems to see the light.

Predictably, military representations gather force during each major war (Russo-Japanese, World Wars I and II, Korean War), extending through the most recent Vietnam revisionist film (*Heaven and Earth*, 1993).⁵⁰ The recurring popularity of the war film is ideological. The major wars since the mid-twentieth century have been sites for the reproduction of negative Asian images. These wars are directly

linked to America's ideological battles with fascism and communism. The Asian other is a political enemy, an internal (and external) threat to democracy and the principles of American capitalism (see Wang 1978: 174). This is a cinematic history of racial violence, a history that ignores cultural differences, and presumes essential racial identities.⁵¹

This history treats all Asians as if they belonged to the same ethnic, religious, and national group. It does not differentiate between Asian nationalities, for example between Korean, Chinese, and Japanese (see Wang 1978: xvi). Nor does it address the complex and shifting foreign relationships between each Asian nation and the United States during the twentieth century (p. 68).

Asians enter silent (and sound) cinema as Eurasian seductresses, Asian war brides, exotic China dolls, evil Dr. Fu Manchu,⁵² masquerading geishas (Browne 1989: 29; Marchetti 1993: 9), spies, military officers, Oriental detectives (Chan, Moto, Wang), Asian warlords, opium den and drug kingpins, passive, cowardly coolies, "pigtailed Chinese laundrymen" (Wang 1978: 57), servants, lowly examples of the Yellow Peril, oriental villains, and immigrating Asian hordes, (pp. 30, 57, 59; Denzin 1995: 90–1; *Wild Bill*, 1995).

Predictably, two themes, connected to the spy, mystery, and war genres, intertwine in this early period; namely, the criminal, military, and sexual threats of the Asian other to American (and British) Society. The sexual and rape themes that sexualize racism (Wang 1978: 23, 76) are powerfully presented in D. W. Griffith's *Broken Blossoms* (1919). This film is a virtual catalog of sexual excesses (rape, incest, sadism, masochism, pedophilia, necrophilia, fetishism, voyeurism; Marchetti 1993: 33).⁵³

The second predominant motif of the silent period, the criminal, detective (spy) and military theme, is given in the figure of Dr. Fu Manchu, whose popularity increased with the advent of sound. Soon the Oriental sleuth, who was virtually ignored in silent film, would complement this figure. With the third Charlie Chan movie, *Behind That Curtain*, the Asian detective became a staple of Asian American cinema (Denzin 1995: 88–95). This sleuth would work in the service of law and order, peace and justice, to protect the world from sinister criminals.

The war genre films briefly ended in 1945, with the Japanese surrender, only to be taken up again with the Cold War (1947–9), the Korean War (1950–3), and the new war against communism (Wang 1978: 169). Americans seemed unable to distinguish the Japanese from the Chinese and the Koreans, although the Korean War would become the site for the construction of a new version of the Yellow Peril (p. 176). Films about prison camp (*Bridge on the River Kwai*, 1957) and brainwashing (*Manchurian Candidate*, 1962) were pivotal in this period. These texts presented images of "white men's minds being manipulated or destroyed by Asians" (p. 178).

Four films in the social problems film cycle of the 1950s partially corrected this negative treatment of the Japanese. *Japanese War Bride* (1952), *Go for Broke* (1951), *Bad Day at Black Rock* (1954), and *Three Stripes in the Sun* (1955), "all dramatized the Japanese as victims of American bigotry" (Keller 1994: 128).⁵⁴ This brief period of positive treatment did not carry over into the civil rights consciousness of the 1960s. Wang argues: "the Asians were omitted from what was essentially a biracial consciousness (Whites and Blacks only) among film-makers" (1978: 183). Indeed, the Vietnam conflict was an occasion for renewed, negative treatments

of the Asian other. This negativity was based, in part, on the fact that this war was causing so much trouble in America (Desser 1991: 81).

The Asian enemy of the 1960s was located in one of three sites, which often overlapped: in Vietnam (*Green Berets*); in the American war protestor (*Alice's Restaurant*, 1969), or the damaged Vietnam veteran (*Who'll Stop the Rain*, 1978); or, as in the James Bond films, in the menacing figure of Dr. No. The Vietnamese enemy was a cliché, a construction based on previous cinematic treatments of the Japanese, Koreans, and the Chinese. He was a jungle-monkey. He hid in burrows. He lived underground. He lay in ambush of well-meaning American soldiers, and he emitted shrill cries when he attacked (Wang 1978: 187).

Three decades of films have attempted to recover the meanings of the Vietnamese war for America (see Auster and Quart 1988). The 1960s gave Americans John Wayne's super-patriotic *Green Berets*. The 1970s offered the dark and deeply existential *Deer Hunter* (1978) and *Apocalypse Now* (1979). Patriotic themes reappeared in the Reagan decade with the three-part Rambo (1982, 1985, 1988) series. However, questioning, doubting films like *Killing Fields* (1984), *Platoon* (1986), *Full Metal Jacket* (1987), and *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989), challenged the 1980s Rambo narrative.

The memory of Vietnam lingers in the American imagination (Auster and Quart 1988: 130). Comedies like *Good Morning, Vietnam* (1987), and television series like "China Beach" and "Magnum, P. I." cannot erase the cinematic images of napalmed bodies, screaming children, and destroyed Vietnamese villages.

The 1970s and 1980s would work back and forth against the Vietnam narrative. Domesticated and exotic images of the Asian American would be given in the western (*McCabe and Mrs. Miller*, 1971), film noir (*Chinatown*, 1974), and disaster (*Airport*, 1975) genres. The Bruce Lee, Hong Kong, martial arts, "chop sticky" series (*Enter the Dragon*, 1973) introduces a 1970s version of Mr. Moto, a diminutive, violent Asian male, who uses martial (kung fu) arts for law and order.⁵⁵

Lee's project would be countered by the Chuck Norris 1980s *Missing in Action* series (1984, 1985, 1988), a White man using martial arts against evil Asians. In turn, *The Karate Kid* (1984) and its sequels (1986, 1989) used karate for self-esteem and self-protection purposes, and the women's movement followed suit (*Tightrope*, 1984). The Asian 1980s ended with historical foreign spectacles (*Empire of the Sun*, 1987; *Last Emperor*, 1987), and Asian gang (and drug) wars in New York City and Tokyo (*Year of the Dragon*, 1985; *Black Rain*, 1989).

The 1990s revisit Vietnam (*Heaven & Earth*, 1993) the bombing of Nagasaki (*Rhapsody in August*, 1991), Indian Asians (*Mississippi Masala*, 1991), the life of a Chinese woman in the 1920s China (*Ju Dou*, 1991), the Chinese Cultural Revolution (*Farewell, My Concubine*, 1993), and another version of the Madame Butterfly story (*M. Butterfly*, 1993). American baseball travels to Japan (*Mr. Baseball*, 1992), while Chinese and Taiwanese generational family conflicts are explored in two Wayne Wang films (*Eat a Bowl of Tea*, 1989; *The Joy Luck Club*, 1993), and two Ang Lee films (*Wedding Banquet*, 1993; *Eat Drink Man Woman*, 1994).

A fitting, neat ending to the Asian cinematic century is given in a penultimate moment in *Rising Sun* (1993). Wesley Snipes and Sean Connery are being chased by a gang of Asian youth through the alleys of South Central Los Angeles. Snipes detours through an alley and stops next to a group of African American brothers

who are just hanging out. He asks them for help. As if in anticipation of the Los Angeles riots of 1992, the Black males attack the Asian males. This comic diversion allows Snipes and Connery to make a safe getaway. In this odd, multicultural, melting-pot fashion, the Asian and Black communities do violent service for White society.

And beneath this narrative lurks another, namely Vietnam's contributions to America's 1980 war on drugs, the crack cocaine narratives (Reeves and Campbell 1994: 26). The Vietnam experience introduced American soldiers to drugs (marijuana, cocaine, heroin). Drug networks extending from Vietnam (and Latin America) to major American cities were established. Black, Hispanic, and Asian gangs took control of these distribution systems.⁵⁶ Soon, so the story goes, the inner cities became "contemporary versions of Southeast Asia – dangerous exotic places where even a child might kill you" (p. 26).⁵⁷

Social Science and the Gendered Cinema of Racial Difference

Let us return to the beginning. America's classed and gendered, cinematic racial order. The histories of Black, Hispanic, and Asian American cinema can now be inserted into the cultural and structural film practices outlined above, namely those practices connected to: America's violent, racist popular culture; its gender-based, racist performance vocabularies; the Hollywood sound system; race- and ethnically linked film genres (Black and Latin musicals); a segregated production system; miscegenation laws; the civil rights movements of the 1960s.

As realistic (and at times utopian) ethnographies of cultural difference, Black, Hispanic, and Asian American cinema transform and are transformed by these discursive practices. Each cinematic formation fits itself to a discrete set of moving, racist historical circumstances, barriers that constantly filter and define and redefine the contested, cinematic, racial self. Each ethnic cinema, as a set of performance texts, creates its version of the racial order; that is, it connects its historical, cultural, and social circumstances to these discursive practices.

To summarize: These circumstances are familiar, and many of them cut across ethnic groups (religion, wars, drugs, gangs, miscegenation and immigration laws, multiple nationality groups, and ghetto life). *For Blacks* these are slavery, strong Black women, hustlers, and specific film genres: musicals, social consciousness, comedies, blaxploitation, buddy, hood. *For Hispanics* these are strong women, American and Italian westerns, and Latin musicals. *For Asian Americans* these are geishas, *Charlie Chan*, the "Yellow Peril," adventure, mystery, and war films.

Thus, every historical moment, and with its cinematic formations, articulates a version of the American racial system. Of course, these moments and formations are tangled up in social science theories of race and ethnic relations.

Social Science Theories of the Gendered Racial Order

Each decade since 1900 (see Table 20.1; also McKee 1993) has articulated its version of the White man's burden. To be specific, nativism and the eugenics movement

dominate in the 1900–20 period, the stuff of Griffith's race films. The notion of race as the White man's burden, coupled with theories of the race relations cycle gain force in the 1921–30 decade. This model presumed that those of dark skin would become like White persons, if given time and help. In contrast, from 1931 to 1940 the non-White other is regarded as a cultural inferior. Separate but equal social arrangements persist, even as melting-pot and assimilation theories are debated. In the 1941–50 period, under democratic presidents, criticisms of the American system of segregation increase and contradictions in the American race system are exposed (the American Dilemma).

Desegregation in 1954, coupled with the publicity surrounding the atrocities of the Holocaust, brings studies of personal prejudice and the authoritarian personality. The civil rights decade (1961–70) turns race into a moral issue (Rogin 1996: 266). Separatist movements begin, and civil rights leaders debate violent and non-violent approaches to the race problem. The laws prohibiting miscegenation are repealed, and the *Immigration Act* of 1965 "increased almost fourfold the allowable number of immigrants in any year . . . and substantially increased [immigration] from Asia and Latin America" (McKee 1993: 360). In the Black Power decade (1971–80), internal colonial and separatist models are advanced, and connected to multiculturalism. The Reagan–Bush decade (1981–90) produces the war on drugs, the Miami race riots, and conservative arguments against affirmative action and multiculturalism. The decade of the 1990s bears witness to criticisms of multiculturalism, the dismantling of affirmative action programs, and new race riots.

The failure of American social science to provide a solution to the race and class problem is finally recognized (McKee 1993: 360). Assimilation models now appear dated (p. 361). A homogeneous American population is not developing, and ethnicity is not declining in importance (p. 362). The barriers to racial, economic, and educational equality have not been eliminated. It is no longer defensible to argue that, "any remaining inequalities are the problems of the minority groups and not the larger society" (Healey 1995: 513).

Contemporary discourse emphasizes ethnic pluralism, many different diasporas (Appadurai 1996), and "some modes of separatism that once would have been called segregation are now encouraged" (McKee 1993: 360). The new academic discourse argues against "race" as a scientific concept, and "in the new pluralism of ethnic groups" (p. 361), ethnic status is now conferred on Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American. Thus is there an attempt to make a transition from a racial category to one grounded in "ethnic" culture (p. 361). However, a color-conscious, conservative America, "still divided by a color line" (p. 361), will have none of this. Nor is everyone ready to accept the doctrines of ethnic and racial pluralism, of ethnic equality.

A Cinema of Resistance

A politically progressive, but discontinuous, narrative emerges from this truncated history. This narrative moves back and forth across the class and race relations models outlined above. These models repeatedly intersect with specific theories of race, culture, Whiteness and non-Whiteness, civilization, ethnicity, intelligence,

cultural difference, violence, deviance, sexuality, gender, sexual desire, addiction, parenthood, and moral correctness. These terms, in turn, are folded, decade by decade, into specific cinematic texts.

Each ethnic cinema is characterized by brief moments of revision and resistance, when past stereotypes are challenged, and more sensitive and complex stories are presented. These revisionist historical ruptures ebb and flow. They have greater influence in some decades than in others, for example Black and Hispanic Hollywood.

However, these ruptures have lengthened in the last decade. From the civil rights movements came a multiplicity of resistance cinemas – Black, Chicano/a, Native, and Asian American. These cinemas shape a politics of ethnic resistance. They frequently challenge mainstream Hollywood representations. Still, as argued previously (also Fregoso 1993: 29), an official race relations narrative runs like a long barbed wire through each of these histories. This narrative converges in those geographical spaces where America's Black, Hispanic, and Asian ghettos crisscross one another, where the rap, hip-hop culture, the hood, the barrio, and Chinatown come together.

In the 1990s, a male, gang-based, multiethnic drug culture mediates this representational system. This culture is anchored in a political economy that extends deeply into the families and gangs in each ethnic ghetto. This political economy exploits the gang and gangster culture (Boyd 1997: 85). In so doing it “integrates the excesses” (p. 85) of race and ethnicity directly into the larger economic and cultural systems of the ghetto and of American society today (p. 85).

Conclusion

At the center of Wayne Wang's 1981 film, *Chan Is Missing*, are overlapping, conflicting, images of ethnic Asian American identities: young women dressed like American teenagers, a Chinese Richard Pryor, Chinese cooks singing “Fry Me to the Moon,” GQ-dressed young Asian males, and sad old Asian men and women. These images do not cohere into a single Asian identity that can be assimilated into the Western view of the mysterious Asian other. Indeed, in Wang's world assimilation is an impossibility. The self that dreams of fitting in loses itself and, in the end, while seemingly alive, is not only missing, but also dead.

Two scenarios. Spike Lee's multicultural ghetto is filled with prejudice, hatred, and vicious racial stereotypes. Wayne Wang's Chinatown is a lonely, quiet place where violence goes on behind closed doors, and in the public arena confused Asians stare past one another.

Additionally, as these two films confront one another, the plight of ethnic minorities in America's inner cities worsens – decaying neighborhoods, drugs, crime, poverty, and violence (McKee 1993: 364). The politics of a new ethnic diversity are now played out in the media, and in those sectors of the public sphere marked by the boundaries of the hood, and the barrio. This is the stuff of the hood movies of the 1990s.

It is possible to imagine a progressive, racial cinema that challenges these dystopian texts. This cinema, like Townsend's *Hollywood Shuffle* (1987) or Marlon

Riggs's *Ethnic Notions* (1986), *Tongues Untied* (1989), *Color Adjustment* (1991), criticizes mainstream Hollywood racial and gender representations. It continues the project of those independent Chicano/a, Black, and Asian filmmakers who use but are not controlled by the mainstream Hollywood production and distribution system (Guerrero 1993: 206). It celebrates the positive values of ethnic life (p. 208). It seeks stories that stir the audience's imagination (Ryan and Kellner 1988: 287). This cinema simultaneously uses and resists mainstream racial ideology. It presents characters that criticize this ideology (e.g., the political reporter in Sayles's *Lone Star*). In neo-blaxploitation versions, these films explicitly resist assimilationist ideologies (e.g., *Panther*, 1997; see Comolli and Narboni 1976 [1971]: 26–7 on types of political cinema).

In these ways, a new cinematic and everyday racial order is imagined. Class-based racial and gender stereotypes are contested and if only for a brief moment, Hollywood cinema becomes a progressive force challenging inequality in American life.

Editorial Note

This essay extends and reworks arguments in Denzin (2002: 17–46). I am most grateful for the critical commentary of Mary Romero and Eric Margolis.

Notes

- 1 The Latin (Afro-Cuban) and Bossa-Nova jazz traditions are precedents for contemporary Latin and Black hybrid musical formations. The first Bossa-Nova recordings appeared in 1954 (Laurindo Almeida). Afro-Cuban jazz can be traced to the early 1920s and extends into the present, with the performances of Tito Puente, Dizzy Gillespie, Mario Bauza, and the current Afro-Latin world-musical scene (e.g., Ruben Gonzalez).
- 2 Salvation followed one of three paths: higher education, athletics, or the gang world, drugs, and single parenthood (Massood 1996: 20–1). Each path combined competing images of race, ethnicity, and sexuality. As Marchetti notes, race and sexuality are always intertwined in Hollywood cinema (as they are in real life). And race in the ghetto is never far from sexuality, and the threat of sexual contact between White and non-White racial, ethnic, and economic groups (1991: 289).
- 3 Ethnography and the ethnographic in this context refer to the attempt to describe a group and its way of life using observations from written documents, oral reports, and interviews. A realist ethnography attempts to describe, accurately and realistically, a group and its culture. Popular films that present themselves as realistic depictions of everyday life draw on the method of realist ethnography (Lubiano 1997; Denzin 1997: 74).
- 4 However, like any realist text, these films are not mimetic, they create the conditions of their own representation (Lopez 1991: 205). Accuracy is not at issue, there are only competing and conflicting images of race and ethnicity (see Cripps 1979; Friedman 1991a). Borrowing from Ryan and Kellner, race movies engage in a process of discursive, racial transcoding (1988: 12). These films draw upon existing racial understandings and stereotypes. They bring these understandings to the screen and this process transforms the original representations.
- 5 Eugenics is the science of racial improvement that uses judicious mating of the better stock and eliminates inferior races. Nativism, however, is the belief that native-born,

Protestant Whites are superior to other racial groupings and that the United States should be reserved for native-born, White Americans.

- 6 There are other endings, including the one about crack cocaine, gang wars, and senseless self-destruction in the hood, as in Singleton's story in *Boyz 'N the Hood* (1991).
- 7 Griffith is central to the cinematic construction of the American racial order. His films exploited nativist and miscegenation themes. He used White actors to play the parts of Blacks (*Birth of a Nation*, 1915), Hispanics (*The Martyrs of the Alamo*, or *The Birth of Texas*, 1915), and Asian Americans (*Broken Blossoms*, 1919). Blacks immediately protested the racist elements in *Birth of a Nation* and *The Martyrs of the Alamo* (Bogle 1994: 15; Keller 1994: 115–17, discussed later).
- 8 This system presented the dark-skinned, minority male as a threat to White society, its women, and to racial purity. Parallel editing (Griffith's innovation), moving back and forth between alternate scenes, was a basic feature of this cinematic system. Griffith could tell two stories at the same time – the story of the Whites and the story of the “freed” Black man who threatens the new society and its women (Rogin 1986: 157; Clough 1992: 52; Keller 1994: 27). These threats occur outside the main narrative, often located in those moments when the White woman is alone and stalked by the Black man. In this way, Griffith displaced race, locating it outside White society. Thus, race (and women) entered American cinema under a system of visual and narrative displacement (Rogin 1986: 178–9; Clough 1992: 53).
- 9 However, see Gilroy's criticisms of this music (1995: 80). Diawara (1993: 22–5) calls these movies the “new realism films [because] they imitate the existent reality of urban life in America.”
- 10 In the 1930s this included MGM, Warner Brothers, Paramount, Twentieth-Century Fox, Universal, RKO, Columbia, and United Artists (Keller 1994: 112).
- 11 Nativists believe that the “United States should be reserved for native-born Protestant whites . . . [and] some propose that all other groups be eliminated from society” (Healey 1995: 550; also see later discussion of social science theories and race relations).
- 12 Bogle argues that early filmic representations of the Negro as coon, mulatto, mammy, and buck “were merely reproductions of black stereotypes that had existed since the days of slavery and were popularized in American life and art” (1994: 4; see Keller 1994: 29 on dime novels and “Wild West” films of the silent era).
- 13 In contrast, the advent of a sound system did not create a need for “real” Native and Asian American actors who, with few exceptions, were played by White actors speaking a version of pidgin English.
- 14 The new sound system functioned somewhat differently for Hispanics. By the 1930s (Rios-Bustamante 1992: 22–3; Keller 1994: 119), the Hollywood film production system had a monopoly over film distribution in Latin America. The sound era required Spanish-language films for Latin America; however, it was impossible to create a single Spanish-language film that pleased the entire Hispanic public (Keller 1994: 120). The solution was simple: use Latin actors and actresses who would use Spanish accents and speak broken or fractured English. However, the Latin musical soon became a popular film category.
- 15 An indigenous Hispanic (Chicano) cinema would not appear until the 1980s, the “so-called Decade of the Hispanic” (Noriega 1992a: xvii), although a vibrant, active Hispanic film (and theater) community existed in Los Angeles in the 1920s (see Rios-Bustamante 1992: 24, n. 35). The “decade” of the Asian American film has yet to appear.
- 16 Early in Griffith's *Birth of a Nation*, happy slaves pick cotton, and “in their quarters dance and sing [Stephen Foster] songs for their master” (Bogle 1994: 12). In these musical, carnival-like moments, the presumably essential performative racial (and ethnic)

self is enacted. This creates a moment of double racism: the essential self is being performed because the Whites allow it to be performed and the performance is for the Whites' pleasure. This conclusion appears to hold for contemporary Black and Latin musicals as well. In this setting, there is little of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque upturning of race relations that Hall discusses (1996b: 474).

- 17 Gender and nationality (e.g., Latin male lovers) complicate the miscegenation situation. On-screen Asian (*Black Rain*) and Black males (*Jungle Fever*) could not have sexual relations with White women; but, under certain circumstances, Black (*The Bodyguard*), Hispanic-Latin (*White Men Can't Jump*), and Asian (*Year of the Dragon*) women could have sexual relations with White men (Wang 1978: 229; Guerrero 1993: 34–5; Bogle 1994: 13–14; Keller 1994: 32). Wang notes that when Asian males were seen as appealing to White women, White actors would typically play the Asian part (1978: 229). Of course, White males could have sexual relationships with Asian and Black females. When these rules are broken, “there can be rape, but there cannot be romance” (Wang 1978: 25).
- 18 He supplements this list with the following, more contemporary types: jesters, comics, servants, entertainers, militants, and action heroes.
- 19 Keller argues that Hollywood's formula system insured that the “ethnic *other* almost invariably played the outcast and the evildoer” (1994: 114; emphasis in original).
- 20 This code was explicit: “Miscegenation (sex relationships between the white and black races) is forbidden” (Keller 1994: 115). It was applied to Native, Asian, Hispanic, and African Americans (p. 115).
- 21 A strong, indigenous cinematic-political economy associated with the Asian American community apparently did not appear until the early 1980s (Fung 1994: 165; Marchetti 1993: 216). Pioneering Asian actors (Wang 1978: 247) include Keye Luke, Victor Sen Yung, Benson Fong, Miyoshi Umeki, and Nancy Kwan (Marchetti 1993: 113).
- 22 Throughout the twentieth century, Hollywood's identification of the Asian enemy shifted back and forth (depending on the war) from the Chinese to the Japanese, the Koreans, Vietnamese, and Filipinos (Wang 1978: 221).
- 23 The gay and lesbian movements were part of this general civil rights history and played key parts in the Hispanic, Black, and Asian political (and cinematic) movements (see, for example, Aguilar-San Juan 1994: 11; Negron-Muntaner 1996 – on the contemporary gay and lesbian Latino film community).
- 24 Native Americans have yet to enter this cinematic history fully (Fiedler 1988: 751), although each year since 1974 the American Indian Film Institution has held its Annual American Indian Film Festival (Nagel 1996: 203, 211). From 1945 to 1969, the federal Indian policy was based on the reservation model of assimilation, involving the “termination of special treaty relationships between American Indian communities and the federal government” (Nagel 1996: 214). Starting in 1970, a series of federal bills initiated the era of American Indian self-determination. This reversed the government's termination policy and ushered in the present red-power period (1996: 217). The 1992 film *Thunderheart* explores some of these issues. The first all-Indian movie was scheduled to begin production in the spring of 1997 (Smith 1997: B1).
- 25 Consider, in this context, Julie Dash's (1991) *Daughters of the Dust*; also the 1977 made-for-television film, *Roots*, and more recently, *Glory* (1989).
- 26 But, as Bogle observes, there was a tendency for the Black performer to “not give a performance of his own, not one in which he interprets black life, but one in which he presents for mass consumption black life as seen through the eyes of white artists. The actor becomes a black man in blackface . . . the blackface fixation” (1994: 27). The decade is represented by Mr. Bojangles, Stepin Fetchit, Hattie McDaniel, Paul Robinson, and Butterfly McQueen, and ends with *Gone with the Wind*.

- 27 Juano Hernandez, James Edwards, Ethel Waters, and Clarence Brooks (Bogle 1994: 137).
- 28 Still, the “huck-finn fixation” persisted (Bogle 1994: 140–1). According to Bogle, this complex aligns a good White man (who is an outcast) with a trusty Black (also an outcast). The White man grows in stature through his association with the Black man, who seems “to possess the soul the white man searches for” (Bogle 1994: 140). There are many examples, from *Casablanca*, to *In the Heat of the Night* and, most recently, the *Die Hard* and *Lethal Weapon* series.
- 29 Dorothy Dandridge, Sidney Poitier, Ethel Waters, Harry Belafonte, Pearl Bailey, Eartha Kitt, Ella Fitzgerald, William Marshall, and Ruby Dee.
- 30 Poitier’s integrationist films (*In the Heat of the Night*, *Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner*) were major exceptions (Bogle 1994: 221), as was *To Kill a Mockingbird* (1962).
- 31 Key directors, actors, and actresses in this decade included Melvin Van Peebles, Gordan Parks, Jr., Michael Schultz, Richard Pryor, Ossie Davis, Richard Roundtree, Ron O’Neill, Paul Winfield, Kevin Hooks, Pam Grier, Tamara Dobson, James E. Jones, Cicely Tyson, Diana Ross, and Billy Dee Williams.
- 32 The list is long and includes: Lee, Charles Burnett, Julie Dash, Bill Duke, the Hughes Brothers, John Singleton, Mario Van Peebles, Denzel Washington, John Amos, Damon Wayans, Louis Gossett, Jr., Forest Whitaker, Cuba Gooding, Jr., Cicely Tyson, James Earl Jones, Whoopi Goldberg, Angela Bassett, Larry Fishburne, Kevin Hooks, Robin Givens, Samuel Jackson, Wesley Snipes, and Alfre Woodard (Bogle 1994: 359–67).
- 33 “Hispanic” is a census category, a term founded in socioeconomic politics (Noriega and Lopez 1996: xii), of Spanish origin to render in Spanish and Mexican; Hispano is Spanish American; Mestizo is a person of Caucasian and Native American ancestry; Chicana/os are Mexican Americans, the ideology of Chicanismo, Mexican American: of Mexican origin, one of the largest Spanish-speaking Hispanic groups in America; Latino applies to three communities: Chicano, Puerto Rican, and Cuban American, a term founded in cultural politics (Noriega and Lopez 1996: xii).
- 34 Keller (1994: 31) identifies several variations within the western genre: cattle empire, ranch, revenge, cowboys-versus-Indians, outlaw, law-and-order, and the conquest story. Wright (1975: 29) isolates four types: classical, vengeance, transition, and professional. The historical time frame for the western was short, 1860–90 (p. 5). The Indian wars started in 1861 and by 1890 “all the American Indians had been exterminated or put on reservations” (p. 5). In 1862 the *Homestead Act* was passed. The great cattle drives lasted from 1866 to 1885 (p. 5).
- 35 Fear of miscegenation (White–Mexican, Indian) and nativist beliefs, stressing the inherent inferiority of Hispanics, also operated (Keller 1994: 32) and class complicated this history. The negative features of “Hispanic” were often erased in the figure of the non-corrupt Spanish aristocrat. The term Hispanic is double-edged, containing within itself positive and negative meanings.
- 36 This would include gendered cinemas within each category (e.g., Chicana, Latina) as well as gay and lesbian cinema.
- 37 Region (e.g., Caribbean) and religion (Catholicism) must also be added to this matrix. This creates complex hybrid relationships between regional and religious (Latin, African, and Afro-Caribbean) cultures – including Rastafarian, Baptist, and Latin-American Catholicism – and its mergers with Aztec and related belief systems.
- 38 In his inaugural address, Roosevelt referred to “the policy of the good neighbor” in reference to Latin American initiatives pursued by his administration (Keller 1994: 117).
- 39 By 1965 the Chicano Movement had coalesced, producing a series of protests in Los Angeles. The first Chicano film, *I Am Joaquín* (made for and by Chicanos) appeared in 1969. In the early 1970s, UCLA became a training ground for Chicano (and Black)

- filmmakers. Noriega (1992b: 142; 1996: 7–8) discusses the Chicano filmmakers connected to the UCLA program. Masilela (1993) discusses the Los Angeles School of Black Filmmakers (e.g., Burnett, Dash, Duke, Woodberry, and Gerima). This program was based on a 1968 US Office of Economic Opportunity-funded program called New Communicators that was designed to train minorities for employment in the film industry (Noriega 1996: 7). In 1975, the National Chicano Film Festival was established in San Antonio and, by 1978, the Los Angeles-based Chicano Cinemas Coalition was formed (Noriega 1992b: 43) and its participants would soon locate their work within the New Latin American Cinema (p. 145). However, as Fregoso (1993: 129) argues, “Early Chicano films . . . were made by Chicanos about Chicanos” (men) and not by and for “Chicanas (women)” (p. 16), but see Sylvia Morales’ film, *Chicana*.
- 40 Rose Portillo, Daniel Valdez (Fregoso 1993: 25); also James Edward Olmos, Ruben Blades, Emilio Estevez, Erik Estrada, Andy Garcia, Rosie Perez, Charlie Sheen, Jimmy Smitts, Madeleine Stowe, Lou Diamond Phillips, Esai Morales, Maria Conchita Alonso (Keller 1994: 151).
 - 41 Los Angeles Chicano student organizations protested against *Boulevard Nights* and its negative depictions of gangs, Chicanos, and Chicanas (Fregoso 1993: 23).
 - 42 During the 1980s, the so-called Decade of the Hispanic (as designated by the Coors Corporation), public funding sources for “Chicano produced film and video . . . were cut back under the Reagan administration,” (Noriega 1992b: 146; Fregoso 1993: 22).
 - 43 M. Esparza, M. Martinez, Sylvia Morales, Jesus Salvador Trevino, Gregory Naven, Edward James Olmos, Luis Valdez.
 - 44 This presence was also felt (Keller 1994: 176–7) on American television (“Miami Vice,” “L. A. Law,” “Santa Barbara,” “Falcon Crest”).
 - 45 The Cheech and Chong comedies (e.g., *Up in Smoke*, 1978; *Cheech and Chong’s Next Movie*, 1980; *Cheech and Chong’s the Corsican Brothers*, 1984) are an important antecedent to this series (but see List 1992).
 - 46 These two techniques merge mid-way through *Mambo Kings* (1992), when the two Cuban musicians appear on the “I Love Lucy” show. They pretend to not speak English. Their wives and friends back in New York City watch the two men lie to Lucy. The screen fills with the picture of the New York Cubans laughing at Lucy, laughing at the Mambo Kings, as they giggle and look out of the screen into the New York City living room.
 - 47 But see John Sayles’s (1996) *Lone Star*, an assimilationist, melting-pot, Texas-border story with miscegenation and incest themes. However, too often these texts stress the importance of machismo and the masculine identity (Fregoso 1993: 29). This gives the impression that the “Chicana subject is the object rather than the subject of the male gaze . . . [she is] denied any active role in the discourse” (p. 94). Time-worn stereotypes persist: virgins, whores, supportive wives, and home-girls (pp. 93–4).
 - 48 These features largely are absent in the social realism of the Black hood films of the same time period.
 - 49 The recent films of W. Wang (Hong Kong), A. Lee (Taiwan), and Mira Nair (India) add an Asian twist to this approach to cultural identity (the Asian self) – see especially Wang’s *Chan Is Missing* (1981), Lee’s *Wedding Banquet* (1993), and Nair’s *Mississippi Masala* (1992) and *The Perez Family* (1995).
 - 50 Indeed, Wang’s 1978 history of Asian American cinema is divided into two time periods: Asians in American films prior to World War II and the mature years, from World War II to Vietnam.
 - 51 This history glosses the 1982 *Chinese Exclusion Act*, the 1913 *Alien Land Act*, ethnic enclaves (Chinatowns), Asian experiences of educational segregation, relocation camps, and laws against miscegenation (see Healey 1995: 436–41).

- 52 This figure would be reincarnated as the evil *Dr. No* (1962), the first of the James Bond movies.
- 53 Marchetti argues that five rape (and miscegenation) narratives (captivity, seduction, salvation, sacrifice, assimilation) organize Hollywood's treatment of Asians and interracial sexuality (1993: 8–9).
- 54 By the end of the 1950s, the communist Chinese had become America's major foreign enemy (Wang 1978: 180).
- 55 Lee's son Brandon (1965–93) would continue this project into the 1990s (*The Crow*, 1994), as would Jackie Chan.
- 56 Near the end of Coppola's *Godfather* (1972), a Mafia chief from Kansas City argues that the five families should market drugs in the ghetto, but the dirty work should be done by "dark people . . . [since] they're animals anyway, let them lose their souls" (Boyd 1997: 86). The release of *The Godfather* in the early 1970s "closely paralleled the upsurge of underworld drug activity throughout African American ghetto communities" (p. 86). By the 1990s, the traditional White ethnic gang film would give way temporarily to the African American gang-hood movie (p. 88).
- 57 Here the CIA drug conspiracy theory resurfaces; the theory that in the 1980s the government furnished drugs to ghetto residents (Boyd 1997: 86; also the films *Deep Cover*, 1992, and *Panther*, 1995).

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Chapter 21

In the Shadow of Cultural Imperialism: Television and National Identities in the Era of Globalization

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This paper outlines some of the issues raised by globalization of television, with specific reference to questions of national identity. In particular, it will explore questions and debates about cultural inequalities as they are revealed by such an investigation. For these purposes, television may be considered global in respect of:

- the various configurations of public and commercial television that are regulated, funded, and viewed within the boundaries of nation-states and/or language communities;
- television which in its technology, ownership, program distribution, and audiences operates across the boundaries of nation-states and language communities;
- television that circulates similar narrative forms and discourses around the world.

Global Television and the Question of Inequality

To discuss the ways that global television may be implicated in questions of inequality, it will be useful to consider what equality and inequality mean as far as the media are concerned. A modernist conception of equality is commonly read as connoting “sameness” (i.e., identical outcomes, thereby seeking to eradicate difference). In the case of global television, this might be understood to mean equality of ownership, access, and representation. Since it is inconceivable that such equality should apply to individuals, I shall interpret it as operating on the level of nation-states (which are themselves marked by inequalities in numerous ways). That is, equality in this context would mean that nations had similar levels of access to the ownership and production capacities of television – which would in turn lead to an equal level of representation as regards national identities and other cultural markers.

As we shall see, no such equality is forthcoming when we examine global television's development at the level of political economy. Indeed, it is arguable that contemporary developments in television's globalization are, in fact, widening inequalities at the level of ownership and access to production facilities. However, I am mainly concerned here not with the question of television ownership per se so much as with inequalities of representation and the possible consequences for cultural identity that flow from it; that is, the focus will be on the alleged *cultural* domination that some critics say television's globalization engenders.

The Power of Representation

Culture, as understood here, is constituted by the representations generated by signifying practices that make the world meaningful to us and which guide our actions. We should be concerned with these matters of representation because they are bound up with questions of cultural power. Representation does not simply mirror or reflect in symbolic form "things" that exist in an independent object world; rather, representations are constitutive of the meaning they purport to stand in for – that is, representation does not involve correspondence between signs and objects, but endows material objects and social practices with meaning and intelligibility.

Thus, we may talk about a "politics of representation," because the meanings generated by representation are not innocent reflections of the real; rather, they are constructions that are constitutive of it. Therefore, they could be otherwise than they appear to us and, thus, it is always possible to conceive of alternative ways of looking at the world. Issues of cultural representation are "political" because intrinsically they are bound up with questions of power through the inevitable process of selection and organization that are a part of the representational process. The power of representation lies in its enabling some kinds of knowledge to exist while excluding other ways of seeing.

It has been commonplace to explore ideas about cultural power and inequality through the notion of ideology, where this concept implies self-serving ideas of powerful groups that purport to be universal truths. However, it is argued that ideology leads to misrecognition of the real condition of social relations by subordinate groups and, thus, to the reproduction of cultural power and inequality. However, since there is no access to a universal truth, then the concept of ideology as falsity cannot work. The notion of ideology at best implies the "binding and justifying ideas" of all social groups where this binding function does not have any reference to a representational concept of truth. As such, the concept of ideology, as used here, is virtually interchangeable with Foucault's notion of power/knowledge (Foucault 1980). Here power defines and produces the acceptable and intelligible way of understanding the world, while excluding other ways of reasoning as unintelligible and unjustifiable.

In this context, the pursuit of equality is not concerned with sameness but rather with diversity and the preservation of difference. Equality does *not* have to involve the elimination of difference and difference does *not* preclude equality. Sameness is not the only ground for claims to equality; rather, difference is the condition for all identities and, thus, the very meaning of equality. That is, when discussing issues of

representation and identity, the idea of equality expresses an equivalency of right to a particularity of identity founded on difference. Our best chance of maintaining difference and pursuing both private and national identity projects lies in developing a global culture that prides itself on being heterogeneous. This is marked not so much by equality of opportunity or equality of outcome – which are neither possible nor desirable in this case – but rather by justice conceived of as the absence of cultural domination and the freedom to construct one's own cultural identity. A respect for difference is supportive of a pragmatic cultural pluralism based on a diverse public sphere of citizens engaged in continual dialogue.

Television and the Public Sphere

Television is at the heart of contemporary culture in so far as it generates a huge array of representations within the public sphere. Television is a resource open to virtually everybody in modern, industrialized societies and an increasing one in the “developing” world. It is a source of popular knowledge about the world and increasingly brings us into contact, albeit in a mediated way, with ways of life other than our own. Television is implicated in constructing the social knowledge by which we make our lives and those of others intelligible.

For Habermas (1989), the public sphere is a realm in which the public organizes itself and in which “public opinion” is formed. He attempts to ground the public sphere in the notion of an “ideal speech situation,” in which competing truth claims are subject to rational debate and argument based on conversational equality. Yet, no such conditions exist in practice. Rather, the consequence of social inequality is that citizens are denied equal access to the public sphere that lacks participatory parity. Habermas requires interlocutors to bracket status differences in order to be able to form one common public sphere. However, social inequality cannot be bracketed and there are competing versions of the public good. So, a postmodern conception of the public sphere should accept the desirability of multiple publics and multiple public spheres, while at the same time working to reduce social inequality. That is, diversity of representation becomes a key principle of the public sphere(s). Habermas is mistaken in his attempt to construct a universal and transcendental rational justification for it. However, as a *normative* position founded on the value-based pragmatic grounds of cultural pluralism, the concept retains political leverage.

Habermas argues that the public sphere is declining in the face of the development of capitalism toward monopoly and the strengthening of the state. However, some commentators (Giddens 1990) have plausibly argued that modern societies have witnessed the media's *enlargement* of the public sphere as it brings greater visibility to public discourses and action. Understood in this way, television can contribute to the democratic project by expanding the range of voices and identities seen and heard in the public sphere. Therefore, what we should seek from television, in the name of justice and equality, is a *diversity of representations*. The concept of *diversity* suggests that pluralistic media are expected to represent the full range of public opinion, cultural practices, and social and geographical conditions.

In this context, television *could* act as a cultural and social interpreter and promote an arena of communicative equality and solidarity in which to present diverse values and cultural identities. However, many writers have been concerned that the globalization of television has narrowed rather than widened the range of representations available to us and, as a consequence, has contributed to the annihilation of local cultural identities in favor of global American identities.

In the Shadow of Cultural Imperialism

The set of arguments that most obviously proposes that the media's globalization is both rooted in and productive of inequalities on the levels of both political economy and cultural identity is the cultural imperialism thesis. This line of reasoning is concerned with constructing and maintaining global inequalities with a particular interest in questions of cultural production and the generation of meaning. The central argument is that the globalization of consumer capitalism has led to the growth of "sameness" and a presumed loss of both cultural autonomy and cultural diversity. This is cast as a form of cultural imperialism, which centers on the alleged domination of one culture by another, conceived of in national terms.

The principal agents of cultural synchronization are said to be transnational corporations. Thus, Robins argues that:

For all that it has projected itself as transhistorical and transnational, as the transcendent and universalizing force of modernization and modernity, global capitalism has in reality been about westernization – the export of western commodities, values, priorities, ways of life. (1991: 25)

Consequently, cultural imperialism is regarded as the outcome of a set of economic and cultural processes implicated in global capitalism's reproduction.

In a similar vein, Herbert Schiller (1969, 1985) – a leading proponent of the cultural imperialism thesis – argues that US-controlled corporations dominate the global-communications industries. He points to the interlocking network that connects US television, defense subcontractors, and the federal government. Schiller's case is that the mass media fit into the world capitalist system by providing ideological support for capitalism, in general, and transnational corporations, in particular. That is, they are said to act as vehicles for corporate marketing along with a general "ideological effect" that purportedly produces and reinforces local attachment to US capitalism.

By contrast, I shall be arguing that the disjunctive-cultural flows that mark globalization are characterizable less in terms of domination and more as forms of cultural hybridity. Above all, we need to put the arguments about cultural imperialism in the context of audience research. For it is the ways in which audiences make use of the competing meanings embodied in texts, including those of television, that becomes the touchstone of arguments about globalization and cultural imperialism. However, before we can assess the cultural impact of global television we need to establish the forms that it is taking.

Table 21.1 Global television households

	<i>TV households (millions)</i>	<i>Cable TV households (millions)</i>	<i>Satellite TV households (millions)</i>
China	340	57.00	0.80
USA	98	66.00	8.00
India	79	19.00	2.50
Russia	45	14.50	0.35
Japan	41	14.00	12.00
Germany	37	19.00	11.00
Brazil	36	1.30	2.40
Britain	24	2.30	4.30
Indonesia	20	0.02	3.00
Italy	19	0.01	0.76

Original source: Screen Digest (May 1998). Modified from Thussu (2000: 132).

Globalizing the Television Market

The concept of globalization refers us to an intensified compression of the world and our increasing consciousness of it (Robertson 1992); that is, the ever-increasing abundance of global connections and our understanding of them. This “compression of the world” can be understood in terms of the power and efficacy of the institutions of modernity, while the reflexive “intensification of consciousness of the world” can be beneficially perceived in cultural terms.

There is little doubt that television is a global phenomenon in its production, dissemination, and viewing patterns – and one that grows daily. For example, in 1995 *Screen Digest* estimated the number of television sets worldwide to be approximately 850 million, distributed across more than 160 countries and watched by 2.5 billion people per day (February 1995). Three years later, the same journal placed the number of televisions globally in the order of one billion plus (May 1998).

Since the mid-1980s, the fastest growth area for television-set ownership has been the “developing world,” with marginal growth in Europe and America in comparison with Africa and Asia – where the number of television sets trebled – or Central America, where the figure doubled. Thus, the United States has the highest density of televisions per head of the population, with 99 percent of American households owning a television and 74 percent of these having two or more sets (Nielsen Media Research 1999). However, it is actually China that can claim the most number of television households per se (*Screen Digest*, May 1998; see Table 21.1). Indeed, Asia now claims some 34 percent of the global television market, as does Europe with the United States taking 21 percent of this business.

The technologies having the most impact are those concerned with distribution (i.e., cable and satellite), which have had different levels of impact across the world. In India, the development of commercial satellite television threatens state-owned television’s (*Doordarshan*) dominance (forcing the government to entertain

commercial broadcasting); whereas in Britain, though the satellite-distributed channels of BskyB have had some success in creating a niche for themselves – especially in relation to sport – their 8 percent audience share has some way to go before they can even conceive of dislodging the BBC or ITV stations.

Unsurprisingly, there is also extremely unequal distribution of the quarter of a billion cabled households across the globe. For example, nearly 70 percent of television households have access to cable in North America, some 23 percent in the European Union, 20 percent in Asia, and only 7 percent in South America. World levels of cable penetration of television households stand at about 23 percent (*Screen Digest*, April 1995). The United States has about 66 million cabled households compared to 57 million in China, 19 million in India, 1.3 million in Brazil, and 0.02 in Indonesia (*Screen Digest*, May 1998).

Synergy and Convergence in Global Television

The globalization of television is an aspect of the dynamic expansionist logic of capitalism in its quest for new commodities and new markets. In particular, an exploration of contemporary television technology and ownership needs to be placed in the context of wider changes in the communications industries.

A combination of technological developments and market change has contributed to the convergence of (or erosion of boundaries between) organizational sectors and, hence, to creating global communications giants. Technological developments – such as the unfolding of fiber-optic cable, satellite technology, and digital switching technology – have opened up commercial possibilities leading telecommunications to be hailed by corporation and state alike as the industry of the future. Of particular significance are the processes of *synergy*, *convergence*, and *deregulation*.

In recent years there has been a good deal of diversification (by financial, computer, and data-processing companies) into telecommunications, creating multimedia giants that dominate sectors of the market. For example, between April 1997 and March 1998 there were at least 333 mergers involving media and communications companies worldwide. Of these, 133 were identified as 100 percent acquisitions and 106 involved “foreign” investors. Corporations, based in the United States (139) and the United Kingdom (42), were responsible for largest part of the mergers and acquisitions noted (*Screen Digest*, April 1998).

This process has been driven by the corporate need for the financial power that can come from mergers and which enables them to undertake the massive investment needed to be a player in the global market. For example, the 1989 merger of *Time* and Warner created the largest media group in the world with a market capitalization of \$25 billion. This was followed, in 1995, by Time Warner’s acquisition of Turner Broadcasting (CNN) and, in 2000, by its merger with the major Internet company, America Online. Similarly, the acquisition by News Corporation of the Hong Kong-based Star TV for \$525 million has given Rupert Murdoch a satellite-television footprint over Asia and the Middle East with a potential audience of 45 billion viewers. When allied to his other television interests, primarily BskyB (UK) and Fox TV (US), his News Corporation’s television interests alone have a global reach of some two-thirds of the planet. Additionally, it is planning further

expansion currently as it negotiates with General Motors to acquire Direct Television in the United States.

One of the prime reasons for these developments is the search for synergy. Consequently, what is significant in looking at the News Corporation dominion is not just the spatial breadth of ownership, but also the potential link-ups between its various elements. For example, in Twentieth Century Fox and Star TV Murdoch acquired a huge library of film and television product that he can channel through his network of distribution outlets. He clearly hopes to create a lucrative global advertising market. At the same time, Murdoch can use his newspapers to promote his television interests by giving space in his press holdings to the sporting activities covered by his television channels. Thus does News Corporation make the gains accruing to synergy whose intertextual link-ups are paralleled by technological and organizational convergence.

Program Flows in Global Television

It is evident that there is indeed an unequal pattern of television ownership and control across the world. Moreover, we are witnessing the increased production and distribution power of international multimedia corporations. Indeed, four out of five of the largest and most influential media corporations in the world – AOL Time Warner, News Corporation, Bertelsmann, Walt Disney, Paramount/Viacom – are US-owned and even the exception to that, German-owned Bertelsmann, conducts the lion's share of its business in and from the United States. However, mapping global television requires us to consider not only the political economy of the industry, but also the evidence regarding the flow and distribution of television texts.

Here, concerns about media imperialism have been fueled by a limited number of somewhat outdated studies of the global television trade. The authors of these studies concluded that international programming flows are dominated by the United States (Varis 1974, 1984). Certainly, America is the world's major television program exporter, a position enabled by the economics of the industry that allows US producers to cover much of their costs in the domestic market, thus leaving exports as profit. This enables American producers to sell their programs at a level borne by the market rather than by the production costs of a given program. Thus, an episode of a popular program costing \$1.5 million to produce can be sold in France for \$50,000 and in Zimbabwe for \$500. Of course, the worldwide familiarity with, and popularity of, Hollywood narrative techniques also plays its part.

However, export figures can be misleading. For example, while 44 percent of all Western European imported television hours came from the United States, Sepstrup (1989) argues that what is more relevant is that 73 percent of the total national supply in all of Western Europe was produced domestically. Further, though some critics argue that the United States can claim at least 75 percent of the worldwide television program exports (Hoskins et al. 1995), a growing number of nations are producing an increasing proportion of their own programming, with a significant number of them "doing over half of their own programming, both in the total broadcast day and during primetime" (Straubhaar 1997: 293).

Indeed, there has been a distinct move toward *regionalization* of markets on the basis of shared language, culture, and historic trade links. Thus Straubhaar (1997) argues that there are a number of “geo-cultural” markets emerging, including those based on Western Europe, Latin America, the Francophone world of France and its former colonies, an Arabic world market, a Chinese market, and a South Asian market. Further, these markets are not bounded by geographical space necessarily, but involve diaspora populations distributed worldwide. For example, the Indian film industry serves not only the Indian subcontinent but also areas of Africa, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Europe. Of recent significance has been the Arabic TV channel Al-Jazeera and its provision of a news service in the Middle East to rival the coverage of both CNN and the region’s state TV services. Overall, ratings success is more likely to be found through forging a regional market than through a truly global one.

As Appadurai has argued more generally, existing center-periphery models are inadequate in the face of a new, complex, overlapping, disjunctive order in which “for people of Irian Jaya, Indonesianisation may be more worrisome than Americanisation, as Japanisation may be for Koreans, Indianisation for Sri Lankans, Vietnamisation for Cambodians, Russianisation for the people of Soviet Armenia and the Baltic Republics” (Appadurai 1993: 328). Thus, in the more specific case of television, it may be that inequalities of representation are manifested as much within regions by “local” powers as by the United States on a global scale.

Similarity and Difference in Television Texts: The Global and the Local

Television has become a globalized cultural form through its circulation of similar narrative styles around the world: soap opera, news, sport, quiz shows, and music videos can be found in most countries. Soap opera, for example, is a global form in two senses: it is a narrative mode produced in a variety of countries across the globe and it is one of the most exported forms of television viewed in a range of cultural contexts. The global attraction of soap opera can be partly attributed to the apparently universal appeal of open-ended narrative forms, the centrality of the personal and kinship relations and, in some circumstances, emerging international style embedded in the Hollywood traditions. However, the success of the soap opera also reflects the possibilities offered to audiences of engaging in local or regional issues and problems located in recognizable places. For example, while South African television screens a good deal of American and Australian soap operas, it is also possible to watch the locally produced *Generations*.

The tensions between the poles of the global and the local are highlighted by, on the one hand, the enormous global popularity of soaps like *Neighbours* and *Dallas* and, on the other, the failure of these very same soaps in particular countries (e.g., *Neighbours* in America, *Dallas* in Japan). As Crofts (1995) has pointed out, the global successes, and failures, of soap opera depend on both the specificities of soap opera as a televisual form and the particularities of its reception conditions. While we have witnessed the emergence of an international, prime-time soap-opera style

– including high production values, pleasing visual appearances, and fast-paced, action-oriented narrative modes (e.g., *Melrose Place*) – many soaps still retain local settings, regional language audiences, and slow-paced, melodramatic storytelling.

Similar arguments can be put forth in relation to the news genre that shows both global similarities as well as local differences. The general case for regarding news as a global phenomenon rests on the establishment of news exchange arrangements whereby subscribing news organizations have organized a reciprocal trade in news material with a particular emphasis on sharing visual footage. Consequently, Straubhaar (1992) concluded (based on a cross-cultural study involving the United States, USSR, Japan, West Germany, Italy, India, Columbia, and China) that “what is news” is “fairly consistent” from country to country and that the format of 20–40 minute programs anchored by presenters was a common feature. Likewise, data collected by Gurevitch et al. (1991) about the Eurovision News Exchange, and the 36 countries that use it regularly, suggest that availability of common news footage and a shared professional culture has led to “substantial, but not complete” convergence of news stories.

That Straubhaar (1992) should have found similarity over difference might reflect a drift toward an international standardization of basic journalistic discourses and the domination of global news agendas by Western news agencies. The raw material of international news is gathered, selected, and controlled by Western transnational corporations – which treat news as a commodity to be bought and sold. For example, two large Western services, Visnews and WTN, are powerful forces within television news. Further, there is an emerging direct supply of finished news product offered to audiences via satellite television, most notably by CNN, the BBC, and News Corporation. However, the fact that Western news agencies tend to supply “spot news” and visual reports without commentary still allows different verbal interpretations of events to be dubbed over the pictures. This has led to what Gurevitch et al. (1991) call the “domestication” of global news, which they regard as a countervailing force to the pull of globalization.

War News

As I write, armed forces from the United States, Great Britain, and Australia are engaged in an invasion of Iraq and the issue of global television news coverage of Middle East events is once again on the agenda. The 1991 Gulf War was a global television war seen all over the world, marking the arrival of Cable News Network (CNN) as a worldwide news service. The war’s news coverage was a highly managed and extraordinarily selective affair, because journalists were not able to move and report freely. Their numbers were limited and those that were present were carefully shepherded by the military. Morrison’s (1992) content analysis of CNN, Sky News, and UK terrestrial television documents the evidence that only 3 percent of the news coverage was of “the results of military action in terms of human casualties” and only 1 percent of the visual images of television were of “death and injury.”

Perhaps worse was television’s deficiency in providing an adequate explanation for the war. Rather, “the event itself – war – appears to swamp the news and did

so at the expense of discussion about either the initial invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, or the presentation of a historical perspective on the war" (Morrison 1992: 68). By concentrating on the "glamour" of high-tech weaponry and the immediate military objectives of the war, television often obscured the reasons that lay behind the conflict. Insofar as explanations were forthcoming, responsibility for the war was placed firmly at the door of Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait and, in particular, on the shoulders of Saddam Hussein (who was cast in the role of "evil emperor"). Over a decade later, in 2003, little appears to have changed except that the US military has become more sophisticated still in managing war news. The so-called "embedding" of journalists with combat forces is designed not only to encourage journalists to develop empathy with soldiers, but also to allow for an even greater control of news output.

Yet, the role of television in both wars has not been wholly supportive of US policy. Thus the images of the rout of fleeing Iraqi forces in 1991 appears to have influenced President George Bush Sr.'s decision to stop the Gulf War short of a full-scale invasion of Iraq. The president is said to have feared that images of slaughter would turn public opinion against the war, as it was thought to have done in Vietnam. In 1991, there was little alternative to CNN news coverage of the war. Today, CNN coverage is rivaled not only by BBC 24 Hour News but also, more significantly still, by the Arabic station Al-Jazeera. Based in Qatar and launched in 1996, Al-Jazeera was formed from the ashes of the BBC cooperative agreement with Saudi-funded Orbit communications.

As the first independent Arabic news channel, Al-Jazeera's rolling news service is in sharp contrast to the state-managed news that characterizes the region and to the pro-Western output of CNN and the BBC. Significantly, Al-Jazeera can claim 35 million viewers and up to an 80 percent audience share in the Middle East (*Sydney Morning Herald Magazine*, March 29, 2003). When the channel screened the video-taped messages from Osama Bin Laden, it suddenly acquired a huge global profile and it is now planning to launch an English-language service. The resources that Al-Jazeera has at its disposal are paltry in comparison to those of CNN, not least because the channel has offended nearly all of the region's Arabic governments. Nevertheless, it is offering an alternative coverage of the war to that of the major Western channels and, thus, demonstrates that television's globalization, though unbalanced in favor of the West, nevertheless does involve countervailing forces.

In sum, there is little doubt that at the political economy level, television's globalization involves sizable inequalities and US-based multinational corporations cast their shadow across the globe. However, this undoubted power does not translate into a neat picture of world cultural domination. First, while there are global trends in programming, such as news and soap opera, there are also local variations. Second, while the United States is the biggest player in the TV market, the distribution of programming is nevertheless uneven and tends toward regionalization. In that context, a new set of inequalities within the region may appear, but they are not necessarily those of Americanization. The next step of the argument is to note that whatever is happening at the production end of the process does not map neatly onto clear-cut consequences at the consumption level, that is, cultural domination does not necessarily follow from unequal patterns of political economy.

Television and Resistance: Audiences as Creative Consumers

The argument that globalization is a form of cultural imperialism, in which Western-produced texts dominate and destroy other cultures, has implicitly relied on the so-called “hypodermic model” of audience response. That is, it has been assumed that the meanings that critics identify as being embodied in a text are also those that audiences activate and take up. If, for example, the world of Disney films represents American capitalism as the desirable high point of human civilization, then this is what the apparently passive and mindless viewers of film and TV will adopt as their own values.

However, it is now widely held that television audiences are active producers of meaning and do not simply and uncritically accept “official” textual meanings. Rather, they bring previously acquired cultural competencies to bear on texts, enabling them to generate an array of meanings. Further, since texts do not embody one set of unambiguous meanings, but are polysemic (that is, they are carriers of multiple meanings), differently constituted audiences will work with different textual meanings. In this context, there is now a good deal of mutually supportive work on television audiences within the cultural studies tradition, from which the following conclusions can be drawn:

- The audience is conceived of as active and knowledgeable producers of meaning not products of a structured text.
- Meanings are bounded by the way the text is organized and by the domestic and cultural circumstances under which it is viewed.
- Audiences need to be understood in the contexts in which they watch television, both in terms of meaning construction and the routines of daily life.
- Audiences are easily able to distinguish between fiction and reality; indeed, they actively play with the boundaries between them.
- The processes of meaning construction, and television’s place in the routines of daily life, alter from culture to culture as well as in terms of ethnicity, gender, and class within the same cultural community.

As such, television and other cultural texts are best seen as *resources* that we draw on in a variety of different ways. Thus, we should talk not of an audience so much as audiences in the plural, those that use television to construct a range of meanings in the context of the wider circumstances of their lives. This will include their engagement with discourses found in other cultural sites. Thus, while it is clear that British and American military forces are attempting to manage television news coverage of the war in Iraq in a way that justifies their actions, it is also the case that across the world many people know that this is happening.

Of course, to simply associate the active audience with an inevitable resistance to “ideology” or cultural homogenization is as mistaken as the previous reliance on the hypodermic model of audience response. Indeed, the construction of multiple audience positions is entirely compatible with a wider consumer culture of niche marketing, while the take-up of any ideology or identity – be it critical or conservative – *requires* audiences to engage actively with texts. There is also a significant

part of the global television audience that does accept the United States/British account of events in the Middle East. Thus, global television is embroiled in a "culture war," the outcome of which is far from certain.

Since audiences are *always active* in relation to decoding texts whose meanings are unstable and in flux, the critical questions do not ask whether audiences are active, as such, but what the consequences of their activity are. That is, how, in the overdetermined and chaotic play of audiences' discursive competencies and television's preferred encodings, does meaning come to be stabilized into those representations with which audiences identify and from which they construct their identities? In this context, watching television is both constitutive of and constituted by forms of cultural identity. In other words, television forms a symbolic resource for cultural identity construction just as audiences draw from their own sedimented cultural identities and cultural competencies to decode programs in their own specific ways. Whether audience decodings constitute "resistance" to cultural homogenization is, case by case, an empirical question.

Resistance and Creative Consumption

The argument that audiences are not cultural dopes, but active producers of meaning who operate from within their own cultural contexts, forms a part of a larger discourse about creative consumption. The critique of contemporary, Western cultures' consuming practices has commonly assumed that commodities carry embedded ideological meanings. These are said to serve the interests of capitalism and are taken on board by consumers through the very act of consumption. However, this view of consumption within capitalist social formations has been the subject of criticism on two fronts. First, it has been argued that commodities do not of necessity carry ideological meanings supportive of the social order, but may themselves be the basis for transgression and resistance. Second, it has been suggested, on the basis of empirical research, that consumers are active creators of meaning. That is, consumers do not simply take on those meanings that critics have identified as being "within" commodities, but also are capable of generating their own meanings through the interplay of commodities and consumers' cultural competencies.

Ironically, as Willis (1990) has argued, it is capitalism and the expansion of consumerism that has provided increased supplies of symbolic resources for people's creative work. Capitalism (in the world of work) may be that from which escape is sought, but it also provides the means and medium (in the domain of consumption) by which to do so.

Traditionally, the resources required for cultural "resistance" have been located in some measure outside of the dominating culture. However, when consumer capitalism is the stated target for resistance, there is virtually no aspect of contemporary culture that can be said to be external to capitalism. If resistance is taking place, it is taking place within commodity culture and is not best understood as a simple reversal of the order of high and low, of power and its absence. This is the kind of resistance that de Certeau (1984) has in mind when he distinguishes between the *strategies* of power that mark out spaces for itself distinct from its environs (through which it can operate as a subject of will), and the *tactics* of the poacher. Here, for

example, young people take the commodities of record companies, clothes manufacturers, and magazines and, in the spaces of clubs, pubs, and streets, make them their own, investing them with their own meanings.

Yet, such resistance is always limited in the scope of its challenge, which can only ever be partial. Resistance is always a matter of degree and within the eye of the beholder. It is to be evaluated, on the one hand, in terms of our values and, on the other, in relation to our judgment as to what is possible. There is no rule book and no guarantees.

Global Television and National Identities

The concept of identity

Before we consider the implications of the production and consumption of global television for national identities, it will be useful to delineate briefly what it is we mean by identity in the first place. The commonsense cultural repertoire, of the self that is available to us, describes persons as having a true self, an identity that we possess and that can become known to us. Thus, we commonly take identity to be expressed through forms of representation; that is, identity is an essence that can be signified through signs of taste, beliefs, attitudes, and lifestyles. This argument is in direct contrast with the understanding of identity as it has developed within cultural studies, where subjectivity and identity are widely held to be contingent, culturally specific productions. That is, identities are wholly social constructions and cannot “exist” outside of cultural representations that constitute, rather than express, identity. Subsequently, it is from the plasticity of identity that its political significance flows, for contestation over identity and subjectivity concerns the kinds of people we are becoming.

This anti-essentialist view of subjectivity and identity is dependent upon the anti-representationalist argument that language is not a mirror that reflects an independent object world. Rather, meaning is understood as being generated by virtue of the differences between signifiers. Thus, black is not white, men are not women, Australians are not British, Koreans are not Japanese, and so forth. Since there are no essences to which language refers, then there are no essential identities. In this vein, Hall’s (1990, 1992, 1996) influential account of identity draws on Derrida’s concept of “différance” – “difference and deferral” – by which meanings are supplemented or differed continually. Thus, identity is understood as a becoming rather than a fixed entity.

However, in order to stabilize identity, and in order to take action, a temporary closure of meaning is required. Consequently, “identity” is said to represent a “cut” or a snapshot of unfolding meanings, a strategic positioning which makes meaning possible. The claim that language is constitutive of identity is not simply an abstract philosophical argument, but also one located in the everyday social conversations of “ordinary” life. Identities are achieved in the everyday flow of language and stabilized as categories through their embedding in the pragmatic narratives of our day-to-day social conduct; that is, the construction of identity is a fluid accomplishment, instantiated in the procedural flow of verbal interaction. In short,

identity can be understood as a description of ourselves in language to which we are emotionally committed.

National identity as a narrative of unity

Cultures are not static entities but are constituted by changing practices and meanings, which operate at different social levels. Any given national culture is understood and acted upon by different social groups, so that governments, ethnic groups, and classes may perceive it in divergent ways. Thus, representations of national culture are snapshots of the symbols and practices that have been foregrounded at specific historical conjunctures for particular purposes by distinctive groups of people. National identity is a way of unifying cultural diversity so that, as Hall argues:

Instead of thinking of national cultures as unified, we should think of them as a discursive device which represents difference as unity or identity. They are cross-cut by deep internal divisions and differences, and “unified” only through the exercise of different forms of cultural power. (1992: 297)

That unity is constructed through the narrative of the nation, by which stories, images, symbols, and rituals represent “shared” meanings of nationhood. Here national identities are connected intrinsically to, and constituted by, forms of communication of which global television is a contemporary manifestation. For example, the media encourage us to imagine the simultaneous occurrence of events across wide tracts of time and space. This contributes to the concept of nation and to the place of states within a spatially distributed global system.

National identity is constituted through *identification* with representations of shared experiences and history told through stories, literature, popular culture, and the media. Narratives of nationhood emphasize the traditions and continuity of the nation as being “in the nature of things,” along with a foundational myth of collective origin. This, in turn, both assumes and produces the linkage between national identity and a pure, original people or “folk” tradition. Of course, understanding national identities as discursive constructs does not prevent identifications from hardening to become the basis of international violence. Nationalism is subject to the ebb and flow of circumstances and is not a stable entity.

Television audiences and cultural identity

Audience research (e.g., Liebes and Katz 1991) suggests that audiences use their own sense of national and ethnic identity as a position from which to decode programs so that, for example, audiences with the destruction of “indigenous” cultural identities as the inevitable outcome do not always consume American programs uncritically. Indeed, the very deployment of their own cultural identifications as a point of resistance to “foreign” texts and values also helps to constitute that very cultural identity through its enunciation. Thus, Miller (1995) argues in his study of television in Trinidad that we would be mistaken in regarding the US soap, *The Young and the Restless*, as simply the export and consumption of American culture

or as the unproblematic carrier of modernity and consumer culture. Instead, he recounts the ways in which the soap opera is “localized,” made sense of, and absorbed into, local practices and meanings.

Miller demonstrates the social and participatory nature of soap opera viewing alongside a sense of the relevance of the narrative content for moral issues in Trinidad. In particular, the gossip and scandal (specifically that of a sexual nature) that are core concerns of the soap opera’s narrative resonate with the Trinidadian concept of Bacchanal. According to Miller, this is a deeply rooted folk concept that fuses ideas of confusion, gossip, scandal, and truth. The concern of the soap thus “colludes with the local sense of truth as exposure and scandal” (1995: 223). Miller’s work is significant because it suggests that the study of the formal characteristics of narratives is insufficient. Additionally, he stresses the need to understand local processes of absorption and transformation that, by their very nature, will be specific, contingent, and unpredictable.

That television is uneven and contradictory in its impact is further illustrated by research work undertaken in China. Here, according to Lull (1991, 1997), is a television system introduced by a government that was keen to use it as a form of social control and cultural homogenization. However, it has turned out to have had quite the opposite consequence. Although the Chinese government has attempted to use television to reestablish social stability, after the events of Tiananmen Square, and preserve the authority of the Communist Party, it has instead become a central agent of popular resistance. Television has amplified and intensified the diversity of cultural and political sentiments in China by presenting alternative views of life. For example, commercial and imported dramas have been juxtaposed to China’s own economic difficulties, as television – driven by the need to attract larger audiences – becomes a cultural forum of competing ideas. Further, not only are programs themselves polysemic, but also audiences have become adept at reading between the lines of official pronouncements. For Lull, the challenge to autocratic rule raised by the Chinese resistance movement, with its stress on freedom and democracy, could not have happened without television.

In short, though television may circulate discourse on a global scale, its consumption and use as a resource for the construction of cultural identities always take place in a local context with unpredictable outcomes.

Hybrid Identities

In recent years, a good deal of attention has been given to diaspora populations and specifically to the contingent and indeterminate character of their cultural identities (e.g., Gilroy 1993; Gillespie 1995). Here the continual construction and deconstruction of cultural identities, across space, is emphasized, rather than a sense of being absolutes of nature, culture, and place. In particular, the concept of hybridity has proved useful in highlighting cultural mixing and the emergence of new forms of identity.

The physical meeting and mixing of peoples across the globe, as exemplified by the Black Atlantic (Gilroy 1993) and other diaspora formations, throws the whole notion of national or ethnic culture and literature into doubt. Thus, the hybridiza-

tion and creolization of language, literature, and cultural identities is a common theme of postcolonial literature and theory, marking a certain meeting of minds with postmodernism. For example, in a Caribbean context the idea of the “Creole continuum” has gained in significance. The continuum is a series of overlapping language uses and code switching that deploys not only the specific modes of other languages, say English and French, but also invents forms peculiar to itself.

Creolization stresses language as a cultural practice over and against the abstractions of grammar or any notions of “correct” language usage. Here, dialogue with the values and customs of the past allows traditions to be transformed into the midwives of the new, so that the meanings of old words are changed and fresh ones are brought into being. At the same time, neither colonial nor colonized cultures and languages can be presented in “pure” form, nor separated from each other. This gives rise to a hybridity that challenges not only the centrality of colonial culture and the marginalization of the colonized, but also the very idea of center and margin as being anything other than “representational effects.”

The concept of hybridity remains problematic insofar as it assumes or implies the meeting or mixing of completely separate and homogeneous cultural spheres. To think of British Asian or Mexican American hybrid forms as the mixing of two separate traditions is problematic, because none of the component parts are bounded and homogeneous. Each category is always already a hybrid form that is also divided along the lines of religion, class, gender, age, nationality, and so on. Hybridization is the mixing of that which is already a hybrid so that all cultural practices are hybrids. There is no pure cultural practice that belongs in one place or to one people. Nevertheless, the theory of hybridity has enabled us to recognize and name the production of new identities and cultural forms, for example Chinese Australians. Thus, the concept of hybridity is acceptable as a device to capture cultural change by way of a strategic cut or temporary stabilization of cultural categories.

The question of television and hybrid cultural identities was at the heart of my study (Barker 1999) of the way in which teenage, British Asian girls enunciated identities in the context of everyday talk about television soap operas. Issues of globalization formed a background to the study in two ways:

- First, soap opera is one of the prime genres of global television; there are few television systems that do not produce and/or import soap operas.
- Second, these girls are the second- and third-generation children of migrants from India whose arrival in Britain is an aspect of global economic and political forces.

The position of British Asian girls in English culture is significant and special by virtue of living across cultural boundaries – at its simplest, Asian, Afro-Caribbean, and White – and also, as girls, being somewhat marginalized within male-dominated cultures. These girls need to be able to reflect across the range of their identity experiences to “make sense” of their lives and are, arguably, in a unique position to reflexively construct hybrid identities. They are aware of themselves as operating across discourses and sites of activity and offer some insights into their own circumstances. Further, the kinds of Asian identities constructed by these girls were not “pure” or essentialist Asian identities; rather, they were British Asian

hybrids crosscut by considerations of gender. Through an active engagement with soap opera, and in particular through collective talk, the girls defined themselves as Asian at the same time as they reworked the meaning of Asianness to encompass their own British Asian hybrid identities.

Globalization and Cultural Imperialism

In the light of our prior discussions, we can now see that there are three central difficulties with the “globalization as cultural imperialism” argument:

- First, it is no longer the case, if it ever was, that the global flows of cultural discourses are constituted as one-way traffic.
- Second, insofar as the predominant flow of cultural discourse remains from West to East and North to South, this is not *necessarily* a form of domination.
- Third, it is unclear that globalization is a simple process of homogenization since the forces of fragmentation and hybridity are also strong.

There is little doubt that capitalist modernity does involve an element of cultural homogenization, for it increases the levels and amount of global coordination. However, mechanisms of fragmentation, heterogenization, and hybridity are also at work, so that it is not a question of *either* homogenization *or* heterogenization, but rather of the ways in which both of these two tendencies have become features of life across much of the contemporary world. Thus, valorizing bounded cultures, ethnic resilience, and the reemergence of powerful nationalistic sentiments coexist with hybrid cultures as “trans-local learning processes” (Pieterse 1995).

In this context, much of what is cast as cultural imperialism is better understood as creating a layer of Western capitalist modernity which overlays, but does not necessarily obliterate, preexisting cultural forms. Modern and postmodern ideas about time, space, rationality, capitalism, consumerism, sexuality, family, gender, and so forth, are placed alongside older discourses setting up ideological competition between them. The outcome may be both a range of hybrid forms of identity and traditional, “fundamentalist,” and nationalist identities. Nationalism and the nation-state continue to coexist with cosmopolitanism and the weakening of national identities. The processes of reverse flow, fragmentation, and hybridization are countervailing forces to the push toward homogenization.

The implications of these arguments for national identities are that importing foreign television is unlikely to result in the swamping or disappearance of local cultural identity. However, as the images and discourses of international television are absorbed into the identity resources of ordinary people, it is possible, indeed likely, that we will witness the emergence of hybrid identities. This is likely to be particularly the case amongst younger people.

While television does play a direct role in the penetration of cultures by meaning systems from elsewhere, rather than obliterating local conceptions, it is better to understand the process as overlaying local meanings by alternative definitions, thus

relativizing both and creating new senses of ambiguity and uncertainty. What we are seeing is a set of economic and cultural processes dating from different historical periods, with different developmental rhythms, being overlaid upon each other to create global disjunctures as well as new global connections and similarities.

Thus, metaphors of uncertainty, contingency, and chaos are replacing those of order, stability, and systemacity. Global cultural flows cannot be understood through neat sets of linear determinations, but are better comprehended as a series of overlapping, overdetermined, complex, and chaotic conditions. In this context, Appadurai (1993) has argued that contemporary global conditions are best characterized in terms of the disjunctive flows of ethnoscapescapes, technoscapescapes, finanscapescapes, mediascapescapes, and ideoscapescapes. That is, globalization involves the dynamic movements of ethnic groups, technology, financial transactions, media images, and ideological conflicts that are not neatly determined by one harmonious "master plan." Rather, the speed, scope, and impact of these flows are fractured and disconnected.

Though the concepts of globalization and hybridity are more adequate than cultural imperialism – because they suggest a less coherent, unified, and directed process – this should not lead us to abandon the exploration of power and inequality. The fact that power is diffused, or that commodities are used subversively to produce new hybrid identities, does not displace our need to examine it. As Pieterse argues:

Relations of power and hegemony are inscribed and reproduced *within* hybridity for wherever we look closely enough we find the traces of asymmetry in culture, place, descent. Hence hybridity raises the question of the terms of the mixture, the conditions of mixing and *mélange*. At the same time it's important to note the ways in which hegemony is not merely reproduced but *refigured* in the process of hybridization. (1995: 57)

For example, the cultural hybridity produced by the Black diaspora does not obscure the power that was embedded in the moment of slavery nor the economic push-pull of migration. As Hall argues, diaspora identities are constructed within and by cultural power. "This power," he suggests, "has become a constitutive element in our own identities" (1992: 233). Thus, the cultural identities of rich, White men in New York are of a very different order to those of poor Asian women in rural India. While we are all part of a global society whose consequences no one can escape, we remain unequal participants in it.

Globalization is spatially, culturally, and politically an uneven set of processes. Consequently, one of the tasks of cultural studies in the globalization era is to work out how and where the lines of power within contemporary culture are emerging and with what consequences. As I have suggested, one such domain of study is the role that television plays in constructing hybrid identities. Here, we should be aware that while we are right to credit audiences with an active role in interpreting television, nevertheless, the fact that the discourses of an international medium are partially incorporated into hybrid identities does suggest that television has an impact within non-Western cultures – though this is not best understood as a form of cultural imperialism. Moreover, if this all sounds indecisive and unclear, then it is so, not least because the very processes we are witnessing are complex and chaotic with no clear-cut outcomes.

Is a Global Conversation Possible?

The exchange of cultural goods and meanings, of which television forms a part, can be regarded as part of a global cosmopolitan “conversation.” However, both practical and theoretical considerations warn against excessive optimism. For example, continued conflict in the Middle East, the day-to-day racism of Western cities, and the simple fact of global differences in wealth, power, and tradition do not meet the criteria for sensible negotiation, let alone a conversation between equals. On a theoretical level, it can be argued that there is no unity of language, so that rule-governed language is untranslatable into those of others. In this view, truth and meaning are constituted by their place in specific, local-language games and cannot be universal in character – rather they are incommensurable or untranslatable.

However, Rorty (1991) argues that we should see language as a *practice* that utilizes skills. Though exact translation of languages or cultures is not feasible, we can learn the skills of language. If we then consider languages (and thus culture) not as constituted by untranslatable and incompatible rules but as learnable *skills*, then incommensurable languages could only be unlearnable languages (which Rorty argues is not possible). This would encourage *dialogue* and the attempt to reach pragmatic agreements. There is no a priori reason why this should succeed. Agreement may never be reached, but there is no a priori reason why it should fail either. Given that the alternatives to talking are violence and/or isolationism, seeking practical agreements based on continual dialogue remains the urgent task. The more that television can contribute to a diversity of representations within a diverse set of public spheres, the better it can assist us in appreciating the value of difference (and thus of equality of cultural identities) in a global context.

Conclusions

This paper has sought to map, in a general way, the changing and expanding contours of television on a global scale. In particular, it was argued that the search for synergy in the context of a deregulated television landscape was leading to corporate mergers and takeovers. These developments advance the formation of multimedia, transnational media corporations able to shape television’s global production and distribution. Thus, the tendency toward monopoly and US hegemony at the level of political economy advances increasing inequality of ownership and access. This would appear to threaten the achievement of that diversity of representations of cultural identity which, I have argued, would be the marker of “equality” in this context.

However, it was suggested that television’s globalization is not best understood in terms of cultural imperialism and the homogenization of world culture. Rather, it was argued that while forces of *homogenization* are certainly in evidence, those of *heterogenization* and *localization* are also strong. This is partly an issue of political economy; namely, US global ascendancy is ameliorated by a trend toward regionalization so that, for example, the Indian film industry serves as an alternative to Hollywood across Asia and Al-Jazeera competes with CNN in the Middle

East. Nonetheless, the modification of, and resistance to, US hegemony is more obviously achieved at the level of reception. The processes of localizing the global are, in part, an outcome of audiences' capacities to create their own meanings from texts. It was suggested that audiences are active creators of meaning and not "cultural dopes" who swallow whole everything television has to offer. Rather, television is a resource that we draw on to construct our identities in a variety of different ways.

These arguments are of significance because (a) they illustrate the place of television, and its cultural representations, as a major and proliferating resource for constructing cultural identity, and (b) they demonstrate that the consequences of inequalities of ownership and distribution are not clear-cut in relation to questions of identity. Rather, the relationship between globalization, television, and cultural identities is a complex one which may give rise to absolutist ethnic identities, fundamentalist religious identities, hybrid cross-cultural identities, fragmented multiple identities, postmodern neo-tribes, "third cultures" of transglobal workers and intellectuals, and a paradoxical understanding that while our planet is a finite, bounded space, it is composed of diverse cultures and peoples with complex local and global cultural identities.

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Chapter 22

Minding the Cyber-gap: the Internet and Social Inequality

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The digital divide is a new frontier where social inequalities are shaping, and being shaped by, the latest development of technology. Social inequality has been increasing both in developed and developing countries since the 1990s. At the same time, the Internet has grown exponentially. Yet, the diffusion of the Internet is extremely uneven. As science fiction writer William Gibson put it: “[T]he future is already here; it just isn’t evenly distributed” (1999, radio program).

On the one hand, there is marked evidence that the digital divide occurs at the intersection of international and intranational socioeconomic, technological, and linguistic differences. At the global level, there is a huge digital divide between developed and developing nations. For instance, while 10 percent of the world population was online in 2002, 88 percent of them were residents in industrialized countries (World Economic Forum 2002). Within national states, the uneven diffusion of the Internet appears along the familiar fault lines of social inequality such as socioeconomic status, gender, age, ethnicity, and geographic location. High costs, the lack of proper content, and the lack of technological support hinder disadvantaged communities from using the Internet to their advantage. On the other hand, Internet use can affect social inequalities in important ways as the Internet becomes more consequential for seeking information, getting jobs, and engaging in civic or entrepreneurial activities. Therefore, the ramifications of falling through the net are far-reaching for societies and individuals.

The primary goal of this chapter is to evaluate and synthesize literature on the relation of the Internet and social inequality since the early 1990s. In the first part of this chapter, we look at how various forms of social inequality result in uneven access to and use of the Internet. Building on existing literature, we develop a framework to analyze systematically how technological and social factors affect both access to and use of the Internet. Our model contains two dimensions. First, the digital divide is not a binary yes/no question of whether the basic physical access to the Internet is available because access does not equal use. Second, the digital divide is shaped by social factors as much as by technological factors.

In the second section, we explore the Internet's impact on individuals, communities, and countries. We assess three scenarios common in the existing literature: equalization, amplification, and transformation. The equalization scenario expects that the Internet reduces social inequalities and ameliorates some broader social problems, such as poverty or illiteracy. The amplification scenario expects that the Internet might enlarge the existing gulf between the rich and the poor, the information "haves" and "have-nots," the better connected and the poorly connected. Both the equalization and the amplification camps tend to derive their arguments from pundits, travelers' tales, and laboratory studies. We argue for a third, more empirically grounded, transformation scenario that emphasizes the social embeddedness of technologies and their social impacts.

In the third section, we review literature on how to narrow the digital divide in disadvantaged communities. Closing the digital divide is more complicated than offering computer and Internet access. It is a long and rocky way before the digital divide becomes digital opportunities. Governmental telecommunication policy, infrastructures, Internet access at public places, education and training, and the spread of digital literacy are prerequisites for the transition to a more thoroughgoing knowledge-based networked society.

The concluding part of the chapter summarizes the three stages of research on the Internet and social inequality since the 1990s, identifies knowledge gaps in existing literature, outlines emerging themes in the field, and calls for further research.

The Impact of Social Inequality on Internet Access and Use

There are many ways in which social inequality shapes Internet access and use. Hence, the digital divide is a multilevel and multidimensional social phenomenon, affected by social inequalities at the global, national, community, and individual levels. These multiple digital divides vary according to the characteristics of countries, such as their different levels of economic development. Data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) shows that school enrollment, educational attainment, newspaper readership, and language diversity are important indicators of knowledge-based barriers to Internet access and use (International Telecommunication Union 2003a). The digital divide also varies according to different characteristics of individuals, such as their socioeconomic status, gender, age, race, and ethnicity.

The global digital divide

One of the most striking aspects of the digital divide is the difference in Internet access between advanced nations at the core of the world system and poor countries at the periphery that lack infrastructures, resources, and skills to log onto the information era. Even though the Internet has become a part of everyday life for many in developed countries, it remains a luxury in developing ones. Only three years ago, the number of Internet users in Africa was less than that in New York City or Tokyo (ABC News 2000). Even today, the penetration rate of the Internet is still lingering at single digits in most developing nations, while the average in

developed countries had already reached 30 percent in 2001 (International Labor Office 2001; World Employment Report 2001; International Telecommunication Union 2003b).

On top of uneven access to the Internet, there are dramatic disparities between nations in Internet use. North Americans have generally been online longer, use the Internet more frequently, and do more kinds of activities online. By contrast, Internet use in developing countries is restricted more to elites (Chen et al. 2002). Just as important, users in developing countries disproportionately consume rather than produce Internet content because of the high cost of Internet access and censorship (Bazar and Boalch 1997).

Data collected by international organizations suggest that the digital divide is narrowing between first-movers and latecomers among developed countries (Table 22.1). The share of US-based Internet users in the world online population has decreased from 54 percent in 1997 to 29 percent in 2002 (Nielsen/NetRatings 2003a). Countries such as the UK, Korea, and Japan have come up to the level of Internet connectivity in the USA. To some extent, the Internet is expanding in developed countries in similar ways to its expansion in the USA, although with a time lag. On the other hand, different dynamics are at work in different countries. For instance, Japan and the Nordic countries are leading the development of the mobile Internet, Korea is the world leader of broadband connection, and the UK has the highest rate of digital TV diffusion in the world. Furthermore, although most countries are lagging behind the USA in PC-based Internet use, some are more rapidly adopting mobile phones to access the Internet.

There is a stark gap between those who live in major urban centers with better education, higher income, and connections to the developed world culturally and economically, and those who live on the periphery, such as poor peasants. By contrast to the catching-up in the developed world, the digital divide is widening and deepening in developing countries in spite of efforts to bridge it. It is widening in the sense that few people actively use the Internet and deepening in the sense that the consequences for not being online may be greater when moving beyond a subsistence level. Without intervention, it may take generations to close.

The digital divide within national states

Inequality in Internet access during the first decade of Internet diffusion has been widely documented: users were disproportionately affluent, better-educated, male, White, and from North America and, to a lesser extent, from other developed countries. That is, the digital divide has often emerged along the familiar fault lines of social inequality: class, ethnicity, gender, age, and geographic location (Whitaker 1999; DiMaggio and Hargittai 2001; Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002).

Socioeconomic status: Internet users are more likely to be affluent and better educated than nonusers. This pattern has been evident in almost all countries, although the magnitude of this impact varies. For instance, among OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, the digital divide between high-income households and low-income households ranges from a gap of more than 60 percentage points in the UK to less than 20 percentage points in Denmark (OECD 2002). Moreover, the divide based on socioeconomic status is persistent or

Table 22.1 Number of people and percentage of population using the Internet in 1999, 2001, and 2002 in selected countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>No. of people online in 2002 in M (month)^b</i>	<i>% of population online in 2002^b</i>	<i>No. of people online in 2002 in M (month)^b</i>	<i>% of population online in 2001^b</i>	<i>% of population online in 1999^a</i>
Argentina	–	–	3.88 (Jul)	10.38	3.00
Australia	10.63 (Feb)	54.38	10.06 (Aug)	52.49	32.00
Brazil	13.98 (Sep)	7.77	11.94 (Jul)	6.84	2.00
Bulgaria	–	–	0.59 (Apr)	7.59	2.57 ^b
Canada	16.84 (Mar)	52.79	14.44 (Jul)	45.71	36.00
China	58.00 (Dec)	4.83	26.50 (Jul)	2.08	0.56 ^b
Denmark	3.37 (Jul)	62.73	2.93 (Jul)	54.74	28.00
Egypt	–	–	0.60 (Dec)	0.85	0.60 ^b
Finland	2.69 (May)	51.89	2.27 (Aug) ^c	43.93 ^c	33.00
France	16.97 (May)	28.39	11.70 (Aug)	19.65	10.00
Germany	32.10 (Aug)	38.91	28.64 (Aug)	34.49	19.00
Hong Kong	4.35 (Apr)	59.58	3.93 (Jul)	54.50	25.00
India	–	–	7.00 (Dec)	0.67	0.20
Iran	–	–	0.42 (Dec)	0.63	0.15 ^b
Iraq	–	–	0.13 (Dec) ^c	0.05 ^c	–
Israel	–	–	1.94 (Jul)	17.12	16.00
Japan	56.00 (Jun)	44.10	47.08 (Dec) ^c	37.20 ^c	15.00
Kenya	–	–	0.50 (Dec)	1.61	0.16 ^b
Mexico	–	–	3.50 (Dec)	3.38	3.00
Norway	2.68 (Jul)	59.2	2.45 (July)	54.40	45.00
Russia	–	–	18.00 (Dec)	12.42	3.69 ^b
Saudi Arabia	–	–	0.57 (Mar)	2.50	0.52 ^b
South Africa	–	–	3.07 (Dec)	7.03	3.74 ^b
South Korea	25.60 (Jul)	53.8	22.23 (Jul)	46.40	21.33
Spain	7.89 (May)	19.69	7.38 (Jul)	18.43	7.00
Sweden	6.02 (Sep)	67.81	5.64 (Jul) ^c	63.55 ^c	41.00
UK	34.30 (Sep)	57.24	33.00 (Jun)	55.32	21.00
USA	165.75 (Apr)	59.1	166.14 (Aug)	59.75	40.00

^a *Source:* World Employment Report (2001).^b *Source:* Nua, http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/.^c Data available for 2000 only.

even increasing, except in a few developed countries such as the USA and Japan. This is because although poorer and less-educated people are accessing the Internet, the rate of increased access is higher among the more affluent and better-educated segments of the population in many countries.

Gender: Worldwide, men are more likely than women to access and use the Internet. Although the gender divide is generally narrowing, it is increasing in some countries where men are going online at a faster rate than women. Furthermore, in

Table 22.2 An integrative framework for the digital divide

<i>Access</i>	<i>Use</i>
Technological	
ICT infrastructure	Digital literacy
Hardware, software, bandwidth	Technological skills
	Social and cognitive skills
<i>Social access</i>	<i>Social use</i>
Affordability	Information seeking
Awareness	Resource mobilization
Language	Social movement
Content/usability	Civic engagement
Location	Social inclusion

Source: Authors Wenhong Chen and Barry Wellman.

less developed countries, patriarchal gender norms are barriers to women's access to the Internet. For instance, in African schools, earlier curfews and household chores hinder girls from using the Internet as much as boys (Gadio 2001).

Life course: In both developed and developing countries, the Internet penetration rate among younger people is substantially higher than among older people. Students who can get online via school connections make up a big share of Internet users in developing countries.

The double digital divide: Inequality in Internet access is not solely contingent on individuals' ability or resources. Wellman and colleagues have coined the term "double digital divide" to describe the gap in Internet access and use segregated by both geographic locations and individual socioeconomic status (in Fong et al. 2001). In 2000, Americans living in rural areas (42 percent) and central cities (44 percent) had substantially lower levels of Internet access than suburbanites (55 percent), regardless of their individual socioeconomic statuses (Fong et al. 2001). The gap in geographic location persists. In 2002, 63 percent of suburbanites were online in the USA, while less than half of rural residents were online (Lenhart et al. 2003).

Interaction effects: The digital divide often happens at the junction of socioeconomic status, gender, age, and geographic location. For instance, more than three-quarters (78 percent) of higher-income Americans (annual household income of \$75,000 or higher) were online in 2000. However, within this higher-income group, there was a 31 percentage-point gap in Internet access between those with a college education (82 percent) and those with less than a high school education (51 percent) (National Telecommunications and Information Administration 2000). Ethnicity further complicates the picture. African Americans are often less likely to be connected to the Internet than are members of other racial groups at the same income levels (Lenhart et al. 2003).

Table 22.2 presents a framework for analyzing unequal Internet access and use within and between countries. There are two axes in this framework – access vs. use and technological vs. social. That is, our model looks at how both technological and social factors affect access to and use of the Internet.

First, the digital divide is not a binary yes/no question as to whether the basic physical access to the Internet is available. Access does not equal regular and informed use. Even among OECD countries, less than half of all Internet users use the Internet daily (OECD 2002). What matters is the extent to which people regularly use computers and the Internet for meaningful purposes. As Warschauer (2002) argues, “a digital divide is marked not only by physical access to computers and connectivity, but also by access to the additional resources that allow people to use technology well.”

Second, the digital divide is shaped by social factors as much as by technological factors. Technological fixes will not close the divide unless they also take into account the social reasons why people are not online. Accordingly, we analyze the digital divide from four perspectives: technological access, technological use, social access, and social use.

Technological access

“The Internet is not a single innovation but is a cluster of related technologies that must be present together to support adoption decision by end users” (Wolcott et al. 2001: 5). People often use different levels and combinations of technologies (e.g., hardware, software, and bandwidth) to access computers and the Internet. The varying quality of Internet access can affect the efficiency, volume, and diversity of Internet use.

Digital literacy (technological use)

Physical access is just the beginning. The skills that users bring with them have profound impacts on what they could gain from the Internet. Having access to the Internet and having the ability to use the Internet effectively are two distinct aspects of the digital divide. Using computers and the Internet is more complicated than switching on the TV set and changing channels or picking up the telephone receiver and punching in a telephone number. It requires basic computer and cognitive skills to use the Internet meaningfully and productively, such as seeking information, developing community networks, constructing social capital, and participating in political activities. Research suggests that age and experience with technology are related to the level of Internet skills (Hargittai 2002).

Social access

Economic, organizational, and cultural factors affect equal access to the Internet. Income is the most important factor. Recent studies indicate that the barrier to Internet access often begins with a lack of awareness and interest (Reddick and Boucher 2001, 2002). For instance, about half of adult nonusers in the UK were not online because of a lack of interest (Office of the E-Envoy 2002). In Japan, 73 percent of the nonusers reported “incomprehensible/have no interest” as the reason why they were not connected (Couldry 2001). Furthermore, awareness or interest is not randomly distributed: the elderly, women, and non-Whites have been less aware of the Internet than youth, men, and Whites (Katz and Rice 2002).

The adoption of the Internet is contingent on the affordability, simplicity, user-friendliness, and relevance of the Internet in everyday lives. Language, content, and location barriers become salient once basic access to the Internet is available. English has been the language of the Internet: 78 percent of all websites are English only, more than double the share of native English speakers (37 percent) in the world online population (Nua.com 2003). However, people might feel more comfortable surfing websites in their first language. For instance, Hispanic Internet users in the USA were more likely to spend their time online in Spanish than in English (Greenspan 2002). Lack of proper content often hinders the minorities' adoption of the Internet by members of disadvantaged groups. They often have difficulties obtaining practical and local information on the web that is relevant to their daily lives, such as job listings, housing listings, and local events (Children's Partnership 2000).

Social factors at a deeper level are also related to the adoption of new technologies. Compared with nonusers, Internet users are more socially connected, have a stronger sense of efficacy (perceived control over one's life), and consume more media (including newspapers, TV, and mobile phone usage, etc.). In addition, informal training through social support plays a crucial role in equipping people with computer and navigational skills for using the Internet (Lenhart et al. 2003).

Social use

The digital divide is more a social than a technological divide. Having access to the Internet and having the ability to use it effectively are two different issues, although marketers often only report the number of people who have access to the Internet and what they are likely to buy online. The issue is not whether people have ever glanced at a monitor or put their hands on a keyboard but the extent to which they regularly use the Internet. Ultimately, the digital divide is a matter of who uses the Internet, for what purposes, under what circumstances, and how this use affects social cohesion and inclusion.

Emailing and seeking information are the two most frequent Internet activities in many countries (OECD 2002). However, socioeconomic status, gender, and ethnic gaps persist even once access to the Internet is available. For instance, while 62 percent of American employees have Internet access, workforce elites (e.g., professionals, managers, and administrative employees) are the "power emailers." They spend at least one hour every day in emailing, and they check their inboxes several times an hour. These power emailers have been earlier adopters of the Internet: predominantly White, better educated, better paid, and working in large companies (Fallows 2002). Moreover, college-educated users are more likely than high school-educated users to visit websites related to work, education, and information (Robinson et al. 2003).

The ways in which people communicate online are also conditioned by gendered styles of maintaining relationships offline (Boneva et al. 2001). Women have been more enthusiastic than men in emailing family members and friends, reflecting women's general role as network keepers (Wellman 1992; Horrigan and Rainie 2002). Women are also more likely than men to search online for health information on behalf of loved ones (Fox and Fallows 2003). However, gender roles and

domestic responsibilities often mean women spend less time online than men (Kennedy et al. 2003).

Ethnicity often plays a role in the level of Internet use. Asian Americans have been the heaviest users in the USA, with the longest Internet experience. They have been more likely than people from other ethnic groups to use the Internet for work- or school-related purposes (Spooner 2001). By contrast to the general online population, African American Internet users spend less time on the web, initiate fewer sessions, and browse fewer web pages (Nielsen/NetRatings 2003b).

The Internet's Effect on Social Inequality

We discuss in this section the other side of the relation between the Internet and social inequality: namely, how does the Internet affect social inequality? Social inequality occurs when social actors are stratified into distinctive groups based on individual differences or socially defined characteristics, such as class, ethnicity, gender, or religion. These socially defined categories can be stratification principles that affect access to resources such as wealth, power, prestige, education, and health, as well as access to and the use of technology. If these differences become institutionalized and persistent, it will be of great consequence for the consolidation of unequal relationships among social actors (Grabb 1984).

The relation between technology and social inequality has attracted sociologists since the beginning of the discipline. In Marxian theories, technological development has been regarded as an impetus for social change because the mode of production has fundamental significance for the formation of class-based inequality. Technology could facilitate changes in the structure of social inequality. By contrast, the Weberian interpretation emphasizes the marketplace as the main arena where differential rewards are allocated according to individuals' market capacity. In this light, technology proficiency and skills would affect individuals' labor-market achievement. Furthermore, status groups could exclude outsiders from accessing and using certain resources. Disproportionate returns are channeled to those who occupy strategic positions in networks (Erickson 1997; Tilly 1998).

Many analysts attribute part of the new inequality to a "skills gap," viewing the ongoing technological change as "skill-biased" (Krueger 1993; Feenstra 1998). The new economy, based on skill-biased technological change, generates fewer low-skill and high-wage jobs. There are concerns that the middle-income class might be polarizing into two groups: those who are well-educated, professional, mobile, and working in the primary labor market; and those who are less educated, stuck in dead-end jobs, less adaptable to change, and working in the secondary labor market (Castells 2001).

Explanations of new inequality have focused on technological change, globalization, the changes in labor-market institutions, and the shift toward the service sector. However, empirical evidence often speaks an equivocal language. The impact of technology, globalization, immigration, and skills mismatch can only explain a small amount of the increasing inequality. More importantly, there are often mixed findings (Blackburn 1999).

The relation between the digital divide and social inequality is complicated. On the one hand, existing social inequalities affect access to and use of the Internet. Thus, the global digital divide is a manifestation of the center–periphery inequalities embedded in the world system (Norris 2001). The digital divide within countries reflects the current structure of power relations and hierarchies: “It is neither accidental nor trivial that men with higher incomes and higher education levels were the early adopters of the Internet, and that their lifestyles set some of the norms (‘netiquette’) for behavior online” (Haythornwaite and Wellman 2002: 11). On the other hand, research suggests that the digital divide can affect the reproduction of social inequality. The rise of social inequality, especially income inequality, began before the diffusion of the Internet.

What role is the Internet playing in the further development of social inequalities? Is the Internet an enabler that is bringing enormous opportunities to disadvantaged social groups, or is it enhancing the existing order of inequality? In what follows, we review three scenarios of the Internet impact on social inequality: equalization, amplification, and transformation.

Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out that much attention has been paid to the other side of the story: how social inequality affects Internet access and use. Fewer studies have looked at how the Internet affects social inequality. In particular, there are few such studies that are based on solid research design and data. Moreover, as the Internet is still a young technology, it may be too early to make sound predictions while the Internet is still evolving (Agre 2002).

The equalization scenario – The Internet decreases social inequalities

Optimists have hailed the Internet and other information and communication technologies (ICTs) as the “prime movers” of social progress. Some have even compared the historical significance of the Internet with the capture of fire (Barlow et al. 1995). For optimists, the Internet will reduce social inequality dramatically because access to the Internet is the key to economic growth, social development, cultural diversity, and the empowerment of the disadvantaged.

First, the information revolution would allow poor countries to leapfrog into a digital future by adopting the latest technologies developed in the rich countries. Second, the Internet was celebrated as an open technology that would lead to democracy and effective government (Negroponte 1995). Initiatives such as e-government would provide opportunities to promote transparency and accountability in developing countries where incompetent autocracies and corruption block social and economic development (Fisher and Wright 2001). For example, the Scottish Parliament webcasts meetings, puts reports online, and has extensive online facilities for public inputs (<http://www.scottishparliamentlive.com>). Or, to take a local example, the village government of Granville, Ohio also provides online meeting announcements, planning documents, and reports, and facilitates online discussions (<http://www.granville.oh.us>).

Third, the Internet could empower members of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Once logged onto the Internet, they could tap into previously unattainable

resources for economic growth and social development. For instance, people in remote Indian or African villages could sell handcrafts online, connecting them directly to customers in the affluent West and bypassing the exploitation of middlemen (Hammond 2001).

Optimists regard the Internet as a global technology. Accelerating the global flow of information, the Internet has the potential to transcend geographic and social boundaries. Class, gender, and racial boundaries are less relevant in cyberspace. Anonymity in cyberspace facilitates the development of social interaction based on common interests rather than on personal characteristics such as gender, skin color, accent, or location (Turkle 1999).

The amplification scenario – The Internet increases social inequalities

By contrast to the enthusiastic equalization scenario, pessimists claim that the Internet is reproducing or even reinforcing social inequalities. For example, Castells analyzes the relation of the Internet to inequality in the context of “a dynamic, deregulated, global capitalist system” (2000: 10). This system results in the biased utilization of information and communication technologies, which “has triggered processes that seem to lead, around the world, to increasing social inequality in stark contrast to the promises of the Information Age” (p. 10).

First, few disadvantaged people, communities, or countries can afford leapfrogging into the networked age. Access to the Internet is denied to the great majority of people living on this planet. Most will remain on the wrong side of the digital divide because they lack the necessary social and technological resources to participate in the knowledge-based economy.

The telecommunications infrastructure is often of lower capacity and poorer quality in developing countries. While an established network is already present in most developed countries, the telecommunications infrastructure needs to be built or updated in developing countries. Users often have to pay higher prices for connection fees than their counterparts in developed countries. For instance, in Africa, the average access fee is US\$60 for 20 hours a month, a prohibitive cost for most Africans (Mbarika et al. 2002).

Not only the physical infrastructure but the social infrastructure also matters. Trust, especially trust in the social system (i.e., citizens’ trust in bureaucratic efficiency, the rule of law, absence of corruption, civil rights, and so forth) is a powerful factor affecting differences in the diffusion of ICTs (Volken 2002). However, in countries plagued by poverty, war, or corruption, it might be even more difficult to build civic trust than the physical infrastructure.

Second, first-movers often establish competitive advantages, reap positive feedbacks, and reinforce the unevenness of the Internet-based economy (Castells 2001). If preexisting inequalities deter people in developing countries from using the Internet, these inequalities may increase as the Internet becomes more central for acquiring information about employment, health, education, and politics.

Third, differential Internet use can increase gaps in access to the social network and social capital, because disadvantaged individuals and communities are unlikely to capitalize on the web and to have ties that provide access to information and

resources. Consequently, the embedding of the Internet in everyday life can exacerbate the power relations that underlie existing inequalities and lead to the further social exclusion of disadvantaged groups (Bucy 2000).

The hope that the introduction of modern technology such as the Internet will bring about transparency or democracy in authoritarian regimes is slim. Authoritarian governments soon learn how to acquire and use the latest technologies for surveillance, filtering, and propaganda (Kalathil and Boas 2003), and corporations often turn alternative cultures into money-making devices (Calhoun 1998; DiMaggio et al. 2001). For example, search engines play a gate-keeping role in channeling information to users. However, in the hopes of grabbing users' attention, an industry has developed that helps clients boost their search-engine rankings (Loosen 2002). Technologies often bring about unexpected consequences. For instance, technologies such as radio, telephone, or cable eventually became new media of entertainment, rather than new tools for education. As Jennifer Light notes, "[I]nitial assumptions about the future form and uses of media, even from experts, are often mistaken" (2001: 725).

Although optimists consider Internet access as part of the solution to broad social problems, such as poverty, health, or illiteracy (bridges.org 2001; Menou 2003), the Internet is not an elixir that can cure social problems. Some analysts expect that the benefits of the information revolution will eventually trickle down to the bulk of the world population living in poverty. Others suggest that instead of trickling down, there is a "Matthew effect." Robert Merton (1973) refers to such phenomena – the rich get richer, the poor poorer – as the "Matthew effect," inspired by Matthew 13:12 ("For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath"). In a similar vein, the Internet stimulates more activities of those who are already active and neglects those who are not interested or are not able to use it (Agre 2002; Kraut et al. 2002). Consequently, the Internet might increase the existing gaps between the rich and the poor, the information "haves" and "have-nots," the better connected and the poorly connected.

The transformation scenario – The Internet transforms the playing field

Both the equalization and the amplification camps tend to derive their arguments from theories or anecdotes, with little empirical support. Until now, research on the social consequences of the Internet has often been inconclusive and paradoxical. It seems that the Internet both increases and decreases social inequality; it empowers, and it deskills. However, it does not do these things in clear-cut ways.

Take the research on the Internet effect on political participation. There is plenty of evidence showing that the Internet and other ICTs are used by a multiplicity of players: governments, democratic or authoritarian; religious groups, modest or fundamental; grassroots NGOs, pro-democracy dissidents, guerrillas like the Mexican Zapatista, or terrorists. It is difficult to estimate to what extent online surveillance offsets social mobilization using email and online forums. Catching up with the networked society still allows authoritarian regimes to crack down (Kalathil and Boas 2003). Authoritarian governments quickly leapfrog conventional tools of

surveillance and propaganda by using the latest information and telecommunication technologies. Overall, the impact of Internet use on political participation seems to be modest at best (Agre 2002).

Internet access and use at public places provides another example. Poor inner cities in developed countries and rural villages in developing countries have received much attention in the cause of bridging the digital divide. Anecdotes abound of how the Internet improves people's lives in disadvantaged communities. Technological innovations and social entrepreneurship that bring computers and the Internet to villages in Southeast Asian rainforest or African grassland inspire technological and social imaginations. Yet, the benefits of community information projects are distributed unevenly. It is often the case that the better-off people living in these communities are able and willing to benefit from the telecenters or cybercafés, as they are literate, have some capital, and are respected in the community. However, the poorest among the poor rarely take advantage of these projects (Selwyn 2002).

Though different in their emphases and conclusions, both the dark perditions of the pessimists and the rosy views of the optimists tend to be one-dimensional. We argue for a transformation scenario that articulates the social embeddedness of technologies and their social impacts. The extent to which a new technology lives up to its potential is contingent on the social and institutional contexts in which it is used. The impacts of class, race, gender, organizational hierarchy, and network diversity persist in cyberspace (DiMaggio et al. 2001; Agre 2002; Katz and Rice 2002; Haythornthwaite and Hagar 2004). On the other hand, the transformation scenario acknowledges that the Internet can be an enabler and transform the way in which social inequalities are reproduced, although the transformation might be less dramatic and astonishing than either the utopians or the dystopians have claimed.

The technology of the Internet allows people to use it in multiple ways. The Internet is a medium of communication, a tool of knowledge management, and an emerging public sphere. The impact of the Internet is contingent on social and institutional context. In different countries, different dynamics are influencing Internet access and use. As Warschauer points out, "many important changes in social relations may come from the human interaction that surrounds the technological process rather than from the operation of computers or use of the Internet" (2003b: 212).

At a deeper level, the Internet and other ICTs are transforming the stratification principles by which social resources are channeled. Access to knowledge is supplementing property and labor as stratifying principles (Stehr 1994; Castells 2000). The Internet and other ICTs are both the conduits and the locales where knowledge and information about education, jobs, health, politics, etc. is disseminated, searched for, and exchanged. Linking people, knowledge, and organizations, new communication technologies foster changes in how people interact and obtain resources from one another (Castells 2000). Accordingly, knowing how to network, both online and offline, becomes human capital, and having a supportive network becomes social and cultural capital (Wellman et al. 2002).

One emerging characteristic of community life in the information age is the rise of networked individualism, as modern transportation and communication technology set communication free from physical proximity and enable far-flung and sparsely knit communities to flourish beyond the traditional spatial constraints (Wellman 2002). Computer-mediated communication accelerates the way in which

people operate at the centers of partial personal communities. It allows people to easily switch and adjust their involvements in multiple networks. As a medium of communication, the Internet enables users to maintain connections with existing ties and to create new ties with people of shared interests outside their often restricted physical world. Accordingly, it will greatly affect the structure and the composition of users' social networks by affording changes in the pattern, reachability, and speed of networking. Numerous studies have indicated that Internet use has positive impacts on social capital and sociability (Hampton and Wellman 2002; Quan-Haase et al. 2002; Gershuny 2003; Castells et al. 2004; Miyata et al. forthcoming). Moreover, the Internet facilitates the formation of cultural capital (Howard and Jones 2004). For example, in 2000, 56 percent of Canadian Internet users reported that the most commonly sought information was about arts, entertainment, or sports (Dryburgh 2001).

Transnational immigration provides an example of how the Internet could transform people's everyday lives and change the dynamics of social inequality. Immigrants often use the Internet (websites, newsgroups, or listserves) to create a place where they can socialize (Miller and Slater 2000; Mitra 2003). Immigrants participate in transnational practices "by combining their new technological prowess with mobilization of their social capital" (Portes 1997: 18). Aided by modern transportation and communication technologies, the scope and density of the current transnational practices exceeds those transnational activities documented in the past. As more and more immigrants in the host countries and their friends and relatives in the home countries obtain access to the Internet, transnational activities are less the playground of a few elite actors.

Transnational entrepreneurs are intensive users of modern transportation and communication technologies (Portes et al. 2002). The Internet and other ICTs open the cyberspace for transnationalism. Online communication and exchange cross national boundaries. Hence, transnational practices do not depend solely on "actual bodily movement" (Smith and Guarnizo 1998: 14). Simultaneous Internet access to images and sounds allows immigrants to follow and take part in what is going on in their home countries, often in real time (Georgiou 2003). These uses of modern technologies have great implications for immigrant adaptation in the host country and economic development in the home country. Economically, immigrants find an alternative way to participate in the labor market. Socially, they can selectively live in two cultures, instead of only assimilating into the melting pot (Guarnizo et al. 2003).

Bridging the Digital Divide

When looking at the relation between the Internet and social inequality, most research assumes ubiquity: that almost all of those who are truly modern and transforming will be connected. It portrays a world system transformed by the Internet and other new information and communication media, from relations among people within organizations to relations between large economic sectors. They see computer-supported communication and knowledge to be crucial for the innovation and dissemination of products and services. Indeed, many studies rest on the belief that the informed use of the Internet is already widely available and growing swiftly.

However, the complicated relation between the Internet and social inequality means that we cannot simply assume that the digital divide – the numbers of people who are not connected to the Internet – is small and becoming irrelevant. The digital divide is here for some time to come (Lenhart et al. 2003). If current trends continue, it could take 20 years for poor households in the USA to catch up to the current level of Internet use of rich households (Martin 2003). The divide is socially patterned, so that there are systematic variations in the kinds of people who are on and off the Internet. Moreover, those who need the positive impact of the Internet most are less likely to have the technology and the skills to access and use it (Rice 2000).

Of the 4.6 billion people living in developing countries, 1.2 billion live on less than \$1 a day, 1 billion have no access to clean water, and more than 850 million are illiterate (United Nations Development Program 2001). Some people argue that the Internet is not a basic necessity for poor communities (Irving 2001). They contend that computers and the Internet are unnecessary luxuries for people living in poverty because they more urgently need food, clean water, and basic education. For example, US Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael K. Powell said at his maiden press conference in February 2001 that, “I think there’s a Mercedes divide. I’d like to have one, but I can’t afford one.” His comment was criticized as downplaying the importance of bridging the digital divide (e.g., Hamilton 2001). It also ignores innovative experiments in poor communities and countries, such as village phones and digital libraries (Hammond 2001).

The digital divide is about the gap between individuals and societies that have the resources to participate in the information era and those that do not. Closing the digital divide is more complicated than offering computer and Internet access. The issue is how disadvantaged individuals and groups can be enabled to obtain the necessary resources and leapfrog into a digital future. We will next review approaches to overcoming the barriers of existing social inequalities and to narrowing the digital divide in disadvantaged communities and societies.

Telecommunication policy is one of the most salient factors explaining the variation of Internet connectivity among OECD countries (Hargittai 1999). Pro-competitive policy and institutional arrangements are essential to the transition to the network society. For Third World countries at similar levels of socioeconomic development, policy partially explains why some are going ahead while others are left behind. Clearly defined national strategies accelerate Internet diffusion through government-sponsored projects, especially initiatives connecting public schools and libraries (Fox 2001).

Promoting Internet access at public places improves Internet access and use for those who cannot afford Internet access at home or the workplace (Boase et al. 2003). Cybercafés, school, community telecasters, and public libraries have provided alternatives to the mainstream paradigm of individual computer ownership and home Internet access. This is crucially true in developing countries. For instance, while only 4 percent of American users access the Internet from public places (Fallows 2002), more than one-quarter of Chinese Internet users are university students going online at campus computer labs (China Internet Network Information Center 2002).

Yet, merely providing Internet access at public places is not enough. Informal mentoring and training at community centers are crucial for bridging the skills

divide and empowering the disadvantaged (Lindgaard 2002). Some public facilities go one step further in encouraging more sophisticated use of the Internet. For example, Intel sponsors a "Clubhouse Network" to help urban youth develop advanced knowledge with hardware and software. Through this program, minority youths get the opportunity to nurture their creativity by designing games (Marriott 2002).

Until recently, the content of the Internet has been more likely to target well-off, well-educated, and English-speaking users. ICT centers should cater to the needs of local communities, and be designed and implemented through a bottom-up approach, using such strategies as recruiting local champions or situating Internet access at less intimidating public places such as pubs, shopping centers, or hairdressers (Selwyn 2002).

Exploring the multiplicity of ICTs. There are other information and communication technologies, each with different social affordances (Haythornthwaite 2001). For example, broader strata of the population can use mobile phones. They bring convenience and pleasure to urban youth in rich countries. They also provide practical information at low cost to peasants in remote villages, who rarely have the literacy or technological proficiency to use PCs. Indeed, mobile phones have diffused faster than the Internet in many developing and developed countries (International Telecommunication Union 2002).

It is a long winding road with many bumps to turn the digital divide into digital opportunities. Governmental telecommunication policy, existing infrastructures, as well as education and technology training, in particular the spread of digital literacy, are widely identified as prerequisites for the transition to the knowledge-based network society. It takes time and money to build the technological infrastructure. Thus, it is hard to imagine that the Internet penetration rate in developing countries will soon catch up to the same level as in the developed world in the near future.

Conclusions

We have identified two phases of research into the Internet and inequality. Pundits either announcing a brave new world of cyberspace or warning about the alienation of humankind through the smart machine characterize phase one. The relation of the Internet and social inequality was the subject of speculation and anecdote rather than of systematic analysis and examination. Too often the discussion was one-dimensional and presentist. The Internet was assumed to be such a powerful force that other considerations were ignored, such as class, gender, or organization. The Internet was thought of as such a transforming force that long-term social trends were ignored, such as the process of globalization, or the pre-Internet move to networked communities (Wellman 2001).

The second phase, starting in the middle 1990s, has seen the systematic documentation of who is surfing on the Internet and what online activities they are involved in. More rigorous empirical studies have taken the place of anecdotes and speculations. These studies have addressed substantial research topics such as the dynamic relation of the Internet and social inequality.

The relation between the digital divide and social inequality is complicated. On the one hand, existing social inequalities significantly affect access to and use of the Internet. On the other hand, the digital divide affects the reproduction of social inequality within and between countries. Until now, research on the social consequences of the Internet has been inconclusive and paradoxical. This inconclusiveness is partly a result of conceptual and methodological gaps in the existing literature.

First, although much attention has been given to projecting the Internet penetration rate, there is a need for more studies investigating variation in Internet use after being connected. Too often it is taken for granted that once people have access to the Internet, they will automatically benefit from the richness of information on the web or they will communicate more and better, which will eventually contribute to social inclusion and coherence. Yet, the digital divide persists even after former information have-nots have gained access to the Internet. The digital divide is not just a matter of access, but also a matter of who uses the Internet, for what purposes, and under what circumstances. Furthermore, the discussion about the Internet effect on social inequality needs to incorporate the impact of the Internet both on those who can afford it and on those who cannot.

Second, as the Internet has become an integral part of everyday life, it is not appropriate to treat online and offline as two separate, mutually exclusive worlds (Haythornthwaite and Wellman 2002). The Internet is just one of the many communication media. While it creates a new social space that restructures existing relations and encourages the emergence of new social practices (Warschauer 2003a), the online and the offline are intertwined with each other. Cyberspace is not an isolated place separated from real life. However, we know little about how the Internet fits in the broader context of media use.

Third, existing studies have focused on the demand side of the story. There have been fewer studies examining the supply side of the story: the extent to which Internet content is supplied in a meaningful way to meet the needs of users with diverse socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds.

Fourth, governments, private sectors, and NGOs have initiated programs for bridging the digital divide through Internet access at public places, such as schools, community centers, and public libraries. While it is worth documenting that X percent of group Y in region Z is now connected, there is also a need to evaluate systematically the impacts of such programs.

Fifth, research on Internet diffusion has followed the evolution of the Internet itself. With the Internet born and raised in the USA, most research has been American. Although the global digital divide has been a buzzword in public discourse and international agendas for quite a while, the literature has mainly focused on the description of the gulf between information “haves” and “have-nots” within the boundaries of national states. With Internet use increasing in other developed countries, research about their situations has been on the rise. Most studies have taken place in developed countries. Even though there is a deep and wide global digital divide, few studies have paid attention to how Internet use fits into everyday life in developing countries (but see Wilson 2000; Norris 2001; Warschauer 2003b).

Sixth, meaningful comparison and knowledge accumulation are hindered because the measurement of Internet access and use differs from study to study. Part of the

disagreement in the existing literature comes from different measurements of Internet access, use, and length of online experience. For instance, while some countries focus on the adult users, other countries include children and teenagers in the online population. There is a lack of a standard definition of who is an Internet user. The frequency of Internet use and the length of the Internet experience are two important criteria for defining who are users. Some studies generously embrace everyone who has ever accessed the Internet as a user, while some more strictly count as users only those who use the Internet at least once a week. Moreover, the definition of "heavy users" varies widely between studies and countries. To make things more complicated, some studies use households, and not individuals, as the units of analysis. In addition to hindering comparability, this masks how individual members within the household use the Internet.

After the bust of dotcom mania in 2000, Internet scholars have come to adopt a more realistic stance in examining how the Internet affect individuals, communities, and societies, especially how different levels of Internet access and use bring about different returns. We highlight three important questions that should be addressed by future research into social inequality and the Internet:

- How does the Internet help people to enhance their social, cultural, and human capital?
- How does the Internet facilitate local and global community building?
- Under what circumstances can disadvantaged individuals and groups benefit from the Internet, especially women, minorities, elderly, the disabled, and those in the Third World?

To answer these questions, we need a more substantial empirical engagement, using multilevel data, longitudinal data, international comparative data, and ethnographic observations. These data should be capable of modeling the relation between Internet use and critical social outcomes in specific institutional, organizational, and cultural contexts.

Most researchers agree that it is still too early to fully assess the effect of Internet use on social and political life. Both the euphoria and teething troubles in Internet use should decline as users, communities, and governments accumulate more experience with the Internet and other ICTs. The reality should be somewhere in between what the equalization scenario and the amplification scenario have predicted. Yet, "while no single scenario is inevitable, certain outcomes, once achieved, can be difficult to reverse" (Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 1996: 1480). Because the impact of the Internet on social inequality is still not rigid, this provides opportunities for individuals, community activists, and policy makers to promote broader access and more effective use.

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Chapter 23

New Global Technologies of Power: Cybernetic Capitalism and Social Inequality

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This essay explores the global historical networking of cybernetic or information-based technologies of power and the impact such new technologies have upon long-standing social inequalities. These complex technologies gained hold over the capital-intensive organization of economic life and the collective social imagination of Northwestern societies during the late twentieth century in a time of cold global warfare. By the early twenty-first century, high-speed cybernetic networks of fascinating and fearful information have become the stuff of everyday life. Whether in the form of wireless cell phone data uploads, 24/7 instant messaging, digital surveillance cams, laser-guided killing machines, ATM dispersals of credit, emotionally charged interactions with television, or any of a wide range of other human-machine interfaces, computational exchanges between energetic humans and coded-informational commands today routinely captivate our senses and thoughts, reorganizing what we remember and what we forget.

Today, of course, remains a time of global warfare, and the technological streaming together of humans and machines is a constitutive aspect of this realm as well. Sometimes hot, sometimes cold, war today also is always telematic. Driven by cascades of electronic information, wired feedback, and actions aimed at imposing or resisting the imposition of one group's will upon others, war operates in phantasmatic theaters of pleasure and terror that are at once real and imaginary. This involves both the fateful electronic staging of deadly mass violence and the forceful corporate-military deployment of popular culture. These technologies of war penetrate our hearts, minds, and bodies, diffracting through us into others.

Loop to loop, image to image, and one vibrant televisionary story after another – a dense and parasitic ensemble of media is streaming through us, transmitting between us, feeding off our collective energies and dreams. Here, the tissue of sociality itself becomes inextricably linked to the flow of “knowledge objects, rhetorical mechanisms, writing technologies, . . . expert systems, even machine agencies other than human agencies” (Clough 2000: 180). For those best positioned to extract pleasure and profit from this new realm, the widespread deployment of telematic

feedback loops of fast-moving electronic information is often pictured in quasi-utopian terms as something like a postmodern break from rigid, modern hierarchies of power. While there is little doubt that new cyber technologies offer unprecedented communicative and transglobal organizational advantages, this is hardly the whole of their story. In truth, and despite the mythic promise that new technologies will open doors for democracy worldwide, the everyday social and institutional effects of high-speed informational networks of power are considerably more complex, problematic, and troubling.

To examine the relationship between cybernetic technologies and social inequality, this essay is organized in the following way. The first section represents a theoretical-sociological meditation on the place of technology in society. It argues that technology is a constitutive aspect of human social life. As such, it is never really possible to be for or against technology in its entirety. We must, instead, endeavor to discern the effects of specific historical constellations of technology and how these impact on realizing a just social order. The second section of the essay reviews the development and use of cybernetic feedback mechanisms. Four moments are examined: (1) the development of the steam engine in the nineteenth century; (2) early twentieth-century Fordist efforts aimed at putting production and consumption – as well as economy and culture – in systemic loops of feedback with each other; (3) mid- to late-twentieth century uses of human-machine feedback in amplifying the technologies of both war and economic domination; and (4) early twenty-first century innovations in the global networking of business, meaning, perceptual fascination, bodily existence, and social change.

Sections three and four assess some of the most powerful uses of information technologies at a global level. Section three reviews available data on the implications of cybernetic control mechanisms for distributing power across the globe. Section four examines who is granted or denied access to these new mechanisms of power.

Section five steps back in time to consider technology's social organization before modern Northwestern strategies of power sought to blast free from lived, energetic connections to nature. This is a hauntingly catastrophic story of flight from the flesh into an increasingly abstract, racialized, and masculine realm of egoistic power and privilege. Section six returns to our cybernetic present, exploring dangers for social equality that lurk behind the seductive screens of what Manuel Castells (1996a) refers to as a "culture of real virtuality."

In concluding, I attempt to discern promising avenues of subversion, resistance, and transformation aimed at dislodging some of the most pernicious effects of new cybernetic technologies of domination, while nurturing social technologies of another sort – technological practices aimed at realizing justice.

Techno-cultures within Nature

Human existence comes into being as a gift of nature. Nature is the source of all life, our mother, the web of energetic materiality from which we come and to which we return. Nature is the matrix within which we are nourished and to which we owe our lives, our breath, our flesh, and our blood. Despite Northwestern

historical appearances, we humans are never really outside of nature looking down. We are, instead, situated within the relational fluxes of living matter, an immanent aspect of nature's own energetic history. We are participants in nature's dynamic evolution, even as we productively carve out a time and place for ourselves within nature by means of technology.

Technology is a parasite. It is also a constitutive cultural practice, a fundamental aspect of what it means to be human. Technology cuts into, creates systemic boundaries within, and feeds off the energetic materiality of nature. This doesn't make technology good or bad. Technology is an aspect of our human condition. Making an ethical judgment about technology demands a careful discernment of technology's relation to the living energetic matters that serve as its host. The practice of technology temporarily differentiates us human animals from the rest of nature. It punctuates our relationship to nature, making the remainder of living energetic matter appear as a context or environment for who we are and what we do. To enact technology is to create artificial boundaries between us and the living energetic matter, which we depend upon for sustenance and well-being. Language plays a part. Language is, perhaps, the most fundamental technology.

In the beginning was the word; well, not exactly. Words are both a technology and a type of information. As informational technologies, words are selective. Words code the varieties of living energetic matter that they seek to describe and render useful from a human point of view. This is what makes words, or the practice of language, a type of information. Information is coded variety. Uncoded variety is noise. In the coded language of information theory, noise represents a lack of sufficient information to usefully code and make productive or orderly sense of the world. As information, words enact artificial boundaries between themselves and the networks of energetic materiality of which they are a part. As informational technologies, words operate to differentiate their users productively from the world of nature from which human linguistic practice draws its energy.

From the technological perspective of words, nature becomes a referent, something outside us, something toward which our language points or directs attention. To declare that in the beginning was the word is to misunderstand living energetic matter. It recognizes energetic matters, but only from the perspective of information, only from the perspective of technologically coded variety, and only from the perspective of the parasite. This is onto-theology. It appears (in history) to separate us technologically from the world of which we are materially a part. This is alienation. From the perspective of living energetic matter – our mother, matrix, and host – things are infinitely more complex and more real. That is, things are more real than that which is enframened by informational technology. Things are more real than the word. The world is more real than the word; and more fleshy, sensuous, and varied.

In parasiting off nature, technology creates an artificial domain within nature called human society. Technology is all about enacting differential social relations within the force fields of living energetic matter. Technology productively transforms our relationship to nature from the inside out. Under the instrumental spell of technology, nature is ritually transformed from the source of life itself, appearing now to our eyes as if a resource destined to be gathered for useful human purposes. This does not mean that technology, no matter how artificial and information-intensive,

is ever really outside of nature. It is not. No parasite is. No parasite exists independent of its host. No information exists independent of the energetic matter upon which it depends. Cars are nature too. So are computers, televisions, air conditioners, game plans, smart bombs, corporate organizational structures, Botox parties, and pills that alter our moods.

Technology is how we humans exist productively within nature. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels observe: "Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them" (1970: 31). This involves information, a reduction of the world's endless variety to useful codes that structurally couple us to some historical possibilities but not others. That is, information technologically weds us to some cultural practices – some dreams, some desires, some ways of living and dying – to the exclusion of others. This happens for better and also for worse.

Technology gives us somewhere from which to become distinctively human. It also gives us somewhere from which to depart from the temporal flux and unfolding of living nature in all its infinite variety and complexity. As such, the productive informational codes enacted by technology involve a deferral of natural time. This is the essence of technology – the willful sacrificial delay and spatial enframing of natural time, so as to serve productive human purposes. Technology partially freezes the natural movement of time. It marks temporal movement with a specifically human direction. It monumentalizes time and draws informational boundaries between the ebb and flow of nature's energetic materiality, its ecological rhythms and rhymes, and our own human historical objectives.

Although typically associated with the practical, industrial, or mechanical arts, technology represents far more than a set of tools enabling its users to achieve masterful ends by instrumental means. Technology is also a constitutive aspect of what it means to be human and social. To be human means to experience time and place and to act within the world in ways that are forever partially shaped by selective social practices of knowledge. And power. This, according to Martin Heidegger, is the essence of technology – a mode of gathering together, bringing forth, and revealing our ongoing human communications with the world of nature in which we are situated as artful participants (1977). Although modern Western and capitalist manifestations of technology have long been driven by efforts to subordinate and extract profitable demands from nature, Heidegger's analysis of the essence of technology hints at something more complex and fundamental – that to be human is to be technological. This is what distinguishes human modes of being in the world from those of other living creatures. This is also why, whether we recognize it or not, all human technological practices owe a debt to living nature, to the host from which they parasitically extract their energy.

We humans act selectively within the world in ways that are mediated by the technological gathering of nature's possibilities into some ways of living and dying, but not others. In this sense, all human cultural action is technological. "Nature and technology are all intertwined, not just practically but ontologically" (Menser and Aronowitz 1996: 21). The distinction that is often made between nature and culture is thoroughly artificial and historically specific. We live culturally within nature and naturally within culture, or in what Bruno Latour refers to as "nature-

cultures" (Latour 1993: 104). As such, it is never really possible to be against technology in its entirety. In a most material sense, technology is "we." As distinctively human animals, we can never entirely exit the realm of technology, even if we are able to periodically transgress the information-coded cultural boundaries that technology produces between the rest of living matter and ourselves. Instead, we can but struggle to discern the material and psychic effects of historically specific technological assemblages, so as to act ethically upon the judgment that such discernment reveals.

This essay represents such a struggle. It seeks to discern key material and psychic aspects of a powerful constellation of new technological vectors that have entered world history over the last several decades. For analytic purposes, I will call these new technologies of power "cybernetic control technologies."

Lodged at the core of global capitalist economic, scientific, political, military, and cultural initiatives, cybernetic control technologies are an omnipresent feature of social life in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, all around us, inside us, flowing through us, between others and ourselves, it is easy to recognize signs of the flexible, mass-marketing of cybernetic control practices. These give form to both cyber-products and cyber-experience. "Cyber-this" and "cyber-that." It is hard to do the ritual of the check-out line these days, without some magnetic cyber-commodity connectors wrapping their seductive sensors, cheek to cheek, in feedback loops with yours – commanding attention, inviting a try. Not that the effects are homogeneous. Nor are the possibilities. From cyber-sex-shopping surveillance, to cyber-warfare, and even utopian dreams of cyborg revolts, much of the world around and within us appears increasingly mediated by an almost magnetic cyber-hyphenation of reality itself. In what ways do new cybernetic technologies of power reproduce and amplify social inequalities and ecological imbalances brought into being over the course of modern Northwestern history? In what ways do these same technologies reveal and make possible modes of thought, feeling, and action capable of better recognizing and countering social inequality? These questions guide the essay you are reading.

Cybernetic Technologies and Ultramodern Capital

One way to tell a global sociological history of contemporary techno-power is to begin with the years surrounding the fateful "nuclear summer" of 1945. This is an important moment in both the corporate-military industrialization of power and the science of cybernetics. Cybernetics refers to the interdisciplinary study of communicative control processes in humans, other animals, and machines. The term "cybernetics" derives from the Greek term *kybernesis* and refers to mechanisms of steering, governing, or control. Cybernetics was given its contemporary meaning by MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener in the years following World War II. Wiener was a pioneer in the application of statistically based nonlinear mathematics to problems of "circular causation" and "self-adjusting feedback." Over time, cybernetics has become somewhat of an "umbrella term for a great variety of related disciplines: general systems theory, information theory, systems dynamics theory, including catastrophe theory, chaos theory etc." (Geyer 1994: 1). This is also a con-

stitutive aspect of what Donna Haraway describes as a new global “informatics of domination” (1991: 161).

In its early years, and under Wiener’s influence, cybernetics was preoccupied with engineering questions, such as how to optimize the operation of negative feedback loops designed to control against deviations from a given system’s state of equilibrium or homeostasis. Imagine a thermostat that continuously monitors household temperature and triggers the operation of a heating device whenever temperature falls below a specified threshold. Then imaginatively transfer this equilibrium-balancing process to a wide host of other physical, biological, and communicative applications. Consider, for instance, the natural feedback loops covering the formation of rain clouds or the patterning of solar radiation, cellular mechanisms governing protein intake, or systemic social forces steering political choices in particular directions. This will give you an inkling of the wide range of techno-scientific concerns soon addressed by cybernetics analyses.

During World War II, Wiener made extensive use of cybernetic logic in refining the operations of antiaircraft guns and precision-bombing equipment. As part of the war effort, Wiener collaborated with Julian Bigelow and other mathematicians and scientists, gathered under the auspices of the MIT Radiation Laboratory. Directed by Warren Weaver of the Rockefeller Foundation, this lab was a high-priority D2 Section project under the command of the National Defense Research Committee. Wiener and Bigelow were pioneers in the technological application of complex “ergodic theorems” and “integral equations,” resulting in what has been described as a “revolution” in (computational) communications engineering. During the final years of the war, this revolution triggered significant advances in the design, production, and strategic deployment of military weaponry. After the war, it would change an entire way of life.

Wiener and Bigelow’s innovative mathematics were part of a complex system of scientific, military, and industrial feedback loops of enormous power. They were also an aspect of exponential leaps being made at the time in computing and telecommunication technologies. Many of these advances were made possible by refinements in the development of the vacuum tube. Nevertheless, by Wiener’s own account, it is clear that the exigencies of war hastened the production of the cybernetic imagination.

Though the vacuum tube received its debut in the communications industry, the boundaries and extent of this industry were not fully understood for a long period. . . . All this changed in the war. One of the few things gained from the great conflict was rapid development of invention, under the stimulus of necessity and the unlimited employment of money. . . . At the beginning of the war, our greatest need was to keep England from being knocked out by an overwhelming air attack. Accordingly, the antiaircraft cannon was one of the first objects of our scientific effort, especially when combined with the airplane-detecting device of radar or ultra-high-frequency Hertzian waves. The technique of radar used the same modalities as the existing radio besides inventing new ones of its own. It was thus natural to consider radar as a branch of communications theory.

Besides finding airplanes by radar it was necessary to shoot them down. This involves the problem of fire control. The speed of the airplane has made it necessary to compute the elements of the trajectory of the antiaircraft missile by machine, and to give the predicting machine functions which had previously been assigned to human

beings. Thus the problem of antiaircraft-fire control made a new generation of engineers familiar with the notion of a communication addressed to a machine rather than to a person. (1989: 147–8)

For the emerging science of cybernetics the problem of “antiaircraft fire” was viewed as a problem of “goal-directed communications.” Solutions to this problem were rooted in the notion of regulated feedback. In cybernetics, the principle of feedback is imagined as the operative force guiding a “contingent world” of beings in reciprocal energetic communication. For Wiener, such feedback occurred in both animals and the new high-speed computing machines that his mathematics helped bring into being. Each makes use of “sensory organs” and magnetic “memory” devices. Together, these convergent technologies produced ongoing comparisons between past and present exchanges of information and energy. In humans and other animals, this involves what Wiener described as “a kinesthetic sense,” recording “the position and tensions of their muscles” (1989: 24). In the new computing machines, such recordings were handled by a combination of data scanning and taping devices. However, in addition to logging a “comparison of inputs to goals,” cybernetic feedback processes also involve something more interactive – “a reciprocal flow” of “two-way interaction between controller and controlled.” This mode of two-way communication serves “not only to communicate influence from the former to the latter, but also to communicate back the results of this action” (1989: 24).

Although horrified by the contributions of other early cyberneticians (including his colleague John von Neumann) to the construction and use of nuclear weapons, the wartime successes of cybernetic technologies inspired Wiener to search for an ever-widening “interface” between command, control, and communication processes in a wide array of machinic, biological, and social systems.¹ Indeed, from 1946 to 1953, Wiener met regularly with an elite cluster of transdisciplinary scholars, including leading figures in postwar social science, in a series of intensive conferences on cybernetics sponsored by the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. These conferences were intended to “generate a new kind of link between engineering, biology, mathematics on one hand and psychology, psychiatry, and all the social sciences on the other” (Heims 1991: 17). The vision of cybernetic technologies emerging from such meetings was somewhat utopian. This was a vision of humans, animals, and machines energetically scanning, monitoring, reading, interpreting, as well as dynamically adjusting, the borders between themselves and others. Wiener and his associates underscored both the managerial efficiency and potential democratic impact promised by cybernetics. To date, the technological realization of the first of these promises has drastically outdistanced the second.

August of 1945 marked an explosive conjuncture of US military, economic, and technological power. In the preceding five years the United States had virtually doubled its industrial capacity. In the summer of 1945, the USA displayed something else as well – an unprecedented capacity to produce and a willingness to use cybernetically engineered weapons of mass destruction against large civilian populations. This was showcased by history’s most technologically advanced form and willful display of collective violence to date – the dropping of a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan. In addition to radiating mass death, the atomic bomb also sent

into circulation powerful and fast-moving informational vectors of mass fear, widespread anxiety, social paranoia, and the perverse fascinations of living at the end of time.

History had been viewed previously as open-ended and indeterminate. Now history, like time itself, was something that could be exterminated in an instant, incinerated in a flash. As Marshall McLuhan astutely observed, "The bomb, like cybernation, is a new environment consisting of networks of information and feedback loops. The bomb, as pure information, consists of higher learning. It is, as it were, the extension . . . of the modern university in its highest research areas" (1966: 98–9). The bomb put fear, anxiety, paranoia, and fascination in mass-mediated Cold War feedback loops with each other; each communicating, if unconsciously, about the prospects of making it into the future, with one feedback loop leading to the next, and the next always already assuming the form of mass nuclear extermination. This is a decidedly material aspect of what Jackie Orr refers to as the technological *militarization of inner space* – a somewhat covert and spectral network of "emotional and perceptual relations" that is "no less necessary" than the control of outer space for cybernetic strategies aimed at achieving "full spectrum" planetary domination (2004: 455). Here, the terrorizing cultural imagination unleashed by "the bomb overtakes overall all earlier technology and organization. It also makes us vividly aware of all human cultures as responsive cybernetic systems" (McLuhan 1966: 99).

The fateful postwar coupling of military, economic, and techno-scientific initiatives was hailed by many as the dawn of the "American century" – a forceful and seductive wedding of over 40 "free world" countries under the umbrella of US nuclear weaponry and an accelerating economic commitment to Fordism. Fordism connotes a technologically charged modality of managed capital. It also represents a new form of global social control. Under Fordism, wages exchanged for productive labor become (almost) immediately linked to orchestrated (cultural) desires for *durable consumption*. As a system of ideas, Fordism was not unique to the post-World War II era. What is unique about this time period is the cybernetic technological materialization of an exploitative economic framework dating back to at least 1914. This was when Henry Ford first introduced the "\$5 per eight-hour day" of automated assembly-line labor.

As a means of automating the control of labor, Ford's Dearborn, Michigan, experiments were not entirely original. Related theories of industrial workplace rationalization are found in mid-nineteenth-century writers such as Ure and Babbage. Nor were they innocent of earlier forms of profit-seeking forms of industrial cybernetics. Indeed, almost two centuries before Wiener's use of the term, cybernetic feedback mechanisms appeared upon the stage of industrial capitalism in the form of James Watt's 1776 steam engine. With its fly-ball governor, an early mechanical-feedback device aimed at the self-regulation of steam inflow, Watt's revolutionary invention changed both the history of human-machine relationships and the history of the world. Karl Marx, an astute observer of early industrial cybernetics, discussed this grand experiment in automation in detail. Marx described the steam engine as a "vast automaton," driven by "the regulating principle of . . . a self-acting prime mover." The power of this new technology revolved around a "transmitting mechanism," a system of self-adjusting feedback by which "motion

is communicated from an automatic centre” backwards to the worker (Marx 1977: 504, 503). In this, the steam engine proved “capable of exerting any amount of force, while retaining control” for the capitalist who owned the new machinery. Marx recognized the advantage this new technology would provide to factory owners in their struggle to control the costs and organization of human labor. As such, he interpreted this early form of cybernetics as “a mechanical monster whose body fills whole factories” with the “demonic power” of intensified exploitation.

The invention of the steam engine heralded an unprecedented industrial revolution – a shift from craft-based manufacture to factory-based mass production. In addition to increasing productivity, this led to other economic and cultural developments, such as expanding of factory work-time to 24 hours and easing the incorporation of women and children into the operation of the new machines. Nowhere are the consequences of this cybernetic innovation more clear than in Marx’s description of the effects of the fly-ball governor on the bodies of people performing factory labor.

All work at a machine requires the worker to be taught from childhood upwards, in order that he [or she] may adapt [one’s] movements to the uniform and unceasing motion of the automaton. Since the machinery, taken as a whole, forms a system of machines of various kinds, working simultaneously and in combination, co-operation based upon it requires the distribution of various groups of workers among different kinds of machines. . . . [T]he mechanical automaton itself is the subject, and the workers are merely conscious organs, co-ordinated with the unconscious organs of the automaton . . . [Here,] the instrument of labour confronts the worker during the labour process in the shape of capital, dead labour, which dominates and soaks up living labour-power. (1977: 546, 548)

Transforming variable human labor into something akin to a mechanical automaton was a modern techno-scientific dream well in advance of Ford’s cybernetic innovations in workplace management. Although resisted strongly by organized and immigrant laborers, by Ford’s time scientific management had become an established principle of control in the industrial workplace. In 1911 this strategy was canonized with the publication of F. W. Taylor’s influential treatise on the capital benefits of fragmenting the labor process into a series of carefully researched “component motions.” According to Taylor, “The change from rule-of-thumb management to scientific management involves, . . . not only a study of what is the proper speed for doing work and a remodeling of the tools and the implements in the [factory] shop, but also a complete change in the mental attitude of all the men . . . toward work and toward their employers” (1911: 131). This was to be accomplished by “scientific managers,” charged with analyzing the smallest units of workers’ movements. The result was an intensified standardization and control of the workplace following “scientific selection and development of the workman, after each . . . had been studied, taught, and trained, and one may say experimented with” (pp. 114–15).

Although lacking the scientific aura of Taylor’s time and motion studies, one of the earliest modern experiments with mechanizing large pools of workers occurred with the disciplinary reforms in the social technology of military organization instituted by Frederick the Great. Frederick ruled Prussia from 1740 to 1786. Throughout his life he was fascinated by the regulated movements of automata – toy

machines, whose technological basis for motion appeared to be self-contained (Beaune 1989). Frederick dreamt of turning a whole army of humans into tightly standardized mechanical men, "an efficient mechanism operating through means of standardized parts. And to ensure that the military machine was used as widely as possible, he developed the distinction between advisory and common functions, freeing specialist advisors (staff) from the line of command to plan activities. In time further refinements were introduced, including the idea of decentralized controls to create greater autonomy of parts in different combat situations" (Morgan 1986: 24).

Frederick's dream of the standardized mechanization of labor was realized in the early twentieth century when Taylor's scientific approach to management was implemented within the US steel industry. The steel industry was at the time characterized by a rigid institutional division between managers and workers. Taylorism dreamt of giving those in charge even more of an upper hand. Managers were to conceptualize, watch over, and evaluate the labor process. Workers, on the other hand, were pictured as little more than "automatons who would perform routinized elements in a grand, managerial scheme. This involved a systematic stripping away of all aspects of production that had previously depended on the judgment and discretion of workers. Skills were divided up into a sequence of simple procedures, to be taught to the workers and monitored by the management" (Ewen 1988: 80). As such, Taylorism served to deskill industrial labor by separating the managerial design and control of work from its shop-floor execution.

Following Taylor, Henry Ford's innovations in the management of production involved channeling of the flow of work to stationary assembly-line workers. Despite contributing to increased productivity, the assembly line was not Ford's most lasting contribution to the organization of capitalism. Ford's most pronounced innovation was more cybernetic in character. It involved the introduction of a kind of feedback loop between what workers earned in the factory and what they did with the money they earned. Indeed, what was unique about Ford's model was its explicit recognition that successful mass production depended upon the controlled arousal of desires for mass consumption. This was Ford's true "genius" – instituting ritual links between wage labor and consumption. In this way, Fordism involved not only refinements in the mode of production but also managerial-induced mutations in the meaning of human experience itself.

This expansive aspect of Fordism was grasped early on by Antonio Gramsci. Writing from within a prison cell in fascist Italy, Gramsci interpreted this "most developed" economic aspect of "Americanism" as leading to an "an *ultra-modern* form" of capitalism (1971: 280–1). According to Gramsci, by requiring "a qualification . . . in its workers . . . which other industries do not yet call for," Fordism resulted in both a new type of labor and a new type of laborer. It also fostered the captivation of the mind and emotions of workers in ways that exceeded the productive constraints of Tayloristic discipline. Gramsci identified a flaw within Taylorism that exacerbated the experiential contradictions of capitalism and slowed its global expanse. This flaw involved the boredom of the assembly line. But with boredom came the mental freedom for bored workers to fantasize and daydream about opportunities denied them by virtue of their lowly economic position. On the assembly line, argued Gramsci, "The only thing that is completely mechanized is

the physical gesture; the memory of the trade, reduced to simple gestures repeated at an intense rhythm, ‘nestles’ in the muscular and nervous centres and leaves the brain free and unencumbered for other occupations. . . . One walks automatically, and at the same time . . . thinks about whatever one chooses. . . . [A]nd not only does the worker think, but the fact that he [or she] gets no immediate satisfaction from . . . work and realizes that they are trying to reduce him [or her] to a tamed gorilla, can lead . . . into a train of thought that is far from conformist” (1971: 311).

Gramsci surmised that the boredom associated with Tayloristic production would lead to mental unrest, emotional dissatisfaction, and eventual political agitation. With Ford’s cybernetic innovations something more controlling was to take place. Fordism aimed at occupying or colonizing, not only the physicality, but also the mental and emotional disposition of workers. Viewing the rationalization of work within Ford’s automated factories as ever “more wearying and exhausting than elsewhere” (1971: 311–12), Gramsci theorized that something “more than just high wages” would be needed to make Ford’s managerial initiatives a success. By themselves improved wages were “not sufficient to recompense and make up for” the “physical and psychic” stress of the automated labor process (pp. 311–12).

To compensate for this contradictory situation, Gramsci contended that “coercion” had to be “ingeniously combined with persuasion and consent” (pp. 311–12). This was exactly what occurred under Fordism. By “tempering compulsion (self discipline) with persuasion,” this cybernetic aspect of Fordism represented a new form of “material and moral pressure.” Fordism promised more than simply higher wages. By creating a feedback loop between the finite demands of hard labor and infinite dreams of pleasurable consumption, Fordism aimed at the realization of “a standard of living . . . adequate to the new methods of production . . . which demand a particular degree of expenditure of muscular and nervous energy” (p. 312). As Gramsci noted, this altered both the objective and subjective landscape of capitalism, resulting in a “new type of worker” who would “undergo . . . psycho-physical transformations so that the average type of Ford worker becomes the average type of worker in general” (p. 312).

While theorizing drastic transformations in embodied subjectivity under Fordism, Gramsci also recognized that massive changes would not take place overnight. For Fordism to become generalized, “a long process is needed . . . during which a change must take place in social conditions and in the habits of individuals” (p. 312). This long process entails changes in economic, intellectual, moral, and even sexual habits² – changes in people’s ritual perception of social time and space; changes in what things mean; and changes in the way that meaning is produced and consumed; changes whose high-speed global teleelectronic circulation blurs the difference between production and consumption, the actual and the virtual, the real and the imaginary, the pleasurable and the dangerous.

Global Inequality in the Information Age

Manuel Castells’ three-volume study, *The Information Age*, provides perhaps the most comprehensive overview to date of the global impact of new cybernetic technologies of power as these relate to matters of social inequality. Castells examines

profound transformations in the control capacities of global capitalism following a revolution in information technology at the end of the second Christian millennium in the Northwest. The result is “informationalism” – a new form of power whereby command, control, and communications circulate through vast social and technological networks composed of interconnected nodes the planet over. Nodes are defined as concentrated points in the global flows of capital where vectors of profit-seeking institutions and practices curve back upon themselves, amplifying their intensity and force. Whether in the form of stock markets or banks, governmental commissions or television studios, poppy fields, clandestine drug laboratories, biogenetic research institutes, or the telecommunicative management of war, network flows of power between nodes are enacted by information technologies operating at the speed of light. This reconfigures dominant modalities of economic, social, and cultural exchange the globe over (Castells 1996a: 470). In combination with crises generated for the nation-state by intensified economic globalization, and challenges posed by the rise of new social movements, informationalism, or cybernetics, ushers in both a new economy – “the network society” – and a new culture – “the culture of real virtuality” (Castells 1998: 336).

Castells’ depiction of informationalism closely resembles Paul Virilio’s analysis of “real-time” cybernetic network transmissions of electromagnetic “data packets.” This involves the transfer of human capacities for movement and communication to high-speed networks of remote control devices, including scanners, fiber-optic probes, and a dazzling array of computational prostheses. The result is a “sudden synchronization of human activities” and a form of “interactivity” that is abstracted from lived bodily experience and spatial location. All this takes place while traveling at the speed of light (Virilio 1997: 12–13, 113). Driven, in large measure, by new communicative and data-processing technologies, the networking capabilities of informationalism or cybernetics results in unprecedented flexibility in both global economic exchange and cultural experience.

In the economic realm, this new flexibility transforms the fundamental social dynamics of power. Those charged with the management of global financial markets are now technologically able “to scan the entire planet for investment opportunities, and to move from one option to another in a matter of seconds” (Castells 1998: 343). With this, “whole nations, their economies, their peoples, their resources, their land, can be simulated and displayed on some electronic input/output device” (Yurik 1985: 3–4). In the cultural realm, the effects are no less dramatic. Here, the global flow of information contributes to worldwide challenges to traditional and, in most cases, patriarchal forms of authority. This fosters “a profound redefinition of family, gender relationships, sexuality, and, thus, personality” (Castells 1998: 348). Together, technologically mediated changes in economic power and cultural experience converge in ritually transforming the material foundations of social life, dramatically altering the lived experience of space and time, historical memory and forgetting. In Castells’ words:

The space of flows of the Information Age dominates the spaces of places of people’s cultures. Timeless time as the social tendency toward the annihilation of time by technology supersedes the clock time of the industrial era. Capital circulates, power rules, and electronic communication swirls through the flows of exchanges between selected, distant, locales, while fragmental experience remains confined to places.

Technology compresses time to a few, random instants, thus de-sequencing society and dehistoricizing history. By secluding power in the space of flows, allowing capital to escape from time, and dissolving history in the culture of the ephemeral, the network society disembodies social relationships, introducing the culture of real virtuality. (1998: 349)

The technological transcendence of place and the annihilation of linear notions of time are today celebrated as bold new opportunities by those who benefit most from these alterations in the global human landscape. This reflects the giddy optimism of those whom Arthur Kroker and Michel Weinstein refer to as the *virtual class*. This class “specializes in virtualized exchange,” speaks in “the language of encrypted data,” and circulates by means of the “information highway . . . through all the capillaries of digital, fibre optic electric space” (1994: 19). According to Castells, this new, virtual class – the professional and managerial workers who command the new information technology economy – represents approximately one-third of the labor force in the so-called developed countries (Castells 1998: 345). Driven by a dynamic “will to virtuality,” members of the virtual class are positioned to exert command and control over a worldwide “cybernetic grid” of economic and cultural exchange. Such exchange “has as its underlying logic the enhancement of (its own) adaptive capacity by the continual redefinition and resequencing of virtual (value) patterns. Virtual debt, virtual populations, virtual labor, virtual money, virtual resources, and virtual wars result” (Kroker and Weinstein 1994: 73).

Because its particular historical interests are “linked to hyperspace and its economic relations are (globally) coextensive with the world network of technological elites rather than bounded in local space, the technological class fuses with the high-speed backbone of the Net” (Kroker and Weinstein 1994: 77–8). At the same time, this new class, “having no energy of its own, . . . feeds parasitically off the flesh and blood” of people worldwide, just as it ravages the energetic materiality of the planet that it regards as a “standing reserve” of energy (p. 77). This results in what Kroker calls *streamed capitalism* – “the driving force of command globalization” (2004: 117). Streamed capitalism takes place “in a culture in which technology and capitalism are effectively electronically steamed together, producing a hybrid version of capitalism” (p. 117). According to Kroker:

Streamed culture [is] when capitalism has suddenly and irreversibly speeded up beyond necessary production, beyond definite consumption, achieving for the first time in financial history that long-sought state of economic . . . equilibrium: zero-time circulation of value in a new economy typified by the circulation of pure capital. . . . Here, just as Marx had prophesied in the *Communist Manifesto*, the unfettered movement of the commodity-form breaks beyond the strictly economic sphere to involve the market penetration of every dimension of human experience, from electronically mediated human subjectivity and processed (social) relations to the biogenetic engineering of human reproduction. . . . [With this] streamed capitalism announces . . . the global consolidation of multinational corporations into *branded electronic networks*, not domiciled in a fixed geographic location, but representative only of a *strategic node* in the circulation of digital capital. (2004: 117, 125–6)

What does this new technological revolution in remote control mean for the vast majority of the world’s population denied access to the teleelectronic command posts

of network society? “For those not involved in a strategic digital node, there is only a growing sense of frustration and humiliation at having been left behind, coupled with the presence of [IMF imposed] labour discipline in a recessionary economy. Chronic dissatisfaction and fading dreams of escape then, as the twin cultural poles of life in the digital future” (Kroker 2004: 126) or, “as the CEO’s and specialist consultants of the virtual class proclaim: ‘Adapt or you’re toast’” (Kroker and Weinstein 1994: 7). This is due in large measure to the way that new high-speed telecommunication technologies permit global corporations to transition from techniques of mass industrial production to what David Harvey (1989) refers to as more flexible regimes of capitalist accumulation. This involves significant changes in the organization of both production and consumption.

In terms of production, while originating in the pursuit of military superiority, cybernetic technologies today lead to increased economic domination by virtue of such information-based managerial innovations as global subcontracting, outsourcing, market-differentiated small-batch production, and “just-in-time” delivery systems that reduce the need for maintaining expensive and soon out-of-date stock inventories. This leads beyond Fordism to what might be called Toyotism, where “production planning will communicate with markets constantly and immediately. Factories will maintain zero stock, and commodities will be produced just in time according to the present demands of the existing market. This model thus involves not simply a more rapid feedback loop but an inversion of the relationship” between production and consumption “because, at least in theory, the production decision actually comes after the market decision” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 291). As such, when coupled with “new technologies of electronic control,” these corporate organizational changes result not only in “reduced turnover times in many sectors of production” but also in “an intensification (speed-up) in labour processes and an acceleration in the deskilling” (Harvey 1989: 285–6).

The unequal impact of these changes is particularly intense for women. On the one hand, the new technologies “make it much easier to exploit the labour-power of women on a part-time basis, and so substitute lower-paid female labour for that of more highly paid and less easily laid-off core male workers” (Harvey 1989: 153). On the other hand, “the revival of sub-contracting and domestic and family labour systems permits a resurgence of patriarchal practices and homeworking. This revival parallels the enhanced capacity of multinational capital to take Fordist mass-production systems abroad, and there to exploit extremely vulnerable women’s labour power under conditions of extremely low pay and negligible job security” (p. 153). The development of *Maquiladora* production initiatives along the US–Mexican border, “while locating factories employing mainly young women south of the border, is a particularly dramatic example of a practice that has become widespread in many of the less developed and newly-industrializing countries (the Philippines, South Korea, Brazil, etc.)” (pp. 153, 155).

Technological changes in the corporate control of consumption have resulted in related global imbalances in power. “Improved systems of communication and information flow, coupled with rationalizations in techniques of distribution (packaging, inventory control, containerization, market feedback, etc.) made it possible to circulate commodities through the market with greater speed” (Harvey 1989: 285). Electronic banking, plastic (credit-based) money, and the computerization of

financial services and markets have each contributed to this speed-up. Also important are what James Beniger (1986: 20) refers to as *technologies of mass feedback* – market research, including consumer surveys, focus groups, door-to-door and telephone interviewing, audiometer monitoring of broadcast audiences, and a plethora statistically based opinion polls, such as that instituted by Gallop. In this, as Jean Baudrillard (1993: 62) points out, consumers are subjected to “a continuous process of orchestrated interrogation” as “the test, the question/answer, the stimulus/response” function not simply as mechanisms of polling, but as telematic feedback loops between the machinery of corporate control and everyday decision making.

Three areas of consumer behavior have been particularly affected. The first involves the global mobilization of mass fashion markets, accelerating the pace of consumption “not only in clothing, ornament[ation], and decoration but also across a wide swathe of life-styles and recreational activities (leisure and sporting habits, pop music styles, video and children’s games, and the like)” (Harvey 1989: 285). This amplifies Gramsci’s fateful early-twentieth-century predictions about how speedy feedback loops between earned wages and increasing desires for instant consumption facilitate capitalist control over workers both inside and outside of the workplace. As Jean Baudrillard observes, with the seductive assistance of the credit system, “cybernetically” engineered mass consumption serves as “a constraint, a morality, and . . . a complete system of values, with all that term implies concerning group integration and social control” (1988: 49).

The second aspect of the information-based consumption involves “a shift away from the consumptions of goods into the consumption of services – not only personal, business, educational, and health services, but also entertainments, spectacles, happenings and distractions” (Harvey 1989: 285). This contributes substantively to the virtual imprisonment of consumers into faster and faster feedback loops of control, as the lifetime of consumable services, whether catching the latest movie or consuming the newest pay-per-session exercise regime, “is far shorter than that of an automobile or dish washer” (p. 285). If this ensnarls consumers in ephemeral networks of fads and rapidly out-of-date cultural practices, the third aspect of information-driven consumption is even more ephemeral – the consumption of signs. Volatilized by corporate advertising and the “pomp and power of fascination,” and fueled by an unquenchable media-driven thirst for prestige and social differentiation, the image-led pursuit of signs of status and well-being – whether hot consumer logos or the latest color, haircut, or skirt length – draws consumers into seemingly endless, if anxious, cycles of “enchantment and vertigo.” Here, as Baudrillard suggests, the promiscuous “pulsation of fashion” results in a more abstract, nonlinear, and fluid form of “limitless circulation” and control, completing “the entire cycle of dead labor” and capitalist political economy as such (Baudrillard 1993: 93, 92).

Manuel Castells’ analysis of new global networks of technologically amplified power also attends in detail to the magnification of social inequalities and misery on the part of those preyed upon by the virtual class. For such people, the new network society means increased marginalization or, what is worse, virulent social exclusion. This results in the rise of what Castells calls the *Fourth World*. This follows the collapse of the so-called Second World (Soviet-styled state socialism) and

the virtual disappearance of the Third World “as a relevant entity, emptied of its geopolitical meaning and extraordinarily diversified in its economic and social development” (1998: 165). In its place emerges a new trans-geographical world of parasitic exploitation, “the Fourth World, made up of multiple black holes of social exclusion throughout the planet” (p. 164).

The Fourth World comprises large areas of the globe, such as much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and impoverished rural areas of Latin America and Asia. But it is also present in literally every country, and every city, in this new geography of social exclusion. It is formed of American inner-city ghettos, Spanish enclaves of mass youth unemployment, French *banlieus* warehousing North Africans, Japanese Yoseba quarters, and Asia mega-cities’ shantytowns. And it is populated by millions of homeless, incarcerated, prostituted, criminalized, brutalized, stigmatized, sick and illiterate persons. They are the majority in some areas, the minority in others, and a tiny minority in a few privileged contexts. But everywhere, they are growing in number, and increasing in visibility, as the selective triage of informational capitalism, and the political breakdown of the welfare state, intensify social exclusion. In the current historical context, the rise of the Fourth World is inseparable from the rise of informational, global capitalism. (Castells 1998: 164–5)

The connection between new technologies of power and the global expanse of capitalist inequalities is, of course, not unique to the contemporary era. As Charles Derber notes, “[G]lobalizers of any historical epoch have their roots in transportation and communications breakthroughs often connected to the technology of war” (2002: 31). This was true during the time of colonial capitalist expansion as “Spain, the Netherlands, and Great Britain all turned themselves into empires by harnessing bold new naval technology and using it to trade and conquer,” as well as during the so-called Gilded Age of robber barons when entrepreneurs turned railroads into the “industrial age’s information highway” (2002: 31). But in the age of cybernetic power the structural coupling of capitalism and technology is even more powerful. In this regard, Castells presents a wide array of data in support of the observation that the rise of global cybernetic capitalism is “*characterized by simultaneous economic development and underdevelopment, social inclusion and exclusion*” (1998: 82, emphasis in original).

In documenting the magnification of misery that accompanies the rise of wealth and opportunity for the privileged virtual class, Castells points to the increased polarization of disparities in income and wealth between the world’s richest and poorest citizens. Indeed, over the last 30 years, “the poorest 20 percent of the world’s people have seen their share of global income decline from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent,” while that of “the richest 20 percent has risen from 70 percent to 85 percent” (1998: 80). Even more alarming is the rise of “extreme poverty,” measured by consumption equivalent to US\$1 per day. By this indicator, “1.3 billion people, accounting for 33 percent of the developing world’s population, were in misery. Of these 550 million lived in South Asia, 215 million in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 150 million in Latin America,” with by far the largest concentrations of extreme poverty in rural areas (1998: 82).

The amplified economic subordination and dehumanization of Africa accompanying the rise of the network society is a particularly important aspect of Castells’

analysis. In addition to the continuing legacies of colonialism, Castells connects increases in African poverty, famine, and disease to the fact that "Africa is, for the time being, excluded from the information technology revolution, if we except a few nodes of finance and international management directly connected to global networks while bypassing African economies and societies. Not only is Africa, by far, the least computerized region of the world, but it does not have the minimum infrastructure required to make use of computers, thus making nonsense of the many efforts to provide electronic equipment to countries and organizations" (1998: 92).

Closer to home, Castells documents increasing disparities in wealth, income, and power between those commanding the helm of informational capital and just about everyone else. While after-tax corporate profits rose from 4.7 percent in 1973 to 7 percent by 1995, in 1995 dollars the average total pay for CEOs skyrocketed from \$1,269,000 per year to an astounding \$4,367,000. Meanwhile, median family income stagnated during this same period, while dropping precipitously for production and nonsupervisory workers, whose adjusted weekly incomes fell from \$479.44 in 1973 to \$395.37 in 1995 (1998: 130). For those at the bottom this meant increases in both relative inequality and the pains of poverty. In large measure these developments may be attributed to four interrelated processes, each an outgrowth of the new information technology economy. In summary, these include: (1) unprecedented deindustrialization, as jobs are exported to sites of cheaper labor elsewhere on the globe; (2) the increased individualization of labor within flexible networks, facilitated by computerized long-distance financial and managerial controls; (3) the rapid incorporation of women into the informational economy, but at discriminatory cut-rates of pay by comparison to laid-off or displaced male workers; and (4) as partially the result of the processes mentioned above, a breakdown in the social viability of the nuclear family (1998: 134).

Although a principle locus of patriarchal control of women throughout modernity, the demise of the nuclear family in today's informational economy, while imposing "punitive effects" on many people, often also penalizes women, and single mothers in particular. Indeed, while the rate of poverty for Americans not living in families rose by 2.2 percent from 1989 to 1994, reaching 21.5 percent of this demographic group, the rate of poverty for female-headed households was even higher, rising 2.2 percent to 38.6 percent of all female-headed families (Castells 1998: 136). For Donna Haraway (1991: 167), this "feminization of poverty," while associated with wholesale reductions of protections once offered by the welfare state, and "the ensuing intensification of demands on women to sustain daily life for themselves as well as for men, children and old people," is associated with what she calls a new "homework economy" outside of the home. This involves the rapid restructuring of work according to categories of labor once associated with female jobs, regardless of whether the work is today done by women or men.

To be "feminized" in this way means also that the new jobs are "extremely vulnerable," able to be quickly disassembled and reassembled based on the latest information about how best to accrue profit. It also means that "feminized" employees are more easily exploited as a "reserve labor pool" and "seen less as workers than as servers; subjected to time arrangements on and off the paid job that make a mockery of a limited work day; leading an existence always on the borders of being

obscene, out of place and reducible to sex” as “factory, home and market are integrated on a new scale” (p. 166). According to Haraway:

The homework economy as a world capitalist organizational structure is made possible by (not caused by) the new technologies. The success of the attack on relatively privileged, mostly white, men’s union jobs is tied to the power of the new communications technologies to integrate and control labour despite extensive dispersion and decentralization. The consequences of the new technologies are felt by women in both the loss of the family (male) wage (if ever they had access to this white privilege) and in the character of their own jobs, which are becoming capital-intensive; for example office work and nursing. (1991: 166–7)

In addition to an increased burden on women, increases in urban inner-city poverty are also a result of the new global technologies of power. While underscoring the continuing importance of racism and spatial segregation as major factors, Castells points to a “systematic relationship . . . between the new network society and the growing dereliction of the ghetto” (1998: 138). Key here is the downsizing of the social welfare state as a result of information-based global structural adjustment policies; the demise of the nuclear family without the emergence of viable new forms of kinship and supportive social belonging; the deterioration of urban school systems as educational finance shifts outward from the city to its surrounding suburbs; and, of course, the managed “outsourcing” of factory jobs once held by urban Blacks, who had just decades ago migrated to northern industrial cities as a result of another form of technological displacement – the mechanization of rural southern agriculture following World War II.

It is precisely this globalization of manufacturing, and outsourcing of production in lower-cost areas, that greatly contributes to the elimination of those jobs that are costlier to perform in America. . . . Informationalization spurs job growth in the higher tier of skills in America, while globalization off-shores low-skilled manufacturing jobs to newly industrialized countries. Thus, in America there is indeed a substantial reduction of manufacturing jobs, and particularly of low-skilled jobs, precisely the kind of jobs that brought black migrants into the urban areas and constituted the stable, hard core of their employment. (Castells 1998: 139)

This results in a “two-tiered” work force as “in the case of blacks . . . labor force entrants from minority groups often have low level educational attainment that . . . impairs the adjustment of these groups to technological change” (Cyert and Mowery 1987: 174).

Deprived of traditional factory jobs, denied access to the quality education needed for success in new informational sectors of the economy, and stigmatized by continuing racism, impoverished urban Black males often find themselves targeted for recruitment into both crime and the prison industrial complex. Indeed, impoverished African Americans represent approximately 53 percent of today’s burgeoning male prison population, with nearly one in four under the control of the criminal justice system as a whole. Moreover, as study after study has shown, the “prison society reproduces, and furthers, the culture of criminality, so that those who end up in prisons see their chances of social integration decreased, both because of social

stigma and their inner injuries” (Castells 1998: 149). And, like off-shoring jobs to regions of the world where labor is more cheaply procured, mass prisonization is itself a structural effect of the new technological economy. The new prison industrial complex is also an aspect of the collective emergence of a Fourth World within the First. Thus, although ballooning rates of incarceration have not proven to effectively reduce or deter crime, mass incarceration is producing yet another substantial outcome. As Castells points out, mass imprisonment “marks the boundaries of social exclusion in terms that blame the excluded for their plight, delegitimize their potential rebellion, and confine social problems into a customized hell. The making of a sizeable portion of the underclass’s young men into a dangerous class could well be the most striking expression of the new American dilemma in the Information Age” (1998: 149).

Power Secured, Access Denied

A recurrent question (that pertains to the relationship between social inequalities and new cybernetic technologies of global power) concerns access to these new technologies. Ecologically speaking, these technologies envelop much of the globe and affect populations the planet over. Nevertheless, the extent to which specific social groups are able to access wired networks of computer-based communications varies considerably. This is evident in the virtual technological exclusion of vast regions of the planet, such as Africa, from the helm of today’s global corporate networks of power. Mark Werschauer analyzed the best available data on this topic in *Technology and Social Inclusion: Rethinking the Digital Divide* (2003). Much of what is presented here draws upon Werschauer’s important study. Werschauer in turn builds upon the insights of Paul Dimaggio and Eszter Hargittai (2001) in arguing that with increasingly diffuse rates of access to the Internet in developed or overdeveloped countries, assessments of stratified access to new communicative technologies need to go beyond rudimentary indicators of the so-called *digital divide*. They need to include more complex measures of *digital inequality* as well.

The digital divide is typically assessed by dichotomous measurements of who has and who doesn’t have access to computer-based Internet communications. Digital inequality encompasses a wider set of variables, including the technical means by which people enter the Internet. To examine digital inequality is to ask questions about unequal access to bandwidth and the ability to procure technologies such as broadband cable or high-speed DSL telephone-line connections. Also relevant are matters pertaining to autonomy (whether user access is time limited and/or monitored by supervisors, and whether or not someone can log onto the Internet from home or only by using computers available in one’s workplace or at public institutions, such as libraries); skill (how knowledgeable someone is about how to search for and download electronic information); and social support (whether or not someone associates with experienced users able to assist one’s development of cybernetic proficiencies). The purpose of Internet use is likewise important. Do people use computers and access the web strictly to perform work or do they also do so as a means of enhancing their social capital, to make purchases, or to be entertained?

Examining measurements of both computerized access to the Internet and the more nuanced terrain of digital inequality, Werschauer notes high levels of social stratification between people worldwide. Estimates prepared by the Population Reference Bureau in 2001 indicate that 513 million people (8.4 percent of the world's population) were by then Internet users (2003: 48). This included 57.2 percent of the population of North America and 21.3 percent in Europe, but only 0.5 percent of those living in Africa, 4.8 percent in Latin America, 3.9 percent in Asia, and 2.4 percent in the Middle East. In analyzing regional discrepancies in access between 75 developed and developing nations, Kristopher Robison and Edward Crenshaw identify teledensity (the number of phone lines per 1,000 people) as the single most important factor. Countries with greater teledensity have considerably more access. Other important factors differentiating high- from low-access countries include: level of economic development (measured by per capita energy consumption), extent of postindustrial economic development (the size of a nation's service sector), educational level (the number of secondary school students per entire population), and political openness (a composite measure of such things as elective governance and constitutional constraints on governmental power) (Robison and Crenshaw 2000).

Examining comparative Internet access among a sample of economically developed nations, Hargittai also found teledensity to be the strongest predictor variable. Important as well were a country's level of proficiency in English (assessed by the percentage of secondary school students studying English), level of education (measured by comparing primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollments), national wealth (indexed by gross domestic product), and internal social inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) (Hargittai 1999). In general, economic cost and telecommunicative density correlated most strongly with comparative access to the Internet. Governmental policies favoring open information also made a difference. As Werschauer notes, "In developed countries (as well as in developing countries) telecommunications policy appears to be a major factor affecting overall access to the Internet, with competition, low rates, and teledensity all correlated with access rates" (2003: 53).

Unequal access to cybernetic communication technologies also occurs within developed nations themselves. Within the USA, for instance, Werschauer's analysis of a report issued by the Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Commerce Department in 2000 indicates that high-income college graduates were about 15 times more likely to have Internet access than were low-income high school dropouts. Stratified access also occurred between the population as a whole and groups whose racialized and ethnic status placed them at a disadvantage. Thus, while 41.5 percent of the US population had Internet access, this was true for only 23.5 percent of African Americans and 23.6 percent of Hispanics or Latinos. Disabled people were also significantly less likely to have access, with only 21.6 percent of this population online. In addition, research indicates that while approximately two-thirds of households with incomes of \$50,000 or above are today wired for the Internet, "in general, blacks and Hispanics, the poor, those with limited education, and those living in female-headed households are less likely to have advanced features at home such as broadband access, faster computers with modern peripherals, or multiple home computers. . . . While these services might seem like luxuries

to many at present, the changing nature of the Internet may make them necessities sooner rather than later" (Werschauer 2003: 57–8).

Technological Disconnections, Haunted Modernity

The first section of this essay draws attention to the necessary but artificial distinction between the social world produced by human technologies and the wider world of living energetic matter to which we humans belong and owe a debt. The useful hierarchical boundaries enacted by technology between humans and the rest of nature are a key component of what Karl Marx referred to as a society's *mode of production* – the historically specific form in which a particular human group organizes its material economic survival. This is also a core feature of what Georges Bataille (1988), complicating Marx's analysis, meant by the *restrictive economy* of human existence. For Bataille, the restrictive economy is characterized by its usefulness or instrumentality. Restrictive economic technologies enable human survival and growth. Their effects are, at once, necessary and tragic. They are necessary because we humans lack built-in biological mechanisms of survival and social organization. As such, we depend on the restrictive technological transformation of living matter into economic resources simply to secure our place within the evolutionary movement of nature as a whole. These same technologies are tragic because they temporarily exile us from participating in the ebbs and flows of living matter in ways unmediated by the instrumental filters of a given historical mode of production.

For Bataille, unlike Marx, human existence was not viewed as governed exclusively by useful, goal-directed, productive labor. While essential to human economic survival, restrictive economic technologies are not by themselves the defining characteristic of human social existence. Productive labor is but one economic aspect of our existence. Equally important is our human animal involvement in what Bataille called the *general economy*. In this economy, instrumental human activity is subordinated to a wider world of energetic cosmic and material connectedness.

Bataille's analysis of these two types of economies – restrictive and general – portrays each as a necessary complement to the other. When immersing ourselves within the general economy of nature from whence we came and are forever returning, humans fall under the ecstatic spell of useless expenditure and effusive self-loss. For Bataille, this suggests the intimate, erotic, and sacred character of gift exchange within the general economy. Here the technological boundaries between culture and nature, as well as between others and ourselves, are temporarily relaxed. Under the cyclic spell of the general economy each co-mingles with the other like "water in water," communing like lovers so enraptured with each other that neither can tell where their skin ends and the other's begins (Bataille 1989: 23). From the standpoint of someone schooled exclusively within the feedback loops of modern capitalist technologies of power, these aspects of the general economy may seem laughable. Indeed, the most restrictive economic forms of capital today ritually position their adherents as if outside of nature looking down. These social forms are driven by a relentless will to profit and by a terroristic flight from finite bodily relations into the abstract, nihilistic, and death-defying promises of totalizing cybernetic

control. Capitalist social technologies are also haunted forms of power, the dominance of which is interrupted and slowed by the persistent specters of what these social forms exclude – an awareness of participating in as well as working upon nature.

The second section of this essay tells a story about how cybernetic technologies of restrictive economic feedback emerged as a dominant feature of the global capitalist mode of production during and immediately after World War II. Prefigured by earlier social technologies of feedback, including those associated with the development of the steam engine in the nineteenth century and the productive engineering of consumption later instituted by Fordism, the imprint of these modalities of command, control, and communications are today pervasive. Indeed, for those of us living and dying within the borders of “overdeveloped” countries such as the United States, these new technologies of power may often feel more like the atmosphere we breathe than a discrete set of tools or objects for analysis. This is recognized by Jerry Mander, who suggests that in both everyday life and formal organizational contexts, “the weave of technology becomes ever tighter and more difficult to separate. For example, without computers, it would be impossible to have satellites, nuclear power, genetics, space technology, military lasers, information technologies, or nanotechnology. And because of computers all these technologies are intertwined with one another. . . . Computers are at the base of them all, and also plug them into one another and into central systems of management and institutional control made larger than ever before” (1991: 189).

Mander follows Marshall McLuhan in attempting to think analytically about technologies in environmental terms:

From morning to night we walk through a world that is totally manufactured, a creation of human invention. We are surrounded by pavement, machinery, gigantic concrete structures. Automobiles, airplanes, computers, appliances, television, electric lights, artificial air have become the physical universe with which our senses interact. They are what we touch, observe, react to. They are themselves “information” in that they shape how we think and . . . what we think about and how. . . .

Workers on an assembly line, for example must function at the speed of the line, submitting to its repetitive physical and mental demands. When we drive a car, we are forced to focus our minds and bodily reactions on being one with the road and the machine: following the curves, moving through the landscape at the appropriate speeds. The more we spend our lives in this manner, the more these interactions define the perimeters of our experience and vision. They become the framework of our awareness. (Mander 1991: 31)

In a manner analogous to how Frankenstein’s monster comes to rule over the scientist who made him, Mander pictures cybernetic technologies as capable of exerting command and control over the imaginations and actions of their creators. This typically involves dense and high-speed electronic loops of communicative feedback between humans and machines. An omnipresent aspect of daily life in overdeveloped societies, this web of interactions between humans and machines also occurs in ways that are habitual, ritualized, taken for granted and, thus, generally unconscious. This makes it difficult for human operators to envision a way out from within the restrictive economic network of feedback in which they are positioned. It also

makes it difficult for us to imagine different and potentially more reciprocal, just, and pleasurable forms of collective technological practice. "Living constantly inside an environment of our own invention, reacting solely to things we ourselves have created, we are essentially living inside our own minds. Where evolution was once an interactive process between human beings and a natural unmediated world, evolution is now an interaction between human beings and their own artifacts. . . . At each stage of the cycle the changes come faster and faster and are more profound. The web of interaction between machines becomes more complex and more invisible, while the total effect is more powerful and more pervasive" (Mander 1991: 32).

Of particular concern for the critical study of new technologies of power is the way that electronically mediated modalities of command, control, and communications are currently creating vast global/local networks of "real time" feedback between humans and high-speed corporate-military-state computational machinery. Over the last half-century, these new technologies of power "have been advertised as enhancing happiness, freedom, empowerment, health, and physical comfort, or else as reducing toil, while also providing jobs, serving democracy, and making life more beautiful and pleasant" (Mander 1991: 46). Indeed, as Vincent Mosco notes, the sublime virtues of these new technologies are extolled in mythic terms by enthusiastic proponents such as Francis Fukuyama, Bill Gates, Esther Dyson, and Nicholas Negroponte (Mosco 2004). For the philosopher Fukuyama, "new forms of information technology (IT) promise to create wealth, spread access to information and therefore power around the world more democratically, and foster community among their users" (2002: 182).

Gates (1999), who heads the Microsoft corporation, is even more exuberant in his search for *business @ the speed of thought*. In celebrating the ability of computerized communications to transcend the physical limitations of time and space, Gates proclaims that this will lead at last to the realization of Adam Smith's late-eighteenth-century dream of an "ideal market." As Gates muses, "Just about everything will be done differently. I can hardly wait for tomorrow, and I am doing what I can to make it happen" (1995: 7). Dyson, a leading high-tech consultant, puts it this way – computerized communications will result in "power shifting from the center toward individuals and small organizations, more fluidity and continuous change, [and] increasingly irrelevant national boundaries" (1998: 338). Negroponte is equally prosaic. For the founder of MIT's Media Lab, the new technologies will not only enhance life, but will become an omnipresent feature of life itself. "Computers," contends Negroponte, "will be a sweeping yet invisible part of our everyday lives: We'll live them, wear them, even eat them. . . . Like air and drinking water, being digital will be noticed only by its absence, not its presence" (1998: 288). Despite such broad and affirmative forecasts, the utopian character of new telecommunicative technologies is enormously selective. As noted previously, the real world deployment of informational power has actually resulted in increases in social and economic inequality for those condemned to structural "underdevelopment," exaggerated poverty, complex new forms of global racism, and ill health.

Why have the utopian dreams of cyberneticians been transformed into the global economic nightmares and social injustices depicted by more recent observers? In exploring this question, I will provide a short genealogy of the relationship between

social power and technology at the onset of Northwestern modernity. This is important because many of the assumptions and tacit understandings about the role of technology in society that today shape cybernetic forms of social power begin in this time period and continue into our present. In this sense, what follows is a short sociological history of the present. This condensed history begins with the recognition that for most of history human animals lived with the awareness that, for better or worse, we are participants in nature, a dynamic part of nature's structure and movement, its stasis and change.

Today the recognition of humans as co-participants in nature is typically viewed as a primitive and primarily non-Northwestern or non-Eurocentric expression of *animism* – the belief that all nature is energetically alive and to be revered as sacred. Nevertheless, prior to the techno-scientific revolution of the seventeenth century and the concomitant rise of the modern capitalist/colonial world system, the vast majority of Europeans also viewed their relations to nature in participatory terms. Indeed, as Marshall Berman points out, “The view of nature which predominated in the West down to the eve of the Scientific Revolution was that of an enchanted world. Rocks, trees and clouds were all seen as wondrous, alive, and humans felt at home in this environment. The cosmos, in short, was a place of belonging. A member of this cosmos was not an alienated observer of it but a direct participant in it. His [or her] personal destiny was bound up with its destiny, and this relationship gave meaning to . . . life” (1981: 16). Here, the Earth was viewed as a living energetic being, “with skin, soul, and organs. The skin was the soil, the soul contained within the rocks and bones of the dead, the organs included rivers (the bloodstream) and winds (the lungs). Such categories were not meant as metaphors. Earth was alive; we lived upon it as millions of tiny microorganisms live on the human skin” (Mander 1991: 211).

In this world, people gratefully acknowledged their debt to living energetic matter, the general economy upon which all of us depend for existence and of which we are intimately a part. But up to the historical edges of modern capital, when usury was still widely forbidden and the self-enhancing accumulation of private property remained a largely alien concept, people were periodically, festively, and with carnivalesque noise, carried wildly beyond the restrictive economic boundaries of individualized consciousness. Wave to wave and heartbeat to heartbeat, humans danced in vibrant synchronicity with all of living matter, as with laughter and tears people participated viscerally in the ebbs and flows of nature itself. Body to body; food chain to food chain; living energetic attention to living energetic attention. Fleshy historical memories of this phase of our interconnectedness within nature remain with us today, if in shadowy and largely unconscious forms.

Over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, collective social knowledge of the participatory character of human, animal being in nature declined precipitously. The man of modern power says that it is only woman, the weaker sex, who still communes with nature, although he would soon make a related claim about the so-called “primitive” peoples he sought to colonize, enslave, or put to death the global world over. “He says that woman speaks with nature. That she hears voices from under the earth. That wind blows in her ears and trees whisper to her. The dead sing through her mouth and the cries of infants are clear to her. But for him this dialogue is over. He says he is not part of this world, that he was

set on this world as a stranger. He sets himself apart from woman and nature” (Griffin 1978: 3). This did not happen gradually or without mass social conflict and violence. People who viewed themselves as living within nature, while revering nature as a sacred mother, found themselves under attack by a violent amalgam of cross, crown, and sword.

Although commonly coexisting side by side with feudal Christian beliefs and rituals, pagan spiritual sensibilities were declared demonic and made subject to the technologies of inquisition. Practitioners of the “old religion” of the Earth were pronounced agents of the devil and singled out for investigatory torment and cruel punishment. Well over 100,000 were subjected to the inquisitorial pains of physical torture, then burnt at the stake (Barstow 1994). Over 80 percent were women. For the most part, victims included midwives, single women, older women, women who practiced the arts of healing, and women who loved in excess of the dominant patriarchal codes of the time. Nearly all manifested a relative independence from men and the dominant social institutions of men’s power. “Town records from France and Germany reveal that whole villages were emptied of their populations during the peak of the fire-frenzy – including very young girls and very elderly women. Travelers of the time reported countrysides hideously littered with stakes and pyres” (Sjöö and Mor 1991: 289).

Known as the “witchcraze” or the “burning times,” the religiously inspired assault upon pagan peoples who worshipped the Earth as mother is also an important aspect of the social and economic transformation of Europe from a network of relatively self-contained feudal enclosures to the apex of an emergent modern capitalist/colonialist world system. The technological implications of this fateful shift are profound. They also set the stage for the later historical reign of the new global technologies of power that today secure and amplify long-standing hierarchical webs of social inequality and material disadvantage. In this sense, it is important to recognize “that the idea that the earth *not* being alive is a new idea. . . . Failing to see the planet as alive, they have become free of moral and ethical constraints, and have benefited economically from exploiting resources at the earth’s expense” (Mander 1991: 212). “This was not the background picture before the scientific revolution. The background picture was then of man as a microcosm within the macrocosm. It is clear that he did not feel himself isolated by his skin from the world outside to quite the same extent that we do. He was integrated . . . into it. Each different part . . . being united . . . by some invisible thread . . . , the man of the middle ages was rather less like an island, rather more like an embryo. . . . Before the scientific revolution the world was more like a garment men wore about them than a stage on which they moved” (Barfield 1960: 78, 95).

Premodern Europeans viewed themselves as participants within nature. They also symbolized nature in feminine and motherly terms. This underscored the material reality of nature as the maternal source of all that is living. As Carolyn Merchant observes, minerals and metals were said to ripen

in the uterus of the Earth Mother, mines were compared to her vagina, and metallurgy was the human hastening of the living metal in the artificial womb of the furnace. . . . Miners offered propitiation to the deities of the soil and subterranean world, performed ceremonial sacrifices, and observed strict cleanliness, sexual abstinence, and fasting

before violating the sacredness of the living earth by sinking a mine. Smiths assumed an awesome responsibility in precipitating the metal's birth through smelting, fusing, and beating it with a hammer and anvil; they were often accorded the status of shaman in tribal rituals and their tools thought to hold special powers. (1980: 4)

All of this changed drastically in the early modern period with the interwoven institutional ascendance of capitalism, global military conquest, and colonization, and the Protestant-led techno-scientific revolution.

In the seventeenth century . . . the female world-soul died – or, more precisely, was murdered – by the mechanistic revisioning of nature as machine. . . . The seventeenth century, in contrast to prescientific culture, seems preoccupied with firming the distinction between self and world, between knower and known. . . . Indeed, it has been claimed that the birth of modern science represents a decisive historical moment in this regard, a ‘masculine birth of time,’ as [Francis] Bacon . . . called it, in which the more ‘feminine’ – i.e., intuitive, empathetic, associational – elements were rigorously exorcised from science and philosophy. The result was a ‘super-masculinized’ model of knowledge in which detachment, clarity, and transcendence of the body are all key requirements. (Bordo 1987: 101, 8)

Francis Bacon was a transitional figure, whose vision of techno-science as a “force virile enough to penetrate and subdue nature” (Fox Keller 1985: 48) represented a major departure from previous medieval notions about the sacred femininity of the earth. Bacon’s work also broke from the early Renaissance tradition of “natural magic” with its alchemic vision of erotic participation in nature, even as its proto-experimental approach prepared the way for subsequent techno-scientific efforts aimed at subordinating nature. According to Evelyn Fox Keller, Bacon’s “dream of dominion over nature” symbolized a “specific kind of aggression” associated not simply with empowerment but with feelings of “anxiety and impotence.” It also represents an aspect of something that would dominate the viewpoint of scientists throughout the modern period – attempts “to secure a sense of self as separate from the immediate objects of their emotional worlds” (Fox Keller 1985: 124).

This sense of fundamental separateness of the self from the world of living energetic matter is a core feature of what Teresa Brennan (1993) refers to as the modern “era of the ego.” This signifies the historical emergence of an intensely masculine form of collective social psychosis that begins to take shape in the seventeenth century. Making use of critical psychoanalytic theory, Marxist-feminist thought, and a wide range of historical data, Brennan identifies social forces enabling the realization of a long-standing “foundational fantasy” about matter (and mothers) as destined to be exploited as “natural resources” by men, “denying any notion of indebtedness or connection to origin” (1993: 167). Forces facilitating the realization of this aggressive fantasy include both the ascendance of profit-driven capitalist logic and new technologies of measurement, manufacture, and transportation permitting an increased objectification and appropriation of earth’s energies. In this, “fantasy is made into reality, as commodities are constructed to serve their human masters, to wait upon them, at the expense of the natural world. These commodities are objects to be controlled: they are nature transformed into a form in which it cannot reproduce itself, nature directed toward human ends” (Brennan 2000: 9).

Psychotic, because it is literally out of touch with material actuality, the technological realization of the foundational fantasy also begets a haunting collective feeling of paranoia – a repressed awareness of the sacrificial violence enacted by modern men of power in the name of economic and scientific progress. This paranoia leads to further cycles of aggressive cultural projections and action aimed at domination, locking the modern Northwest into a self-enclosed death culture of masculine and imperial violence. Brennan describes the dynamic behind this perpetual cycle of technologically fueled aggression in the following way:

The aggressive imperative involved in making the other into a slave, or object, will lead to territorial expansion (territorial imperialism). This is because the objectification of the other depends on establishing a spatial boundary by which the other and self are fixed. But this fixing of the other leads to the fear that the other will retaliate, which in turn leads to a feeling of spatial constriction. Moreover, the feeling of spatial constriction is related to the physical environment. These changes have physical effects on the psyche, which in turn alter the psychical perception of the environment, and of one's boundaries. With spatial constrictions, one's boundaries are threatened, and the resultant fear increases the need to control the object. (1993: 8)

In the language of Bataille (1988), the aggressive technological imperative ushered in by the “era of the ego” represents a kind of masculine deification of capitalism's restrictive economy and a deadening cultural denial of human animal participation in the energetic materiality of the general economy. When paired with the growth imperatives and profit motive of capitalism the result is catastrophic. “Capitalism . . . can only continue to make a profit through the continuous overconsumption of nature; that is to say capitalism cannot sustain its profit levels and sustain the environment at the same time. . . . Capitalism, unlike some other forms of market economy which replenished the natural environment, exploits nature in the same way as it exploits labor” (Brennan 2000: 3). In this sense, capitalism “spreads death by turning nature into commodities, without replenishing the life it appropriates in the process,” binding nature ever more quickly into “forms that are not biodegradable, forms incapable of re-entering the life cycles via the reproduction of their own kind or organic decay” (2000: 5). As such, the technologies of modernity are “producing a more complete and final form of death. Its victorious economy, capitalism, is turning biodegradable life into a form in which it can generate nothing. . . . By binding more and more of life in a form which cannot reproduce life, capitalism, and a complicit modernity, disturbs ecological balance” (2000: 2).

Brennan's historical account of the techno-scientific realization of a long-standing masculine fantasy of controlling nature without honoring our human animal debt to the mother whence we are born – living matter itself, the physical source of all life – resembles Arthur Kroker's recent depiction of modern society as governed by a *will to technology*. According to Kroker, the visible signs of this will to technological mastery are everywhere. “Set in motion by the software of information technology, volatilized by digital capitalism, driven onwards by the seduction of communication, and relentlessly aimed at reducing existence to the moral axiomatic of fully realized technicity, the will to technology is the sustaining myth of contemporary culture” (2004: 29). This also commits society to “an indetermi-

nate and increasingly violent series of technological experiments on the horizon of existence itself" (2004: 6). In analyzing the social and environmental effects of dominant forms of technology, both Brennan and Kroker invoke Heidegger's important distinction between nature as source and nature transformed into an expendable human resource. To view nature as nothing but a resource for Man entails widespread nihilism and "a relentless politics of economic and psychological appropriation by which the world-picture is reduced to the machinery of harvesting" – an "exterminatory metaphysics" by which the "living energy" of humans, animals, and nature are transformed into a "standing reserve" of commodities, exploited, then abandoned to a "random cycle of economic circulation" (Kroker 2004: 49–50).

While Kroker's most prescient empirical examples involve recent cybernetic technologies of power, in *Technology as Symptom and Dream* Robert Romanyshyn provides a cultural history of visual technologies that proliferate throughout earlier phases of modernity. In the context of capitalist techno-science, these technologies, whether telescope, microscope, or camera, typically result in fixing the human self as a "spectator" outside and above the world it pictures as "spectacle." Here, only one's "eyes remain 'in touch' with the world observed below," and even the human body is pictured as an objectified "machine," "empty sign," or "specimen" (Romanyshyn 1989: 38, 103). This results in a "kind of geometrization of the space of the world," a "way of knowing" that virtually separates humans from the world of living energetic matter of which we are actually a part. Governed by "dreams of distance, departure and disincarnation," this is also a "transformation of the eye into a technology and a redefinition of the world to suit the eye, a world of maps and charts, blueprints and diagrams, the world in which we are, among other things, silent readers of the printed word and users of the camera, the world, finally, in which we have all become astronauts" (1989: 2000). This represents a "vision of the world from behind the window." And, as Romanyshyn suggests:

The condition of the window implies a boundary between the perceiver and the perceived. It enables as a condition for perception a formal separation between a subject who sees the world and the world that is seen and in so doing it sets the stage, as it were, for the retreat or withdrawal of the self from the world which characterizes the dawn of the modern age. Enconced behind the window the self becomes an observing *subject*, a spectator, as against the world which becomes a *spectacle*, an *object* of vision. . . .

In addition to this separation between perceiver and the world, the condition of the window also initiates an eclipse of the body. Looked at from behind the window the world is primarily something to be seen. Indeed, a window between me and the world tends not only to emphasize the eye as my means of access to the world but also tends to de-emphasize the other senses. . . . [M]y vision of the world from behind the window tends to lose touch with the sound, tastes, smells, and feel of the world. And with this eclipse of the body fostered by the window, the world on the other side of the window is set to become a matter of information. As a spectacle, an object of vision, as something to be seen, it is already well on the way to becoming a bit of data, observable, measurable, analyzable, and readable as a computer print-out, for example, or a blip on the radar screen. (1989: 42)

While modern technologies, particularly visual technologies, contribute substantively to a cultural image of humans as spectators at an eye's distance from the

world, modern society is also haunted by the material actuality of what it represses from consciousness. These repressed matters return to haunt, disturb, and disrupt the willful actions of modern men and women, if in a shadowy or uncanny manner. In this sense, as Avery Gordon suggests, "Haunting is a constitutive element of modern social life. . . . In haunting, organized forces and systemic structures that appear removed from us make their impact in everyday life in a way that confounds our analytic . . . and . . . social separations themselves" (1997: 7, 19). Gordon's work invites sociologists and other students of culture to "make contact with haunting, to engage the shadows and what is living there" and to enter into dialogue with the "seething presence" of modern history's ghosts (1997: 16, 8). This is to make haunting not simply a shadowy disruption, but a site for "profane illumination" and social as well as psychic transformation (1997: 204–6). This is because the ghosts that remind us of that from which we take flight not only register what is missing, but also conjure up a redemptive "longing for the arrival of a future . . . ripe in the plentitude of nonsacrificial freedoms and exuberant unforeseen pleasures" (1997: 207).

Robert Romanyshyn finds both of these elements – the symptomatic and the transformative – alive in the shadows of modern technology as well. Romanyshyn is particularly attentive to the abandoned human body that falls out of energetic connection with living matter into the shadows of a history consumed by a willful dream of distanced technological mastery. However, between the technologically abandoned body and its shadows Romanyshyn discerns not only a "barrier of repression" but also a "threshold of remembrance." At this threshold, what is excluded symptomatically remains alive and calls out its reanimation and ours:

As a threshold of remembrance, it is the place where . . . [the abandoned] body nevertheless continues its presence, refusing, as it were, to be silenced and left behind, insisting that it be remembered. . . . At this cultural threshold . . . the body which is always more than a technical function is . . . present as a cultural symptom. For just as an individual symptom, like anxiety or depression, both reveals and conceals a conflict of emotions, . . . shadows of the abandoned body reveal and conceal the animate flesh of daily life, the body of desire, memory and movement, the individual, personal body in relation to the world, from which we have taken flight. As symptom, then, these figures of the body haunt and shadow our cultural dreams of escape and reincarnation. They are, if you will, the unconscious side of our technological age made visible. They are the cultural unconscious made flesh. (1989: 148)

After discussing how modern industrial technologies imprint themselves upon the bodies of factory workers, mechanizing and dehumanizing the flesh, Romanyshyn discusses various cultural figurations in which we hear faint echoes of the human animal body in resistance to its abandonment by a massive cultural will to technological mastery. This cast of uncanny and dissenting characters includes the feared female body of the accused witch, a body burnt upon the pyre of modern technological distance from the enchantments of nature; the mad or insane body raging with repressed animality and controlled by institutionalization, behavioral "therapy," and regimes of psycho-pharmaceutical drugs; the hysterical body, acting out a story of disempowering and pathologized femininity, a body again subdued by various technologies of modern psychiatric control; the mesmerized body, yearn-

ing to reconnect with living energetic matter but able to do so only by suggestive spells of unconscious fascination; and even the body of the anorexic, whose “refusal of food . . . and obsessive counting of calories, mockingly imitate and caricature our objectification of food, . . . and in this respect . . . calls us to remember that food is always communion and that in eating it we enter into union with others, into community” (p. 171). These and other ghostly figurations of missing human animal connections to our natural history are crucial reminders, not only of a catastrophic past, but also of futures that await realization in how we today approach technology in this our cybernetic present.

Network Feedback, Amplified Inequality

The haunting inequalities of modern technological power remain with us today in an era dominated by cybernetic forms of social power. This is one reason why I prefer the term *ultramodern* – rather than postmodern – to describe contemporary technologies of power. As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, in large measure, ultramodern technologies amplify rather than reduce many of the injustices engendered by Northwestern modernity and the accompanying colonial/capitalist world system of which it is a part. This is nowhere more evident than at a global level, where, “ignited by new technological paradigms,” the continued “subordination and exploitation of the periphery” operates “with unprecedented decentralization” as “global financial flows . . . play a fundamental role in the transfer of wealth . . . from periphery to core” (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez 2002: xxi).

Here, continuing manifestations of what Anibal Quijano (2000) calls the *coloniality of power* are exercised in policies of *structural adjustment* – cybernetic feedback mechanisms set in motion by such *disciplinary institutions* as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization – and fueled by stereotypical and racialized imagery broadcast worldwide by global corporate media. As Saskia Sassen (1991) observes, the confluence of these and related vectors of force result in a hyper-concentration of wealth and power in core states, and in “global cities” in particular. “The point is that global inequalities and asymmetries are still informed by the strongholds of the Eurocentric imaginary, and shaped by the continuities of colonial relations on a world scale without the existence of colonial administrations” (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez 2002: xxi).

All of this both extends and deepens forms of modern power and what James Beniger (1986) refers to as “the control revolution” in capitalist economic management. This deepening of control does not spare ultramodern power from the shadows of inequality and exploitation that continue to haunt its new technologies. But rather than repressing these shadows – as was the case with modern forms of power – ultramodern power simulates the resurrection of its *excluded others*, incorporating densely aestheticized images of what and who is excluded by power into the pleasures and profits of power’s own circuitry. In this, the voracious media machines of hi-tech capitalism partially inoculate those most complicit with its exploitative extraction of living energy from others; inoculating global capitalism’s most profit-minded parasites against the threatened return of those to whom they’ve done harm, and whose return would make a mess of this cruel system of power.

The suggestion here is that ultramodern society, unlike earlier modes of North-western social organization, is no longer staked upon a simple sacrificial exclusion of the others upon whom it dines. As complex as such restrictive economic exclusions may have been in the past, something else is taking shape today. Here, ultramodern technologies of power offer those they privilege more defense than ever against the peoples and ecosystems they exploit – more defense and more forgetfulness. Social amnesia is part of this story.

This inoculation involves first producing a simulated double of people, things, and social practices excluded from or pushed to the margins of modern power. Imagine here a vast array of stereotypical images of the economically oppressed and of women, and images of non-Whites, people from outside the Northwest, as well as others excluded from full and reciprocal participation in modernity. Imagine MTV or the latest metropolitan fashion magazine. Under the spell of ultramodern technologies of power “others” exploited in the ritual organization of hierarchical society are not simply excluded. They are excluded by first being included, but only in a stereotypical and technologically sanitized form. In this sense, those sacrificed to the erection of modern power are for the most part (but never entirely) preemptively cleansed of their potential to resist, to noisily disturb, and to challenge the systemic reproduction of domination. Here “others” may be digitally reduced to picture-perfect copies, exotic techno-doubles, not of what is real but of what has already been stereotypically imagined as if real about them. In this way, purified iconic simulations of what modern power had previously cast to its outsides are technologically remade and incorporated for profit into the commanding telematic global feedback loops of power in the present age.

This is to suggest that cybernetic control mechanisms simulate their own transgression. No wonder so many middle-class, White men in America today think that women, racialized others, poor people struggling to make ends meet on welfare as we’ve never known it, and even immigrants, have the upper hand. Here, all too many of us are first seduced, then abandoned, by the mass social engineering of something like a collective virtual reality where the flesh-and-blood historical actualities of life appear in forms that are inverse. Bombarded by one cyber-cultural wave of publicity after another, even revolution is emptied of its threat to the dominant order, although “the contrast between publicity’s interpretation of the world and the world’s actual condition remains stark” (Berger 1972: 151).

Revolutionary bras, revolutionary automobile tires, revolutionary new diets, drugs, and self-enhancement techniques – these are also aspects of the cybernetic expression and control of otherness that are a central feature of contemporary technologies of power. In this sense, otherness is not repressed but expressed in a neutralized or inoculated form. Otherness is simulated and celebrated as a feature of business, just as business itself supposedly moves “beyond hierarchy.” This alleged overcoming of hierarchy by going with the flow of feedback is a key aspect of the gospel of “liberation management” preached by hi-tech business guru Tom Peters (1992). Peters calls for “joyous anarchy” in business and for companies to function like carnivals. Deconstruct at every turn, he advises; and engage in “perpetual revolution” in order to “abandon everything” – everything, that is, but the relentless and obsessive pursuit of profit (Peters 1994).

The simulation of excluded otherness is also a cutting-edge vector in cyber-media technologies where “existential rebellion has become a more or less official style of Information Age capitalism” (Frank and Weiland 1997: 34). Here, captivating images of counter-culture rebels are incorporated into the corporate mediascape, as the “anointed opponents of capitalism are now capitalism’s ideologues” (1997: 35). Among those whose iconic representations have been appropriated by recent cyber-business advertising campaigns are Bob Dylan, the Beatles, William S. Burroughs, and even Martin Luther King – who, despite his simulated resurrection as a icon for profit-driven televisionary communications, in actuality never spoke of having a dream about happily profiting from the disadvantage of others. In the looping waves of feedback engendered by iconic resurrections of sanitized otherness, the haunts and shadows of earlier rebellions may be telematically recycled and emptied of resistive potential. Thus, rather than being repressed, contradictions resulting from structured social exclusions and inequality are expressed in a hyper-visible manner and drained of disturbance and meaning.

In addition to the networked amplification and cybernetic absorption of the contradictions of social inequality, new global technologies of power may result in far worse. While a thorough discussion of technology’s future goes beyond the scope of this essay, I will close this section by noting a few of the worst-case scenarios presenting challenges for anyone concerned with the relationship between technology and social justice. These challenges include: (1) the cybernetic facilitation of *full-spectrum corporate-state-military dominance*; (2) technological advances in mechanisms of *surveillance and invasive monitoring*; (3) the virtual saturation of so much of life with high-speed simulation technologies that it might be said we are at the doorstep of *preemptive culture* – a technologically engineered culture, where not all the engineers are human and where social control begins to take place ahead of time; and (4), lastly, but hardly the least important, the possibility of *full-spectrum genetic technological dominance* of the code of life itself.

Full-spectrum corporate-state-military dominance

Cybernetic forms of techno-science were inspired by mid-twentieth-century wartime demands for a more efficient human–machine interface. Following World War II and funded by massive government initiatives, such as the US Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, and championed by leading research institutes, including the influential RAND Corporation, systems of managed feedback and systems of war grew interactively (Edwards 1989; Levidow and Robins 1989; De Landa 1991). By early in the next century high-speed information feedback systems have become integrated into virtually all aspects of military practice. While not the military in its entirety, these feedback systems today represent the cutting-edge of military technologies. Indeed, whether as a weapon, myth, metaphor, force multiplier, trope, factor, or asset, “information (and its handmaidens – computers to process it, multimedia to spread it, systems to represent it) has become . . . the single most significant military factor” (Gray 1997: 22).

The cybernetic management of war goes beyond the technological management of the new electronic battlefield to include *psych-ops*, aimed at manipulating public

emotions and the control of domestic politics (1997: 247). In this way, war “is diffused throughout the culture, helping shift gender definitions, structuring the economy, selling products, electing presidents, and boosting ratings” (p. 22). “War . . . becomes the general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination, whether or not bloodshed is involved,” as “daily life and the normal functioning of power has become permeated with the threat and violence of warfare” (Hardt and Negri 2004: 13).

This is not to say that war can ever be reduced to pure information. As the recent US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq all too clearly shows, the flesh and blood of both civilians and soldiers are always involved. Nor is war necessarily a vehicle for the perpetuation of social inequality. Nevertheless, in a historical context where profit-driven US global economic interests are explicitly linked to a vision of what the US Space Command calls *full-spectrum dominance*, the prospects for a more equitable distribution of the world’s resources hardly seems likely. This is evident in the bold language of documents released by the US Space Command. After discussing tensions generated by the “globalization of the world economy,” including a “widening” gap “between ‘haves and have-nots,’ it is stated that the central objective of US military dominance is “to protect U.S. interests and investments” (Orr 2004: 452–3). The Bush administration’s first National Security Strategy document of September 2002 – justifying preemptive strategies of war – is even more explicit. It declares: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States” (*Boston Globe* 2002: H10). Here, what Lewis Mumford (1963) referred to as *authoritarian technics* blend with desires for global economic supremacy in foreshadowing a dangerous *new world order* of enforced inequality.

Technological surveillance and invasive monitoring

“Now more than ever, we are under surveillance. When we use a credit card or ATM, when we call on our cell phones or use EZ Pass, when we surf the web or simply walk down the street, we leave electronic traces. In light of the striking proliferation of tracking technologies – from traditional video to high-tech biometric face-recognition systems – questions of surveillance have long been a topic of heated political dispute” (Levin et al. 2002: 10). One such question concerns the potential of amplified surveillance technologies to amplify social inequalities. Although typically justified as necessary for the protection of society as a whole – particularly in the wake of the terrifying attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 – in the hands of the most powerful, high-tech surveillance often operates primarily to protect the interests of those who profit most from an unequal social order.

This is evident in recent studies of surveillance technologies such as William Staples’ *The Culture of Surveillance* (1997). Staples extends Michel Foucault’s (1979) analysis of the “meticulous rituals” of modern surveillance by exploring how new technologies of observation and data gathering intensify – rather than replace – those of an earlier modern sort. At issue are the ways that contemporary surveillance techniques extend the watchful eye of power from the panoptics of formal disciplinary institutions into the informal – but no less controlling – rituals of everyday social life. Staples describes how surveillance techniques, developed in formal

organizations, “reach out from these organizations, linking up with other institutions and practices” to create “a micro web of social control” enveloping even “the tiniest reaches of social life” (1997: 30). Consider, for instance, the omnipresent cell phone:

[E]ach of which creates a rough electronic account of user’s time and space. Cell phones communicate with networks of transmission points that monitor and note a phone’s location whenever it is on. . . . The resulting records can be archived, aggregated, disaggregated, and correlated with other information to create a broad overview of group behavior or detailed portraits of individual habits. Thus, a convenience, an Information Age accessory, becomes an electronic tag. (Parenti 2003: 2)

Particularly important are advances in visual and auditory surveillance and recent developments in medical, forensic, and computerized information systems. These collude in generating a new social physics of power rooted in the “normalization” of omnipresent video cameras and biometric measurements of identity, routine drug tests in schools and the workplace, and the electrical-chemical monitoring of a wide range of bodily processes and even our emotional dispositions. Indeed, as Christian Parenti notes, “Routine digital surveillance is now almost ubiquitous and includes the records produced by credit cards, bankcards, Internet accounts, gym memberships, health insurance records, and workplace identification badges. All these create electronic files and therefore automatically and inadvertently log our movements, schedules, habits, and political beliefs. In most respects dull, the contents of such electronic dossiers become rich veins of informational ore to excavate from any number of angles by marketers, insurance firms, or police officials” (2003: 3).

While these new technologies potentially endanger the civil liberties of everyone, their threat “falls disproportionately on the members of certain groups. Like many resources in contemporary . . . society, the use of surveillance technologies is stratified” (Muschert 2004: 56). This can result in the wholesale monitoring of entire social groups, independent of the real or alleged criminality of specific individuals. This is a well-documented pattern in the policing of poor, racially profiled, and dissident groups (Marx 1988). Today, given contemporary geopolitical inequalities and the widespread fear of terrorism, “police might disproportionately observe the behavior of Arab-Americans not because any particular individuals are suspect, but because some members of this group might be potential terrorists” (Muschert 2004: 56).

Collective surveillance of this sort violates people’s rights to privacy and equal protection under the law. It may also result in an overcrowding of the criminal justice system as well as a generalized breakdown of trust in society. Moreover, detached academic scholars are mistaken to assume that intensified surveillance is aimed directly only at unfortunate and impoverished populations. As Krier and Staples (1993) have shown in analyzing “remote control” processes in the management of community colleges, high-tech surveillance may today operate much closer to home. Indeed, when combined with the computerized monitoring of instructional activities and part-time faculty access to resources and equipment, practices such as mandated textbook use, the standardization of course mandates, and supervisory classroom checks are today altering previously taken-for-granted aspects of professional academic autonomy.

Nor is the consumer marketplace free of invasive data gathering and behavioral manipulation. This is also a troubling aspect of cybernetic capitalism, as the corporate gathering of information feeds back into the management of consumers themselves. This “increases the ability of organized interests, whether they are selling shoes, toothpastes, or political platforms, to identify, isolate, and communicate differentially with individuals in order to increase their influence over how consumers make selections” (Gandy 1993: 2). In this sense, corporations are “aggressively seeking personalized information and creating computer systems that categorize individual consumers” (Garfinkel 2001: 158). This represents something more than a specialized marketing tactic involving the buying and selling of information about consumers. As Glenn Muschert points out, corporate surveillance can also “lead to the disempowerment of groups and individuals, as contemporary marketing practices increase the efficiency with which economically distressed groups, . . . who might not fit with the profiles of preferred customers . . . are excluded from the market. . . . Simply stated, as a result of corporate surveillance in marketing practices, the poor are increasingly excluded as producers and consumers in a free market” (2004: 56–7).

Preemptive culture: Simulation and the power of fascination

Modern forms of technological power are rooted in the ritual construction of rigid hierarchical boundaries between culture and nature and between those most blessed and those cursed by the sacrificial organization of Northwestern forms of economic and social privilege. Despite such privilege, modern forms of power are also haunted. By this I mean that modern technologies of command and control are disrupted, slowed down, or resistively challenged by the very people, things, and social practices they condemn to the outsides or margins of the boundaries they construct. Modern power is a historically specific mode of power that seeks to territorialize, contain, and objectify the natural/historical flow and interconnectedness of living energetic matter. It seeks to reduce living matter to something that modern Northwestern men of power can precisely define, calculate, and profit from. This is to convert the material source of human animal life into a resource that Man can count upon – all the way to the bank. This is the stuff of modern culture, what that culture represses, as well as the contradictions and ghostly inequalities that haunt modern culture.

The haunts and contradictions of a given culture – what that culture excludes in erecting powerful boundaries between itself and others – are as real as the culture itself. Both are steeped in historical and material actuality. This is certainly true of the contradictory boundaries of modern culture. Here, the *real* violence of Northwestern modernity – its White supremacist and masculine epistemologies and its capitalist/colonialist forms of domination – scrape against modern culture’s *imaginary* pretensions to technological emancipation from nature and to the universal realization of truth, justice, and equality for all. When made to serve systemic goals of intensified domination, cybernetic technologies of power appear capable of partially preempting the contradictory haunts of modernity, suspending modernity’s ghosts. This is why these ultramodern technologies engender what might be called *preemptive culture*. This culture is preemptory in three senses. First, it preempts a

collective recognition of human debt to living energetic matter as the ongoing source of life itself. Second, it preempts the resistive and potentially transformative effects of being haunted by structured social inequality. And, third, it preempts the concerted exploration of alternative life-affirming and socially just ways of organizing our collective historical lives together on a global scale.

Preemptive culture is driven by what Jean Baudrillard (1993) refers to as the logic of simulation. Unlike modern representations of the world, feedback-driven cybernetic simulations exceed previous techno-scientific initiatives aimed at precisely defining and, thereby, copying the real world in terms of words, symbols, and numbers. Rather than copying the real world, simulations copy a model – a pre-fabricated or preprogrammed double of the real – its code – and engage in ceaseless loops of interaction with that code. In simulation the actual difference between what is *real* and what is *imaginary* is virtually erased. This partially preempts the disruptions and challenges to power engendered by modernity's contradictions. In this way, technologies of simulation appear capable of blurring contradictory historical boundaries between the *real* historical pains of modernity and its abstract, egoistic, and *imaginary* pleasures.

Lost along the way, or at least radically displaced, is modernity's critical side – its ability to stand back, be reflexive about, and make meaning of the contradictions that constitute its existence. This results in a more flexible form of social control as modernity's ideological program – its self-enclosed and repressive dream of standing outside of the world and looking down – is cybernetically retooled. In addition to the boundary-blurring speed of real-time telematic-feedback loops, two other features of cybernetic technologies of power are key to the emergence of preemptive culture. These include a mass-mediated politics of fascination (and fear) and the deployment of simulation strategies capable of inducing social control in advance.

To fascinate is to attract attention in an irresistible manner, to captivate, spellbind, and enchant, to mesmerize or bewitch. Whereas modern technologies of power sought to meaningfully defend and ideologically justify actions aimed at both separating human culture from nature and subordinating humans to the abstract freedoms of the capitalist/colonialist world system, ultramodern technologies operate instead to fascinate those they captivate. When something is fascinating it is faster than thought and harder to deny. In this sense, fascinating technologies of simulation don't try to convince us about the meaningfulness or moral rectitude of the dominant ways of doing things. Instead, the power of fascination extends beyond the haunted realm of modern meaning, short-circuiting meaning with the pleasures and the terrors of what Jean Baudrillard refers to as a realm of *tactile hallucination*. In this, "power can stage its own murder" and in so doing "rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy" (Baudrillard 1988: 177). This glimmer of legitimacy is not based on convincing anybody about the meaning of anything. It is, instead, a new form of technologically intensified ideological capture based on "the neutralization and implosion of meaning" (Baudrillard 1983: 104).

Under the sensory spell of fascination (and fear), boundaries blur between the insides and outsides of power as people are both invaded by and drawn out from within themselves into the captivating cybernetic circuitry of media technologies. Here, contradictions are suspended as opposites bend into what they oppose. "All

referentials intermingle their discourses in a circular, Moebian compulsion” where everything “is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form. Every form of power, every situation speaks of itself by denial, in order to escape by simulation . . . its real agony” (Baudrillard 1988: 176–7). Nature bends into culture, sex bends into work, and the real oppression of women bends into women’s imaginary domination of men. Osama Bin Laden bends into Saddam Hussein, peace bends into war, and the freedoms once promised by democracy bend into coded constraints of mass-marketed commodification without end. In this way cybernetic technologies of power mask or disavow their own fierce contradictions, blasting off from the bodies they must abandon and the planet they ecologically destroy.

No wonder that record numbers of First World consumers claim to have been visited by aliens or angels. For just as social inequalities and ecological damage are magnified the globe over, these energetic messengers, like televisionary vampires and the lives of the rich and the famous, fascinate us with images of what lies simultaneously within and in excess of Northwestern modernity’s rational veneer. Such fascination, of course, oscillates with great fear. This is because in preemptive culture the contradictions of power escalate even as their conscious recognition is suspended and dulled. Here, all things solid may melt into teleelectronics, but ghosts in the machinery of power remain. Nevertheless, under the fascinating spell of cybernetic media even these ghosts may be put up for sale as preemptive cultural technologies bombard people the globe over with a panicky oscillation between comfort and fear, pleasure and terror, security and risk.

In addition to draining meaning of contradictions, the technological simulations of preemptive culture may also act as a kind of social control in advance. William Bogard (1996) explored this aspect of preemptive culture. Bogard uses the term *simulation of surveillance* to denote a “diverse multiplicity of procedures and techniques” which begin with “the modeling of complex physical, biological, and social processes” and result in the front-ending of processes of command and control (1996: 3, 22). In this way, contemporary practices of simulation deepen, rather than replace, earlier technologies of surveillance. Bogard asks us to imagine how abstractly modeled simulations of everything, from the most profitable ways to do work to the supposed best ways of having sex, are today preprogrammed and distributed for mass consumption. Simulations such as these induce aestheticized judgments about social matters, based less on the exigencies of lived bodily experience than on the effectivity of models floating across the networked screens of telematic society.

The simulations of people and things which feed back upon us through the technologies of preemptive culture may be delusional – phantasmatic stereotypes produced by those who command significant vectors of power. Nevertheless, in a world where simulations of what is real are increasingly accepted as “objective” aspects of everyday life – from what constitutes a really sexy look, hot news event, fast car, successful diet, or political campaign strategy – the effects of such virtual modelings may be more real than what is actually real, at least for those of us who consume these simulations. As Bogard contends, “Increasingly, it seems, we are forced to resort to hallucinogenic, delusional images just to stay ‘objective’ about the present. Nothing less captures the movement of the forces of simulation” (1996:

24). A central technological feature of preemptive culture, a picture here emerges of simulation as “an ‘observation machine’ that fashions its own images for consumption, for which an ‘outside’ no longer exists, where nothing is left to control because everything is under control from the beginning” (1996: 24).

Full-spectrum genetic technological dominance

The ability to manipulate the so-called genetic code of life is perhaps the most powerful aspect of new cybernetic technologies. The advance of these technologies is fueled by recent scientific theorizations of the body as commanded and controlled by informational codes. As Evelyn Fox Keller remarks, “The body of modern biology, like the DNA molecule – and also like the modern corporation or political body – has become just another part of an informational network, now machine, now message, always ready for exchange, each for the other” (1995: 118). This transformation of the anatomical body into the informational body corresponds with recent developments in the realm of public policy, where “social problems as diverse as school failure, alcoholism, delinquency, and even homosexuality are increasingly attributed to our genetic make-up,” while the “notion that the script of our lives is largely written in our genes has taken root in the popular imagination” (Wajcman 2004: 80).

Genetic technologies are typically advertised in noble and quasi-utopian terms as a solution for problems of illness and disability – from Parkinson’s disease and Alzheimer’s to genetic forms of cognitive impairment, such as Fragile X Syndrome, and even schizophrenia. Yet, when viewed in the context of global corporate control over central tendencies in biomedical research and application, the prospects of genetic manipulation may appear less sanguine (Rothman 1995). “Our society is,” after all, “characterized by an inability to leave anything in nature alone. Every piece of land, every creature, every mineral in the oceans, every growing plant, every mountain, every inch of desert is examined for its potential contribution to commercial development and exploitation. Even the essential building blocks of life – the atom, the proton, the electron – are subject to commercial scrutiny. Where science can intervene science does so; corporations then package and sell it” (Mander 1991: 161).

Several kinds of genetic engineering are today of considerable importance. These include: somatic therapy, involving interventions within the cellular structures of living organisms; germ line therapy, involving alterations in sperm, eggs, or embryonic cells affecting changes in future generations; and the splicing of transgenic materials from one species to another. Proponents of genetic engineering today ritually distance themselves from the ideologically charged language of *eugenics*, associated historically with the conservative hygiene movement of the late nineteenth century and twentieth-century Nazi experiments aimed at racial purity. Nevertheless, whenever “recombinant DNA, cell fusion, and other related techniques are used to ‘improve’ the genetic blueprints of a microbe, plant, animal or human being, a eugenics consideration is built into the process” (Rifkin 1998: 128). As such, whether in a biology laboratory or corporate boardroom, every time a decision is made to alter the hereditary code of a particular species, some form of eugenics is at work. This is not to suggest that there are no differences between earlier forms

of eugenics and those emerging today. "The old eugenics was steeped in political ideology and motivated by fear and hate. The new eugenics is being spurred by market forces and consumer desire. . . . The new eugenics is coming to us not as a sinister plot, but rather as a social and economic boon" (1998: 128).

In attempting "to reduce all biological organisms and ecosystems to information and then use that information to overcome the limitations of time and space," the contemporary revolution in biotechnology also articulates a long-standing North-western cultural dream of immortality (Rifkin 1998: 217). "We all want immortality," suggests Jean Baudrillard. "This is our ultimate fantasy . . . at work in all of our modern sciences and technologies – at work for example, in the deep freeze of cryonic suspension and in cloning in all its manifestations" (2000: 3). The fantasy of immortality is also at the helm of our most powerful cybernetic technologies when they declare that life itself is nothing but self-perpetuating patterns of coded information. "Information, it is argued, impervious to the ravages of time. It is of this world but does not die with the flesh. Just as a Christian might contend that the body is merely a temporary vessel for the everlasting spirit that resides in it, the new cosmologists would contend that the body is merely a temporary vessel for the information that is embedded in it" (Rifkin 1998: 218).

In addition to the specter of corporate eugenics, with its promise to upgrade imperfect bodies, produce designer babies, and sell immortality to those who can afford it, another problem haunting cybernetic forays into genetics is the increased likelihood of social and economic discrimination based on genetic screening. Indeed, in a recent survey by Lisa Geller and her associates of 917 individuals, 455 respondents indicated that they experienced discrimination based on their genetic makeup or disposition (Geller et al. 1996). This included discrimination by insurance companies that refused coverage based on preexisting genetic conditions, discrimination by employers, and even discrimination against so-called "at risk" couples who wished to adopt children. Educational institutions also are experimenting with the genetic assessment of children, as the development of new neurotechnologies and pharmaceutical drugs propels "schools to classify youngsters based on their genotype" (Rifkin 1998: 167). The long-term effects of such genetic interventions are, at once, unequal and profound. As Jeremy Rifkin concludes:

Segregating individuals by their genetic makeup represents a fundamental shift in the exercise of power. In a society where the individual can be stereotyped by genotype, institutional power of all kinds becomes absolute. At the same time, the increasing polarization of society into genetically "superior" and genetically "inferior" individuals and groups could create a new and powerful social dynamic. These families who can afford to program "superior" genetic traits into their fetuses at conception could assure their offspring an even greater biological advantage, and thus a social and economic advantage as well. (1998: 168)

Power-reflexive Attunement: Countering Technological Domination

A central tendency of new global technologies of power is to perpetuate human disconnection from nature while amplifying long-standing modern social inequalities.

In keeping with this tendency, dominant modalities of cybernetic power today expressively preempt – rather than repressively hide – the contradictory character of systemic social inequality. Yet, while dominant, this tendency is neither necessary nor inevitable. It is contingent and contestable. But to counter this tendency requires approaches to technology that are attuned to the historical situation of human culture within nature and which foster reciprocity in the global social organization of power. Rejecting technology in its entirety is not an option. Instead, the challenge is to create technologies that are more life affirming and socially just. In concluding, I will briefly discuss several *power-reflexive* approaches to technology aimed at transforming the current global matrix of domination into a more economically sustainable and socially equitable order of things.

The term “power-reflexive” denotes an immanent critical engagement with the circuits of power in which we are situated (Pfohl 1994). As such, power-reflexive knowledge is forever partial and provisional. It endeavors to fold back upon the complex personal and historical terrain in which power is shaped and reshaped. Its goal is to materially transform – rather than idealistically transcend – the existing matrix of domination. To do so we must first understand technology in holistic and ecologically grounded ways. This involves a partial reversal of the modern technological flight into disembodied forms of knowledge that is today amplified by cybernetic simulations of an ultramodern sort. By contrast, power-reflexive knowledge is attentive to the complex ways in which techno-scientific claims are situated within historical knots of power.

Power-reflexive approaches to technology entail something like an *earth-bound attunement* to the energetic effects of technology as a supplement to the analytic rigors of critical social inquiry. Here attention must be paid to the diverse ways that we are cognitively, bodily, emotionally, and aesthetically attracted into or repulsed by complex human-machine assemblages and energetic transmissions of affect and power (Brennan 2003). In what ways are our minds, emotions, and capacities for judgment affected by the sonorous loops of feedback that guide the ebb and flow of so much of our everyday lives? How might we be both reflexively attuned to and discerning about the unequal effects of the vast networks of coded technological inscriptions into which we are routinely seduced and abandoned? Although more sensuous than the abstractions guiding modern sociological methods, power-reflexive strategies of attunement seek to augment, rather than simply replace, more traditional forms of analysis. Their goal is to nurture complex ways of knowing which facilitate a reckoning with the systemic effects of technologies and what technologies displace, sacrifice, or convert into ghostly matters.

Discerning earth-bound strategies of attunement are akin to what Avery Gordon, drawing upon the writings of Walter Benjamin, refers to as the methods of *profane illumination*. “These illuminations can be frightening and threatening; they are profane but nonetheless charged with the spirit that made them. Sometimes you feel they are grabbing you by the throat, sometimes you feel they are making you disappear, sometimes you are willing to talk to them. . . . Whether it appears unexpectedly or whether you cultivate and invite its arrival, the profane illumination is a discerning moment. It describes a mode of apprehension distinct from critique or commentary when . . . ‘thought presses close to its object, as if through touching, smelling, tasting, it wanted to transform itself’” (Gordon 1997: 204–5).

While alien to dominant technologies of power, earth-bound discernment is not really outside the communicative range of cybernetic feedback as such. This is evident in the work of more holistic proponents of cybernetics, including Gregory Bateson, Anthony Wilden, Donna Haraway, Patricia Clough, and N. Katherine Hayles. Bateson (1972) situates cybernetic awareness as a reflexive material aspect of what he describes as a dynamic *ecology of mind*. Wilden reverses the top-down and human-centered command focus of dominant cybernetics, underscoring instead a “dependent hierarchy” of human indebtedness to living energetic matter (1987: 74). In this sense, nature in all its complexity is recognized as the communicative source of all life, including the global social life of power. If this acknowledgement of gratitude to living energetic materiality borders on what Northwestern culture has long denigrated as *animism*, this should be no surprise. As Arthur Kroker suggests, “Animism is nothing to be ashamed of. It is repressed knowledge. It’s the forbidden eye. It’s the ticket to the truth of prophecy, of mythic utterance. That’s why it has been so discredited by all the demon-spirits of the virtualizers” (2004: 173).

Kroker discerns artful signs of the return of repressed animism in the digital interstices of today’s cybernetic culture – the “cybernetics of everyday, then, are also about recuperating the language of animism and mythology and prophecy for an art of electronic perception” (2004: 174). Animism here ritually functions as a kind of counter-memory to the phantasmatic forgetfulness of virtual culture. With this in mind, the ethical-epistemological challenge for power-reflexive knowledge is to create a context-bound story about how webs of communicative feedback between others and us shape and are shaped by our ongoing material and imaginary relations within history. Given the global matrix of contemporary technological power, this is no easy task. Enchanted by “the logic of capitalist colonialism,” this matrix “turns everything into a resource for appropriation,” a profitable resource for “he” who abstractly imagines himself a distanced observer of everything natural (Haraway 1992: 13).

Seeking to dispel the enchantments of domination and to kindle energies for just social change, Donna Haraway (1991, 1992) conjures up an ironic political myth of the socialist-feminist cyborg – a subversive “world-changing fiction” intended to affirm human–animal–machine interconnections within nature, while promising to monstrously interrupt, diffract, and reinvent existing global technologies of power. Haraway critically acknowledges the genealogy of cybernetics as an offshoot of modern Man’s desires for military-industrial domination. She also recognizes structured gendered inequalities at work in today’s global information economy. At the same time, Haraway (1991: 181) embraces a transgressive image of the cyborg as an affirmation that human animal existence is forever implicated in open-ended networks of technological metamorphosis. As such, “taking responsibility for the social relations of science and technology means refusing an anti-science metaphysics, a demonology of technology.” Instead, activists seeking social justice are urged to skillfully take advantage of new technologies “in reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in communication with all of our parts. It is not just that science and technology are possible means of great human satisfaction, as well as a matrix of complex dominations. Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is a dream not of a common language, but of a power infidel

heteroglossia. It is an imagination of feminist speaking in tongues to strike fear into the circuits of the supersavers of the new right. It means building and destroying machines, identities, relationships, . . . stories" (1991: 181).

For Haraway, cyborg politics is rooted in a reciprocal respect for difference and results in "power-sensitive" affinities rather than unified identities. This represents a "struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution, rejoicing in the illegitimate fusions of animal and machine, . . . subverting the structure and modes of reproduction of 'Western' identity, of nature and culture, of mirror and eye, slave and master, body and mind" (1991: 176). The partial and provisional character of cyborg politics also recognizes the machinery of human knowledge as an active technological diffraction within (natural) history, rather than a passive reflection of the facts of history as such.

Understanding knowledge in terms of the fluid subtleties of diffraction is crucial for a power-reflexive approach to technological reconstruction. Earth-bound discernment of technology's impact depends upon situating ourselves within complex material pathways of diffraction cut by historical pathways of power. As Haraway suggests, "Diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form. . . . Rather, diffraction can be a metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness . . . , one committed to making a difference and not to repeating the Sacred Image of the Same" (1997: 273).

Viewing the world in which we are situated in terms of global patterns of diffraction enables us to better discern the complex ways in which history and human subjectivity are not only mediated by various social institutions – the nation-state, the family, the education system, and workplace – but also modulated by informational feedback from the "machinic assemblages" that populate our everyday lives. As Patricia Clough notes, diffraction opens us to a new form of criticism beyond self-reflection. It alerts us to the "global miredness" we share with "semiotic-material objects" and "nonhuman agencies that inhere in finite forces, speeds, and exposure" (2000: 184). In this way, diffraction also provides a way of mapping interference patterns set into motion by decentered network-based global/local activism (Critical Art Ensemble 1994; Hardt and Negri 2004; Wark 2004). Each also shares in a dream articulated by N. Katherine Hayles "that embraces the possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied mortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that understands life is embedded in a material world of great complexity, on which we depend for our continued survival" (1999: 5).

Hayles dreams of an embodied ethical engagement with cybernetics that cuts against the grain of global inequalities resulting from dominant uses of the new technologies discussed in this essay. But for such a dream to be realized, power in its nuanced complexity and diffracted pathways, as well as our own network complicities with power, must be reflexively discerned and partially remade. To facilitate these tasks, I offer the following questions posed by Jeremy Rifkin. "Is the power inherent in the new . . . technologies an appropriate exercise of power? Does

it preserve and enhance rather than destabilize and deplete the biological diversity of the planet? Does it protect the options or narrow the opportunities for future generations and the other creatures who travel with us? Does it promote life or diminish it? On balance, does it do more good than harm?" (1998: 232).

Notes

- 1 For a discussion of Wiener and von Neumann's wartime scientific contributions, see Heims (1980). Von Neumann, already a scientific advisor to the US Army's Ballistics Laboratory in the years before the war, made strategic mathematical contributions to the development of digital computing machines, enabling the complex and high-speed computations necessary for the design and production of the atomic bomb. Wiener, whose technical concerns with cybernetic feedback processes were tempered by an ethical concern for the potentially "inhuman" uses of these same sources of knowledge, upon learning of the US use of atomic weaponry withdrew entirely from military and governmental service, becoming somewhat of an "independent scholar" and never again accepting governmental funding for his continuing work with cybernetics.
- 2 Of the connection between Fordism and changes in human sexuality Gramsci (1971: 297) observed, "It is worth drawing attention to the way in which industrialists (Ford in particular) have been concerned with the sexual affairs of their employees and with their family arrangements in general. One should not be misled, any more than in the case of prohibition, by the 'puritanical' appearance assumed by this concern. The truth is that the new type of man demanded by the rationalization of production and work cannot be developed until the sexual instinct has been suitably regulated and until it too has been rationalized."

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